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THE STATES OF NORTH AFRICA IN THE 1970'S

JOINT HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE NEAR EAST
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
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
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
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






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








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PREFACE

North Africa is an area which should command the attention of foreign policy makers because of:

(1) Its strategic geographical position, dominating the Mediterranean;

(2) Its size and population—the four states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya alone have an area almost equivalent to that of Europe (excluding the Soviet Union)¹ and have a population of more than 35 million people;

(3) Its essential petroleum and other mineral resources; and

(4) Its links with Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.

North Africa, the Maghrib, is part of several regional networks at the same time. Close cultural, historical, and often political ties of these Arab States with the Arab States of the Middle East must be juxtaposed with some traditional and some very recent and increasing political and economic ties with black Africa. In a third direction, the states of North Africa have important economic and political relations with Western Europe in general and with France in particular.

Although the common planning in the sixties for some sort of economic union did not come to fruition for a variety of reasons, the intra-regional relations of these states with each other are becoming increasingly important and, although each state is pursuing its own economic policy, there is increasing movement towards the eventual development of common economic policies. Moreover, in their association with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), they are pursuing a common policy toward several issues, including policies toward Africa and colonialism. But the prospect for joint policies outside the economic sphere remains unlikely in the near future.

The United States has important relations with the countries of North Africa. Our economic links, including aid with Morocco and Tunisia, comprise a large percentage of the total United States involvement in the continent of Africa. There is concern among many Americans knowledgeable on North Africa that our relations with the Moroccan Government in particular are too close and also that the United States is not moving quickly enough to take the opportunity for improved economic relations which certain states, especially the Sudan and Algeria, are now offering. Improved bilateral relations based on mutual economic interests would also be essential in developing any useful relationship with the Revolutionary Command Council in Libya. One of the conclusions emerging from developments in North Africa—a conclusion which is relevant in a much wider context—is the absolute necessity for flexibility in our approach to devel-

¹ The combined area of North Africa is 1,835,161 square miles whereas Europe's area, excluding the Soviet Union, is 1,905,017.

oping countries in order to work out mutually beneficial economic relations.

The Subcommittees on Africa and the Near East held a series of three joint hearings to examine these issues, to be informed in particular on the current and future economic and political trends in the countries of North Africa, to scrutinize aspects of the United States interest in and involvement with these states, and to review their orientation toward the states and issues of the Middle East and the rest of Africa. In the view of the undersigned, these hearings underscored the following points:

(1) There is both unity and diversity among the principal states of North Africa. These states have tended in recent years to follow pragmatic policies in their dealings with each other, and certain bilateral disputes, especially between Morocco and Algeria, have recently been settled. Major differences in political and economic structure remain, although they are united by the stated policy objective of nonalignment. In the short-term, cooperation is likely to be limited mainly to the economic sphere, although at present they are pursuing diverse approaches to Europe and relations with the Common Market.

(2) The United States Government is too closely tied to King Hassan of Morocco. Such close identification will tend in the future to endanger relations with this country, as in Libya, because the monarchy has not offered popular participation in politics or set in motion any meaningful economic development. An increasing percentage of the educated elite and the officers of the armed forces are demanding basic changes in the Moroccan political system. (An attempted coup occurred even since the holding of the hearings.) The subcommittees also questioned the utility of the Kenitra base.

(3) The United States, while expressing its awareness of the need for new and creative economic policies toward Libya and Algeria, has not yet engaged in visible concrete action. It is hoped that the El Paso-Algerian Natural Gas deal can be finalized in the near future. If the deal does not succeed, the fault lies here in the United States, rather than with the Algerian Government.

There were few suggestions presented to the subcommittees as to what the United States can at present do in Libya. But the American oil companies should seek to work closely with the Libyan Government to adjust their operations to local needs and development priorities. The United States should actively encourage an imaginative approach to deter nationalizations in the existing atmosphere of intense suspicion of Western interests. Indeed, throughout Africa, the United States should work with U.S. business interests and try to develop innovative approaches to equitable ways of doing business.

(4) The states of North Africa have important ties with both black Africa and the Arab Middle East. Their identification with the political issues of these areas and in particular with minority rule in southern Africa and the Arab-Israeli conflict is strong and their membership in the OAU—especially with the current president being King Hassan of Morocco—emphasizes these interests.

(5) A new attitude toward the Arab-Israeli issues, and possibly a pro-Arab policy, may be emerging from Africa, because of the connecting links between the North African states and the Middle East, because of the Muslim influence, north and south of the Sahara, and

because of the active participation of the states of North Africa in the OAU.

(6) For the foreseeable future, the leadership of these countries will be involved primarily with economic development in their own countries. This will not preclude an important international role, however, especially for Algeria and Libya which support many liberation movements.

(7) Our success in relations with these states will depend in large measure on our ability to become identified with their development and to seek ways to export technology which they need and want. We should maintain a prudent low-profile policy without particularly close ties to any government.

North Africa is often neglected because it has a low priority for United States foreign policy makers. It is essential, however, that the region receive in-depth attention on a continuing basis, because the United States has had important interests in these countries since World War II, because there have been some major setbacks in our relations with these countries, particularly in Libya and Algeria, and, finally, because of the inherent importance of this area at the cross-roads of a number of different regions.

CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr.,

Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa.

LEE H. HAMILTON,

Chairman, Subcommittee on the Near East.

THE STATES OF NORTH AFRICA IN THE 1970'S

TUESDAY, JULY 18, 1972

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON AFRICA AND THE NEAR EAST,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittees met at 10 a.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee Hamilton (chairman of the Subcommittee on the Near East) presiding.

Mr. HAMILTON. The meeting of the subcommittees will come to order. Today, the Subcommittee on Africa and the Subcommittee on the Near East commence a series of three joint hearings on the countries of North Africa.

While our main focus will be on Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia, we do expect to discuss developments in the Sudan, Chad, Mauritania, and the Spanish Sahara—those states between Arab North Africa and black sub-Saharan Africa.

The purpose of these hearings is threefold. First, to examine the varying U.S. economic, military, and political relations with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. Second, to delineate the significant political features of these countries and the trends of economic, political, and social development in the coming decade; and third, to discuss the orientations of these North African states, individually and collectively, toward the states and political issues of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa and their relations with Europe.

In today's hearing, we expect to focus principally on recent political and economic developments in and between these countries, and we are fortunate to have with us two scholars who have lived in and written on North Africa. Dr. William Quandt, who is currently a research associate at the Rand Corp., and will next year be a fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, has written extensively on Algeria, United States relations with North Africa, and, while at Rand, on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Dr. William Zartman, who is a professor of political science at New York University, has written articles and books on North Africa as a unit and on such topics as North Africa's relations with the EEC and with sub-Saharan Africa.

Gentlemen, we are happy to welcome you both here.

Mr. Quandt, you have a prepared statement and you may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM B. QUANDT, RAND CORP., SANTA MONICA, CALIF.

(A biographic sketch of Mr. Quandt appears on p. 117.)

Mr. QUANDT. I would like to emphasize that my comments today are made in a personal capacity and are not based on any of my research at Rand. My remarks will focus primarily on the Maghrib countries, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, and I will make shorter references to Libya and Sudan. The focus of my comments will be on political trends and I will make some effort to relate political and economic issues in these countries.

STATUS OF NORTH AFRICAN STATES

The states of Maghrib, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, have all been independent for at least a decade, and Morocco and Tunisia for longer than that. This has meant that the basic problems of institution building are to some degree part of the Maghrib's past. The immediate issues of decolonization are no longer as pressing as they were some years ago. The primary social and economic issues facing the countries now are the typical ones of developing countries: low GNP, unemployment, low productivity in agriculture, unequal distribution of wealth, illiteracy, poor health, high rates of population increase and poor housing. These social and economic issues are common to most developing countries. On the political front, rather than creating new political institutions, the problem in all three of these countries is largely that of broadening the political base and expanding political participation to include new groups that until this time have been left out of the political process: workers, peasants, students, women, and so forth.

The question of how these issues will be handled over the next decade is, in my opinion, crucial for anticipating problems in the area, and a central question is how the current political leadership or the leadership that will emerge in the coming decade handle these issues. My brief remarks which summarize my more extensive statement will focus on the leadership in these countries.

MOROCCO AND KING HASSAN

In Morocco, the role of the monarch, King Hassan, has been strengthened in recent years, largely at the expense of political parties, of the various constitutions that Morocco has had, and of the elected Parliament. The King is able to count on a large reservoir of support for the monarchy, and has shown great skill at augmenting his personal power at the expense of Cabinet ministers and representatives of other political institutions.

These practices have, however, alienated a large part of the educated class, particularly in Morocco's modern sectors, thereby leaving the King dependent on traditional support in rural areas where he is still a very attractive figure to many people. Since independence, the monarchy has also been supported by the army. Now, however, the army's support has been called into question, most recently with the very dramatic events of a year ago, the attempted coup d'état at

Skhirat, where the King and his principal supporter, General Oufkir, were nearly killed, and the monarchy came close to being destroyed.¹

Since the events at Skhirat, King Hassan has promised substantial efforts at reform. He has acknowledged the existence of widespread corruption and has promised to try to eliminate it. He has also claimed he would try to revitalize the political institutions of the country, especially the Parliament and the Constitution, and to open the political system to the opposition, which until recently has been thoroughly excluded from the political process.

But the King, in making these promises, faces a serious dilemma in that if he opens the political system he threatens to erode his own basic position. Social and economic reforms could eventually weaken the role of tradition. This would pose a threat to the type of monarchical institutions that now exist. The King has hesitated to push for any changes, and has gone through elaborate motions of drafting a new Constitution, holding parliamentary elections, and talking with the opposition about their participation in the government, but nothing has really come of any of these efforts.

The real problems of the country remain untouched. There is political stagnation, and there are continuing serious political tensions, particularly among students and the urban poor. This is a very hard pattern for King Hassan to break since his own base of support would be the first to be eroded in any real reform, and rather than undertake these changes, it seems likely that King Hassan, as long as he is to retain the strong position he has today, will probably not press very hard for reform. The price will be paid in slowed economic and social development and occasional crises.

ALGERIA AND ITS LEADERSHIP

Turning briefly to Algeria, one finds a different pattern. A country which previously had a great deal of political instability and chaos. Algeria has in recent years found a very high degree of political continuity and stability. This has made possible a serious reorientation of Algerian political life toward domestic internal change and development, rather than foreign policy adventures which were more common in the early years of independence.

The current leadership, much of which has been in power for many years—some leaders have been in power since independence—has assigned itself, as a primary objective, vigorous economic development as a means of legitimizing the regime. In order to focus on this objective, most internal and foreign policy conflicts have been eliminated, thereby releasing substantial energies for dealing with domestic issues.

The emphasis in recent years has been on heavy industrialization and on development of Algeria's substantial reserves of oil and gas. This has been a very conscious policy on the part of the regime, a regime that recognizes that in the short run these measures of industrial development will do little to solve the problems of unemployment and the serious problems in the agricultural sector. But the current leadership is betting on the long term advantages of rapid economic

¹ General Oufkir died in an apparent suicide following an attempt on King Hassan's life in August 1972 between the date of this hearing and its publication.

growth to answer most of its economic and social ills, particularly the problem of large scale unemployment. Now, to offset somewhat the neglect of certain sectors of the economy, the regime has invested substantially in education and welfare in the hope that the coming generation will be sufficiently well trained that it can pick up the burden of directing development efforts in the future.

CHALLENGES TO GOVERNMENT

The major challenges to the regime now are not so much in the political sphere, where most opposition has been virtually eliminated, but rather in areas of social and economic development, the most recent area being that of agricultural reform where the regime in the past year has decided to launch a major effort. The so-called agrarian revolution is bound to encounter a large number of difficulties, not so much because of the existence of wealthy land owners such as exist in Morocco, but rather because the Algerian peasantry, despite the Algerian revolution, remains conservative and traditional and does not show much understanding or appreciation of the efforts to redistribute land in the rural sector.

Consequently, agrarian reform is very much up in the air. It is not at all clear how developments will go in the coming years, but it may very well be that the agrarian reform will get off to a good start, because this year Algeria and the rest of north Africa are experiencing good yields in the agricultural sector. They have been fortunate in having good weather, and this may make it easier in the rural areas to press for land reform.

A less immediate problem for Algeria, but one which will become serious in the future, is political participation by groups which remain outside the political process at present. Those now in power stem from the generation of the Algerian revolution, and yet there is a new generation coming of age which has not shared the revolutionary experience and which probably views politics in different ways. Thus far, this younger generation has not been allowed into positions of responsibility, and I think that over the coming decade one can anticipate that their demands will increase. Algeria's government is heavily bureaucratic, and this may make it difficult to respond to these new groups and one can consequently expect that demands from new groups such as workers, intellectuals, and students may cause increased political tension in Algeria, although for the moment this is not of immediate concern.

TUNISIA AND PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA

Finally, turn to Tunisia. Tunisian political life since independence has been heavily dominated by a single personality, that of President Habib Bourguiba. As long as he remains on the political scene, his personality has a decisive influence over Tunisian political life.

President Bourguiba has developed around himself a very capable, well-educated, and experienced political elite, but he continues to make major decisions. It has been very difficult for other individuals to emerge as strong leaders as long as President Bourguiba exercises

power. Bourguiba's health has not been good in recent years, and the question which has been on many Tunisian's mind has been that of his successor. This has become a key issue in Tunisian political life. Many anticipate a serious political crisis when he passes from the scene. Although this is possible, I find it rather unlikely that such a crisis will be particularly serious, in that the political elite around Bourguiba has shown a remarkable ability to compromise and find pragmatic solutions to most issues they have faced.

Regardless of how successfully the succession problem is handled in coming years, economic problems will remain most serious. Tunisia is a poor country without the resources of Algeria or Libya, and the management of its few scarce resources will inevitably be a major political issue, as the crisis that developed over Ben Salah's efforts to force collectivization in the rural countryside in 1969 indicated. The question of handling these scarce economic resources is likely to be a cause of continuing political conflict within Tunisia. Tunisia also has a problem of political participation of groups that are now outside of the political process demanding entry. Students in particular have shown their dissatisfaction with the authoritarian nature of the regime. A strike earlier this year showed a great deal of dissatisfaction on this score.

The men in the political elite around Bourguiba have waited so long for a taste of power that it seems unlikely that they will readily turn over responsibility to the new generation of politically active Tunisians. Consequently, the possibility for generational conflict seems great in Tunisia in the coming years.

LIBYA

The regimes in Libya and Sudan are less predictable than those in the rest of North Africa, largely because they have been in power for only a few years. They are still seeking institutional and political bases of legitimacy. I find these countries most interesting in the context of our discussion today because they represent unusual types of regimes in terms of our normal way of classifying governments as left or right or moderate or radical. The regimes in both Libya and Sudan defy these typologies. They have shown themselves to be nationalistic and unpredictable. They have been called pro-Soviet, pro-West, left, right, all sorts of things. Yet their most consistent feature is a strong nationalism which looks after their own interests.

Libyan leaders who came to power in 1969 are quite young, in their early thirties or in their late twenties, and intensely nationalistic. Some of them have been influenced by Islam and Arabism. President Qadhafi has been particularly active in regional Arab politics and interested in foreign policy, where he has made a number of spectacular moves which have gained Libya notoriety in the Middle East.

It seems to me, however, that the part of the Libyan political elite which is asserting its power at the moment consists of those who define Libya's priorities in less global terms. The new Premier of Libya, Jallud, appears to be more in this mode, in contrast to Qadhafi's more international orientation.

SUDAN

Sudan, which was once considered among the radical Arab regimes, is now on the verge of restoring diplomatic relations with the United States. This is quite a major departure from what one expected in the Sudan some years ago. The decisive development there, of course, was the abortive Communist Party coup d'état last year. President Numayri, after being restored to power, turned away from his strong orientation toward Egypt. In particular, Numayri has pressed for an end to the longstanding civil war in southern Sudan.

The conflict has now been brought to a formal end, thereby raising serious new issues of reconstruction and redevelopment in the south. By focusing on these issues, the present regime in the Sudan will be less oriented toward the Arab world for a while. It is unlikely to join the Federation of Arab States and will look after Sudanese interests before all others.

Both Libya and the Sudan, in the sense I have been discussing, illustrate the assertiveness of state national interests in North Africa as opposed to any other ideologies such as Pan-Arabism, socialism, capitalism, or any outside ideology. I think most of the regimes have recognized that the real problems lie at home in the fields of economic and social development and in expanded political participation.

IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES

I will conclude with a brief statement on some implications for U.S. policy. I think the United States is fortunate in not facing many difficult choices in North Africa. We do not have to choose Morocco and Tunisia as our favored clients as opposed to Algeria and Libya. The countries of the area themselves have made substantial efforts to overcome their own disagreements, and this makes it easier for the United States to deal with all of the countries of the region on a state-to-state basis.

Algeria is clearly emerging as the strongest North African country. It is the most dynamic and one in which our interests are growing because of their large reserves of natural gas. Our political relations with Algeria will have to continue to improve in order to accommodate the expanding economic ties between the two countries. This is one development which I think is both feasible and desirable for the United States and Algeria.

Libya likewise is a country in which we have considerable interests, particularly in the field of oil. In order to assure that these interests are developed in accordance with mutual concerns of the two countries, considerable attention will have to be paid to our relations with Libya. Apart from these areas, there are no terribly difficult issues facing the United States in North Africa. We can make a modest contribution to the economic development of some of these countries by giving them access to our technological resources and in some cases to our financial resources. In return, we should be happy to see them develop as strong independent nationalistic government. Recent developments indicate that this is precisely the path they will take.

Mr. HAMILTON. Your written statement will be made part of the record as will yours, Mr. Zartman, and you may proceed with your statement as you see fit.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Quandt follows:)

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH AFRICA

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss political trends in North Africa and the Near East. I would like to emphasize that I am appearing before the Subcommittees as a private citizen, not as a staff member of The Rand Corporation reporting on government sponsored research. My statement will deal primarily with developments in the Maghrib countries of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, with secondary attention paid to Libya and the Sudan.

TRENDS IN THE MAGHRIB

The three states of the Maghrib have been independent sufficiently long—ten years for Algeria and sixteen years for Tunisia and Morocco—that the early problems of decolonization are now part of the past. State institutions have emerged out of the disorder left by the departure of the French. Even Algeria, ravaged by more than seven years of guerrilla war, has managed to create a viable political system. All three states are in varying degrees authoritarian, overly bureaucratic, and strongly nationalistic.

Among developing countries, those of the Maghrib are fortunate not to be involved in serious foreign crises. Nor do they face massive problems of domestic violence. This means that the Maghrib countries essentially confront challenges of economic and social development and expanding political participation. The capabilities of the three states to deal effectively with these issues depend heavily on the quality and composition of the political elite, and this group will therefore be the focus of my remarks.

MOROCCO

Morocco is in many ways a strikingly traditional country. The King of Morocco is revered by a large portion of the peasant population as both a religious and political leader. His personal popularity is considerably less than that of his father, Muhammad V, but nonetheless the royal institutions bestow a legitimacy on the role of King that is difficult to challenge in contemporary Morocco. Co-existing with this strand of traditionalism is a modern, well-educated elite that is closely in tune with European culture. Many of these men are supporters of the King, while others participate in opposition political parties and trade unions. The political system ideally functions as a multiparty constitutional monarchy, combining modern and traditional features. But in fact the King's personal power has grown since independence, at the expense of parties, the constitution and parliament. This has led to the disaffection of a portion of the modern educated class, as the King relies increasingly for support on the traditional peasant sector and a very wealthy aristocracy. This narrow base of royal rule has become the overriding problem in politics and is probably the most ominous element in Morocco's development over the next decade.

One year ago Moroccan political life was seriously shaken by an attempted *coup d'état* during the King's lavish birthday celebration at Skhirat. By extraordinary good luck, the King and his main supporter, General Oufkir, survived the rebellion led by a substantial part of the officer corps. While the motivations of the plotters are still somewhat obscure, it seems clear that they resented the corruption that was rampant in parts of the political elite; the stagnation into which political life in the country had lapsed; and the lack of serious attempts at economic and social reforms. These criticisms were widely acknowledged as valid, even by the King himself, and in the aftermath of Skhirat new efforts at reform were to be made. But the King faces a dilemma in trying to implement reforms. Any effective changes in the social and economic order risk undermining the support he receives from the wealthy segment of Moroccan society, just as education and social development are bound to weaken the traditional sources of legitimacy of the regime. The safer path consequently seems to be the adroit use of royal power to pay off opposition elements against one another, keeping

virtually all power centralized in the royal household, while cultivating the army, whose loyalty after Skhirat can no longer be taken for granted. This leads to considerable motion—a new constitution, parliamentary elections, amnesty for most of those officers arrested last year—but little real change. As has been true for the past decade, Moroccan political life stagnates as the price of royal supremacy. The corollary is relatively slow economic and social change, which leaves Morocco's massive problems of unequal distribution of wealth, illiteracy, and political apathy untouched.

King Hassan is a shrewd and skillful politician, as his foreign policy successes indicate. He has also been brilliantly successful at accumulating power in his own hands. He has shown less ability in using that power constructively and in developing a loyal and dedicated political elite committed to development. Instead, ministers are rotated with astonishing frequency, providing the large political class with a brief taste of power, but rarely allowing talented individuals to pursue policies to their conclusion. Only General Oufkir, currently Minister of Defense, seems indispensable.

Recent efforts by the King to open the government to opposition leaders from the *Kutlah al-Wataniyyah* (National Front) attracted considerable attention earlier this year, but ended in failure. Unless the King is genuinely willing to relinquish some of his power, the opposition is unlikely to find reason to participate in the government. If, on the other hand, the King does cede some of his prerogatives to the civilian politicians, he risks seeing his own position eroded. Thus far there are few signs that King Hassan is willing to make such concessions and accept their consequences. One can therefore anticipate continuing acute struggles over the issue of broadened participation in political life, with students, opposition politicians, and workers taking the lead. If these disaffected groups are joined by some segment of the army, the future of Morocco's monarchy could be very much in doubt. Even the King's critics, however, do not relish the thought of the removal of the monarchy, since that would almost inevitably lead to prolonged internal dissent and conflict before a new political order could evolve.

Behind the surface calm of Moroccan life today lie many imponderables which cast doubt on the ability of the present leadership to cope effectively with the country's problems. At the same time, however, no obvious alternative is on the horizon. The most likely trend in the next decade, then, will probably be continued political stagnation punctuated by occasional severe crises. Through it all, the monarchy may survive if Hassan remains as skillful as in the past, but the price will probably be paid in slowed development in other sectors. If Hassan disappears, the monarchy will probably not survive, and either a conservative military regime or radical nationalists might come to power.

ALGERIA

For several years after independence, Algerian political life was characterized by instability, radical rhetoric, and overly ambitious domestic and international policies. In recent years, however, President Boumedienne has demonstrated considerable talent in redirecting Algerian society along lines of stability and progress. This has been possible because the political elite that now rules Algeria is less interested in settling old quarrels left over from the days of revolution than it is in legitimizing itself by bringing about rapid economic and social change.

Since 1968, the Algerian leadership has consisted primarily of two complementary groups. One is the officer corps of the army, whose leaders sit on the Council of the Revolution and participate in major policy decisions. They are the guarantee of order and stability in the country, an objective they have achieved with a minimal use of force. The second part of the elite is composed of ministers and high-level functionaries who are well trained technical experts. Boumedienne manages to keep this coalition together through mediation, and increasingly he appears to be the key figure in Algerian political life. In recent years, there has been an unusually high degree of continuity in top political positions, especially in the key areas of defense, industrial development, foreign policy, and internal security. Boumedienne himself has controlled the armed forces since 1960, first as Chief of Staff and since independence as Minister of Defense. His foreign minister has served since 1963; his minister of the Interior since 1962, with only a brief interlude; and his talented Minister of Industry since 1965.

Having overcome the internal conflicts that plagued Algeria in the early years after independence, the current political elite has been able to turn its attentions

to problems of development. Algeria remains a poor country, with a high rate of illiteracy and massive unemployment. It is, however, a country with substantial resources, especially oil and gas. Capitalizing upon these assets, the regime has launched an ambitious plan of industrialization, in the hope that rapid economic growth will soon begin to solve social and economic problems. With a high rate of population increase, Algeria has to grow merely to keep its current standard of development.

To release energies for industrialization, Algeria has sought to minimize its foreign political entanglements. Its relations with its neighbors, Morocco and Tunisia, are now excellent. Despite a serious crisis with France last year resulting from the nationalization of French petroleum companies, Algeria remains on good terms with the former colonial power. Finally, relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union are correct, if not unusually warm.

The major area of social investment made by the regime has been in the field of education. Compared to pre-independence days, the proportion of children in school is truly remarkable. Morocco, by contrast, has not done nearly as well in educating its young. The largest single item in the Algerian budget is for education, far surpassing defense spending.

Most recently, the regime has decided to press for a major agricultural revolution. Until this time, agriculture had been the weakest sector of the economy, although two-thirds of the population depends upon it for livelihood. A weak regime would have hesitated to attack this sector, knowing that both traditional peasants and large landholders would be skeptical of reforms. Algeria does not have a very wealthy landowning class, such as exists in Morocco, but the disparities in wealth are nonetheless great in the countryside. It is not yet clear how effective reforms will be in augmenting production and in equalizing wealth, the two major objectives, but the experiment will be worth observing carefully, both because of its possibility for weakening the regime if it goes badly, and for the beneficial results if it happens to succeed.

This moderately optimistic picture of contemporary Algeria is likely to last through the rest of the decade. A number of predictable problems will nonetheless have to be dealt with. Perhaps the most severe involves political participation by the younger generation that has come of age since independence. At present, political positions are held by comparatively young men, mostly in their 30s and 40s, who came to power as a result of their role in the revolution. If they remain in power for the next two decades, as their young ages might permit, what outlets will there be for the talented and ambitious men who are now in their 20s? Can they be coopted by the regime, or will they turn to the politics of opposition? At present, very little overt organized opposition to the regime exists, but unless the political system can prove to be flexible and responsive to new groups, the risk of heightened internal conflict is high. Unfortunately, Algeria has inherited a centralized and often rigid bureaucracy, which may make it difficult for the system to be responsive and adaptive to new demands. Therein lies a long-term challenge to the present political elite, and much of Algeria's future development hinges on the solution to be found for this problem.

TUNISIA

Tunisia faces a much more urgent problem of reordering its political system than does Algeria. Modern Tunisian nationalism has been virtually synonymous with the name Habib Bourguiba. Since independence, Bourguiba has been the major factor in Tunisian political life, overshadowing all contenders. This era is approaching an end, as Bourguiba's age and health will not permit him to play such an active role in coming years. The manner in which the succession to the post-Bourguiba period will be handled is very uncertain. Some observers anticipate a severe crisis of authority after Bourguiba is gone.

Tunisia has numerous assets with which to handle its current and future problems, and probably there will be no crisis of major proportions. The Tunisian population is relatively homogeneous; the Socialist Destur Party is well organized; and an experienced group of well educated politicians surrounds Bourguiba. The army is small and is unlikely to play a dominant role in Tunisian political life. The main conflicts will likely be among a small group of possible successors to Bourguiba, some of whom will want to continue in the "Supreme Combatant's" path, while others will press for greater liberalization of the political system.

Given Tunisia's lack of natural resources, economic development will be an issue of overriding concern throughout this decade. Growth rates have been lower than the economic plan envisioned. Ambitious efforts at agricultural reform

and collectivization have been discredited by the failure of Ben Salah's efforts in this direction in 1969. It is not at all clear how any ruling elite will deal with Tunisia's economic problems, but this area is one where considerable acrimony may emerge between political rivals.

Tunisia, like Algeria, faces problems of including the younger generation in political life. Student demonstrations took place earlier this year, revealing a surprising depth of disenchantment with the regime. The old-guard around Bourguiba has been waiting to take charge too long to welcome a rapid rise to power of new elements. Thus some generational conflict can be anticipated within the elite.

Despite these signs of difficulty, Tunisian political culture seems to place a high value on pragmatism and on reconciliation. Thus it would seem justified to expect that after the initial difficulties of adjusting to the post-Bourguiba era, the new rulers of Tunisia will continue along the moderate path laid down by Bourguiba. Tunisia does not have the resources and potential wealth to play the regional role destined for Algeria, but it can nonetheless pursue its independent path of development that makes it an unusually interesting and sympathetic country in the Middle East.

LIBYA AND SUDAN

Libya and Sudan deserve brief mention because they may well represent regime-types that will be increasingly common in the Arab Middle East and North Africa. Both countries have at various times been labeled as radical, socialist, Islamic, and nationalist. They are condemned by some as pro-Soviet, by others as pro-American. In fact, of course, most of these categories, with the exception of nationalist, do not fit very well.

Libya is ruled by a very young group of officers. Since coming to power in September 1969, they have succeeded in placing Libya on the Middle East map by a series of bold and flamboyant actions. Libya pressed hard for a loose federation with Syria and Egypt; has managed to force petroleum prices up to all-time highs; and has used its vast reserves of hard currency for a variety of foreign policy ventures. The Libyan leadership contains both ideologues and pragmatists, and the combination insures that Libyan policy will be unpredictable. Attacks on atheistic communism and the Soviet Union are as common as denunciations of Western materialism and the United States. At the same time, however, Libya acquires arms from the Soviets and continues to do business with U.S. oil companies. Islam is declared the guiding element in Libyan foreign policy, but Libyan money is apparently loaned to other Muslim states at normal rates of interest. It is still too early to judge the Libyan leadership and the political system, but early signs suggest a populist form of Islamic socialism, including strong doses of Libyan self-interest, that will defy conventional right-left categorization.

Sudan, like Libya, is in a state of flux. After several years of radicalism and rapprochement with Egypt, President Numayri is now pursuing a quite different path. The key element in this change was last year's communist-inspired *coup d'état*. With help from Libya and Egypt, Numayri managed to regain power after a few days, and in the following weeks the large Sudanese communist party was decimated and relations with the Soviet Union were severely strained.

In the aftermath of the abortive communist coup, Numayri has tried to restructure the political system. This has resulted in an end to the long and costly civil war dividing north and south. Regional autonomy has been promised to the south, as well as representation in the national government. This has led Numayri away from his close ties to Egypt and Libya, and it now seems doubtful that Sudan will join the Federation of Arab Republics. Pro-Egyptian members of Numayri's government have been replaced, and the regime is now exploring better relations with both the United States and China. For the moment, Sudanese national interests and reconstruction after years of bitter internal strife are likely to be the guiding principles for the regime.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

The United States does not face particularly difficult choices in its policies toward the countries of North Africa. In all of them we have some assets that we can capitalize on, and with flexibility and imagination we should be able to pursue reasonably productive relations with each of the countries in the region.

At present no diplomatic relations exist between the United States and Algeria and Sudan. In time, these countries are likely to take the initiative in seeking the restoration of diplomatic ties, but this is not an urgent requirement for the United States.

The United States should be clear about its objectives in these countries. We do not need clients or bases or allies in this region. We do, however, have an interest that the Soviet Union not acquire bases or allies in North Africa. Independent, self-reliant states in this area are very much to our advantage, even though they may disagree with us on many issues of foreign policy. The U.S. has a modest role to play in promoting independence, particularly in the economic sphere, where our technological skills and products are in high demand. In return, we are likely to have an increasing interest in obtaining Algerian natural gas and Libyan oil, and a variety of unconventional economic arrangements will be needed to insure access to these resources.

Without sacrificing our traditional friendships with Tunisia and Morocco, the United States in the years ahead should seek to broaden the basis of its presence in North Africa by cultivating relations with Algeria and Libya. For obvious reasons, these two countries will play major roles in North Africa, and despite their alleged radicalism, they are both committed to their own national interests above all else. Ample room exists for the United States to develop areas of mutual interest with these countries, thereby helping to insure that North Africa will remain independent and non-aligned.

STATEMENT OF I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

(A biographical sketch of Mr. Zartman appears on p. 120.)

Mr. ZARTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me pick up with the opening and closing comment of my colleague, that the countries that we are talking about have achieved their stage of institution building, their awareness of themselves as nations and their problems are common problems of development with other countries.

I think the two have to be brought together as Dr. Quandt has said, in having us realize that development in these countries will take place according to their own desires within national frameworks and that their policies are geared toward the development of themselves as political, economic, and social units.

I think this is particularly important since the topics you asked me to address myself to are those of integration and of regionalism in the area and its relationships, which are partly integrative with Europe.

THE MAGHRIB AS A UNIT

Since we, in the United States, have learned that North Africa's name for themselves—the Maghrib—instead of simply North Africa, we very often intended to think of the area as a unit, as a region and have looked toward integration of the region into perhaps overly hopefully a single state.

I would like to suggest first of all that North Africa is a geographic unit. It has great similarities to many other areas, but is at best an analytical unit, not a political unit or even a social unit.

Its geography is similar to the mountains that formed the backbone of each country, the same chain of mountains that run from the Cananis to Sicily. They provide a similar type of Mediterranean mountains and plain climate and geography on which the societies have been based. In addition, the societies have been shaped by the same forces of Islam and Arab social organization. Based on the structure

of Islam, traditional societies grew up before the coming of the colonial rule into North Africa.

The similarities then in traditional society are tremendous in this area. The similarities are greater according to social unit within the area, in relation to the geography, than they are within the national unit, that is, a traditional city in Algeria may be much more similar to a traditional city in Tunisia than that city is to its own fellow compatriots in the mountains who exists as shepherds, or sometimes even as nomads in the pre-Sahara.

On top of the similar social organization there came a similar type of Western influence, all in the three countries that I am primarily talking about at the hands of the French for various lengths of time. The impact of the French was largely to create by design and by example a small modern sector that rose and destroyed its creator by bringing independence to the countries.

Thus, the similarity of experience has created a beginning of a modern society. But again, my first point is that these are similarities and this is not a pan-Maghrib society that is being created without any differentiation or boundaries.

STATES ARE SEPARATE UNITS

Second of all in a political sense, colonial rule followed a divide-and-conquer type of activity that fostered separate national development, separate nationalism and eventually separate states.

These states have continued as separate units now that the colonial impact has disappeared. There was cooperation during the 1950's in the nationalist movements as they tried to coordinate themselves against the French and in fact the dates of independence of Morocco and Tunisia were very related as the two national leaderships played off the French desires to cut its losses and at the same time to adopt some kind of liberal stance in regard to its North African colonies.

France had hoped by granting independence to Morocco and Tunisia to keep them friendly—"interdependence" was the word at the time—and also to maintain its control of Algeria. The reverse occurred. France lost interdependence as the two wing countries became independent and then in turn they helped Algeria achieve its independence.

In the process of carrying out their nationalist struggles, the three countries tried to coordinate but they had different independence dates. Because two of them, after 1956, were states, were going concerns, whereas the other was a nationalist movement, and because one of the states was a republic and the other a monarchy, national differences soon rose and the political phase of North African cooperation soon broke down as each of the countries realized they were separate political units and acted in consequence.

This political phase saw its greatest defeat, its lowest point of cooperation, in 1963, when Morocco and Algeria actually went to war over their nondefined boundary. Things have been better since but that was probably the death knell of any attempted political cooperation among the three states.

LIMITED COOPERATION

My third point then is good relations on the basis of limited cooperation for mutual benefits and of common diplomatic positions

have become the nature of North African cooperation. Since North African political unity is a dead issue, diplomatic cooperation and economic cooperation is a goal that will take a long time to work on and that can undergo a good deal of effort and therefore, is not something that can be rapidly achieved and written off as a step to something else.

Diplomatic and economic cooperation probably are not steps to any kind of political unity. Political unity is dead now, and I am not suggesting it is likely to be revised and resolved in the future. As economic and diplomatic cooperation are being developed, there seems to be a pattern emerging and this pattern is based on the rising strength of Algeria as the central state among the three, the state which is largely in control of the cooperation that takes place among the three of them.

In fact, it is not surprising in this light then that the era of good relations that we are now seeing among the North African states began with a conscious effort on the part of Colonel Boumedienne to mend his fences—to literally mend his fences, since some of the issues involved were border issues—after 1969, and develop limited economic interchanges and alleviation of outstanding issues among the three states. There have been trade agreements, there have been border agreements, and there have been narrow agreements on cooperation toward common goals but again among the three states.

ECONOMIC TIES

Earlier than the 1969 renewal of good relations among the states, in 1964, the three North African states also launched another aspect of cooperation among themselves and this was toward common economic goals. Under the influence largely of the Economic Commission for Africa, a United Nations organism and an organism many associated with the Organization for African Unity, the North African states, were brought to realize the fact they could develop more economically by sharing the burdens of various kinds of activities. This was good economics, but it was unrealistic politics because it suggested that major projects could be undertaken and would be best done by forgetting the national element of pride and accomplishment that each of the states saw as their own national goals.

So not only were there suggestions for transformation industries that could be specialized in one country or other, but also suggestion that a steel mill could be created for all of North Africa and this would be a most economic venture, or that a common market could be created among the countries.

Again, this may have been good economics, but in fact nationalism was too strong to allow Tunisia or Morocco on the one hand to see the North African steel mill be located in Algeria. So, in the steel mill case, Tunisia went ahead with its plan, Algeria with its plan and Morocco off and on has been studying the creation of its own steel mill. In the same line a common market has not been created among the three countries.

An organization was set up though, the organization called the Permanent Consultative Committee which was to coordinate planning and coordinate any of the economic ventures that could be undertaken

among the three countries and particularly to coordinate their efforts to associate with the European Common Market.

This committee functioned in a very sporadic fashion for the next couple of years after 1964, and finally died of inactivity and it is only recently that it has been revived again with relation to its original charge, that is, negotiations with Europe.

ECONOMIC TIES WITH EUROPE

I think at this point, I should say something, as we switch in our focus to Europe, about the relationships of the North African states or societies to Europe. The colonial impact has remained and what remained is a rather complex love-hate relationship across the Mediterranean in which many of the good values are still seen to be embodied in French society.

This was particularly strong in a love-hate sense during the time of De Gaulle but it remains. North Africa is a bilingual and bicultural area in which French and modern influence becomes associated together and become an important part of the society.

But the society at the same time is torn by contradictions within this relationship with Europe. Because what is modern is conceived to be French and French is colonial, so there is a positive and negative aspect to "modern things" within north African society.

What is traditional is perceived to be Arab-Islamic and traditional in the modern point of view is something backward and bad but Arab-Islamic is something which is part of national heritage is good.

One of the problems then of the social relations and social development within the societies is this ambivalent view of what is good and bad in modern and traditional, internal, and foreign terms.

Obviously this kind of an affective view of modern and traditional is going to have some effect on the foreign relations of the countries.

RELATIONS WITH EEC

Now, to the political aspects of the association with Europe. In 1965, after many years of watching and waiting, north African countries, or Tunisia and Morocco, began negotiations on an association agreement between their countries and the European Common Market.

In 1969 these agreements were brought to fruition, signed and entered into effect. But they were limited partial association agreements, much smaller in their scope than the North African countries or even the European Commission would have liked.

The agreements indicated that in the course of their 5-year period, renegotiations would begin for a new full association of all three North African states with the European Common Market.

At the present time, activity has begun on both sides toward this association. The Consultative Commission that I mentioned met in March and set out guidelines for an approach on the North African side and the European Commission has just submitted a report to the Council of Ministers in Europe for guidelines again on this full agreement.

Both sides look to a full association agreement of all three states with the European Common Market to be negotiated and enter into

effect by 1974. What is significant again, from the point of view of the topic that we are looking at, is that these agreements will still be three parallel agreements, essentially the same in nature but not a common agreement between a North African community and a European community.

TIES WITH MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICAN REGIONS

I have said some things in my prepared statement about relationships in North Africa and the African area on one hand and the Arab area on the other hand. Briefly in identification, North Africa identifies more strongly with the Arab region than with the African region although it looks on both as pools of support for its particular policy.

Within these two regions, it feels more strongly about the burning issue for the Arabs, the Palestine issue, than it does for the burning issue of the Africans, the South African issue.

But nevertheless it is involved in both necessarily from a distance. I have also made some very brief remarks in my statement about Libya and I think it is important to point out here one major fact, that Libya is and should be considered outside of the Maghrib. It is now associated with the Union of Arab Republics of Egypt and Syria and has largely turned its back to the North African states.

At an earlier time, under the monarchical, Libya began to cooperate with the North African states and was involved in the consultative committee. It no longer is. And Libya's position has always been one between the two areas.

At the present time it is much more in its Middle-Eastern phase than in its North African phase. This predominance of Arab over North African issues is likely to continue for some time, even if, for example, Jallud actually replaces Qadhafi.

NORTH AFRICA AND U.S. INTERESTS

In regards to American issues or American interests, it seems to me as well that our interests here are important in the area, although not necessarily primary or direct outside of the oil concern we have with the area.

I think the most important aspect of North Africa for us is its location in the Mediterranean, on the edge of the Mediterranean, and the existence in the area of states that are going concerns with a realistic attempt to face their foreign policy and particularly their domestic problems.

We often think that there are things we can do to improve the way the countries are governing themselves. This is a very difficult problem. Morocco, for example, can certainly stand improvement in the efficiency with which it attacks its economic and social problems. I am afraid it is very difficult for the United States, even though it is a major source of aid to Morocco, to play a strong role in reorienting its perceptions.

A good example though, of realistic approaches to domestic needs through foreign policy, is the EEC Association that the three countries are working on. This association can help develop open markets

and hence protect the economies of the countries, can help develop the labor in the countries, a large part of which has emigrated to Europe until the economies can grow and support the labor force that the North Africans have. There are many laborers, for example, from Morocco in Europe. There are more than there are in the industrial labor force in Morocco.

North Africa also hopes for technical assistance and monetary assistance from the EEC and this also is a positive aspect of its association. All three countries then are looking at their association as a possible way of helping their own development within their own boundaries in a cooperative but not in an integrative sense.

Perhaps the best way to underline the similarities and also the rivalries among the countries is to refer to the fact that they all have a saying that the citizens of the three countries are like a lion, or a man or a woman, respectively, but who is the lion and who is the man and who is the woman varies according to which person in the country tells the stories. They all have same cultural background, but the ties in their cultural background change according to their national affiliation.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Zartman follows:)

THE MAGHRIB AS A UNIT

1. North Africa (The Maghrib) is an analytical unit, not a political, economic, or even social unit. At most, it is a geographic unit, often called an "island" (*jezira*) in Arabic because it is enclosed by the Mediterranean Sea and a sea of sand (the Sahara). The same mountains that form the Canaries and Sicily run across the Maghrib as the Atlas and the Tell (meaning "hill"), and people at the same altitudes live by very similar social ways regardless of country within the region. Thus, there is more similarity between the lifestyles of the mountain herdsmen of the Anti-Atlas, the Kabylia, the Khroumeria, and maybe Jebel Nefusa (Libya), of the plainsmen of the Gharb, the Mitija, and the Mejerda, or of the traditional city-dwellers of the *medina* of Fez, Constantine, and Tunis (the first two with 300,000 people, the third about double), than there is among the several levels within each country.

Of course, it is not merely geographical resemblances that produce similarities in lifestyles. There is a Western Arab, Islamic culture that is both the cause and effect of social resemblances. The entire region is composed of a basically Berber population, largely Arabized and Islamized under waves of invasions from the East since the sixth century. The Arab conquerors assimilated with the population to an extent that latter-day colonists might envy, and their Muslim religion provided a set of social rules and political relationships that created unity and similarity wherever it took root. Thus, traditional society was shaped.

On this base came the colonial overlay, brought by the French between 1830 (Algeria) and 1912 (Morocco), pushing aside, defeating, and gradually destroying traditional society, using its modern sorcery to train a new generation of apprentices who ultimately did it in. Thus modern society was shaped.

Yet these similarities do not mean unity. Except for a short time in the eleventh century, North Africa was never a political or economic unit. Colonial revolt has modernized separate nationalisms. There is one concept of a "Maghrib nation" as there is of an "Arab nation;" in fact, there is not even a convenient Arabic word for North Africa ("Maghrib" refers, properly, to Morocco).

STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

2. In the struggle for independence as under colonial rule, Maghribi politics were kept apart by colonial division and conquest. The successor states thus created have provided their own reasons for separate existence, to the destruction of political cooperation projects.

Even under French rule, Morocco and Tunisia were governed as protected monarchies and Algeria as an "integral part" of France. The nationalist move-

ments in the three countries attempted coordination in a unified student movement in France in the 1930s and a Maghrib office in Cairo in the 1950s but the separate national social systems and separate colonial political systems made necessary different tactics, different leaders, and eventually different dates of success. Strategies were related but not unified. Tunisian autonomy in 1954 led to Moroccan restoration in 1955 and then to Tunisian independence in 1956 (three weeks after Morocco), as France pulled back her defense lines the better to meet the Algerian revolt (which began in 1954). The reverse took place; Tunisian and Moroccan independence gave the Algerians a diplomatic and military base and eventually caused the collapse of the French IV Republic and the advent of General de Gaulle, (1958) and the independence of Algeria (1962). An attempt to set up a Permanent Secretariat of the Arab Maghrib and a consultative assembly (Tangier, 1956) collapsed because the needs and tasks of two government parties (Istiqlal and Neo-Destour) were not the same as those of an insurgent movement (FLN), any more than the nature of a monarchy was compatible with a republic and a revolutionary movement without a government.

Thereafter, until 1968, political relations among the three North African states were modeled on the eternal triangle; it was always two against one, with France shifting favors from one state to another, depending on the issue. Even this amount of cooperation broke down completely in 1963, when Morocco and Algeria went to war for three weeks over the non-existent frontier between them across the Saharan borderlands (*confins*). Morocco won, in a sense, and the humiliation of the war and the subsequent government attempt at reconciliation was a major reason for the Algerian army's overthrow of ben Bella in 1965. There is no present hope for political unity in North Africa.

RELATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES

3. Good relations on the basis of limited cooperation for mutual benefit and of common diplomatic positions have become the hallmark of North African "unity," and even this effort is a long way from success. Although other patterns may be conceivable (e.g., a dual alliance which then coopts the third member), the most natural pattern of cooperation leaves the decisive role in Algeria's hands.

Algeria—literally—keeps the other two states apart and can bring them together. In 1968, having forced its internal opposition into the open and defeated it, the Boumedienne regime began—again literally—mending its fences with its two neighbors. An exchange of visits and treaties with Morocco and Tunisia settled the border questions and set up channels for commercial and other cooperation between the two pairs of neighbors. This goal has been achieved: relations among the three are good and postures are correct and reassuring in time of troubles (as were Algeria and Tunisia in August 1971 when the Moroccan monarchy defeated an attempted military coup). When attending international conferences (such as the UN or the OAU, the Arab League not having met for a while), the three communicate and coordinate their policies, even if they do not always adopt exactly the same position.

It is likely that Algeria, which started this process, is interested in carrying it to its substantive conclusion: Algerian leadership on policy positions among the three states. It is also likely that this goal, if attained, is more attractive than any closer integration or "domination" of the region by one state. It is therefore within the limits of this goal—moving closer to or further from it, toward coordination or diversity—that North African relations are likely to be played in the coming years. To "take over" Morocco or Tunisia in any sense would be expensive for Algeria; an ideologically closer regime in either country would be pushed by its nationalism to greater rivalry and resentment toward Algeria, and the subversion of the two regimes in which Algeria dabbled under Ben Bella in 1962-63 was highly counterproductive. Thus, inter-Maghribi relations are in a foreseeably long phase of cooperation and coordination among separate, sovereign units.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

4. In the economic field, there are limited opportunities for an exchange of goods and services and greater possibilities for savings through joint ventures, although the bigger the venture and the bigger the potential savings, the bigger the nationalistic pride in going it alone.

There is a slight possibility for trade in agricultural goods because of slightly different growing seasons, slightly different emphases among the same Mediter-

anean products, and different climatic accidents which mean that a good year for one country is not always a good year for another. There is very little possibility at this stage of development for trade in industrial goods, and even if one country stakes out a lead in some industrial sector or even in a heavy industry, there is no reason for the others to bow to that lead anymore than they would bow to the longstanding advances of nearby Europe. Development demands the contrary, that new economies overcome the "comparative disadvantage" of their colonial-type relations with the industrial world. There is only a very selective possibility of exchanging or cooperating in the use of raw materials, since the three have almost the same natural resources. However, geographic location sometimes makes cooperation necessary, and Moroccan deficiencies in oil and Algerian in phosphates allow for some exchange potential. Planning being the delicate job that it is, and North African planning being highly variable in quality, there is practically no possibility of coordinating national economic plans or conducting joint planning. There is greater possibility of narrow specialization within transformation industries, or integration of energy and communications grids, or coordination of service practices, and of joint marketing and market allocation.

This list of general possibilities roughly describes actual realizations, although it has taken the three countries ten to fifteen years to understand where the potentialities lay. Hopes for joint plans, a common steel industry, industrial specialization, a common market or an economic community all bloomed large and burst. In the meanwhile, modest, piecemeal, scattered progress has been made in providing for cooperation and coordination in a number of sectors. In almost all cases, the progress has been found in the agreement, with the final concrete results still lying in the future.

5. North African unity, therefore, has been institutionalized at the stage of economic cooperation and commercial diplomacy. This is a state of its own right, capable of fulfillment as a goal; it is a surrogate for integration or political unity, not a step toward it (except possibly at the longest run, beyond our concerns) nor an example of creeping functionalism.

RELATION WITH EEC

In October 1964, the first institutions of the new stage of Maghribi cooperation were established: a Permanent Consultative Committee of the Maghrib and an Industrial Studies Committee. The Consultative Committee, which comprises the economic ministers of the member states, soon created other committees to coordinate efforts in transportation, tourism, commerce, telecommunications, education, and a Maghribi Office for the Exportation of Alfa (esparto grass used in making paper). Results were slim, besides the coordination of rail transportation and postal and telephone rates, and by the end of the decade the Consultative Committee was considered moribund.

The immediate impetus to the formation of the Committee was the opening of negotiations for Association with the European Economic Community, which began with the EEC Commission's first mandate in July 1965 and ended with the signature of two parallel partial Association agreements in March 1969 in Rabat and Tunis. The Consultative Committee was essentially a failure in bringing about coordinated, let alone joint, negotiations and there was a good deal of suspicion between the two negotiating countries during the negotiations. Algeria decided to continue to enjoy its "de facto membership" as long as it could, until its benefits were whittled down to the Moroccan-Tunisian level, and only then seek de jure association. Morocco and Tunisia discussed goals and notified each other of the results of their separate negotiating sessions. Any coordination between the two North African agreements was primarily the work of the EEC Commission, which decided that neither state would be granted an advantage at the expense of the other. The partial Association treaties run for five years from 1 September 1969, but with the provision that preparation would begin in the middle of that period for negotiations toward a full Association.

Although negotiations have not yet begun, two other events of importance have taken place. Algeria has felt that it has reached the Association level and has requested to join the next round of negotiations. At the same time, in March 1972, the Maghrib Consultative Committee met again after a long period of inactivity and set up guidelines for the new negotiations between Europe and the Maghrib.

The policy that all three Maghribi states seek to implement aims at the expansion of the present agreements and status into full Association, including

the remaining agricultural products not now involved and extending the agreements into the areas of technical and financial assistance. Full Association of this type will confirm the privileged position of the Maghrib over the other non-European Mediterranean states (Lebanon, Israel), and will do so by multilateralizing currently bilateral relations that have been too vulnerable in the past to the whims and tactics of individual European states' policies. By providing multilateral middle-range guarantees of markets, aid, assistance, and labor agreements, Association will enable Maghribi planners to develop better economic policies.

Yet even these guarantees are measures for buying time, and are only useful to North Africa if their planners and politicians are aware of future goals beyond the time bought. For the Community, Association means two things: either middle-range guarantees to favored states, or waystations on the road to full membership. Just as Maghribi cooperation is no step to regional integration, so Association with Europe is no step toward membership. For ex-colonies, Association is already a controversial and delicate relationship, and anything closer would be a return to the past. But other Mediterranean economies are closer to the second type of Association; Greece and Turkey have been Associates since 1961 and 1963, Spain signed a trade agreement in 1970 and is eager for membership, and Italy is a charter member. At best, then, Maghribi Association can only be an arrangement for providing protection during economic takeoff. Association is a domestic not a foreign policy. It must provide training for skilled labor, hard currency for capital imports, markets for industry and agriculture, and protection for economic reorientation to domestic needs.

TIES WITH AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST

6. North African relations with the two other circles or regions of which it is part are logical consequences of its distance and the individual states' general stance. Being both North African and Western Arab, the three states are concerned with but not involved in the two region's problems. They can preach moderation or extremism without being held accountable. By the same token, they cannot seize a position of real, active leadership on such burning issues as Palestine or South Africa because they are too far from the scene of action to make their leadership effective. They can only goad others.

Prior to the formation of the OAU in 1963, African ties were important for North African states as supports for their foreign policy prestige in general, their particular policy aims (including irredentism), and their independence struggles. After the breakup of the more radical sounding Casablanca Group, to which Morocco and the Algerian Provisional Government belonged, the North African states have found the OAU useful above all as a podium for their policies and a place to let the Morocco-Algerian border dispute soak until it had cooled off enough for them to handle alone. After 1964, however, Africa slipped in its importance to the Maghrib, for the region's policies were little in need of the kind of support that African states could give. At best, it can normalize relations with its neighbors (Mauritania, Mali, Niger) and keep communications open with its friends (Senegal). Trade is small but grows, particularly with West Africa. In other than official terms (trade, diplomacy), Africa is relatively unimportant to North Africans. It is not a primary identification referent, and most sources of sympathy—colonialism, racism—are so because they are also part of the Maghribi experience, not because they are associated with Africa. North Africa tends to feel strongly about South Africa but there is little it can do about it.

RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD

The Arab region is closer to the identities of North Africans, although socially as well as politically, Maghribi attitudes are still distinguishable from those of the Arab East. No North African state agrees with current Arab policy on Palestine (whenever and whatever it may be), although none of them agrees with the other two on the subject either. Significantly, Bourguiba's unsolicited opinions on diplomacy, Boumedienne's haughty emphasis on guerrilla warfare, and Hassan's militancy only when prompted reflect each country's particular ways of achieving its own independence. The Arab League has dropped in importance in Arab politics, but when it was more useful (through the Rabat Conference of 1969), North African states were a secondary part both of the balance of power pattern that accompanied the Unity of Purpose phases of Arab politics and of

the concert pattern in the Unity of Ranks phases. None of the states has ever given decisive weight to an intra-Arab coalition or policy, either on the side of the radicals (Algeria) or the moderates (Morocco or, when not boycotting, Tunisia). The Maghrib is less important to Arab politics than Arab politics are to the Maghrib. Bourguiba nurtured his charisma by baiting Nasser and mediating intra-Arab disputes; Algeria feeds its pride and builds domestic support by out-radicalizing the rest; Morocco compensates for domestic inaction with anti-Israeli radicalism lest the Palestine issue be used to rally opposition to the monarchy. The unlikely event of a settlement would do much to free North Africa from its embroilment with Arab politics. In the absence of a settlement, Arab politics and the Palestine question remain distant but visible, a flag to be brandished by the government lest it be captured by counterelites.

LIBYA

7. Libya has been left aside in this discussion because it is aside. There is nothing in Libya except the traditional society (and then without the complexities present in the other three countries) that fits the preceding descriptions. The colonial experience (with Italy), the nationalism movement (a conservative Muslim sect), the attainment of independence (by UN decree), the partyless palace politics thereafter, the lack of substantial ties with Europe, and finally the combination of Robin Hood and John Calvin in Mu'ammār Qadhafi all make Libya *sui generis*. Libya was not part of the earlier, political attempts at Maghribi unity but did participate in the first half decade of the Maghrib Consultative Committee's economic cooperation. However, the absence of institutional arrangements with the EEC removed much of the economic purpose from this cooperation, and when Capt. Qadhafi overthrew his king in 1969, institutional arrangements with North Africa were counter to his political purpose. Instead, Libya fostered the Union of Arab Republics with Egypt and Sudan, and then Egypt and Syria, withdrew from the committee and while maintaining relations with Algiers and Tunisia, viciously attacked the Moroccan monarchy during and after its troubles with its army in 1971.

AMERICAN INTERESTS

8. American interests in this situation are not primary or direct, but are nevertheless important. The U.S. no longer has its bases in North African (although it has forces in Morocco) and no longer needs them. But it has a floating base off Maghribi shores, the Sixth Fleet, which is vital to the exercise of American influence in the entire Mediterranean area. This presence is contested by North Africans: Algeria for a long time, now recently Tunisia, someday Morocco. It is important to maintain good relations with the North African states lest today's formal protest become tomorrow's cause for alliance or alignment.

The U.S. has little economic interests in the area but aid has been very high, and investments and trade are growing, to mutual benefit. To a country of global interests, it is important that other countries be developing, meeting their problems, and making life better for their people. North African countries are doing this, each very much in its own way. The growth of an economic middle class in Morocco, a technocratic bureaucracy in Algeria, and a party administration in Tunisia are all important signs of social and political stability and development. In a world of uncertainties, the three North African states are good bets. Their careful institutionalized cooperation among themselves and with Europe, on the basis of a growing, mature awareness of their own goals and interests is a good sign.

But we too, in America, must continue to be aware of North African states' goals and interests, and of the evolving nature of their societies, if we are to continue to relate to these old "new" nations effectively. This means that above all we must continue to train specialists in the study and understanding of the region. Such training cannot be expected to take place primarily under the auspices of state and local educational authorities and financial sources. Education in regional studies is primarily a federal responsibility, since it meets a national need. Federal aid to higher education and to international regional studies is a desperate and immediate need. In its absence, the serious progress and developed expertise available in this country in the study of North Africa—as of other regions—will simply dry up as interests and opportunities appear elsewhere. I have pointed out above that North Africa's best foreign policy

is a domestic policy. This is no less true in the United States, where support for our own educational programs is a prime means of knowing and tending our interests abroad.

VIEWS ON U.S. POLICY

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you for your statement; let's begin with a couple of general questions.

I would like each of you to comment on your assessment of American policy toward these North African states: What you think is right with that policy and what is wrong with it and what ought we to be doing that we are not doing? I want to get a general view of your feeling about American policy toward these states at the beginning of our questioning.

Mr. QUANDT. I will make a few comments on that. I think by and large our policy in recent years have been fairly enlightened. Perhaps this is because we have not tried to do anything terribly difficult in the area. We have not tried to acquire client states or bases. We have not insisted that the countries of the area line up with the United States on all foreign policy issues. As a result of this relatively relaxed approach to the area, we have done, I think, reasonably well.

The country that I am most familiar with, Algeria, is something of a success story for the United States, despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations. In the past few years we have developed a large variety of contacts with the Algerian Government, focusing primarily on economic issues where we do have clear mutual interests.

The Algerians want American technology, they want American credit for their industrialization, and we in turn seem to want their gas, liquified natural gas, if not too much else.

I think that U.S. relations with Algeria are going along reasonably well and probably will lead to the restoration of diplomatic relations in the not too distant future, although there are still some outstanding issues of importance.

RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO AND TUNISIA

Toward Morocco and Tunisia, I think we have to accept the fact that the very close, almost client-like relationship we have had with these countries, will be eroded in the future. This trend will not be particularly damaging to U.S. interests.

I would guess that our aid to Morocco may go down somewhat as the country deals with its own economic affairs without much grant assistance from the United States. We now have a rather large U.S. presence in Morocco, and this could be reduced substantially without ill effects. Several hundred U.S. AID administrators are in Morocco. If I am not mistaken, and this seems to me in excess of what we need for our interests and what the Moroccans really welcome. We can afford to cut back on some instruments of U.S. policy, such as grant assistance, and move more toward credits and toward the transfer of technology as elements of U.S. foreign policy.

I think the impending restoration of diplomatic relations with Sudan is a positive development indicating flexibility on their part as well as on our own. We should be pleased with that development. The Sudan is the second of the Arab States which broke relations with us in 1967 which has or is on the verge of restoring them.

Consequently, I would conclude this brief assessment by recommending more of the same, with a little more emphasis on indirect instruments of U.S. diplomacy, trade, credits, transfer of technology and somewhat less on military assistance, and grant assistance to those countries which still receive some.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Zartman?

UNITED STATES HAS DEVELOPED IMPORTANT TIES

Mr. ZARTMAN. I would not disagree. I think that we have looked at these areas as important areas, have stepped in since the departure of the French colonial presence, and have helped the countries through economic aid and also expressed a concern for the continued prosperity and existence of the countries.

We have developed a close relationship with Tunisia and I think this is a relationship that is important to continue. Tunisia is a country that is extremely poor, has a very high level of aid from the United States, and has developed its limited resources and also its imported resources in the form of aid in an effective and efficient sense.

I think that one can emphasize, perhaps a little more than my colleague has, the element of democracy in Tunisia. Although Tunisia is a single party state it is a state which has a functioning series of elections and a good deal of democracy within the party, although not within the single party state; there is a difference certainly, between the two. Tunisia therefore, becomes a model in fact for development, political development as well as economic development, in the developing world and therefore becomes an attractive and realistic area for the United States to continue a close relationship with.

Morocco, which had an appearance of democracy with the multi-party system, certainly has much less so under the way that the monarchical system has evolved. But Morocco too, I think, is an area in which we should continue our close relationships although with Morocco there is a greater tendency to rely on foreign assistance from the outside than to bootstrap it in the same way as Tunisia.

UNITED STATES AND KING HASSAN

Mr. HAMILTON. Are we too close to King Hassan of Morocco?

Mr. ZARTMAN. It's hard to be not close to the King in Morocco. And, therefore, I don't think we are too close to the King in Morocco. Being farther away from the King and actively cultivating an opposition force would be a very difficult position to maintain.

Mr. HAMILTON. You think we have no alternative but to work closely with him?

Mr. ZARTMAN. I think, as I understand—

Mr. HAMILTON. Is there anything we can do to encourage him to broaden political participation. As I understand it, not much has happened since that coup d'état attempt last summer in terms of his really buckling down and moving his country forward. Surely we are disappointed with that. Is there anything we can do or are we stymied?

Mr. ZARTMAN. I think, although there may be very little we can do, I think it is important to keep on talking as we talk with the Moroccan Government about, as you put it, getting the country moving.

It is unlikely that we would see immediate results but that is not an argument for not saying anything. I think it is important to keep contact with all the political forces in the country and Morocco's opposition is a loyal opposition and therefore, it is possible to keep contacts. To the best of my knowledge our diplomatic service is in contact with political life in Morocco.

KENITRA FACILITY

Mr. HAMILTON. I noticed in your biography that you served at Kenitra. What is your impression of that facility? Should we maintain that base? Would we be better off to close it? What kind of impact does it have?

Mr. ZARTMAN. I think that we did very well in the past during the liquidation period of our bases in Morocco. This left a generally favorable impression of our policy in this area. This base that we now hold in Kenitra and the two communication facilities are unofficial bases in some sense of the word. The base in Kenitra is under the Moroccan flag and the Americans are there. I do not think the base is terribly important from my understanding of strategic military considerations. If it becomes such an important issue, if it becomes a more political issue, I would see no problem in liquidating it, liquidating our presence.

It is an issue that is mentioned from time to time. I do not feel that it is that important at the present time. I think we should therefore be ready to leave gracefully if the pressure becomes very great.

Mr. HAMILTON. It is not, then, a source of tension so far as you know between the two countries?

Mr. ZARTMAN. Not between the two countries. It is an issue that is mentioned from time to time by the opposition. The opposition looks around for indirect issues. Its main concern is participation in the Government. These are secondary issues rather than primary issues.

FUTURE ECONOMIC TIES

Mr. HAMILTON. Both of you stress in your statements the focus of these countries will be on the question of development in future years. What direction will they be looking in terms of their economic ties? Are they going to be looking to the Middle East, to Europe, to the United States or to Africa? What is their economic orientation going to be in the future or can't you answer that in any specific way?

Mr. ZARTMAN. Their foreign economic orientation is toward diversification and the maintenance of markets. And all of them have looked to trade with all regions of the world, including the Communist countries, expansion of trade and diversification of trade within Europe, that is, moving from France alone to other European countries, and also expansion with other parts of the world, including the United States.

This is very important to them as they develop an economic base for their own economic self-reliance.

In the domestic direction of their economy, Morocco has a controlled economy with a large free enterprise sector. Tunisia is more of a mixed economy and Algeria, largely state economy with nevertheless some small and encouraged free enterprise among the Algerians.

Each seems committed to its particular mix of state and private activity and given the structure of the society, this seems to be a good bet for economic effort.

PRIMARY ECONOMIC LINKS WITH EUROPE

Mr. QUANDT. Let me add a comment to that. I think it is clear the states of North Africa will continue having their primary economic links with Europe. Europe has been their traditional natural market. They will sell their oil there, those that have oil. They understand how to do business with Europeans perhaps better than they do with others. So I would think that will continue. Certainly Africa and the Middle East do not pose any comparable opportunities for any of the states of North Africa in terms of economic ties. The only area where we may see some shift is on the part of Algeria and Libya, both of which may send an increasing amount of their resources to the United States, and in return will purchase U.S. technology. Quite high-level technology, in fact.

I would guess that these two countries, particularly Algeria which has been very heavily dependent on France in the past, will continue to pursue a policy of diversification, not only by seeking markets in other European countries and to some degree the Soviet Union, but increasingly in the United States as well.

It is the European and Western economies that are likely to be the most attractive to all of these North African countries. The disadvantage of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries is that they tend to trade on a barter basis. They do not provide hard currency and the products which they will exchange for North African oil and gas are often seen by North Africans as inferior goods to those they can get in Western Europe and in the United States.

SOVIET PRESENCE

Mr. HAMILTON. What kind of a presence does the Soviet Union have in their countries? In answering that, you might comment specifically on Soviet presence at Sidi Yahya, Sidi Bouknade, and Mers Al-Kebir in Algeria.

Mr. QUANDT. The Soviet presence in North Africa, with the exception of Egypt, is not particularly strong. In Morocco and Tunisia, the two regimes maintain minimally correct diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, but there is no particular warmth or closeness in those ties.

Algeria receives the bulk of its military equipment from the Soviet Union. It has since 1963. However, it also receives some from France and gets military training from France. Algeria has the largest Soviet presence in the area, but it is in no sense on the verge of becoming a major client or satellite of the Soviet Union. The Algerians are very proud of their independence. They have had a number of quarrels with the Soviet Union at various times. They have not been on particularly close terms in recent years, although economically they continue to do business with the U.S.S.R.

With respect to the naval base at Mers al-Kebir, as far as I know there is no evidence that the Soviets have any base rights or that the

Algerians would allow them to acquire such rights. The Algerians have consistently denied that they will allow Mers al-Kebir to become a Soviet base. The French have a very keen interest in what takes place there and in fact seem to have an arrangement with the Algerians that gives them some say over the use of the base. They have shown no signs of concern by the Soviet presence there. The French have not indicated that any base is under construction or being developed in Algeria for the use of the Soviet Union.

The Soviets are allowed to make port calls in Algeria. They also have exercised this privilege in Morocco and Tunisia and other countries in the area on a straightforward basis. I don't anticipate any acquisition by the Soviet Union of any military forces in the North African countries.

SOVIET UNION AND LIBYA

Finally, with respect to Libya, you may know that the regime there has been very critical of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union's Middle East policy. Very harsh words have been passed back and forth between the two countries. Nonetheless, the Libyans do buy some military equipment from the Soviet Union. It seems quite unlikely that the Libyans would sacrifice their independence by allowing the Soviets to exercise greater influence in Libya than they now do.

Mr. ZARTMAN. Everything I know completely conforms with what my colleague said about Mers al-Kebir as well as the rest. The Soviet presence in Morocco and Tunisia is minimal and correct. In Algeria it is larger than minimal but still correct. There are about 2,000 technicians in Algeria including military technicians. But then there are 6,000 French of various kinds in Algeria as well.

Algerians have a funny way of looking at foreign technicians. They look at them as resources, as computers to be tapped and keep them at arms length in any kind of political or even social relations. And whether the adviser is a Frenchman or a Russian or even an American management expert, he is there for his expertise and the Algerians are intensely nationalistic about who holds the reins of political command.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Diggs.

Mr. DIGGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Quandt, you are employed by the Rand Corp. For the record, could you just briefly tell us what the Rand Corp. is and what it does and whether or not it has any projects that are relevant to the subject under discussion?

Mr. QUANDT. I opened my statement, Mr. Diggs, by saying that I was appearing in a private capacity and was not reporting on any Rand research. I have done no research on North Africa at the Rand Corp., which, as you doubtless know, is a private nonprofit research corporation which receives the bulk of its funding from Government sources, largely the Defense Department; Rand is increasingly moving into new areas of domestic research. It has no programs for research on North Africa, and only minimal research on vaguely related topics such as developments in the Middle East.

OSU AND ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

Mr. DIGGS. I would like to advance the next question for response from both of you gentlemen. As you know, the new president of

the OAU, the Organization of African Unity, is King Hassan. One of the resolutions that was passed at their last meeting praised Egypt for its moderation in the Middle East and strongly condemned Israel for what it characterized as its continued occupation of Arab territories and called on all states to cease supplying any military assistance to Israel.

Now, that is a much more aggressive statement than the OAU has adopted in the past on the question of the Middle East. I would like to get an assessment from both of you gentlemen as to the implications that this might suggest. Does this, for example, suggest that the OAU is going to become more actively involved in the Middle East question as opposed to the relative neutrality or passivity that has characterized them in the past?

Just what are the implications of this? Is it just tied to the fact that King Hassan is more aggressive on the question of the Israeli subject as opposed to his predecessor? I hope you can respond to this because it could have some very serious implications in terms of the posture of Africans relative to the Middle East questions at the U.N. and at other international forums and, for those who, in the United States, might look to the OAU for some kind of guidance with respect to the black perspective, it also has implications that might heat up some domestic reactions in this whole area.

NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND PALESTINIAN ISSUE

Mr. ZARTMAN. I think that the standards of both the current and the previous president of the OAU have much to do with their domestic situation. First of all, Mauritania has long been trying to emphasize its Arab nature as against its background of a state of French West Africa. That was responsible for its strong interest in the Palestine problem.

On the other hand, there is no doubt of the Arab nature of Morocco. There is some doubt of its militancy against its moderate, sometimes stagnant, governmental situation and it is largely in terms of domestic policy that the King I think is taking this stand.

That is one point. Second, the Arab States, Arab-African States have long tried to push stronger and stronger resolutions, particularly led by Egypt, within the OAU and they have, as you pointed out, gotten the strongest resolution at this point, particularly since the leadership for this resolution came from Morocco.

Hassan himself claims credit for it. I think this should be seen within the context of international politics, interstate politics in Africa, and particularly between black and Arab-African States, rather than as a voice of black Africans or black people, state leaders speak for a larger black population in the world.

It is likely that the OAU's activities will be limited to this kind of resolution and I think the Arab States are looking for some kind of support.

More important would be changes of individual states under the pressure of friends analysis such as the change of the stand in Uganda, for example.

AFRICAN HEADS OF STATES MIDDLE EAST MISSION

Mr. QUANDT. I might add that without any particular pressure from North African regimes such as Morocco or Algeria, a number of African leaders undertook to mediate the Arab-Israeli dispute last year and on their own volition came to the conclusion that they should press for the implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolution. They took a position that Israel found to be hostile. This was advised by one of the most moderate black African leaders and I think it represented an opinion that they had reached without particular pressure from the Arab States.

On their own, some black African leaders have shown an inclination to support a Middle East settlement that one could say was not on Israeli terms but was somewhat closer to the preferred Egyptian solution. When the question came up in the OAU, there was already support for a more militant position on the issue. Advocates of this position included some of the African countries which had tried to mediate between Egypt and Israel and had concluded that the main obstacle to a settlement was Israeli reluctance to evacuate Arab territory.

RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS

Mr. DIGGS. You touched upon the relationship between the North African states. Could you expand on that to include their relationship with their neighbors and particularly their relations with other countries where there is a high percentage of members of the Islamic faith? Is there anything in the winds from your vantage point, that would appear to suggest a prospective link between the North African states and these other countries that have based upon a religious affinity?

Mr. ZARTMAN. I think that North African relations with the black African area are likely to continue to be low-key state-to-state relationships as they have in the past since about 1965.

In the pre-OAU period, as I mentioned in my statement, Africa was important to these states, particularly for territorial issues. Since then they have devolved into rather normal state-to-state relationships. There are cultural ties and these remain important as well as they form the matter or the basis of state-to-state relationships.

There is a magnificent mosque in Dakar that was built by Moroccan technical assistance and is in Moroccan style and is a very strong reminder for anybody who sees it of the ties across the Sahara that have gone on for a good thousand years. But as to closer ties to any kinds of regionalism, any kind of institutionalized link with the OAU, the basis for this is simply not present.

There may be political activities: Libya has been very interested in the Chad movement, for example; Morocco had warm relationships with Mali at an earlier period when foreign relations were important under the territorial issue. But these are minimal matters at the present time and in the foreseeable future.

SPANISH SAHARA

Mr. DIGGS. Can I get your assessment of matters relating to the Spanish Sahara, that is, related to Morocco, for example, and what you

think, if there was a referendum in that area, would be the result. If those people had a chance to make some specific determinations would they join with Morocco, or just what is your assessment?

Mr. ZARTMAN. Spanish Sahara is a terribly complex problem. Figures vary widely but there are probably 5,000 permanent inhabitants of Spanish Sahara. There are probably 35,000 people if you count them at a particular time, but they move from the area of Mali all the way up through the Spanish Sahara, Mauritania, Algeria, into markets in southern Morocco. Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania, as you know, have agreed some years ago to bury the hatchet and to form a common front for the independence of Spanish Sahara and a referendum that would give it an independent government, which is really pushing the problem off in the future. It is difficult to see Spanish Sahara as an independent self-governing territory. It is worse than poor.

Which way it would vote if then it were asked to join with one party or the other is an impossible question and it depends on the freedom of the vote, not only in political controls, but also on the frame of mind as they perceive the problem at a particular time and also who among these moving population votes. Also when is the vote held and are they there or in some other country of the region at the time?

The problem is complicated by the existence of phosphates in the territories as well and this makes all of the three countries interested in the natural resources as well as the people. The tripartite front for the liberation of Spanish Sahara was certainly a wise move in that it stopped sterile bickering among the three countries but it pushes the problem off into the future, in a very unforeseeable future.

Mr. DIGGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Buchanan.

IMPORTANCE OF OIL AND GAS

Mr. BUCHANAN. You have indicated, Mr. Quandt, the increasing importance of oil from Libya and Algeria, natural gas to the United States, understanding the energy crisis in this country, and the shortage of our resources and our problems with ecology, and the other aspects of the growing energy crisis in this country, it does seem quite likely that we will have to look to the Near East and North Africa increasingly and become increasingly dependent upon this part of the world for a portion of our oil and natural gas.

Mr. DIGGS. Also, the rest of Africa, too.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Quite so. As is already the case of course with Europe. Now, I wonder from your statement, (a), one of the toughest foreign policy questions we face is that of what to do in and about the Near East. We have a friendship with Israel that is important to many people in this society, which many of us feel we ought to sustain.

We have because of that friendship, however, significant problems with other states of the Near East and Arab States more generally. We have the problem of how we protect our interest in terms of countries with significant oil and natural gas reserves, and at the same time, live up to our obligations, what we feel to be a responsibility to the nation of Israel and to the question of protection of its rights.

Is it fair to assume from your statement, that it would be your feeling—and I will appreciate your comment also Mr. Zartman—that the questions of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which appear at times to be composed of insoluble problems and irreconcilable differences are not quite as decisive in these states in terms of possibly complicating our ability to obtain this needed resource and the possibility of its being used as a weapon against our country for political purposes or in the politics of the Near East. Would you comment on the degree of its importance against such questions as economic development and their desire to maintain relations with countries like our country.

ACCESS TO RESOURCES IN LIGHT OF U.S. POLICY

Mr. QUANDT. I think that your assumption that the Arab-Israeli issue is a less burning one in North Africa than in the Middle East is by and large true, despite rhetorical support of and an obvious affinity for the Arab position. The states of North Africa see this as a more remote issue than do those immediately concerned and whose territory is occupied. I think, however, that the implication that we can disregard the possible adverse reactions of the North African countries to our Middle East policies is not completely warranted.

Algeria after all did break diplomatic relations with us in 1967, on the basis of misinformation about our role in that war. If there were to be a conflict in which we became directly involved militarily on behalf of Israel, I think this would jeopardize our relations with all Arab States, whether in North Africa or elsewhere, and certainly would raise the possibility of their trying to use oil and gas as a weapon against the United States.

Now, short of that degree of support of Israel—and I think we all hope it will never come to a conflict where the United States will have to face that decision—short of that degree of involvement, it seems as if we can continue to support Israel and still do business with the North African Arab countries. In fact, even in some of the other Arab countries we have managed to continue to deal with them constructively, despite their obvious disagreement with our Middle East policy.

I would guess that because of the very great importance of the export of natural gas for Algeria and oil for Libya, that they will be concerned about continuing the flow of capital into their countries that they get from these resources. In anything short of a crisis in which the United States becomes militarily involved on Israel's behalf, they will not try to boycott the United States. In addition, it is very difficult to use oil and gas as a weapon against a country the size of the United States. Our degree of dependence on any given Arab Middle East country will never be terribly large. Right now, of course, our oil and gas imports are quite low. They probably should be higher on economic grounds, but we have limited these imports for considerations of national security. I think, however, that we need to take a good hard look at this security argument.

U.S. ENERGY NEEDS

We have paid a very high price for using our scarce domestic energy resources and refusing to import inexpensive foreign supplies.

Many economists would argue we should try to conserve and harbor our own resources for that day when a real crisis comes when we need control over energy and in times of noncrisis we should take advantage of the fact that we can get oil from the Middle East at rather low prices.

Prices for natural gas from north Africa are still somewhat higher than U.S. domestic sources, partly because domestic gas prices are artificially low. But in the coming decade, we will probably find that gas imports from North Africa are to our economic advantage. And, since we are so concerned with the environment and ecology, as you have mentioned, natural gas is a very attractive fuel, and I think we will, therefore, find ourselves desiring to import it from Algeria, and perhaps Libya, in the future. Under most conceivable conditions, I would guess that both Algeria and Libya would honor contracts that they would sign for delivery of these fuels.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Certainly, we have a present or projected shortage of natural gas when you combined industrial demands with that for private individual homes. I think that already we are confronted with something near rationing in this country. So that would imply that the Algerian resources could become important to our country, and as you indicated, I think there are some arrangements in progress for liquefaction and transport to the United States. I think there are contracts in existence of some size.

Mr. QUANDT. That is correct.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Zartman?

Mr. ZARTMAN. I have nothing to add.

IMPORTANCE OF AREA TO UNITED STATES

Mr. BUCHANAN. Let me ask, part (b) then, Mr. Chairman, if I still have time. Along the same line, if these countries are maybe of growing importance to us as a source of oil and natural gas, and if this is true also, Mr. Chairman, of other countries of Africa, does not this indicate a basis that this area may be more important to us than otherwise might be indicated, and that such things as continuing aid or whatever assistance may be appropriate, could become a significant importance to our economic interest and our national interest. Would you comment on that possibility?

Mr. ZARTMAN. I think this adds another reason of importance to us, and it adds to what has been a long-time interest in the whole Mediterranean area. The trade of oil is important to them as well as to us even if it is not our major source of oil imports, and therefore, it is of mutual benefit, a mutual interest between the United States and that area.

Mr. QUANDT. I would like to comment on the suggestion that in order to cultivate our growing interests in North African oil and gas we may have to get more deeply involved in aid transfers to some of the countries of North Africa. I do not think that we have to provide them with grant economic or military assistance in order to trade with them. In fact, the oil and gas rich countries are really not in need of the type of help that we provide under grant assistance.

What they do need for some of their industrialization is access to credit which they have been getting at regular commercial rates of interest. This type of aid, if you wish to call it that, access to credit

interest, access to American technology, is all that we really need to provide in order to see them develop their energy resources.

I do not think we need to bring up the specter of large-scale grant aid programs to any of the countries in this area, with the exception of the one without many resources of its own; namely, Tunisia, and there what is required there is a small program, not designed to keep any vital resources flowing to the United States, but simply to encourage a political experiment that has been quite impressive over the last decade.

Mr. ZARTMAN. The nice thing about Tunisia is that it has used aid well. The nice thing about Algeria is that it has not needed that much aid.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Bingham.

Mr. BINGHAM. I have no questions.

EL PASO-ALGERIAN NATURAL GAS DEAL

Mr. HAMILTON. What is the status, Mr. Quandt, of the El Paso-Algerian natural gas agreement? An article which appeared in the Washington Post a few days ago talked about some difficulties regarding prices. The Federal Power Commission had set prices and, according to the article, they jeopardized the entire deal. Could you bring us up to date on that matter? Algeria has been waiting quite a while, haven't they, for this deal to be concluded?

Mr. QUANDT. That is right, Mr. Chairman. The original contract between the Algerian National Petroleum Co., Sonatrach, and El Paso, was signed in October of 1969, almost 3 years ago, and it was for the delivery of a very substantial quantity of liquefied natural gas to the east coast of the United States, 10 billion cubic meters per year for 25 years. Since that time, the contract was revised upward by 50 percent and during the past year the major issue has been whether the Federal Power Commission would approve the import of this natural gas, which admittedly would be priced higher than current natural gas in the United States. The delivery of the gas, however, was projected for around 1975, and it is difficult to know what gas prices will be at that time, given the short supply of gas at present. Well, it took a very long time for the Federal Power Commission to hold hearings and to approve conditionally the import of this gas. I must say in all candor, I think we lost a good deal of political mileage that we might have gotten out of the deal by the lengthy administrative and bureaucratic delays which, rightly or wrongly, the Algerians were unable to understand, especially once the State Department, the Defense Department and the White House had all approved that import of the gas. Finally, the Federal Power Commission did very recently conditionally approve the import of the gas, but the conditions which they set have been criticized by El Paso.

The conditions were essentially that the Federal Power Commission would be able to review the price agreement, and if prices did not reach anticipated levels by the time the imports were going to come into the country, the Federal Power Commission would be able to revise prices of the imported gas downwards. This meant that the guaranteed quantities of gas that the Algerians were promising to deliver could be placed in question in case prices did not reach the anticipated levels.

SITUATION NOW ON DEAL

The Algerians want a guaranteed market as part of the contract that will extend over a 25-year period. El Paso likewise wants this, and they have protested the Federal Power Commission's decision in this respect and have appealed it for reconsideration, asking that the Commission not insist on this clause whereby the quantity delivered could be jeopardized if cheaper sources of gas were found.

I am not sure whether this undermines the project or not. If it does, I think this will have very serious political consequences in the short run, since the Algerians have been counting heavily, and have been given every reason to count heavily, on this agreement with the United States.

Until the Federal Power Commission reviews its decision, we will have no idea as to what the financial arrangements would be. I would think, and personally would hope, that an agreement could be worked out, because I think that this type of economic tie, which is bound to be mutually beneficial, is the kind of arrangement that we want to see developing between the United States and countries such as Algeria which do have resources and which are dedicated to rapid development. I hope that the El Paso deal with Algeria does not turn out to be another failure of U.S. foreign policy comparable to the Aswan Dam affairs with Egypt in 1956.

Mr. HAMILTON. What kind of time frame do we now face as the Federal Power Commission reviews the matter at the request of the parties?

Mr. QUANDT. I think there is an agreement to review the case quite rapidly. There are problems on the Algerian side since they have signed contracts which have escalation clauses in them if they cannot begin construction of the liquefaction plants soon. Naturally, the Algerians are anxious to get a final go-ahead so that they can begin construction of the necessary plants without paying further penalties to their contractors.

El Paso also has to confirm orders on the tankers, so there is considerable economic pressure for an urgent decision, and given the very lengthy delays that have taken place up until this time—nearly 3 years since the initial contract was signed—I think that the Federal Power Commission will act expeditiously, and hopefully the agreement will go through in the next month or 2.

Mr. HAMILTON. Why is the Federal Power Commission so slow to act?

ROLE OF FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION

Mr. QUANDT. There have been challenges by domestic gas producers, arguing that this gas is not necessary and that it is excessively expensive. I think most producers and those who service the consumers, particularly on the east coast, do not subscribe to that argument. They believe that the gas which they can now acquire at a relatively low price, comparatively speaking, from the Algerians, will be competitive by the time it begins to arrive in the United States, in 1975 or 1976, and if the contract has to be negotiated because of delays, the price will go higher to the disadvantage of consumers.

But, inevitably, in a competitive domestic gas producing situa-

tion, some of El Paso's rivals have protested the import of this gas saying that it will erode some of their own markets.

Mr. BINGHAM. I am puzzled by a couple of aspects of that. Why would the competition be concerned about gas that would be brought in at a higher price, if that is the condition that it is concerned with?

Mr. QUANDT. I am not sure of the full argument they presented to the Federal Power Commission. They may fear that El Paso is going to make very large profits by having a guaranteed market, and that they will be excluded from comparable profits because they may be selling their gas at a relatively lower price in other parts of the country, while El Paso, with a guaranteed market and prices approved by the Federal Power Commission will be making very large profits. I know this is one element of their challenge.

Mr. BINGHAM. Did the arrangement involve an agreement that El Paso will be able to sell the gas domestically at a higher price than the current price allowed other producers?

Mr. QUANDT. The issue of cost did come up. The import costs of the gas would—if El Paso is not to lose money on the deal—force them to sell the gas at a higher rate than the current rather low price for natural gas. Their argument has been, in view of shortages in the United States, that gas is priced artificially low and that by 1975, if—

Mr. BINGHAM. I understand that, but is there in the total deal any assurance to El Paso that it will be able, that it will be permitted to sell the gas at that higher price. It would seem on the surface as if the risk were El Paso's. If El Paso is prepared to contract, to purchase the gas at the relatively high import price, then, the risk is El Paso's as to whether it can resell the gas at higher than the current domestic price if the domestic price has not advanced.

Mr. QUANDT. I may be wrong, but I believe that domestic gas prices are not simply a function of a free competitive economy. I believe they are fixed by the Federal Power Commission. Consequently, the prices in the purchasing area would have to be settled upon in advance in order for the full agreement to go through, and in this case, since the argument is that gas cannot be provided from any other source because of scarcity, El Paso is obviously insisting that it be assured of recovering its costs.

Mr. BINGHAM. If that is the case, I understand. In other words, El Paso is looking for an assurance that it will be permitted to sell the gas at a price high enough.

Mr. QUANDT. Right.

DEAL AND U.S. INTERESTS

Mr. HAMILTON. Your view is it is in our national interest to proceed with this arrangement as promptly as possible.

Mr. QUANDT. My personal view is, yes. I think it is very likely to make good economic sense for the United States. Although it covers only a small portion of our overall need, it certainly is a worthwhile type of relationship to have with Algeria. Although the Algerians do not stand to make a great deal of money from the contract, their stake is very large in this arrangement. I think that over time the volume of exports could be substantial and it is likely that by the mid- and late 1970's the current price that is being debated will look rather

low. If the contract is implemented over its 25-year period, I think it will probably be a good bargain for the United States.

LIBYAN POLITICAL SITUATION

Mr. HAMILTON. The paper this morning reports a shift in the Libya Revolutionary Command Council. Evidently, Colonel Qadhdhafi is no longer premier and president. He has resigned his premiership, and this comes about according to this article because of a serious dispute within the council.

Did we have any, or did you have any anticipation of this development there, and the second part of the question, what does it mean?

Mr. ZARTMAN. It would be nice to say that I wrote an article last week predicting this kind of thing. I cannot say I had anticipation. I think is a logical kind of situation. Qadhdhafi is a flamboyant and for that reason attractive international figure who has done relatively little besides set out some principles within Libya, particularly with the oil wealth of Libya.

It is hard to tell how much of this oil wealth has been used in ways that he has claimed, support for various kinds of movements throughout the world including specifically the Irish. But it is rather clear that even the weak attempts at planning under the monarchial government have not been continued or certainly expanded to the benefit of the Libyan society.

There is cause, then, or at least there is a good subject for a debate.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think it was a lack of progress domestically that brought about the change? What is your interpretation of the change?

Mr. ZARTMAN. Debate over the use and allocation of resources that are available in Libya and over a firm direction of policy within the state. The state machinery has slowed down and certainly after the coup for a number of years was paralyzed until people found out what direction the government was moving in and government activity toward economic development has not picked up strongly within Libya.

I think that is a basis of the debate between Jallud and Qadhdhafi. Jallud is a much more pragmatic, hard-nosed, less flamboyant leader.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you see the hand of Egypt in this at all?

Mr. ZARTMAN. I have no reason to suspect the hand of Egypt in there. It could or could not be. It could be well explained by a debate that has gone on for some time between these two figures. I think it is not outlandish to say that Jallud is to Qadhdhafi what Boumedienne is to Ben Bella. Their styles are similar.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Diggs, you had some further questions?

ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH EUROPE

Mr. Diggs. If I might, Mr. Chairman, I wanted to find out from Mr. Zartman a little more detail about a reference he made on page 7 of his statement. The association with the Common Market represents a controversial delicate relationship for ex-colonies. I would like to know from him if there are any particular factors in this arrangement that might be applicable to a significant degree to the micro-Maghribi

states; whether or not this might frustrate the prospect of some kind of economic integration among those states.

I am reminded that the consultative committee in 1967, among other things, had plans for a union between the Maghribi countries and Libya and they were also talking about a bank in those days. I just wonder whether or not all of this is going up in smoke now as one of the byproducts of the common market development.

Mr. ZARTMAN. First of all, I would think an association would be a positive factor toward integration, in the sense that I have been talking about it rather than with Europe, integration among the North African states.

By pooling their resources and their diplomatic strength deciding on allocation of markets among themselves, deciding among priorities, they would be moving toward living and working together. And strangely enough among countries that have lived side-by-side for so long there are inherent barriers simply of suspicion, as I have pointed out, toward living and working together, particularly in regard to their Association.

As I mentioned I think it is very significant and I would say—I have argued in print—that they would do much better by cooperating together, by joint negotiations and yet they are the countries who insist on parallel separate negotiations with the EEC. The more they are forced situationally to combine their policies in dealing with the EEC, the closer they can move together in working together and toward a rational allocation of their own resources.

Secondly, reference to ex-colonies here was to underline the fact that this is really a very pragmatic step to be able to negotiate with the Europeans now after having broken political ties from the colonial period and that they are not moving now toward integration with Europe or membership in some way in the EEC. They are moving toward short-term ties of mutual benefit.

Now, third, there is a debate in some North African countries, particularly in Morocco, over the direction of these ties and the values of these ties. The opposition in Morocco could question that there is value in association and it is afraid that there will be a continued type of colonial type association in the economic sense, that is development of dependency on markets in Europe up to the point where Europe becomes self-sufficient in Mediterranean products, leaving North Africa in a very vulnerable situation.

This criticism was very useful to the North African Government because it strengthened their handling in negotiating with Europe and helped them guard against this type of dependency. This is important. This is a short-term association among two protective groups. Europe is trying to develop its autarchy as much as the North African area is trying to develop their economies.

I don't think it is my view that this is a dangerous association. This is a useful one if the North African states keep their eyes open about the long-term consequences and guard against overdependence and second, if they work closely together.

ROBERTO ALIBONI ARTICLE

Mr. Diggs. Mr. Chairman, a gentleman by the name of Roberto Aliboni wrote a paper a couple of months ago on Europe and Maghrib

where he discusses this whole question of the internal equilibrium of that region and the implications that it has with respect to the EEC.

I would like at this point to ask unanimous consent that this paper be made a part of the record and included in the appendix of the hearings.

Mr. HAMILTON. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The document referred to appears on p. 215.)

Mr. HAMILTON. Any questions, Mr. Buchanan?

Mr. BUCHANAN. No.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Bingham.

Mr. BINGHAM. No, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony and your response to our questions.

The subcommittees stand adjourned until 2 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 11:55, the subcommittees adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m., July 19, 1972.)

THE STATES OF NORTH AFRICA IN THE 1970'S

WEDNESDAY, JULY 19, 1972

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON AFRICA AND THE NEAR EAST,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittees met at 2 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa) presiding.

Mr. Diggs. The joint subcommittees will come to order.

The Subcommittees on the Near East and on Africa will continue this afternoon their joint inquiry about U.S. policy vis-a-vis the states of North Africa.

INTERESTS OF SUBCOMMITTEES

Today we are fortunate in having with us a long-time expert with respect to that area, the Honorable David Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. We have asked Mr. Newsom and the Department to inform us about several areas.

The stability of the monarchy in Morocco and what efforts if any, the United States has made to persuade King Hassan to diversify Morocco's leadership since the abortive coup last summer.

The attitude of the United States toward Algeria's leadership and Algeria's domestic and international policies.

We would like also to have discussed and touched upon the prospects for United States-Algerian diplomatic relations and the status of the proposed El Paso-Algerian natural gas arrangement.

We would also appreciate comments on our country's view of what is likely to happen in Tunisia after President Bourguiba's retirement as chief of state in Tunisia.

We are also interested in our country's attitude toward the Libyan Government in light of its provocative statements against our country of rather recent date.

Additionally, we are interested in our country's attitude officially toward the Sudan and the peace agreements between the north and the south of that very large country.

An explanation of current United States policies toward north Africa with respect to economic relations and aid policies would be a useful part of the record, U.S. military relations, with specific discussion on the Kenitra Base in Morocco, the outstanding issues and claims arising from the Wheelus Air Base turnover and, perhaps, in the conclusions some projections about the future, particularly the relations with Arab and sub-Saharan Africa, Chad, Mauritania, Ethiopia, Spanish Morocco, and similar territories.

Mr. Newsom is accompanied this afternoon by Mr. James J. Blake, the Director of the Bureau of North African Affairs; Dorothea Watkins, Deputy Director of the Department of Public Affairs; and Mr. Michael A. Samuels, the legislative management officer for this geographic area.

Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID D. NEWSOM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

(A biographic sketch of Mr. Newsom appears on p. 117.)

Mr. NEWSOM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome this opportunity to meet with you and the members of your subcommittees to discuss our policies toward North Africa. I am impressed by the long agenda which you have presented to me and will seek in this opening statement to cover as many of the points as I can and then look forward to expanding on these points in the questions which follow.

Your joining together for this review is symbolic of the significant way in which the problems and the currents of the Middle East and Africa meet in this area.

I might say that I also have read with interest the very good statements which were presented to the committees yesterday by two distinguished academic experts on the North African scene.

I have been associated with our relations with the Arab world for the better part of my career, going back to service in Iraq in 1951. My North African experience began with my assignment as Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs in the Department of State in 1962 and continued with my appointment as Ambassador to Libya in 1965. I continue to follow events in the area closely against the wider backdrop of my present African responsibilities. I have visited each of the countries we are discussing today several times. I have met all but one of the heads of state. The only one I have not had the opportunity of meeting is Colonel Qadhafi, the present head of state in Libya.

EXECUTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR NORTH AFRICA

As you know, responsibility for our relations with the Arab States of North Africa, except for Egypt, falls within the Bureau of African Affairs. While there is no perfect way to divide the world for such purposes, this has proved a thoroughly feasible organization and has recognized the special links of these countries with the rest of the continent. At the same time we coordinate closely with the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs to insure that our policies take fully into account the fact that these countries are also Arab and inextricably linked as well in culture and interests with the Near East.

Mr. DIGGS. Would the Secretary yield at that point and explain why Egypt is the exception there?

Mr. NEWSOM. Egypt is the exception because of Egypt's very direct and intricate involvement with the Arab-Israeli problem. As one of the principal nations involved in the search for a solution of that problem and it falls, in our view naturally in a bureau which has with-

in it all of the principal and contiguous protagonists in that struggle.

Mr. WHALLEY. May I ask a question, Mr. Diggs.

When was the exception made, what year?

Mr. NEWSOM. The exception——

Mr. WHALLEY. Of Egypt.

Mr. NEWSOM. This goes back, Mr. Whalley, for I guess 15 years anyway. The Bureau of African Affairs was organized out of the Bureau of Near East, South Asian, and African Affairs in 1959, I believe, and it was at that time that the division was made.

COMMON THREADS AMONG COUNTRIES

Now while there are common threads that run through these North African countries they are distinct in character, culture, and background. In our policies we recognize and encourage wider area links but basically we treat them as individual countries. The actual relationships we have with each vary accordingly.

Each of these states is sovereign and jealously independent. No matter how close our relations may be, we recognize this as a fundamental basis for our relations. Their internal affairs are their own. While we may have some marginal influence on the implementation of economic and developmental policies through our aid programs, this does not extend to internal political policies or organizations. The latter is an area in which, in this day and age, our involvement is neither feasible nor consistent with our respect for the national sovereignty and diversity.

With two of the states of the area, Algeria and the Sudan, we do not have diplomatic relations—a circumstance existing since the 6-day Middle East war of 1967.

I might interject here we welcome indications from the Sudan that they are giving serious thought to an early resumption of diplomatic relations with the United States and we would very much welcome this step when it takes place.

With Algeria we take the position that we are prepared to resume relations whenever Algeria decides that it wishes to. Even in the absence of diplomatic relations, our relations with each of these two countries has steadily grown on the basis of developing mutual interests.

MAURITANIA

In the case of Mauritania—a state which was not within the scope of your statement, Mr. Chairman, but which is in a sense Arab and African—it has identified itself increasingly with North Africa because of its Arab and Islamic heritage and the diplomatic relations that had been broken in June 1967, were restored in 1970 with the re-opening of a small American diplomatic mission in Nouakchott and of a small Mauritanian mission in Washington. Our relations with Mauritania are cordial but not extensive. In September 1971, President Ould Daddah visited Washington in his capacity as president of the Organization of African Unity and held useful conversations with President Nixon regarding the status of Nimibia.

The leaders of the area have shown in the past several years a remarkable ability to resolve problems existing among them. While actual economic or political unity may still be a distant dream, their

practical relationships and understanding has steadily grown closer. What seemed like intractable problems 10 years ago are now behind them.

Morocco's recognition of Mauritania in 1969 set aside centuries old claims. Algeria and Tunisia found a common understanding on their frontier and on economic cooperation in 1969. The agreement concluded between Morocco and Algeria in June of this year resolved problems which resulted in actual conflict between the two states in 1963. Sudan, with the help of others, has resolved its 16-year-old internal southern problem. Each one of those, in a world of unresolved disputes, is a remarkable achievement that has received all too little attention in this country.

SPANISH SAHARA

One regional problem that remains is the status of Spanish Sahara which both Mauritania and Morocco claim and in whose eventual disposition Algeria is also interested. Discussions regarding the future of this territory have been held from time to time by the interested governments and in the United Nations. Spain has promised to hold a referendum of the inhabitants of the area to ascertain the wishes of the population regarding their political future, but a date for the referendum has not yet been fixed. One of the principal reasons for the interest of Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria in Spanish Sahara is the territory's economic potential represented chiefly by its substantial phosphate deposits. The territory might also provide a relatively nearby exit point for Algerian exports of iron ore from mines in southwestern Algeria should they be developed in the future.

Now to take up the countries on an individual basis.

RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO

Our relations have traditionally been closest with Morocco and Tunisia. Each has been going through a period of some political uncertainty.

In Morocco, since the abortive coup attempt on July 10 of last year, the King has been seeking new constitutional arrangements which would widen the sharing of governmental responsibilities. He has so far been unable to reach agreement on a more broadly based government with the leaders of the traditional political parties. An additional factor may be elements in the youth of the country who find identity neither with the traditional political parties nor the monarchy. The King, a shrewd political leader in his own right and the inheritor of a very old monarchy, is still very much in control.

Morocco remains one of the largest recipients of U.S. assistance in Africa. In fiscal year 1972, we provided \$50 million in loans and grants, the largest part of this being in Public Law 480 commodities. At the same time, U.S. investment in Morocco, already at the \$47 million mark by December 1971, increased still further.

In the military field, Morocco permits us to utilize frequencies and facilities for U.S. naval communications, although the size of our contingent is being reduced as part of a worldwide reduction of U.S. personnel at similar installations elsewhere. The Moroccan facilities, however, remain an important and integral link in our worldwide communications system. We provide a limited amount of grant aid train-

ing for the Moroccan Armed Forces, as well as credit assistance for the purchase of U.S. military equipment that last year totaled \$15 million.

Morocco is also the site of one of the two principal Voice of America relay points in Africa. The transmitters at Tangier are shared with the Moroccans under arrangements made in 1963.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA IS STRONG FRIEND

In Tunisia we have had a strong friend over many years in President Bourguiba. He recalls early American help to him as a person and to his nation. His moderate views on many issues have been close to ours. After a period of inactivity because of illness he has returned to active leadership in Tunisia, manifested by a vigorous appearance at the Organization of African Unity meeting in Rabat and by a recent state visit to France. During this period the Destourian Socialist Party organization has been considering the question of succession and constitutional changes have been proposed. Under the current provisions of the Constitution the Prime Minister—currently Mr. Nouira—would fill out the remainder of the presidential term; that is, until 1974.

We have for many years made a substantial input into Tunisia's economic development, recognizing the potential of this energetic nation with relatively few natural resources. In fiscal year 1972, our assistance will total about \$43 million, a large part of this representing continuing help to the agricultural sector.

RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA

Three major political differences have affected us in our relations with Algeria since before Algerian independence: Their view of our relations with France during the Algerian war of independence; difference views on Vietnam, Cuba, and the Middle East; their activist role in Third World movements. Relations reached their lowest point when Algeria broke diplomatic relations with us in 1967. The break was further aggravated by the Algerian nationalization of the assets of nine U.S. companies.

Since that time we have worked slowly and realistically to find a common basis for improved relations. This has been found in the growing U.S. need for natural gas from external sources and the Algerian need for capital and markets for that country's extensive hydrocarbon resources.

Within the last few years we have, as a result, seen the settlement, with compensation, of the nine U.S. nationalization cases, a growing involvement in Algeria of U.S. technology and technicians, and an increasing exposure of the Export-Import Bank in Algerian projects. The largest project is one in which the El Paso Natural Gas Co., proposes to purchase a very substantial quantity of gas for U.S. customers from Sonatrach, the Algerian national hydrocarbon company. The purchase from Sonatrach would run at approximately 1 billion cubic feet a day.

The U.S. customers have obtained preliminary approval from the Federal Power Commission for the deal but serious problems of future pricing remain to be worked out. Two other U.S. companies have

contracted to purchase Algerian liquefied natural gas. Conceivably, Algeria by 1985 could be selling half of its natural gas output to the United States.

Meanwhile, diplomatic contact has been developing through the establishment and augmentation of interest sections in each country. Algeria is under the flag of Guinea in this country and we are under the Swiss flag in Algeria.

THE LIBYAN REVOLUTION AND TIES WITH UNITED STATES

The Libyan revolution of September 1969, changed the character of the Libyan-United States relations. The new regime, under the leadership of Colonel Qadhdhafi and a group of young military officers, sees its policies in exclusively Arab terms. It seeks closer cooperation among Arab States and sees that cooperation focused primarily on the cause of the Palestinians and the struggle with Israel. Although strongly anti-Communist the regime is at the same time cool to the United States and Britain because of the stand of these Governments on Arab issues.

The present Libyan Government has, at the same time, sought greater control, greater revenue and greater participation in the production of its basic resource, petroleum. U.S. companies which produce 90 percent of Libya's petroleum are under severe pressure as a result.

The Libyan revolution also ended the previous military relationship with the United States and Britain. We withdrew at the request of the Libyans from Wheelus Air Base as the British withdrew from their base at El Adem. In keeping with the 1954 agreement, permanent construction reverted to the Libyan Government. Movable property was removed except for a small amount which was sold to the Libyans after screening our worldwide requirements. By a recent exchange of notes outstanding agreements were ended and conflicting claims canceled. The Libyans now use the former base as their principal military base in the Tripoli area.

PRESIDENT NUMAYRI

President Numayri of the Sudan has, since he came to power in a military coup in 1969, been charting a delicate course among the various political tendencies of that country, the largest geographically in Africa. Coming to power originally with support from the Sudanese Communists, he broke with them after the abortive coup of July 1971. Relations with the Soviet Union became particularly strained, although those with Communist China did not.

Today he is seeking to build improved relations with all his neighbors, to the south and to the north. He desires to insure the success of the recent agreement on the southern Sudan while at the same time keeping firm ties with Egypt and the Arab world. Because of the complex political and ethnic makeup of the Sudan he has avoided any commitment to join the Confederation of Arab Republics.

The slow improvement in our own relations with the Sudan began after Numayri came to power but predating his break with the Soviets. We see our improved relationship as stemming from a desire on President Numayri's part to resume effective relations with the United States and not only as a counterweight to the Soviet Union.

Most recently we have demonstrated our admiration for the southern settlement and our hope for the future of the Sudan by giving emergency assistance to the Sudan Government for returning refugees in the South. We are making available more than \$4 million in Public Law 480 title II food supplies and are also contributing some \$18 million for food relief through the world food program. Much of our bilateral assistance will be funneled through U.S. voluntary agencies.

ROLE OF NORTH AFRICA

North Africa is the hub of a wheel with spokes to the Near East, to Africa, to Europe, and to us. Its policies need to be seen in all these dimensions.

The countries are drawn to the Near East by their Arab language and culture and by their political concern over Near East issues. At the same time, other interests and priorities are present and none is as completely absorbed in these issue as are the states directly contiguous to Israel.

Each of these states points also toward Africa. Morocco and Mauritania are pressing the question of the Spanish Sahara. King Hassan of Morocco has just succeeded President Ould Daddah of Mauritania as President of the Organization of African Unity. As such he will, for the coming year, be deeply involved in African issues.

Algeria borders on Mauritania, Mali, and Niger. It has always taken an interest, and continues to do so, in the liberation movement in Africa. President Boumedienne recently visited Guinea before his attendance at the OAU meeting in Rabat.

Tunisia has always taken a great interest in African issues and a significant role in the OAU. Libya has increasingly interested itself in sub-Saharan Africa through expressions in the past of support for Muslim populations in other states and opposition to what it regards as Israeli influence detrimental to the Arab cause in Africa. President Numayri is striving to unite the Sudan as the recent agreement with the southerners has shown. In this endeavor he has been aided by other African states, the good offices of the Imperial Ethiopian Government and the personal efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie.

TIES WITH EUROPE

Relations with Europe have always been of great importance, particularly to the three states of Maghrib: Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. They remain so today. Europe is the principal market and the principal source of supplies. Relationships of these nations with the European Common Market become increasingly important to them.

Common Market relations with Mediterranean countries are in a state of flux. Existing trade arrangements are to be modified as a result of the enlargement of the community and the proposed changes in relations between the community and the European Free Trade Area countries remaining outside. For the longer run, the community has under active consideration a coherent "Mediterranean policy" embracing the countries from Spain to Israel and including the Arab States.

Algeria, particularly, is also manifesting more and more interest in questions of European and Mediterranean security and is expressing a desire for Maghrib participation in any European security conference.

I have already outlined how the relationship of each of these states with us is also important, whether for reasons of investment, trade or aid. I believe they will remain so. Though our direct relationship to the political events of this area may continue to diminish, though these countries may become increasingly allied to Europe economically, strong bases of common interest between the United States will remain. Our policies for the future will be designated to develop those common interests into strong and realistic links across the Atlantic.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Newsom follows:)

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID D. NEWSOM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman: I welcome this opportunity to meet with you and the members of your sub-committees today to discuss our policy toward North Africa. Your joining together for this review is symbolic of the significant way in which the problems and the currents of the Middle East and Africa meet in this area.

I have been associated with our relations with the Arab world for the better part of my career, going back to service in Iraq in 1951. My North African experience began with my assignment as Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African affairs in the Department of State in 1962, and continued with my appointment as Ambassador to Libya in 1965. I continue to follow events in the area closely against the wider backdrop of my present African responsibilities. I have visited each of the countries we are discussing today several times. I have met all but one of the Heads of State.

NORTH AFRICA AS AN AREA

As you know, responsibility for our relations with the Arab states of North Africa, except for Egypt, falls within the Bureau of African Affairs. While there is no perfect way to divide the world for such purposes, this has proved a thoroughly feasible organization and has recognized the special links of these countries with the rest of the continent. At the same time we coordinate closely with the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs to insure that our policies take fully into account the fact that these countries are also Arab and inextricably linked as well in culture and interests with the Near East.

While there are common threads that run through these countries they are distinct in character, culture, and background. In our policies, we recognize and encourage wider area links, but basically we treat them as individual countries. The actual relationships we have with each vary accordingly.

Each of these states is sovereign and jealously independent. No matter how close our relations may be, we recognize this as a fundamental basis for our relations. Their internal affairs are their own. While we may have some marginal influence on the implementation of economic and developmental policies through our aid programs, this does not extend to internal political policies or organizations. The latter is an area in which, in this day and age, our involvement is neither feasible nor consistent with our respect for the national political institutions.

OUR REACTIONS

With two of the states of the area, Algeria and the Sudan, we do not have diplomatic relations—a circumstance existing since the Six Day Middle East war of 1967. We take the position with each that we are prepared to resume relations whenever they are. Nevertheless, as I will show, our relations with each have steadily grown on the basis of developing mutual interests.

In the case of Mauritania, a state which has identified itself increasingly with North Africa because of its Arab and Islamic heritage, the diplomatic relations that had been broken in June 1967 were restored in 1970 with the reopening of a small American diplomatic mission in Nouakchott and of a small Mauritanian

mission in Washington. Our relations with Mauritania are cordial but not extensive. In September 1971, President Ould Daddah visited Washington in his capacity as President of the Organization of African Unity and held useful conversations with President Nixon regarding the status of Nimibia.

The leaders of the area have shown in the past several years a remarkable ability to resolve problems existing among them. While actual economic or political unity may still be a distant dream, their practical relationships and understanding has steadily grown closer. What seemed like intractable problems 10 years ago are now behind them.

Morocco's recognition of Mauritania in 1969 set aside centuries old claims. Algeria and Tunisia found a common understanding on their frontier and on economic cooperation in 1969. The agreement concluded between Morocco and Algeria in June of this year resolved problems which resulted in actual conflict between the two states in 1963. Sudan, with the help of others, has resolved its 16-year old internal southern problem. Each one of these, is a world of unresolved disputes, is a remarkable achievement that has received all too little attention in this country.

One regional problem that remains is the status of Spanish Sahara which both Mauritania and Morocco claim and in whose eventual disposition Algeria is also interested. Discussions regarding the future of this territory have been held from time to time by the interested governments and in the United Nations. Spain has promised to hold a referendum of the inhabitants of the area to ascertain the wishes of the population regarding their political future, but a date for the referendum has not yet been fixed. One of the principal reasons for the interest of Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria in Spanish Sahara is the territory's economic potential represented chiefly by its substantial phosphate deposits. The territory might also provide a relatively nearby exit point for Algerian exports of iron ore from mines in southwestern Algeria should they be developed in the future.

Now, to take up the countries on an individual basis.

Our relations have traditionally been closest with Morocco and Tunisia. Each has been going through a period of some political uncertainty.

MOROCCO

In Morocco, since the abortive coup attempt on July 10 of last year, the King has been seeking new constitutional arrangements which would widen the sharing of governmental responsibility. He has so far been unable to reach agreement on a more broadly based government with the leaders of the traditional political parties. An additional factor may be elements in the youth of the country who find identity neither with the traditional political parties nor the monarchy. The King, a shrewd political leader in his own right, and the inheritor of a very old monarchy is still very much in control.

Morocco remains one of the largest recipients of U.S. assistance in Africa. In Fiscal Year 1972, we provided \$50 million in loans and grants, the largest part of this being in PL 480 commodities. At the same time, U.S. investment in Morocco, already at the \$47 million dollar mark by December 1971 increased still further.

In the military field, Morocco permits us to utilize frequencies and facilities for U.S. Naval communications although the size of our contingent is being reduced as part of a worldwide reduction of U.S. personnel at similar installations elsewhere. The Moroccan facilities, however, remain an important and integral link in our worldwide communications system. We provide a limited amount of grant aid training for the Moroccan armed forces, as well as credit assistance for the purchase of U.S. military equipment that last year totaled \$15 million.

Morocco is also the site of one of the two principal Voice of America relay points in Africa. The transmitters at Tangier are shared with the Moroccans under arrangements made in 1963.

TUNISIA

In Tunisia, we have had a strong friend over many years in President Bourguiba. He recalls early American help to him as a person and to his nation. His moderate views on many issues have been close to ours. After a period of inactivity because of illness, he has returned to active leadership in Tunisia, manifested by a vigorous appearance at the Organization of African Unity meeting in Rabat and by a recent state visit to France. During this period, the Destourian

Socialist party organization has been considering the question of succession and constitutional changes have been proposed. Under the current provisions of the Constitution the Prime Minister would fill out the remainder of the Presidential term, that is, until 1974.

We have for many years made a substantial input into Tunisia's economic development, recognizing the potential of this energetic nation with relatively few natural resources. In fiscal year 1972, our assistance will total about \$43 million, a large part of this representing continuing help to the agricultural sector.

Three major political differences have affected us in our relations with Algeria since before Algerian independence—their view of our relations with France during the Algerian war of independence; different views on Viet Nam, Cuba, and the Middle East; their activist role in Third World movements. Relations reached their lowest point when Algeria broke diplomatic relations with us in 1967. The break was further aggravated by the Algerian nationalization of the assets of nine U.S. companies.

Since that time, we have worked slowly and realistically to find a common basis for improved relations. This has been found in the growing U.S. need for natural gas from external sources, and the Algerian need for capital and markets for that country's extensive hydrocarbon resources.

Within the last few years we have, as a result, seen the settlement, with compensation, of the nine U.S. nationalization cases, a growing involvement in Algeria of U.S. technology and technicians, and an increasing exposure of the Export-Import Bank in Algerian projects. The largest project is one in which the El Paso Natural Gas Company proposes to purchase a very substantial quantity of gas for U.S. customers from Sonatrach, the Algerian national hydrocarbon company. The U.S. customers have obtained preliminary approval from the Federal Power Commission for the deal, but serious problems of future pricing remain to be worked out. Two other U.S. companies have contracted to purchase Algerian LNG. Conceivably, Algeria, by 1985, could be selling half of its natural gas output to the United States.

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LIBYA

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The present Libyan government has, at the same time, sought greater control, greater revenue and greater participation in the production of its basic resource, petroleum. U.S. companies which produce 90% of Libya's petroleum are under severe pressure as a result.

The Libyan revolution also ended the previous military relationship with the United States and Britain. We withdrew at the request of the Libyans from Wheelus Air Base, as the British withdrew from their base at El Adem. In keeping with the 1954 Agreement, permanent construction reverted to the Libyan Government. Moveable property was removed except for a small amount which was sold to the Libyans after screening our worldwide requirements. By a recent exchange of notes outstanding agreements were ended and conflicting claims cancelled. The Libyans now use the former base as their principal military base in the Tripoli area.

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Today he is seeking to build improved relations with all his neighbors, to the south and to the north. He desires to insure the success of the recent agreement on the southern Sudan, while at the same time keeping firm ties with Egypt and the Arab world. Because of the complex political and ethnic make-up of the Sudan, he has avoided any commitment to join the Confederation of Arab Republics.

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RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS

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Each of these states points, also, toward Africa. Morocco and Mauritania are pressing the question of the Spanish Sahara. King Hassan of Morocco has just succeeded President Ould Daddah of Mauritania as President of the Organization of African Unity. As such he will, for the coming year, be deeply involved in African issues.

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FUTURE CHANGES IN ROLE OF OAU

Mr. DIGGS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Now that the OAU is headed by a North African, King Hassan, what changes in emphasis do you foresee, or have you already witnessed that has implications for the Middle East? I have specific reference to the recent Arab-Israeli resolution that seemed to be much stronger than anything that has come out of the OAU previously on that subject.

Mr. NEWSOM. Well, the first thing, Mr. Chairman, is that King Hassan has always manifested an interest in African issues. You may remember that before the Organization of African Unity was formed there was a Casablanca grouping which was a very early indication of King Hassan's interest in some of the African issues. I think we will see the King personally taking an interest in the issues, and naturally I think when he does so he will also be reflecting his own involvement in and concern over Arab issues.

Now the resolution of the Organization of African Unity which was passed on the Middle East question did go further than resolutions previously in supporting a position of requiring Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and seemingly more to endorse an Arab point of view. We are not certain that this stemmed from the fact that it was held in Rabat or that King Hassan was to become the president of the organization as much as it stemmed from the views of the African states present affected in part I think by the involvement of a number of the leaders of African states in the so-called Wisemen's effort last year in which a group of African leaders headed by President Senghor visited Israel and the Arab States.

While there is not unanimity of opinion among the African heads of state on this, I think the resolution reflected some of the views which were in part headed by that group. I think, however, that on an individual basis the African countries are going to continue to make decisions with respect to their relations with Israel and their general attitudes toward the Arab States on the basis of their own past relationships and direct interests.

ROLE OF OAU ON ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

Mr. DIGGS. Do you see a more active involvement on this subject beyond these resolutions?

Mr. NEWSOM. I can't speak for the African leaders involved but I think our impression is that after their examination of the issue last year and the general conclusions they reached in support of Resolution 242 and of the Jarring mission that they don't plan any further initiatives.

Mr. DIGGS. What are your impressions of what appears to be an anti-Israeli opinion among certain elements in the black community of America that has implications with respect to Africa?

Mr. NEWSOM. Mr. Chairman, this is I think a domestic issue certainly outside the immediate scope of foreign policy and it is obviously one on which there has been a considerable debate within the black community in this country. I am not sure it would be appropriate for me to comment on that.

LIBYA'S SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

Mr. DIGGS. Now Libya has recently shown increasingly marked interest and support for liberation movements in Africa. Particularly, she offered a battalion of troops and has been quite critical about policy with respect to other southern African matters. Part of my reference to getting some impressions from the Department with respect to black Americans relates to Libya's recent interest in black Americans where she, as you know, loaned the Black Muslims of the United States \$3 million, as I recall. What is your assessment of this kind of identification at least that this north African country is attempting to establish not only with these very sensitive southern African problems but identifying with a large and significant group right here in our own backyard?

Mr. NEWSOM. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think that Colonel Qadhdhafi has particularly manifested in the speech that he gave on the anniversary of the U.S. withdrawal from Wheelus June 11 his own strong personal views of the interest which he possesses in movements which in his view appear to be related to the preservation and advancement of Islam and the Arab cause throughout the world.

We are aware of the loan which the Libyans have made to the Black Muslims for the construction of a mosque, I think in Chicago, and this strikes us as being the financing of a religious institution by a country interested in the advancement of the Islamic religion in this country and not different from perhaps other financial arrangements that have been made in the past by other religious groups.

We did take exception officially to some of the remarks which Colonel Qadhdhafi made in this speech characterizing the situation of the black community in this country, we felt they were not only inaccurate but an unwarranted intervention in the internal affairs of this country. We don't put those remarks and the loan in the same category.

Mr. DIGGS. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

I thank you for your testimony, Mr. Secretary.

KING HASSAN'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Mr. DIGGS. You state that King Hassan is seeking new constitutional arrangements to widen the sharing of governmental responsibility in that country. Could you for the record be more specific on this and indicate to us what we might do to help persuade His Majesty to diversify the leadership?

Mr. NEWSOM. Following the events of July in what appears to have been an attempted coup in Morocco, the King held a referendum on a new constitution which called for the election of a parliament and for the appointment of a government still, if I am correct, responsible to him but more broadly based than previous governments which had been appointed entirely by the King. It was anticipated after the virtually unanimous passage of this constitutional referendum that he would continue consultations with the leaders of the old political parties, the Istiglal parties, the UNFP, and perhaps even before the elections for the parliament come out with a more broadly based government.

These do not appear to have succeeded although they appear to have come close to succeeding, and it is a little unclear at this point whether the King intends to carry through with the elections in October as he had originally intended.

I think on the question of our involvement in all of this, Mr. Chairman, I have to say that the degree to which the United States can have a direct influence in the political policies being followed by another head of state, and particularly where it involves delicate negotiations with elements within his own country, is very much limited. We have not sought to advise or to make suggestions to the King in a period when he obviously is himself going through some very delicate, and very significant negotiations on the future arrangement of national institutions in Morocco.

CLOSE TIES AND LARGE SUPPORT OF MOROCCO

Mr. Diggs. The general factors that went into the relationship between Morocco and the United States obviously have changed in connection with our military requirements there. This is no longer what it used to be, but yet Morocco is still one of the largest recipients of U.S. assistance. I am curious as to the rationale which, in effect, maintains this country as one of the largest recipients of U.S. assistance in Africa, particularly in view of the feeling on the part of some people that there are one or two other countries in Africa that ought to begin to get some attention. You have already alluded to one.

If we are correct in evaluating the trend of the prospects of restoration of relations with the Sudan as you characterize it, and properly so, as the largest geographical country in all of Africa and involving some 15 million people, we have to think in terms of our aid in that direction. As you further know, I particularly have contended that at least one of the majority ruled southern countries—namely, Zambia—ought to be the recipient of U.S. economic cooperation much more than it is. So, when I ask about the rationale of the continued favorite position of Morocco it is within that context, without trying, of course, to detract from whatever our interests might be in the country.

Mr. Newsom. Yes. I fully understand your point of view, Mr. Chairman.

We have, as you have pointed out, a considerable history of close relationships with Morocco—it goes back actually to the early days of our own revolution.

During World War II we built up a complex of air bases in Morocco by arrangements with the French and continued those bases in the post-war years—actually until 1963 when they were finally phased out. There was a great deal of sympathy in this country for the Moroccan struggle for a new relationship with France and for independence from the French protectorate. Very early after Moroccan independence, not only for reasons of the military bases but for reasons of general sympathy with the Moroccan situation, there was a recognition of the importance of the geographic situation of Morocco, situated as it is at the mouth of the Mediterranean. We began a relationship of quite extensive economic assistance.

Morocco is a country with very considerable potential which justifies in our view this kind of economic input. Much of this input has been in the form of Public Law 480 commodities which has boosted the

total considerably. We provide aid basically because of the recognition of Morocco's location, its basic friendship to us, identity of view with the Moroccans on a number of issues, its proximity to us across the Atlantic and its ability to make use of the assistance that we have been providing.

Mr. Dicks. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

MOTIVATIONS OF KING HASSAN

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned in your statement that King Hassan has been seeking constitutional arrangements to broaden participation in his government. One of our witnesses yesterday raised the question as to whether the King is really sincere. He pointed out that the King's support in Morocco comes from a group of people basically who do not want change and that what we really have in Morocco is some faints and moves and some motion but not much real progress toward reform. The witness suggested that maybe this is what the King wants—motion but not substance.

Do you agree with that observation or disagree with it?

Mr. NEWSOM. Well, it is always difficult, Mr. Chairman, to probe the mind of the ruler of another country. I think it is also true that someone who has had a very substantial degree of power, who may well recognize the need to expand the base of his consultations and the base of his support, still perhaps has limits which he may feel he cannot go beyond even though he may be sincere in his desire to see reforms and to see a new kind of constitutional arrangement.

Mr. HAMILTON. Since the attempted coup d'etat we have not had much progress, have we?

Mr. NEWSOM. We had the referendum in March which was intended to set the stage for new elections and for a more broadly based government, and we had extensive consultation between the King and the leaders of the traditional political parties. Our best reading is that the King wanted to reach agreement with the leaders of these political groups but that the price that they were asking either in terms of positions which they wanted in the government or in terms of specific commitments on his part that we don't know the nature of was too high for him to pay. I don't think one can say over the years when the King has tried various forms of constitutional and governmental arrangements in Morocco, that he is not interested in having a broad base of governmental participation. The problem is achieving it. The result is the difficult part.

UNITED STATES ROLE IN MOROCCO

Mr. HAMILTON. What kind of a role do we play in this situation? You mentioned in your statement that Morocco is one of the largest recipients of our assistance. What has been your role? What has been the role of the State Department in encouraging King Hassan to move toward reform?

Mr. NEWSOM. I think the King is very well aware of our views that in any society a broad base of participation in the government is highly desirable. The degree to which any outside country, whatever its involvement, can be influential is limited—and our involvement

while large is not as large either in terms of investment or involvement with the military as is France.

Mr. HAMILTON. In our approach to the King do we make any suggestion at all that the amount of assistance from us, our aid, is in any way related to progress toward reform?

Mr. NEWSOM. We can and we have discussed with the King reforms in specific areas in which our aid is being provided and we have made progress in some of these areas. We have not discussed our aid in terms of political reforms.

Mr. HAMILTON. What kind of progress are you talking about?

Mr. NEWSOM. Well, in terms of the actual organization and policies to be followed in projects in which our money is directly involved. But in terms of the wider use of aid funds for leverage on political development, we have not tried that and we doubt that it would be successful.

KING HASSAN'S POSITION

Mr. HAMILTON. Some people say we are too closely identified with the King in Morocco. Is this true?

Mr. NEWSOM. We have this problem inevitably when we have a large assistance program and a commonness of interests with a ruler of a country such as Morocco but I think that we also, to the extent that it is possible for a diplomatic mission to do so, have indicated our recognition that there are other political forces in Morocco and in a way that I would hope suggests that we are not opposed to their greater participation if it could be worked out with the King.

Mr. HAMILTON. We have contact with the sources of opposition to the King?

Mr. NEWSOM. We have been in touch frequently over many years with principal political leaders, many of whom are in opposition to the King.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it your judgment the King is very firmly in power and that there is no threat to that power from these opposition forces?

Mr. NEWSOM. Well, I think it is dangerous to make categorical assumptions about the political stability of any country. Certainly the King had a very narrow escape last year but I think our reading is that the King is a shrewd leader, that he has very substantial support as a member of an ancient monarchy, particularly in the countryside in Morocco, that at the moment the armed forces under General Oufkir are loyal to him, and we don't see any immediate violent threats to his regime. As I said in my remarks, however, there are youthful elements growing up in Morocco as there are in every country who perhaps identify neither with the King nor with the traditional political groups and they are certainly to be reckoned with in the future.

EL PASO-ALGERIAN GAS DEAL

Mr. HAMILTON. What is your view of this El Paso-Algerian gas deal? Algeria has been waiting for 3 years for the completion of the deal. They are going to get tired pretty soon, aren't they? Is there any danger that the deal will fall through while the Federal Power Commission deliberates?

Mr. NEWSOM. Well, I would put our view in two categories. First our view as it relates to our relations with Algeria and to our con-

fidence in Algeria as a source of supply. The Secretary of State authorized a letter to the Federal Power Commission, as he was invited to do, indicating that we had no objection to this arrangement on foreign policy grounds and making it quite clear that we considered, in spite of the differences that we had with Algeria and the lack of diplomatic relations, that Algeria was a country to which we could turn for this kind of vital resource.

Now as far as the El Paso deal itself is concerned this has been, as I am sure you know, an arrangement between Sonatrach, the Algerian national hydrocarbon company, and the El Paso Natural Gas Co. which buys the gas from Sonatrach and then in turn sells it to three pipeline companies in this country which are the actual outlets.

The deal grew out of El Paso's own negotiations with the Algerians over the nationalization of their properties in 1967. This deal is a ground-breaking deal in a number of ways but particularly because it would bring into this country for the first time a substantial amount of liquefied natural gas, not just for what are called peak shavings or use at peak loads but as a base supply source. I think the statistics we have shown that if it goes through, that by 1975, 15 percent of the natural gas that we would use east of the Mississippi would come from Algeria.

POTENTIAL OF DEAL

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Secretary, isn't it correct that this is probably the most important economic arrangement we have with North Africa in the country at the present time?

Mr. NEWSOM. Well, it certainly has the potential to be.

Mr. HAMILTON. Why has it moved so slowly?

Mr. NEWSOM. It has moved slowly because—I can't speak for the Federal Power Commission although we have followed its deliberations very closely—but it is my impression that the members of the Federal Power Commission have considered that this is such a major step in terms of making the United States dependent for a fuel energy source on a distant country and on tanker rather than pipeline supply that it has raised a whole host of questions of the basis of pricing, of the regulatory arrangements, of the jurisdiction between the Federal Power Commission and the State regulatory agencies. I think you can appreciate that, therefore, each step of this has necessitated a very thorough examination of both the authority of the FPC and the judgment of the FPC so that this will not be severely challenged in the courts.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think there will or will not be a deal?

FPC AND GAS DEAL

Mr. NEWSOM. As you know, the Federal Power Commission issued its decision on the 28th of June.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, they have been asked to reconsider that.

Mr. NEWSOM. They have now been asked to reconsider. There is a 30-day period for filing to reconsider and the companies have filed for reconsideration. There is another 30-day period in which the board rehears the case. So, if it moves according to the timetable, we understand it is still in our view possible to reach decisions on this case

within the time limit that we understand is possible from the Algerian as well as the El Paso point of view.

Mr. HAMILTON. What is that timetable?

Mr. NEWSOM. Well, I think it involves primarily commitments made to some of the contractors that are going to build the facilities—those commitments which had to be extended.

Mr. HAMILTON. The Federal Power Commission is going to have to change their position, aren't they. As it now stands, the price is too low and both parties are objecting to it; is that not correct?

Mr. NEWSOM. The question is not the price so much, Mr. Chairman, as it is the two aspects of the decision. I again emphasize that I can't speak authoritatively for the Federal Power Commission whose special status in the Federal structure you are very well aware of, but very briefly, one is the requirement that the imported liquefied natural gas would be separated out and sold at a different price from the domestic supplies available to the pipeline companies rather than rolled in so that all of the gas is sold at one price.

Mr. HAMILTON. And a higher price, I presume?

Mr. NEWSOM. It would be sold at a higher price; yes. The companies at least in their discussions with us have taken the position that this is a very difficult basis for them given the very substantial financing that they have to obtain for the deal.

The other problem is that the FPC—

Mr. HAMILTON. Wait. I don't understand that. Aren't the companies joining in this request for reconsideration?

Mr. NEWSOM. They are joining in the request for reconsideration and what they are requesting be reconsidered, among other things, is the FPC determinations that the gas would be sold at two different prices. If I understand it correctly, they wish to be able to roll in the Algerian gas and adjust the prices of the domestic gas so that all of their gas is mingled together and sold at one price.

The other problem is that the FPC has said that in the event that cheaper domestic sources are found, the FPC reserved the right to adjust the price of the El Paso-Sonatrach agreement or the price at which this gas was sold. Here again the companies, at least speaking with us, have stated that this is an unacceptable condition.

Mr. HAMILTON. Does the resumption of United States-Algerian relations depend on this case in any direct way?

Mr. NEWSOM. At one point, Mr. Chairman, we had understood that had this moved rapidly to a conclusion it might have provided the basis for resumption of relations. The time that it has taken, I think, has changed that picture. The Algerians have not been precise with us in what might in their minds, justify a resumption of relations. Certainly if this goes through it will be helpful in this effort but I don't know that it will automatically bring it about.

Mr. HAMILTON. I will yield, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Dicks. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Whalley.

IMPROVEMENT OF U.S. POSITION

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you have had a tremendous lot of experience. You say that you have been associated with the Arab countries since 1951 and in North Africa since 1962. What in your opinion has been the

experience in that period of time in the way of improvement or otherwise with the United States? You talk about the whole for a while and then you talk about individual nations. Taking them on as a whole, are we making any progress?

Mr. NEWSOM. Well, I think perhaps our relations with any part of the world, Mr. Congressman, is a mixed picture and we very much had our ups and downs. If we take two countries of North Africa, Morocco and Tunisia, we have had a good relationship throughout this period.

With Algeria we have had a difficult relationship but since 1967 I think it has been an improving relationship—improving because it is on a pretty solid basis of recognition and a search for common interests between us.

With Libya we had a very good relationship with the monarchy. The monarchy did not survive and our relations with the present regime are difficult.

With the Sudan we had a very good initial relationship. We had a difficult period during the mid-sixties largely I think because of internal Sudanese politics but now again that picture is improving.

I would say that in general, except perhaps for some of the problems we have with Libya, our relations with the North African countries today are as good as they have ever been.

AREA'S NATURAL RESOURCES

Mr. WHALLEY. When did they find oil in Algeria?

Mr. NEWSOM. Well the oil in Algeria goes back I guess to the late fifties. The oil was found there during the French period in Algeria. Oil has never been as important a resource in Algeria as it has been in Libya. Gas has been more important, and I believe the gas discoveries date from the late fifties and they have expanded very rapidly in the late sixties.

Mr. WHALLEY. With the finding of oil and gas in Algeria and Libya, did that worsen the conditions between the United States and those nations? Did they feel then they didn't need the United States as much?

Mr. NEWSOM. In the case of Algeria, I have to say that our relations with Algeria were never terribly close because of some of the basic differences that I stated. Furthermore, the American oil companies that went into Algeria by and large went in in cooperation with French oil companies before the independence of Algeria. This meant that after independence and after the discovery of larger quantities of oil they encountered both the nationalism of Algeria and the handicap of some identification with the French companies.

That combined with the Algerian reaction to the Six-Day War brought about the nationalization of the American companies so that in general it could be said that up until 1967 the discovery of oil and gas presented perhaps more problems than it did solutions. Since then, however, working out compensation for the American companies and working with the new Algerian national companies, the situation has been better.

Now in the case of Libya, American companies were first on the scene in Libya. Oil was first discovered there in 1957, first exported in 1961,

and as I said today American companies produce about 90 percent of Libyan oil.

We have tried to take the position in the Department, and I think generally successfully, that the relationship is fundamentally between the companies and the Libyan Government and even though our own relations may have their problems they don't necessarily affect the relations between Libya and the oil companies. However, the nationalism of this young regime and their desire to control the companies more, to get more revenue from the companies, has brought about difficulties and difficult negotiations between the Libyans and the oil companies. No American companies have been nationalized and today the operating relationships are satisfactory but I think we can anticipate additional pressures in the future.

SOVIET UNION'S ROLE

Mr. WHALLEY. Does Russia step into Algeria and Libya in the oil business and try to make a better arrangement than the American companies, or what happens?

Mr. NEWSOM. The Libyans have made an effort to turn to the Soviets for help, apparently in marketing oil. Libya nationalized the British Petroleum Co. some months ago and has been having difficulty marketing the oil and apparently made some efforts to interest the Soviet Union in this. We don't know the precise results of these efforts and we don't see indications that the Soviet Union is coming into Libya in any major way. The Libyans are not particularly friendly to us but they are also strongly anti-Soviet.

Algeria is a fiercely independent country which has depended upon the Soviets for military equipment but has had a policy of diversifying their economic relationships between East and West and between Europe and the Western Hemisphere to a point where nobody has any particularly strong position in Algeria.

ALGERIA AND FRANCE

Mr. WHALLEY. How about the relationship between Algeria and France since they were both together at one time?

Mr. NEWSOM. This also had its high points and low points. It reached a low point a couple of years ago when the Algerians nationalized—well, I might go back and say that for the first 7 or 8 years of Algerian independence relations with France were satisfactory. The French provided Algeria with substantial technical help, with teachers. There were still unresolved between France and Algeria, problems of claims and counterclaims arising from the preindependence period. Then, in 1971, Algeria nationalized the French oil companies and this brought about a crisis between France and Algeria which resulted in temporary suspension of some of the French help to Algeria. This has finally now been resolved in an agreement between France and Algeria and the relations are reasonably good again, but, as both parties have said, they will probably never again return to the kind of special relationship which they once had.

Mr. WHALLEY. When Libya or Algeria nationalizes an oil company, do they immediately make an arrangement for the payoff or is that held in abeyance for many years of uncertainty and doubt?

NATIONALIZATIONS

Mr. NEWSOM. In the case of Algeria, with respect to the nine companies that were nationalized in 1967, there was no immediate compensation. We stressed to the Algerians the importance we attached to compensation for the companies and indicated that, just as a practical fact, because of the climate for financing in which they were interested compensation was essential—fair, prompt, and adequate compensation. In the intervening period since 1967, the Algerians and the companies have negotiated out nine agreements for compensation. In a situation like that, of course, not all of the parties are happy with the results but there has been compensation accepted by the companies and these cases are now closed.

Mr. WHALLEY. When they nationalize a company and without an immediate settlement, do the American companies continue to operate the operation?

Mr. NEWSOM. This varies from case to case. Sometimes a company will be nationalized and operations will continue while there are negotiations. In the case of the companies in Algeria, the companies were taken over and they were operated by the Algerians and the profits from the companies were placed in an escrow account, if I remember correctly, pending a resolution of the compensation. Rarely in any of the cases that I am aware of in North Africa have the operations actually been shut down. In the case of the British petroleum nationalization in Libya the operations were reduced but they have never ceased completely.

RESOURCES ELSEWHERE

Mr. WHALLEY. What are the prospects of oil in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia?

Mr. NEWSOM. Well, I cannot speak in detail of Egypt but there have been important finds in Egypt. In the case of Tunisia there is exploration going on offshore from Tunisia but there have been no significant strikes as yet, and the same is true with Morocco.

Mr. WHALLEY. I understand in two countries widely separated that probably north of Africa would have oil.

Mr. NEWSOM. Well, the geological formations of Morocco and Tunisia don't extend sufficiently into the Sahara Basin where the oil of Algeria and Libya is. The companies are searching not in the edges of the Sahara and these countries as much as they are offshore which is an entirely different set of structures.

Mr. WHALLEY. When they find oil offshore, how far off can they control the operation?

Mr. NEWSOM. I am not sure I can answer that, Mr. Congressman. It is a technical question. It depends of course on the depth of the water and I am not sure I know what the current depth is at which they are currently able to operate. Certainly they can operate in the Mediterranean many miles offshore.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you.

Mr. DIGGS. Mr. Vander Jagt.

Mr. VANDER JAGT. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

KENITRA FACILITY

Mr. DIGGS. Mr. Secretary, back to Morocco, could you tell us what the mission is of the naval communications facility at Kenitra?

Mr. NEWSOM. The communications facility there is primarily a relay point for worldwide communications and for communications with naval units operating in the Mediterranean.

Mr. DIGGS. Is our presence there in connection with that facility based on some kind of a treaty?

Mr. NEWSOM. When we withdrew from the SAC base in Morocco in 1963, there was an oral understanding between President Kennedy and King Hassan that the facilities at Kenitra which had been an American base would become a Moroccan base but that we would be permitted to remain and utilize communications facilities and frequencies which were available there and would undertake at the same time a training program for the Moroccan Armed Forces. This was basically an oral agreement which does not exist in any written form.

Mr. DIGGS. So it is subject to cancellation on either side; is that correct?

Mr. NEWSOM. That is true, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. DIGGS. And the quid pro quo is the training of Moroccans. Is there anything further involved in the quid pro quo there?

Mr. NEWSOM. The quid pro quo is the training of members of the Moroccan Armed Forces. We have a training mission on the base at Kenitra and we also provide credit sales for military equipment. This is not considered precisely a quid pro quo, it is part of our general assistance to Morocco.

VOICE OF AMERICA RELAY STATION

Mr. DIGGS. We have a VOA relay.

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes, we have transmitters at Tangier which carry VOA broadcasts to Africa and to southern Europe.

Mr. DIGGS. I think you stated that the Moroccans share in this in some fashion.

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes.

Mr. DIGGS. What does that mean?

Mr. NEWSOM. By the arrangement worked out the Moroccans can use the transmitters for their own national broadcasts and shortwave broadcasts up to an agreed number of hours each week, and if my recollection holds it is 300 hours a week.

Mr. DIGGS. That is within their own country?

Mr. NEWSOM. Both within their own country and on shortwave and outside.

Mr. DIGGS. You monitor these broadcasts?

Mr. NEWSOM. I presume the answer is yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DIGGS. Is there programing outside by shortwave including what might be considered propaganda broadcasts in connection with the Israeli matter, the Middle East matter?

Mr. NEWSOM. We have never had any complaints on that score, Mr. Chairman, that I am aware of.

Mr. DIGGS. Does it differ from our VOA operations in Monrovia or any place else?

Mr. NEWSOM. Only in the fact that we have a sharing arrangement for the transmitters.

PRESENCE OF 6TH FLEET

Mr. DIGGS. How about the 6th Fleet? Now it makes visits there presumably.

Mr. NEWSOM. Yes. I don't have the exact statistic but there are visits by ships of the 6th Fleet to Morocco—not very many actually because the harbor at Kenitra is not a very large one and it is on the Atlantic side.

Mr. DIGGS. What is their purpose? Is it R. & R. (rest and recreation) or do they have some other purposes?

Mr. NEWSOM. There are very few visits. These are normally four or five visits to Tangier and Casablanca and they are normally for R. & R. and in some cases official visits.

Mr. DIGGS. Do we have a military presence in Morocco, or a residual presence from the old days?

Mr. NEWSOM. We do in the personnel that are assigned to both the training and communications tasks at Kenitra. About 1,300 Americans, both civilians and service personnel.

Mr. DIGGS. That is a pretty good size. That is as many as we have on the Azores. Could you tell us a little something more about what constitutes their mission and whether or not there is any commitment involved there?

Mr. NEWSOM. I would like to provide the details of that for the record if I could, Mr. Chairman. I don't have them.

Mr. DIGGS. We would like to know about the presence of our forces there and their mission and whether or not this involves any commitment on the part of our Government with respect to Morocco.

Speaking of the military presence, I am also interested in knowing if there are any claims that are still arising out of our former military presence in Libya?

Mr. NEWSOM. No, Mr. Chairman. There was a mutual cancellation of claims with Libya.

Mr. DIGGS. When we left Wheelus we did move our functions. Where have these functions been moved to?

Mr. NEWSOM. The principal function of the Wheelus Air Base was an all-weather training facility for the tactical air forces in Europe. The squadrons stationed in Germany and Britain would come to Wheelus for aerial target training. These activities have now been divided among a number of existing ranges in Europe, in Germany, Italy, England, and Spain.

TUNISIA'S DEBT BURDEN

Mr. DIGGS. In connection with Tunisia, the increasing debt burden that we are beginning to experience as a result of that rather massive aid in the past, could you comment on this particularly as it relates to Tunisia which obviously does not have many resources and if I were a creditor of Tunisia, particularly of that magnitude, I would be a little nervous.

Mr. NEWSOM. We are very conscious, Mr. Chairman, of the debt problem in all the developing countries, particularly in view of some of the more dramatic problems that have come up such as in Ghana and we watch with the Tunisians this problem. I think my impression at the moment is that we have a very frank understanding with the Tunisians on this, that the Tunisians are as conscious as anybody of

their desire for good standing with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and that the lending to Tunisia takes this into account. This is one of the reasons why we have generally emphasized in our assistance programs to Tunisia the long-term soft loans rather than short-term hard credits.

Mr. Blake adds that Prime Minister Hedi Nour is the former president of the Bank of Tunisia and a very good financial expert in his own right and very conscious of this problem.

SOVIET UNION'S PRESENCE

Mr. Diggs. Finally, in answer to a question earlier I think on the part of Mr. Whalley about the penetration of the Soviet presence you appeared to sort of dismiss that as not being significant which is a little curious.

Mr. Newsom. I don't mean to imply that it is not significant.

Mr. Diggs. The presence of the Soviets in North Africa, particularly as it relates to the problems relating to the Mediterranean and implications down further with some countries that have some cultural and other types of affinity for North Africa, would not be dismissed by everyone in that way.

Mr. Newsom. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think we would not discount the Soviet presence and the Soviet interests. The Soviet interests in North Africa have long been manifested going back to the days when they wanted to be a participant in the trusteeship in Libya. I think we do feel that there have been some stories which have exaggerated at least the degree of acceptance of the Soviets by the North African States.

For example, from time to time it is said that the Soviets have base facilities or homeporting facilities in Algeria. This is not correct so far as we can determine. Algeria does depend upon the Soviet Union as a military supplier but we don't have the impression that this gives to the Soviets any particular influence within Algeria.

The Moroccans have relations with the Soviets, they have obtained some military equipment from the Soviets, but these relationships are at a pretty low key.

Tunisia has always had a nonalignment policy but the Soviets have never been able to obtain or gain much headway there.

Libya has been dealing with the Soviets, as I have said, both in terms of perhaps selling their oil and also some indications that they may be acquiring arms from the Soviet Union. Again if there is one thing that shines through President Qadhafi's statements, it is as much antipathy to the Soviets as it is to us.

We didn't mention, but it is public record, that we have been asked to reduce the size of our diplomatic mission in Libya to eight diplomatic personnel and seven administrative personnel and so have the Soviets. So they are doing this on a nonaligned basis.

SITUATION IN THE SUDAN

The Soviet difficulties in the Sudan have been a matter of public record climaxed by Nimayri action in the attempted coup. I would not dismiss the Soviet interest and the Soviet presence but I think it is very much balanced by the independence of the countries in North Africa and by certain setbacks which they themselves have had.

Mr. DIGGS. I am glad you ended up on Sudan because during our trip there earlier this year we were particularly impressed with the tremendous influence of the Egyptians on the foreign policy of the Sudan and the recent manifestation of the desire for restoration of relations with our country. Certainly moving toward that would appear to have some implications involving a reduction of Egyptian influence in the Sudan. Is that a correct assessment?

Mr. NEWSOM. I think, Mr. Chairman—

Mr. DIGGS. Does it go far beyond the Sudan if, that implication is correct? It might have some implications involving some other problems we had in the Middle East and so on.

Mr. NEWSOM. Well, I don't think that we would want to picture an improvement in our relations with the Sudan as necessarily being at the expense of Sudan's relations with any other country. Sudan's relationships with Egypt are historical and are very significant and I think it would not be correct to suggest that we see the hoped for improvement in our own relations with the Sudan in those terms.

Mr. DIGGS. Do you have any questions?

RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA AND SUDAN

Mr. HAMILTON. When can we expect the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Sudan?

Mr. NEWSOM. You probably saw the story in the New York Times yesterday morning suggesting that the matter would be considered by the Council of Ministers meeting in Khartoum today and perhaps announced at the end of the week. We have no official confirmation of this but we have no reason to doubt that it may be that imminent.

Mr. HAMILTON. How about Algeria?

Mr. NEWSOM. Algeria is I think farther away because I think the problem is more complex, and as we mentioned the current complications on the El Paso deal will undoubtedly affect this and perhaps make the immediate resumptions less likely in Algeria.

SITUATION IN LIBYA

Mr. HAMILTON. Did you have any warning of the recent changes in the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council?

Mr. NEWSOM. We don't have terribly close relations with the revolutionary command council. There have been a number of indications though over the last couple of weeks that some kind of major discussion was going on within the council. We had some indications that Major Jallud would perhaps emerge as the Prime Minister.

Mr. HAMILTON. Does Qadhdhafi come out of this with substantially less power?

Mr. NEWSOM. I cannot say. I am not sure that the full scenario has been played out yet. It seems clear from what we do know that Qadhdhafi is still a very significant figure. He still seems to be the head of the RCC and he is still the Minister of Defense.

Mr. HAMILTON. But he has resigned his Premier post?

Mr. NEWSOM. He has resigned his Premier post but I think he is still looked upon as head of state and there is some speculation that he may seek to have this position in some way confirmed in the course of the coming days.

Mr. HAMILTON. Why did they ask us to reduce our mission there?

Mr. NEWSOM. The ostensible reason was that they were reducing our mission, the Soviet mission and the British mission to be more compatible with the size of the Libyan missions in each of these three countries. Given the fact that none of the other diplomatic missions in Libya larger than our own or larger than these three were reduced, I think we are inclined to think that there were also political elements involved.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do we have any kind of assistance program with Libya?

Mr. NEWSOM. No.

Mr. HAMILTON. No sales?

Mr. NEWSOM. No; no sales. We have sales of spare parts through commercial channels for equipment that we provided to Libya before the revolution.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is there any risk of nationalization of U.S. oil companies there?

Mr. NEWSOM. The Libyans say that the nationalization of the British Oil & Petroleum Co., was because it was owned in part by the British Government and was taken as a reaction against the British failure to turn over two islands in the Persian Gulf to the Emirates when the British pulled out and that it did not set a precedent for the nationalization of other companies. We have no reason to believe that they have this in mind but I don't think we can exclude it.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA'S POSITION

Mr. HAMILTON. In Tunisia has the President's health improved to the point that the succession problem is pushed back or is that still a very active concern there?

Mr. NEWSOM. I think that it has been pushed back somewhat by his recovery but as I said all indications are that in the minds of the Tunisians the succession plan is fairly clear and that the Prime Minister would take over and subsequently there would be an election within the Destourian Socialist Party for a new president.

Mr. HAMILTON. You would not anticipate any instability as a result of the succession?

Mr. NEWSOM. We don't believe so.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I hope in responding to your inquiry about Kenitra that the State Department will also furnish information about the nature of the agreement that governs that facility and the duration of it.

No further questions.

Mr. Diggs. Well, it probably might be best to put our requests for additional information in the form of some memorandum because there is certain additional supporting information we would like to have for the appendix and for the record based on aid and a few other matters. We will make reference to it now in the record but we will make it more specific in a memorandum to the Secretary so that there won't be any doubts as to what information we are seeking.

If there are no further questions, the joint subcommittees stand adjourned.

Mr. NEWSOM. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the joint subcommittees adjourned.)

THE STATES OF NORTH AFRICA IN THE 1970'S

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 2, 1972

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON AFRICA AND THE NEAR EAST,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittees met at 2:10 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building. Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa), presiding.

Mr. Diggs. The joint subcommittees will come to order.

The Subcommittees on Africa and the Near East are concluding today a joint inquiry on the States of North Africa. This afternoon we will examine the regional identity of the North African states—Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya—with the Middle East, with sub-Saharan Africa and with Europe. This will comprehend the role of these countries in the Organization of African Unity and their views on African issues, including the southern African problem as well as their Middle East problems.

We are indeed fortunate today in having with us to give us their views and to lead our deliberations two former U.S. Ambassadors and a former editor of *Africa Report*. The Honorable Hugh Smythe, the former U.S. Ambassador to Syria and later to Malta, will discuss the orientation of the States of North Africa to the Middle East and to Arab concerns. The Honorable Elliott Percival Skinner, form U.S. Ambassador to Upper Volta, will focus on the evolution of the relations between the Maghrib and black Africa. Prof. Aaron Segal, of Cornell University, will direct our attention to the relations of these states with Europe.

Now we have also asked each to comment briefly on the foreign relations of these North African states in a **general fashion**.

I believe the format will be for each of you to give in a 10- to 15-minute opening presentation some discussion of the issues posed in your papers which will be made a part of the record because, as I recall, the totality of your very learned dissertations total some 60 pages. So if we can have the presentation and then make your entire paper part of the record, I think we can proceed more expeditiously and have more time for the questions that the panel has developed.

Ambassador Smythe's distinguished biographical data will be made part of the record. Suffice it to say that for many years he has been on special assignments of one type or another in addition to serving as ambassador and as a consultant to our Government and to agencies in the private sector. He holds memberships on many of the most prestigious organizations in the academic and community-related and oriented types. He has published any number of learned works and has been the recipient of many scholarly awards and honors.

It is a real privilege to have you with us here, Mr. Ambassador. You may proceed in your own way.

STATEMENT OF HON. HUGH H. SMYTHE, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO SYRIA AND MALTA

(A biographic sketch of Mr. Smythe appears on p. 119.)

Mr. SMYTHE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am simply going to open up with an abstract of the long statement which you mentioned.

Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya represent a microcosm of the developing world while sharing some similar qualities peculiar to them as North African states. They have a strong feeling of national pride, think the Western World is obligated to help them because of earlier colonial exploitation and are sensitive to outside interference in any of their affairs, domestic or foreign. While alike in some ways, they are diverse in national character, form of government, and in natural resources. Known as the Maghrib, which now includes Libya, the four form a significant area of the world as the hub where Europe, Africa, and the Near East meet. They lie on our access to southern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean, and some of their territory is an important source of energy for Europe and will become increasingly so for the United States.

OAU AND NORTH AFRICA

As regards the Organization of African Unity which I was asked to address myself to, these four states really appreciate their membership but each is quick to let it be known that national interests have a stronger pull. They all support black Africa on self-determination and human rights for southern Africa because all are against racial oppression and prejudice and believe in political independence. Like other nations, they give support out of self-interest expecting in return sub-Saharan African support for their stand on the Middle East, but they do not take a common position on all issues.

Morocco and Tunisia are oriented more toward Europe. Libya is more involved with Egypt, Middle East questions, Islam, and the Arab world, while Algeria tends to support Soviet views on Vietnam, Korea, Cuba, and others. However, on most general resolutions condemning America or other Western countries for what they perceive as violations of the United Nations Charter, sanctions and the like, they tend to vote together.

They use the OAU at times to ameliorate their differences and disputes, such as ending the Morocco-Algeria frontier problem. As a group they support Africa-wide ventures like the trade fair held in Nairobi last February. They agree that without the OAU, black African and Arab African interests would be more difficult to promote in the international arena. Thus all are generally consistent in supporting almost anything advanced by the Organization to benefit the continent, and through membership they feel a sense of involvement in African matters of culture, trade, and social betterment in which the OAU engages.

Relations with other African States depends upon individual interests. Morocco and Algeria want Spain to hold a referendum in Spanish

Sahara as they, along with Mauritania, want to exploit phosphate deposits there. Algeria has an interest in her bordering states of Mali, Mauritania, and Niger as well as in liberation movements elsewhere in Africa. Tunisia takes an active interest in all-African affairs, while Libya expresses concern through support for Muslims in other states and in opposing Israeli influence where it feels it to be detrimental to the Arab cause anywhere on the continent.

TIES WITH MIDDLE EAST

The Middle East is important to them since they are Arabs and Islamic in religion and culture. They support basic positions vis-a-vis Israel but differ in approach. While Libya provides material help to the fedayeen, all four abstain from actual physical involvement in guerrilla activities. Although members of the Arab League, they are not unanimous in their treatment of the Middle East conflict or other world issues, as their post-1967 war positions illustrates. Algeria was lusty for more battle, Tunisia against it, while Morocco took a cautious approach and Libya remained moderate. You must remember at that time Libya had a monarchy; it does not have such a form of government now. This also just about reflects their behavior in Arab summitry where moderate Morocco and Tunisia stand against the use of force and for negotiations with Israel, as Algeria and Libya act more as "radicals" partisan to "unconditional" backing for militant Palestinians.

Toward Egypt, Algeria, after a period of friction, is functioning satisfactorily while Tunisia's attitude, based on unhappy incidents with the late Gamal Abdul Nasser and President Habib Bourguiba's awareness of the philosophical-cultural gulf between them, continues to be unfriendly to Cairo. Morocco oscillates between the Algerian-Tunisian poles while Libya not only has open admiration but gives Egypt major financial help.

I am sure that all of you present today understand that there are other developments occurring even as we sit here today.

North African foreign policy overall is less attuned to the Near East problems than states contiguous to Israel. Rather, it is focused on improving relations among the four since African unity, to which they all subscribe, has not as yet inspired any great harmony within the quartet. While they know political unification is not possible now, they have faced up to the need for some kind of integration and formed a permanent consultative committee of the Maghrib. It is trying to develop inter-Maghrib African trade, coalesce economic policies, coordinate industrial activity and find a common policy toward Europe and the Common Market.

INDEPENDENCE IMPORTANT

Each of the four nations is jealous of its sovereignty and as a group they do not countenance military alliances and in principle reject foreign bases or other military facilities on their soil. In the U.N. they belong to the nonaligned group and usually adhere to its decisions. Their relations with the major powers grow mainly out of former ties.

Algeria, who severed relations with the United States in 1967, is critical of our role in Vietnam but still has close military and economic relations with France while cooperating with the Soviet Union in economic and military matters.

Tunisia, whose views often coincide with ours, even on Vietnam, regards us as the most influential outside power and our relations are cordial even when she receives assistance from the U.S.S.R. as well as Western Europe.

Morocco was close to France until the Ben Barka affair but since 1966 American economic assistance has caused our influence to rise there.

Libya, formerly heavily dependent on us and the British, now is oil rich and has a new military regime in control that bases its foreign policy on money, Pan-Arabism and Islam. She is somewhat unfriendly to both the United States and the United Kingdom, disliking what she calls our unqualified support for Israel even while storing her funds in American and Swiss banks. Having nationalized British Petroleum, she is friendly to France who sells her Mirage aircraft, keeps a close watch on the Russians, and remains close to Egypt.

Finally, in closing let me say it can be said that in recent years Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya have shown remarkable ability to resolve their problems and their practical relationships and understanding have grown steadily closer.

Thank you.

Mr. Diggs. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Smythe follows:)

STATEMENT OF HON. HUGH H. SMYTHE, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO
SYRIA AND MALTA

ORIENTATIONS OF NORTH AFRICAN STATES

A brief background perspective on the North African Maghrib states, of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, will help in understanding their current behavior in the Organization of African Unity, positions on the Middle East conflict, and their foreign policy in general. The four states in some ways represent a microcosm of the developing world and their characteristics, problems, reactions and issues are common to most of the nations that have achieved independence since World War II. These four states share several similar qualities. They all have a strong feeling of national pride. They adhere to a basic belief that the United States and the rest of the Western world has an obligation to them for their earlier exploitation under colonial rule, and they are keenly sensitive to any outside interference in their internal or other affairs.

At the same time they are diverse in national character, forms of government, and in their resources. Morocco is about the size of California containing some 172,000 square miles, nearly 16 million people whose literacy rate is 10 to 14 per cent, has a monarchical form of government, a GNP of \$3 billion, a \$200 per capita, a basically agricultural economy, and is the world's principal exporter of phosphates.

Algeria, the second largest country in Africa with 920,000 square miles or about a third the size of the United States, has nearly 13 million inhabitants of whom 45 per cent are literate. It is governed by a President with the aid of a National Revolutionary Council, a GNP of \$1.5 billion and a \$135 per capita (as of 1965). It is fundamentally agricultural but with large oil resources, possesses one of the most modern and largest mostly Soviet equipped military forces in Africa, an excellent infrastructure, and is self sufficient in grain except in drought years.

As for Tunisia, the smallest and poorest of all North African nations, it has more than 5 million citizens of whom 30 per cent are literate, living on 63,400 square miles of territory, and is endowed with very modest natural resources,

governed by a single party Presidential structure. Its GNP is \$1.1 billion, per capita \$219, has an agricultural economy, and requires much foreign assistance.

Libya, the fourth largest country on the African continent, has 680,000 square miles for less than 2 million people, about 15 per cent of whom are literate. Its economy is an agricultural-animal husbandry one but it is rich in oil deposits, has a GNP of nearly \$3 billion, a per capita of \$1650, and is now governed by a military Revolutionary Command Council headed by a young Colonel of its armed forces.

Overall the four states form a significant area of the world because they are at the hub where Europe, Africa, and the Middle East meet. They lie on our route of access to southern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean, and North Africa is an important source of energy for Europe and will become increasingly so for the United States. It is against this abbreviated panorama we examine their participation in the OAU.

NORTH AFRICA AND THE OAU

While there are a number of differences of approach both toward the OAU and toward African issues in the United Nations among the four, there are certain common elements. All of them tend to support black Africans in their positions on the issues of self-determination and human rights in southern Africa. They do so, even though not directly involved or necessarily concerned, but because they believe in the political independence of states and are against any form of racial oppression and prejudice.

Further, they give their support out of self interest, like all other nations, when operating in the international sphere, because in return they expect black African support for their positions on the Middle East and the Palestine question. Two of them, Algeria and Libya, can be listed among the militants in the OAU, and have been inclined to be more active in its affairs than Morocco and Tunisia. However, with the election of King Hassan II of Morocco and Tunisia. However, with the election of King Hassan II of Morocco as this year's President of the OAU, Morocco should in all likelihood take a more active and militant role, both in the OAU and the U.N.

On the other hand, the differences between the four countries make it unlikely that they will always take a common stance either on African, Middle East, or other world issues. Reasons for this are several. Tunisia and Morocco are somewhat more oriented toward Europe than is Libya, which is more involved with Egypt and the Palestine question, as demonstrated by its willingness to use its sizable oil revenues to counter Israeli influence in Africa. Algeria, while currently improving relations with the U.S., tends to support Soviet positions on world issues, such as Vietnam, Korea, Cuba, and so on.

While the four differ, on most general resolutions condemning the U.S. or other western countries for what OAU members see as actions against their individual or continental interests or against human concerns, such as our continuing to import chrome from Zimbabwe in violation of U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia, and for providing military aid to Portugal through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, they tend to vote alike and support each other. At times the Organization has served as a forum to resolve disputes among them, such as took place at the June, 1972, sessions in Rabat. At this 19th meeting of the Council of Ministers and 9th chiefs of state conclave King Hassan and President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria signed documents in the final open session to end their once bloody frontier dispute and set forth plans for the joint mining of iron ore in reserves near Tindouf in southwestern Algeria. Also, the North Africans tend to support ventures like the first major economic venture of the OAU, the all-Africa trade fair held in Nairobi, Kenya, last February.

The June meeting in Rabat demonstrates what must of necessity be the stance of these four states—and all others in the OAU—at this stage of their development. As a delegate from one of these four stated it, "Naturally, our national interests have a stronger pull on each of us." Thus Morocco protects its brisk tourist trade of Europeans and Americans coming via Spain, while Algeria negotiates to run an oil pipeline through that same country to France. Oil-rich Libya, one of the two "radicals" among the four, buys influence with its donations of some \$158,000,000 annually to Egypt as its leader, Colonel Mu'ammar Qadhafi, carries on an unrelenting feud with the Moroccan King, on the grounds that he has turned its citizens into "hungry and barefoot creatures."

All four realize, however, that without the OAU black African and Arab African interests would be more difficult to promote in the international arena.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER AFRICAN STATES

Each of the four states has particular interests in one or more of its neighbors to the south. Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria would like to encourage Spain to hold an early referendum in Spanish Sahara. Morocco and Mauritania are particularly interested in the substantial phosphate deposits which are located there.

Algeria borders on Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, and it has always taken an interest in, and continues to do so, the liberation movements in other parts of Africa. Boumedienne visited Guinea, before his attendance at the June meeting in Rabat.

Tunisia has always taken a serious interest in African issues and played a significant role in OAU affairs, while Libya has increasingly interested itself in sub-Saharan Africa through expressions in the past of support for Muslim populations in other states and in opposition to what it regards as Israeli influence detrimental to the Arab cause in Africa in general.

The four are generally consistent in their support of actions, resolutions, and programs advanced by the Organization to benefit the continent. Thus at the June meeting they stood together in backing plans to implement an all-Africa communications network and an all-Africa system of connecting highways, and to develop a system of laws to govern the rich commercial fishing areas now being fished for the most part by non-African powers. And through membership they feel a sense of involvement in many African issues and activities that the OAU engages in such as the promotion of conferences on culture, trade, and social betterment, and through assistance to regional economic groupings that help weaker nations to prosper.

NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

We must keep in mind that all four of the North African countries are Arab and inextricably linked by the Muslim religion, culture, and interests with the Near East; and they are also drawn to this region by their political concern over Near East issues. They verbally support the Palestinian cause but generally abstain from involvement in extremist terrorist activities, of the fedayeen, although Libya gives the latter anti-Israel guerrillas some material aid. They are members of the Arab League, take part in its deliberations and meetings, but their positions differ on Middle East questions. Algeria and Libya tend to be more supportive of positions taken by Syria and Iraq, while Morocco and Tunisia are inclined to be more reserved if they feel these Near East neighbors are too extreme in their actions; they do not criticize overtly but prefer to move with what they conceive to be more realism in their approach to a given problem.

The four stand with Arab countries of the Near East vis-a-vis Israel. Thus after the June, 1967, six-day war, they, like nearly all other Arabs, at first opposed recognition and negotiation directly with Israel and insisted upon the return of all territory lost to Arab nations. They were, however, among the Arab states who disagreed on what policies to follow in order to deal with the consequences of the military defeat of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. While leaders of Syria, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Algeria pressed for a continuation of armed struggle against Israel, the moderate faction, that included the other three North African entities, contended Arabs were and would remain for some time to come too militarily weak to challenge Israel: therefore, they should resort to diplomatic and political means to salvage as much as possible from defeat on the field of battle. This they felt was a more realistic view. Tunisia's President Habib Bourguiba even proposed that the Arabs stop talking about destroying Israel and consider negotiating a definitive peace settlement on the best terms the Arabs could get.

General positions taken following the 1967 conflict reflect the respective nature of these four states on Middle East matters, although time has caused some changes due to internal developments in each of them, as well as shifts on the world scene in general, and activities in the Arab world in particular. The war brought about a polarization of attitudes among the four. Algeria took the most radical stand in supporting the cause of armed struggle in Palestine and the fedayeen al-Fatah group; she criticized Egypt severely and its army for accept-

ing a cease fire. In contrast, Tunisia, who since 1965 had openly advocated recognition of an Israel state does this in the name of "realism."

As for Morocco, she adopted a cautious approach to the Middle East problem and her position just about approximates that of the Middle East states after the June conflagration, while Libya, prior to the overthrow of King Idris, usually adopted a moderate position on Arab-Israeli affairs. However, since the take over of authority by young Colonel Mu'ammarr Qadhafi she tends to align with Algeria to form a "radical" team. Morocco and Tunisia seem to understand, too, the tenuous position of Jordan's King Hussein who is caught between Israel on the one hand and the pressure of Egypt and heavy dependence on the United States for aid on the other. As a result they tend not to press Jordan into difficult positions as the two other North African states may be inclined to do.

In summit meetings of the Arab leaders on the Middle East problem Tunisia and Morocco can be expected to take a moderate stance and generally abstain from supporting any resolutions or actions that call for the use of force. Libya continues to contribute to the fund distributed to Arab Near East states that suffered the greatest economic losses from the war and that enables Egypt to keep the Suez Canal closed. As regards the Palestinian conflict, this produced a further split in the political unity of the Arab world, between partisans of negotiation with Israel—a point of view to which Tunisia and Morocco subscribe—and those adherents of Egyptian diplomacy, which is generally backed by the Eastern Arab nationalist parties, and the partisans of "unconditional" support for the Palestine guerrillas.

NORTH AFRICA AND EGYPT

Towards Egypt, the key nation in Near Eastern affairs, Algeria in May, 1963, had the late President Gamal Nasser in for a visit, and the then United Arab Republic arranged a loan of ten million pounds sterling and sent large numbers of technicians, mostly teachers of Arabic and military experts. The UAR supported Algeria in her frontier dispute with Morocco, but the change of regime in Algeria in 1965 was ill received in Cairo. President Nasser, along with Moscow and the African states of the "revolutionary" group, remained very hostile towards President Boumedienne for some time. Algeria then proceeded to expel the Egyptian technicians, whose qualifications had been placed in doubt. Yet she did not modify her foreign outlook. Her hostility to American policy, notably on Vietnam, and her support for African liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and elsewhere, remained unchanged. Gradually, however, friendly relations with Egypt were resumed. Boumedienne visited that country in December, 1966, and relations between Algeria and Egypt have been satisfactory since then.

On the other hand, Tunisia has always been unfriendly to the policies of Cairo, a hostility created far back in the past when President Bourguiba lived there for four years after World War II. The President never disguised the fact that he then became conscious of the gulf which separated the Arab East from the Maghrib, a gap which further widened by European influence, since French colonization of the Maghrib had left a very deep imprint. Egypt's attitude of support for the Youssefist movement in Tunisia in 1955, and the "plots" of 1962 and 1968, in which the UAR and Syrian embassies were openly accused of involvement, created an atmosphere in which Bourguiba's visit to the Middle East in 1965 and his pronouncements on the Palestinian question did little to dispel. Isolated in the Arab world, Bourguiba adopted in 1966 the project of an Islamic Conference, which was condemned in Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, and Algiers as "American inspired."

Tunisia's position is unique in North Africa and her aging leader is particularly concerned about his country's uncomfortable position sandwiched between two military dictatorships, Libya to the east and Algeria to the west. Thus he is anxious to continue his present ruling structure featuring a strong executive so as to be better able to fend off the country's neighbors should this be necessary. Tunisia is having internal difficulties with the regime under pressure to reform and set up "collegiate direction" of political affairs, elections at all political levels, and for an end to the "practice of designation and choice." At this writing, however, Bourguiba remains in power and control with much the same kind of regime as in the past—a Political Bureau of 14 men, averaging 54 years of age, representing an older generation that fought with the President against the French.

As for Morocco, her position has oscillated between the Algerian-Tunisian poles. She began as a member of the "revolutionary" camp, and in January, 1961, King Mohamed V invited the Heads of State from the then radical countries (of Mali, Guiana, Ghana, UAR, and Algeria) to a conference in Casablanca. But the old king died in February that year and was succeeded by Crown Prince Hassan II. After his ascendancy to the throne Morocco began to side with the moderate faction. In 1966 Hassan accepted the principle of an Islamic league and publicly demonstrated this by inviting the Shah of Persia, Kings Hussein of Jordan and Feisal of Saudi Arabia to a conference. Presently Morocco is so involved with internal political, economic, and social problems that the King's throne is somewhat insecure; thus she is giving little attention to foreign affairs. But it is accepted that Hassan sides with the moderates on the Near East conflict and he has moved to resolve difficulties with Algeria and Mauritania.

Turning to Libya, it remained quiet for a long time under the conservative and traditional rule of aged King Idris. During his reign the nation remained on the sidelines while taking the expected positions where Arabs were involved with Israelis. But disenchantment of the young with lack of progress there led to a military coup that overthrew the monarchy in September, 1969, and (then Captain and now) Colonel Qadhafi took over leadership. The new military regime, deeply influenced by the frustration of the young Arab military officers over the course of the June, 1967, war, made the Arab struggle against Israel a major tenet of foreign policy. They believe strongly that the U.S. gives unqualified support to Israel and today this affects their actions in Middle East policy. Although the Colonel, a highly religious man and strict observer of Moslem practices, has had some internal difficulties, he has managed to remain the strong man ruling with the help of a Revolutionary Command Council.

In July, 1972, Qadhafi reorganized the Council changing it from a military to one of mainly civilian technocrats. He expects them to bring about what is called a "green revolution" under a three-year agricultural-industrial development plan to cost \$3.75 billion. It is designed to diversify the economy to prepare for the day when the nation's oil wealth dries up. Under its current rulers Libya may be classed with the "radicals" of North Africa. The Colonel has used its oil riches to support groups fighting Israel, has close ties with Syrian leaders, is reported to give aid to the new Moslem leader, General Idi Amin, of the military regime in Uganda, supply funds to the Moslem rebel Eritrean Liberation Front in Ethiopia, and forms one of the triumvirate with Syria and Egypt in the Federation of Arab Republics formed in 1971.

NORTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY

While the above represents in brief the positions of the four North African nations, it is well to remember that at the same time other interests and priorities are present for them and none of the four is as completely absorbed in Middle East concerns as are Arab states directly contiguous to Israel. Further, we must remember that the 1960's produced climactic events in the Near East which have affected to a greater or lesser extent our own relations with each of these four countries. Algeria broke diplomatic relations with us in 1967 and things remained cool between us until early this year. Relations with the other three became difficult in the wake of the 1967 war, mainly due to the belief that we had helped Israel to win that war, and this belief died hard. While armed forces of the four may not have been directly in the fighting, they were committed as Arabs and shared the feelings of humiliation and bitterness over the events that took place then. Thus Near Eastern issues still remain a serious problem in U.S. relations with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.

However, one of the principal foreign policy occupations of their leadership is improving relations among themselves. The cause of African unity, to which they all subscribe, has not inspired any great harmony within the quartet than that of Arab unity or Maghrib unity. Until 1962 Morocco had assumed a posture as special champion of African unity, having taken the initiative to bring together the "revolutionary" states, as aforementioned, known as the Casablanca Group, as a follow up to the Conference of African Peoples organized by the late Ghanaian leader, Kwame Nkrumah in Accra in 1958.

But the Group did not survive for long as an organized entity and Tunisia herself sided with the "moderate" states of Senegal, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Liberia, and Ethiopia, among others, who subsequently combined to become known as the Monrovia Group, and it was also of brief duration. In 1965, Bourguiba toured some of the latter countries to discuss the idea of a French-speaking Common-

wealth. As for Algeria, after 1962 she found herself in the role of defender of the more radical approach to Africa, expressed this at the conference of African Heads of State held in Addis Ababa in May, 1963, which itself gave birth then to the Organization of African Unity.

The foreign policy of the four is also tied up with the proposed historic Second Bandung Conference that was to be held in July, 1965, but which never convened because of the hostile attitude of "revolutionary" Arab and African states, and because of Russia's adverse attitude towards the new Algerian regime. Rather, once normal relations had been established with these countries, an Economic Conference of the Third World was held in Algiers in October, 1967. But as has been noted, all these tentative and fragile bodies had almost no impact on the internal developments of governments, although they did help to create some international institutions, even if the effectiveness of the latter was more apparent than real.

RELATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES

But the basic foreign policy of these four nations is a medley that emerges from a framework of belief that politics is practiced as a competitive game consisting at best of inflexible balancing of the greatest number of options, allies, and adversaries. Consequently, they all understand that political unification among them is not possible for the foreseeable future. In 1958, before Algeria was free, leaders of the dominant Istiqlal, Destour, and the National Liberation Front (FLN) parties convened at Tangier to map a possible future confederal Maghrib, but early optimism faded quickly and the only such structure that emerged was the Confederation of North African Students which proved abortive.

By 1960 Morocco was bitterly opposing Tunisia's recognition of an independent Mauritania, whose territory was claimed by Morocco. The next year the FLN and the Moroccans formed a confederation that excluded Tunisia, but even before Algerian independence, the Tunisians and Moroccans were insisting upon a revision of the old colonial frontiers which favored Algeria. Then in 1963 Tunisia broke off diplomatic relations because Ben Bella harbored Youssefists who had tried to assassinate Bourguiba. The simmering border dispute between Morocco and Algeria broke out into an open but short war in the fall of that year. Tunisia had no choice but to recognize Algeria's Saharan frontier, but Morocco continued in principle to contest it. To defend its colonial legacy, Algeria, beaten in battle by the more experienced Moroccans in 1963, moved to modernize its armed forces with Soviet and French help. This forced Morocco to seek arms from the United States in order to partly rectify the balance of military power, so that by 1966 a North African arms race had become a reality and there was no longer hope for any overt political unity.

Finally, realizing that the diversity of their political regimes is a major obstacle to true Maghrib unity, in recent years the four nations have exercised some discipline and faced up to the need for some kind of integration, especially economic. While progress here has not been spectacular, some bilateral agreements have been reached that cover such things as trade, technical finance, and administrative matters. A permanent Consultative Committee of the Maghrib, to plan the basis of future economic integration, has been established through the initiative of the Economic Commission for Africa. Growing out of this it is hoped the four will be able to harmonize their foreign trade policies so as to develop inter-Maghrib trade, coordinate industrial activity, find a common policy towards Europe and the Common Market, and generally coalesce their economic policies.

Further, the leaders of the area have shown in the past several years a remarkable ability to resolve problems existing among them. While actual economic or political unity is still a distant dream, their practical relationships and understanding have grown steadily closer, so that what seemed like intractable problems a decade ago are now behind them. Morocco's recognition of Mauritania in 1969 set aside centuries-old claims and Algeria and Tunisia found a common understanding about the frontier and on economic cooperation in the same year. The agreement concluded between Morocco and Algeria in June of this year also resolved problems which had resulted in actual conflict between the states in 1963. As for relations with Europe, they have always been of significant importance, and they remain so today. For Europe is the principal market and major source of supplies for all four states, and their relationships with the European Common Market countries becomes increasingly important to them, even more so as it is now in process of expanding from six to ten.

Overall Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya are jealous of their national sovereignty and, of course, permit no outside dictation of their foreign or domestic policies. They do not countenance military alliances and reject in principle any foreign bases or other military facilities on their soil. Tunisia has in fact been free of all foreign military entanglements since the French finally evacuated Bizerte in 1963, while they are evacuating ahead of schedule from naval and Saharan installations in Algeria. In Morocco, in theory all foreign bases were liquidated in 1964; but in practice the U.S. retains certain facilities at Kenitra on behalf of the Moroccan government, while Libya in 1970 cleared Americans out of Wheelus Field in Tripoli and the Coast Guard navigation station in the Gulf of Sirte, and the British air force from Tobruk. In the United Nations they are all a part of the nonaligned group and their foreign policy here is dictated basically by the decisions reached by this collective of more than 50 nations made up mainly of Asian, African, Arab, and a few Latin American and Caribbean countries.

TIES WITH GREAT POWERS

Vis-a-vis the major powers the policies of the four North African states vary, based mainly on their respective former ties to them. This suggests a present pattern of intense and growing competition feeding upon rivalries among them. Thus Algeria still retains close military and economic relations with France, despite periodic crises, while at the same time Boumedienne pursues growing cooperation with the Soviet Union in economic and military matters. She criticizes the United States for its role in Vietnam, and since the severing of relations in 1967 she did not receive an American official visitor for talks until March of this year, when the President met with our Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs.

As for Tunisia, she recognizes the U.S. as the most influential outside power and relations with us continue to be cordial. Tunisia does, however, receive some support from France, other West European countries and the USSR. Bourguiba's views on major issues often coincide with those of the United States, even on Vietnam.

Morocco stayed close to France in foreign policy until after the Ben Barka affair. Thus it is only since 1966 that we were able to become the major outside influence there. Recently, though, our economic assistance has been decreasing, the same as it is in Tunisia, although both are among the African countries enjoying highest priority for our aid.

At this juncture in time Libya's attitude towards the big powers is too unstable and too unclear to catalog with any certainty; it is a combination of many elements. Long dependent on Britain and America for economic aid, in 1957 Esso struck oil there, and by 1968 Libya had become one of the world's leading oil producers increasing its per capita from about \$35 at independence in 1951 to more than \$1650 today. Its former elderly, conservative traditional monarch maintained close relations with the USA as a consequence of our having provided substantial financial support in the early days of the kingdom, and there was widespread belief then that America and Britain actually dictated Libyan government policies.

But all of this changed as a result of the 1969 military coup, and only this year the current rulers ordered the Americans and British to reduce their embassy staffs to a prescribed minimum number. Some of its behavior towards us is based on its dislike of what it perceives to be American unqualified support for Israel. It has nationalized British petroleum. While remaining close to Egypt, since Qadhdhafi idolized Nasser, it keeps a close watch on the USSR and has let it be known that Communism cannot solve the problems of the Muslim and Arab world. France still enjoys some privileges while it sells Mirage aircraft to the regime.

It can be said with some validity, however, that Libya bases its foreign policy on the internationalism of Islam but mainly on money and is spending considerable sums beyond its borders to consummate its dreams. Aside from being intransigent on the Palestine question and making expenditures in causes against Israel and providing the aid mentioned above, Qadhdhafi also supports Muslim rebels in Chad, as well as insurrectionists in the Philippines; promised Catholic Malta a subsidy for ordering British forces to vacate military bases there, and last December urged Arab and Muslim countries to declare a jihad or holy war on India for its attack on Pakistan.

Although leaders of Muslim nations from all over Africa tread a steady path to Libya seeking help, the Colonel is neither overly generous nor reckless. Ex-

tremely conservative in fiscal policies, he keeps most of his money on short term deposit in American and Swiss banks, and he is inclined to be more parsimonious than profligate. Pan-Arabism is the fundamental creed and Islam Libya's *idée fixe*, even if its leader has called upon the Jordan army to oust King Hussein for trying to liquidate the Palestinian commandos.

But generally the Libyan government is still experiencing internal pains that affect her actions both domestic and foreign, as well as her attitudes and positions on international issues so that her specific foreign policy as a North African state cannot be detailed with any degree of accuracy or reliability.

Mr. Diggs. I think it might be well that we proceed to get the opening presentations in summary form from our other two distinguished witnesses and then we will proceed to general questioning.

The chairman now would like to recognize our former Ambassador to Upper Volta, Dr. Elliott Percival Skinner, who like Dr. Smythe has a whole list of distinguished citations for his public service. These and his academic history, his affiliation with professional societies, his academic achievements, and his publication of various distinguished works of one type or another will be made part of the record.

Ambassador Skinner.

STATEMENT OF HON. ELLIOTT PERCIVAL SKINNER, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO UPPER VOLTA

(A biographic sketch of Mr. Skinner appears on p. 118.)

Mr. SKINNER. Mr. Chairman, I was asked to talk about the evolution of relations between the Maghrib and black Africa. In contrast to Dr. Smythe, I accepted the Arab's view of the Maghrib, the islands of the west, and limited by discussion to Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.

The main thrust of my paper was an assessment of the often contradictory forces of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Arabism and Pan-Africanism. These forces link the Maghrib and black Africa but these forces have also contributed to a great deal of conflict between the two regions.

Historically these two areas have been in contact since the neolithic. With the Arab conquest of North Africa, Islam moved into the area and provided a bond between the states of black Africa and the states of North Africa. It was Islam rather than Arabism that played an important role in the development of trade, commerce, and the general relations between the Maghrib and black Africa.

ROLE OF EUROPE

The Europeans conquered North Africa at the end of the 19th century and by the beginning of the 20th century almost all of Africa had been conquered and colonized by the European states. It was this latter conquest that created many of the links which we presently find between the Maghrib and black Africa.

During the colonial period the French encouraged the spread of Islam to black Africa on the supposition that Islam being closer philosophically to African religions would help destroy the traditional fabric of African society, thus permitting French culture—which the French viewed as superior to all existing cultures—to come

in and complete the job of "civilizing" Africans. The French permitted marabouts and teachers to move between the Maghrib and black Africa thereby spreading a kind of Islam characteristic of North Africa, but also facilitating the development of a kind of Islam which adapting to black Africa took on specific black African attributes.

NATIONALISM

Later on, nationalism developed both in North Africa and in black Africa. The nationalism that developed in North Africa had specific characteristics: One of these was Pan-Arabism in which the nationalists in their anger against western colonialism decided to go back to their own roots which were Arab civilization; another characteristic that the North Africans had in common was Islam. Islam acted as a religious bond between the Maghrib peoples; finally there was, of course, nationalism itself. Thus, when the Algerians started to talk about their nationalism they said that they are Arabs in culture, Muslims in religion, and Algerian in nationality.

These three forces—Islam, Arabism, and nationalism—became important factors in the revolutionary movements in North Africa. In contrast, religion did not play an important role in the nationalist movements of black Africa; the Africans talked primarily in political terms. As Nkrumah said, "Seek you first the political kingdom and everything will be added thereon to." The closest the Africans came to talking about philosophy and culture was to talk about the concept of *négritude*. That undefinable characteristics or essence of black people which in this country we know as "soul"—something which by its very nature cannot be defined.

The one thing that the Africans of sub-Sahara and the Africans north of Sahara had in common when they came to independence was the bond of having experienced colonialism. It was to be anticolonialist and the desire to be independent of foreign control that played the most important role in postcolonial relations between the Maghribis and black Africans.

BUILDING AFRICAN UNITY

Significantly, it was a black African, Nkrumah, who invited the then independent states of North Africa to come to Accra to take part in the First Conference of Independent African states. Nkrumah said, if I remember correctly, that, "the Sahara may have divided us, now the Sahara is to unite us." Nkrumah said that there should be "one for all and all for one." However, the reality of Africa, both north and south, was not to permit this kind of cooperation and collaboration. The Arab States of the north soon split among themselves over France's war in Algeria. It was this split, compounded by the problems the Congo had in moving to independence, that led to the development of two important blocs in Africa: the Casablanca group, and the Monrovia group.

Not all of the North African states, nor all the Maghribi states belonged to the Casablanca coup. Bourguiba stayed out because of his links with France. Likewise the Monrovia group did not include all of the states of black Africa. Guinea, Mali, and Ghana stayed

out of that. The reasons for membership in one bloc or another were economic as well as political. The Casablanca states were socialist and were concerned with the rapid liberation of Africa. They also insisted upon rupturing existing or surviving colonial ties. In contrast, the Monrovia states were moderate. They tended to value some of the links which they had developed with Europe over time, and therefore could not agree with the basic thesis of the Casablanca group. Nevertheless, Pan Africanism was able later on to cut across the ties which Arab League, the Council of Understanding, and OCAM, among others, to bring both the Maghrib states and black African states to Addis Ababa in 1963 to form the Organization of African Unity.

Addis Ababa, the center of Pan Africanism, became a rallying point where the states of the Maghrib and the states of black Africa could attempt to resolve problems among themselves and between the two regions. It was after Ben Bella had returned from the OAU meeting of 1963 that he began to take a very active part in the politics of the Maghrib and the politics of black Africa. Thankful of the aid he had received during the independence struggle, Ben Bella, in turn, welcomed to Algiers almost all of the liberation movements engaged in fighting the Portuguese or fighting the southern whites. He also welcomed the Socialists, the militant nationalists, and the dissident elements from almost all states in Africa.

ROLE OF ALGERIA

Dr. Smythe talked about Ben Barka. It was Ben Bella who provided a passport for Ben Barka, thus creating problems between himself and his Maghribi neighbors. Ben Bella also provided a passport for the Gabonese rebel Mba; harbored people of the Sanwi region of the Ivory Coast; and gave succor and help to the Sawaba movement from the Niger, thus creating problems with many states of black Africa.

Algeria's active participation in the nationalists' struggle dominated her relationship with the rest of black Africa. The fall of Ben Bella did weaken somewhat the Algerians' interest in the liberation movement, but Boumedienne is still a militant. The last conference he had in Algeria, a cultural conference, was transformed into a political conference, and created problems between himself and some black states of sub-Saharan Africa.

Tunisia emerged from the 1963 OAU meeting more interested in black Africa. Bourguiba, who until this time was talking about caution with respect to Israel, suggested that the relations between black African states and Israel were against African unity. However, Bourguiba, given his hostility to the militant Arabism of Nasser and being attracted by the linguistic relationship with France and the franco-phone states of West Africa, remained committed to a commonwealth based on French. Bourguiba has remained more or less moderate, but as we all know he is in bad health and anything can happen once he releases the reins of power.

MOROCCO

Now we come to Morocco. This state has had difficulty relating to black Africa because of claims over Mauritania. Mauritania had been part of the Sharifian empire and the Moroccans were loathe to see her

become independent as member of the UAM and later on as a member of OCAM. Morocco was disturbed that during the Pan-Islamic conference in Algeria in 1969, Boumedienne was able to encourage the Moroccans and Mauritians to come together. The religious link these two states were able to resolve many of their differences, thus leading to a greater rapport between an Arab State north of the Sahara and an Arab State in the Western Sahara.

Ould Daddah, the President of Mauritania, has now emerged as an important figure in the African and Maghribi affairs. As the past president of the OAU, he played a pivotal role. He was Arabic Islamic, and African. In fact Senghor had always seen Mauritania in those terms. He saw it as a link between what he called the Negro-Arabo-Berber elements of Africa.

During 1971-72 Ould Daddah was able to galvanize the states of the OAU into a more dynamic policy. One may suggest that he was able to do that because by the time he came to the leadership of the OAU the states of black Africa and North African were in a state of disarray, a state of confusion and a state of disappointment with the West. The African voice had become muted in the conference halls of the world. The African States were divided over the issue of dialog with southern Africa. The African states were angry with the West because of a decline in terms of trade. Finally African States were frustrated by their inability to play any role whatsoever in the continuing conflict in the Middle East.

Thus it was that at the OAU meeting in Addis Ababa in 1971 they appointed a subcommittee of African presidents to go to Cairo and to Tel Aviv to talk to the Israelis and to the Egyptians "council of peace." The Presidents failed. Because of this failure, the African states meeting in Rabat just 2 months ago took a very hard line with respect to Israel's position in the Middle East. They also took a strong position against the allies of Israel, and against all of those states including the United States which give succor and help to the enemies of African liberation.

THE MAGHRIB AND BLACK AFRICA

At Rabat, the Maghribi states, the states of North Africa and those of black Africa were able to unite along the following axis—the axis of Pan-Arabism which linked these states to Egypt, to the Palestinian Arabs and to the Arabs in Lebanon; on the basis of Islam which has been the basis of the political alliances between Egypt, Libya, Syria, at one time the Sudan; and along the axis of Pan-Africanism in that they were able to agree to a resolution condemning the continued occupation of African soil by non-African forces, and the persistence of white colonial rule in southern Africa.

We are now faced with a situation where King Hassan II, of Morocco has emerged as the President of the OAU. The axis has swung to the north and Hassan, who until now has not played a very vigorous role in the fears of black Africa, has become a hard-liner. He has promised \$1 million out of his own funds to help the liberation movement, and he has broken the diplomatic relations with Portugal. In Hassan II, of the Maghrib we may have a person who will represent that area and the rest of Africa, vigorously and forcefully, as the OAU

at this point in the evolution, attempt to enable the African states to play a new role.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Skinner follows:)

THE EVOLUTION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MAGHRIB AND BLACK AFRICA

The relations between the Maghrib and Black Africa have been influenced by geography as well as by often conflicting historical forces of Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Africanism. Geography, history and ideology have often separated these states, but these factors have also made for cooperation between them.

During the neolithic period the fertile Sahara was a veritable highway between North and Central Africa, and engravings in the now dry regions attest to the presence there of herding and agricultural people presently restricted to the oases or to the northern regions and to the Sahel-Sudan regions of the south. It was the drying up of the Sahara that fostered the development of the distinct Berber societies in North Africa as well as those of Ghana, Mali, Songhay, Hausa, and Bornu in the Sahel-Sudan area, but there was never a complete cessation of travel and commerce between the two regions. Black Africa certainly felt the effects of Phoenecian, Roman, Visigothic, and Byzantine influences in North Africa.

Arab conquest of North Africa (called by them Djezira-el-Maghrib-Island of the west) during the late seventh century created the conditions for vigorous interaction with the Western Sudan. Paradoxically, it was not the Arabs that influenced the Bled-es-Sudan, but Islam brought by the Arabs.

By the eighth century Arab rule in North Africa had come to an end. It was Islamicized Berbers who not only carried Islam and elements of Arabic civilization into Spain but who also diffused Islam to the Blacks of Ghana and conquered that kingdom in 1076 A.D. Later it was the Islamicized Black kings of Mali and Songhay who extended their own power over neighboring societies thereby creating large empires.¹ Arab elements such as the Beni Hilal herdsmen were to re-introduce Arabic elements into the Maghrib, but the Arabs as a group did not again become important in the Maghrib until centuries later on.

MAGHRIB AND THE SUDAN IN HISTORY

Close relations between the Maghrib and the Western Sudan existed from the twelfth to the sixteenth century. The Sudanese valued the Islamic bond with the North Africans, and profited from this relationship to adopt many aspects of Arabic civilization. Arabic became the language of the literati of Sankore in Timbuktu and these men exchanged visits and students with the Islamic centers in North Africa and Egypt. Muslim scholars and clerics from North Africa and architects from Spain (such as Es Sabei) built mosques in the Sudan and introduced various arts and crafts. Black Muslim rulers exchanged envoys with Maghribian kings and sought advice on problems of state-craft. Commerce in gold, books, salt, slaves, hides increased between the Mediterranean and forests, and wealthy African pilgrims visited North Africa on their way to and from the holy cities of Medina and Mecca.

Although Muslim, the rulers of the Sudan were never subjected to the rule of the Muslim Caliphate—a Caliphate which quite early had ceased to be Arab. Moreover, except for imperialist reasons they seldom islamized their subjects. The mass of the people in the Sudan remained traditionalists. When they did adopt Islam, they accepted only those aspects of it that harmonized with their basic social and cultural values.² Thus Ibn Battuta who visited Mali in the fourteenth century during his travels throughout the then Muslim world was amazed to find matrilineal succession among the Blacks. He was also shocked by the independence of the women in the household of Muslim Kadis.³ Islam in Black Africa developed different *tariqas* or practices that differed from those

¹ Froelich, Jean-Claude, "Islam et culture arabe en Afrique au sud du Sahara", in *Revue française d'études politiques africaines*, Janvier 1966, No. 1, pp. 54-70.

² Skinner, Elliott P., "Islam in Mossi Society", in *Islam in Tropical Africa*, I. M. Lewis, ed., London, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 358 ff.

³ Battuta, Ibn (Mohammed), *Travels in Asia and Africa, 1325-1354*, (trans. H.A.R. Gibb, 1929.)

of orthodox Islam as does Islam in Pakistan and presumably Bangladesh. Islam in Indonesia and Islam in the Philippines. Yet, the acceptance by the Black Africans of the central tenets and beliefs of Islam did enable them to worship in concert with their co-religionists.

Relations between the Maghrib and Black Africa began to deteriorate when the Moroccans, thrown out of Spain by Christians in the fifteenth century, raided by the Portuguese, and attacked by the Turks, sought to increase their revenue by coveting the salt and gold mines in the Sudan. Unknown to the sultans of Morocco was that the Portuguese were already draining gold from the West Atlantic Coasts, and that this process had also started to erode the power of Songhay. In vain did the Songhay ruler Askia Ishak II remonstrate with the Moroccan Sultan Ahmad al-Mansur not to attack a brother Muslim. The plea was rejected, and the Moroccan army led by a Spanish mercenary officer, Judar Pasha, crossed the Sahara on April 12, 1591 and defeated the Songhay.

There is still a controversy as to whether al-Mansur's forces captured enough gold to justify his subsequent sobriquet, "Al Dehbi" (the Golden One). Most scholars agree that one certain result of the conquest of Songhay was the ruin of Sudanese commerce, the intellectual decline of Timbuctoo and the retreat of Islam on the middle Niger. Another result was that Morocco gained the reputation for being a rich and powerful country. The power of its sharif caused anxiety to the sultans of Constantinople, who had desired to impose their religious supremacy on him. The beylerbeys installed at Algiers were also concerned because they dreamt of handing the Atlantic ports to their corsairs. Nevertheless, neither the power of the Moroccan *sharifs* nor the beys of Algeria and Tunis was to last since Europe was on the ascendancy. After three centuries of intrigue and conflict the French replaced the Sharifian empire in Morocco and ended Turkish rule in both Algeria and Tunisia. They and other western Europeans conquered and colonized almost all of Africa.

EUROPEAN RULE

European rule in the Maghrib and in Black Africa was to create many of the conditions that facilitated relations between the two areas later on. The French who captured Algeria in 1830 imposed imperial rule on the territory, made it a province of France, discriminated against those people who kept their Muslim civil law (all but 2,500 of them until 1934), and attempted to assimilate the small elite. Ferhat Abbas, a member of this elite, would later say: "France is Myself." He added, "If I had discovered an Algerian nation, I would have become a nationalist and would not have been ashamed of it. Six million Muslims live on this soil which had been French for a hundred years. Out of this hungry mass, we shall make a modern society, elevate them to human dignity, so that they may be worthy of the name of Frenchmen."⁴ His problem, as the earlier American colonials knew so well, was that colonialism could never grant its subjects human dignity.

In contrast to Abbas, there was Messali Haj, an Algerian nationalist, whose activities in both France and Algeria "covered a broad canvass of ideas and issues: North African independence, Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islam, anti-imperialism, socialism, and the Pan African Congresses of Dr. W. E. B. DuBois."⁵ Thomas L. Blair tells us that "Under Messali's leadership, socialism, a renascent Islam, and Maghrib unity became household words among Algerian workers in France and at home. His dreams of an independent nation allied to the Arab and African worlds and rooted in popular democratic socialism and Islamic values became in time Algeria's own ideals."⁶

FRENCH RULE

French rule in the protectorate of Tunisia was less harsh. Taking over the country in 1881-1883, the French instituted a form of indirect rule under the Beys, introduced its own way of life, but tolerated that of the Tunisians. For decades, "The two worlds existed side by side: one self-confident, arrogant, and more and more demanding, and the other withdrawn, passive and baffled."⁷ Finally when the first generation of French educated arose they demanded, among other things, that all French schools be opened to all Tunisians. The French

⁴ Zartman, I. William, *Government and Politics in Northern Africa*, New York, Praeger, 1963, p. 40.

⁵ Blair, Thomas L., "The Land to those who work it: Algeria's Experiment in Workers' Management", New York, Doubleday & Co., 1969, p. 29.

⁶ *Loc. cit.*

⁷ Sylvester, Anthony, *Tunisia*, Dufour Editions, Chester Springs, Penn., 1969, p. 43.

rejected these demands and the fires of nationalism were sparked. There were Arab congresses, political manifestation, boycotts, and the inevitable arrest and deportation of such leaders as Bash Hamba. By 1920 the traditional Tunisian elite represented by religious leaders, Koranic lawyers and merchants formed the first political party, the *Destour* or "Constitution" party. They demanded a "representative assembly, the establishment of responsible parliamentary government, and a return to the true source of Islamic culture."⁸

The nature of colonial rule in Morocco from 1912 onward permitted the people there, and especially the Sharifian sultans, to retain most of their indigenous traditions. Marshal Louis, H. G. Lyautey, the veritable pro-consul of French Morocco, always maintained that French policy was "in the name of and for the benefit of the Sultan." The French did little to affect Islam and introduced few educational institutions that challenged Arabic culture. They were even less effective in the Berber areas which were not conquered until the 1930's. Then the French made an alliance (*dahir*) with the Berbers to remove them from Sharifian control and thereby weaken the king. This act was correctly perceived by the emerging Arab elite as an old imperialist ploy of "divide and rule." They flocked to support the young sultan, hailed him as "king" of all Morocco, and formed an independence movement, the *Istiqlal*. This movement developed links with independence movements in Algeria and Tunis, but it remained allied to the king. This monarch became a symbol of resistance to the French, a friend of the allies during World War II and the man who succeeded in eliminating foreign rule over Spanish Morocco as well as the International Zone.⁹

TIES BETWEEN THE MAGHRIB AND THE REST OF AFRICA

France's rule in Africa south of the Sahara created a number of conditions that were to facilitate relations between this area and the Maghrib. After frustrating the consolidation of the western Sudan by El Hadj Umar and Almamy Samoray Ture, the French adopted a policy fostering the spread of Islam. They believed that Islam, freed from the help or hindrance of the traditional African ruling elite, was a useful tool to weaken the African traditional cultures which would then be easily swept away by the more vigorous French civilization. They provided funds to build koranic schools and even permitted Algerians and Moroccans to teach in these schools. In addition, the French did not oppose the activities of itinerant Muslim clerics, the *marabouts*, who traveled between the Maghrib and the Sudan spreading the teachings of the *Kadiriyya* and the *Tidjaniyya*, two tariquas that had arisen in North Africa. Islam was also spread by devout Dioula and Hausa traders who took advantage of new roads and motor vehicles to spread their faith among their many passengers and customers.

ROLE OF ISLAM

Islam did emerge as an important link between the Maghrib and Black Africa during the colonial period, but there were important differences between Pan-Islamism in Black Africa and that in the Maghrib. In North Africa there was an alliance between Islam, nationalism and Arab civilization. The emerging nationalists in Algeria cried: "Islam is my religion. Arabic is my language, Algeria is my country!" The emerging nationalists of Black Africa wanted to promote "national self-determination among Africans under African leadership, for the benefit of Africans themselves." Black African nationalism was concerned not with religion, nor culture, but was committed to *Africa for Africans*, and desired to project the African personality in world affairs. The nearest it came to a mystique was a belief in *négritude*, an undefinable quality of black people. Whereas the people of the Maghrib would always feel some commitment to Arabic civilization and Arabs in other areas of the world, the Black Africans were primarily concerned with the inviolability of Africa, and the liberation of African peoples. Islam was only of secondary importance to Black Africans even though it provided a link to Arabs and Arabic civilization. Again, whereas the people of the Maghrib felt some constraint to work within the ancient philosophical framework of Arabism and Islam, Black Africans sought to project their personality by taking advantage of every cultural vehicle or modern technique.

The main links that emerged between the people of the Maghrib and those

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 44.

⁹ Zartman, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-38.

of Black Africa at the end of World War II were based on a common heritage of European domination, and a common desire to achieve independence for all of Africa. France did not encourage trade between her colonies and the economic relations between the Maghrib and Black Africa are still weak. For example, both Algeria and Tunisia import only 1% of their goods from Black-African states and export 5% to them. Morocco on the other hand imports 3% of her goods from Black Africa, most of there from Senegal, and exports 8% of her merchandise to these states.¹⁰ Politics rather than commerce has forged links between these two groups of states. It was politics that led nationalists from Morocco, Tunis, Algeria, as well as those from the Cameroons, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, Chad, Mozambique and South Africa, to gather in Egypt after that country recovered its full sovereignty. Nasser did play an important role in the liberation of the Maghrib, especially of Algeria, and this was one of the factors which influenced French action in the Suez War of 1956. Nevertheless, by this time both Morocco and Tunisia were independent and Ghana was on the threshold of becoming Black Africa's first post-War II independent country.

RELATIONS BETWEEN AFRICAN STATES

Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah lost no time in establishing formal diplomatic relations with the independent African states including Morocco and Tunisia. On April 15, 1958, he called the First Conference of Independent African States whose aim was to forge "closer links of friendship, brotherhood, cooperation and solidarity" between these states. He declared: "Today we are one. If in the past the Sahara divided us, now it unites us. And an injury to one is an injury to all of us. From this Conference must go out a new message: 'Hands off Africa!' Africa must be free!"¹¹ The political realities both in the Maghrib and in Black Africa did not permit the various leaders to adhere to Nkrumah's principle of "one for all and all for one." France's agonizing war with Algeria divided the Africans. Black African politicians such as Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny did not support the Algerians against the Metropole thus alienating Nkrumah, Nasser and the Algerians. Even when the force of nationalism compelled the moderate leaders of France's Sub-Saharan colonies to be independent they preferred to give DeGaulle the opportunity to solve the Algerian problem rather than support the militant Algerians.

The growing ideological differences between leaders in both Black African and Maghribi states widened when Belgium's decolonization of the Congo turned into rebellion and civil war. Calling for the forceful intervention of the United Nations in Congolese affairs, Morocco, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea and Mali met at Casablanca on March 1, 1961, affirmed their non-alignment in the Cold War, and asserted their dedication to the rapid decolonization of Africa. Reacting against them, another group of states, including Tunisia, most francophone states and West African anglophone states, Libya and Ethiopia met at Monrovia on May 12, 1961. They insisted on the doctrine of respect for the sovereignty of each state, and affirmed their hopes for African unity by cooperation rather than conflict.

There were however, other factors besides the Congo and Algeria that influenced the decision of the Maghribi states to adhere to one side or the other. Tunisia was moderate because Bourguiba refused to accept dictation from a militant Nasser and because of her own internal political culture. Morocco was hostile to most francophone states because they supported the independent of Mauretania over which the Sharifian dynasty had always claimed sovereignty. From this period both history and ideology were to influence the relations between the Maghrib and Black Africa, and within these state systems. Later on when both Mali and Niger had difficulty with the nomadic Tuaregs who sought refuge in Algeria, the Algerians helped their ideologue partner Mali punish the rebels, while they gave shelter to the Tuaregs from Niger.

PAN-AFRICANISM

Despite ideological differences between and among the Maghribi states and Black African states, they all subscribed to the ideal of Pan-Africanism and

¹⁰ Michel, Hubert, "La politique africaine des Etats Maghrib", in *Revue française d'études politiques africaines*, Mars, 1968, Nov. 27, pp. 41-62.

¹¹ Nkrumah, Kwame, *I Speak of Freedom: A statement of African Ideology*, New York, Praeger, 1961, p. 131.

had a commitment to African liberation. Thus despite the existence of the Arab League, the Monrovia and Casablanca groupings, the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, The Council of Understanding, and the African and Madagasy Union, the African states decided to form the Organization of African Unity. This organization did not achieve the federal structure hoped for by Nkrumah, but it did provide the Africans with a platform for cooperation and for resolving some of their differences. M. Ahmed Ben Bella, who represented the recently independent Algeria at Addis Ababa in 1963 declared: "It is necessary to revise the whole strategy of Africa. The Africans expect very much from us, and we cannot deceive them. At Addis Ababa I felt our responsibility, our very great responsibility."¹²

Paradoxically it was to be this sentiment that created problems between Algeria and the rest of Black Africa. Conscious of the help which the G.P.R.A. had received from the independent African states, Ben Bella participated actively in the Committee of Nine organized to provide aid to the Liberation Movements. But he also permitted FRELIMO, PAIGC, MPLA, UPA, and SWAPO to establish headquarters in Algiers. Then to the consternation of the independent African states he permitted the dissident UPC of the Cameroons, the Sanwi of the Ivory Coast, the FLN of Chad, and the Sawaba of Niger to come to Algiers. Ben Bella also provided Algerian passports for such people as the Gabonese rebel Mba, and the mysterious Moroccan, Ben Barka. He supported the Congolese rebels and remained implacably hostile to Tshombe who was being rehabilitated by the francophone African states. These activities plus conflict over mineral rights resulted in frontier war with Morocco which fortunately was quickly stopped by the OAU. But the states of the francophone OCAM did not forgive Ben Bella. They declined to attend the Second Afro-Asian Summit conference planned for July 1965, and were not displeased when he was overthrown by Houari Boumedienne in June 1965.

Ben Bella's fall did not immediately change Algeria's hard policy towards the remaining colonial powers in Africa. In contrast to Tunisia and Morocco, Boumedienne broke diplomatic relations with Great Britain in 1966 over the Rhodesian "secession." Again, alone among the Maghrib states, he broke relations with the U.S. over the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Boumedienne retained the hijacked Tshombe in prison until the latter died, but whether to prevent him from being executed by Mobutu or to punish him is not clear. The Algerian leader transformed the 1969 Pan-African Cultural Festival in Algiers into a contest between the radical and moderate African states much to the chagrin of the Ivory Coast among others.

ROLE OF TUNISIA AND MOROCCO

Tunisia became more involved with the states of Black Africa after the formation of the OAU than before. It was as a member of the OAU that President Bourguiba, a former member of the Monrovia group, received the heads of many African Liberation movements. It was also at the meeting of the Chiefs of States of the OAU in Cairo in July 1964 that he suggested that the relations which had been established between Israel and certain African states was "an obstacle to African Unity." However, Bourguiba did not press for a resolution against such relations. He has consistently warned his fellow Arabs to be realistic about the struggle with Israel. The Tunisian President has shown a tendency to ally himself with Senghor of Senegal in favor of a Francophonie Commonwealth in Africa. Apparently ignoring his Arabism he declared: "It is normal that nations cooperate and associate as a function of the superior relationship that the use of the same language imposes upon them. This linguistic region that exists in Africa has more significance than a climatic zone because it make co-operation a more spontaneous thing."¹³ Bourguiba's health is not good and relations between Tunisia and Black Africa might well change when he releases the reigns of power.

Morocco has only recently adjusted to the fact that it had no chance to achieve the goal upon which its policy toward Black Africa was predicated: namely, the recovery of Mauretania.¹⁴ By 1963 it had witnessed the signature of a commercial

¹² Rondot Pierre et Jean-Claude Froelich, "Le Maghrib entre l'Orient et l'Afrique Noire", *Revue française d'études africaines*, Janvier 1966, No. 13, p. 108.

¹³ Catta, Emmanuel, "Etats arabes d'Afrique du Nord et Tiers-Monde africain noir", *Revue française d'études africaines*, Janvier 1966, No. 1, pp. 71-87.

¹⁴ Pautard, Andre, "Le Maghreb et les Etats d'Afrique Noire", in *Revue française d'études politiques africaines*, Mars, 1968, No. 27, pp. 63-75.

treaty between Mali, one of the Casablanca group, and Mauretania; and in 1964, another of its partners, Egypt, officially recognized Mauretania. King Hassan II was led to admit that the epoch of Morocco conquest is over, but as late as 1965 he still named persons to the Ministry of Saharan and Mauretanian affairs. This act caused some dismay among the OAU members who felt that his action was motivated by the Istiqlal which could not accept Mauretanian independence. However, President Senghor of Senegal with whom Morocco had had important economic as well as cultural relations was able to allay most fears.

PAN-ISLAM SENTIMENT

It was the persistence of Pan-Islamic sentiment between the Maghrib and Black African states that finally led to a rapprochement between Morocco and Mauretania. In August 1969, 25 countries with sizeable Muslim populations attended an Islamic conference in Rabat. As usual the Arab-Israeli conflict was discussed. But with Senegal, Chad, Niger and Mali (among other countries) reportedly remaining extremely discrete, the conference did little more than deplore the "aggression of June 1967" and persistent military occupation of the conquered territories. President Boumedienne of Algeria took advantage of this religious ambience to induce Hassan II to meet Ould Daddah of Mauretania. The next day the Moroccan king invited the Mauretanian to a private dinner and the relation between the two countries improved.

During the past two years, Ould Daddah has emerged as a pivotal figure between the Maghrib and Black Africa, and this development is having important implications for the whole of Africa. Senghor has always considered Mauretania with its mixed population a key area for the creation of a cultural synthesis of the Negro-Arabo-Berber elements of Africa. The Mauretanian President no doubt profiting from his Islamic, Arab, as well as Black African attributes, has succeeded in bringing a dynamism to the OAU that had been absent over the past few years. When he took over the Presidency of that organization in June 1971, he found many African chiefs of state concerned with the failure of the Africans to play an important role in world affairs. They were divided over supporting the liberation movements, about the issue of dialogue with South Africa, and were frustrated by the stalemate in the Middle East.

AFRICAN ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST

Whether because of Ould Daddah's leadership or because of a growing disappointment with their western allies, the states of the OAU decided to take bold steps on a number of issues, especially the Middle East. Deploring what they considered to have been Tel-Aviv's unresponsiveness to the Jarring initiatives in February 1971, they unanimously demanded that Israel retreat from all occupied territories. This resolution, including as it did, the non-African territories of Syria and Jordan was surely a victory for Egypt and the hard-line states. The delegates resolved that the OAU form a commission charged with putting pressure on the great powers to find a solution to the conflict based on the U.N. resolution of November 22, 1967. They also asked President Ould Daddah to secure a sub-committee of African Presidents to visit both Cairo and Jerusalem "as pilgrims of peace." Presidents Senghor, Ahidjo, Gowon and Mobutu were chosen, and they visited both capitals between November 2 and 5 and between November 22 and 25. They also submitted a peace plan to both the Egyptians and Israelis.

The result of the African Presidents' initiatives in the Middle East were only to be revealed to the OAU, but it soon became clear that they had failed. The only issue was why they had failed and what would be the reaction of the delegates to the next OAU meeting to be held in the Maghrib city of Rabat.

The reaction of the OAU to the Presidents' mission came at Rabat. Thomas A. Johnson reporting in the New York Times from Rabat on June 15 wrote: "Representatives of 40 African nations—including 23 heads of state—ended 11 days of meetings here today after agreeing to strongly worded resolutions criticizing Israel's role in the Middle-East conflict and the United States role in Rhodesia and in Portugal's African territories." Apparently reacting strongly to the failure of the Presidents' mission to Jerusalem, "The chiefs-of-state conference resolved to deplore what it called Israel's negative and obstructive attitude, and it asked that all United Nations members refrain from supplying Israel with weapons, military equipment or moral support." Surprisingly, the resolution offered no new solution to the Middle East problem and will probably rely again on the initiatives of Mr. Jarring.

The delegates in Rabat, reportedly enjoying greater cooperation and conciliation than was seen in years, did manage to resolve a number of problems between Black African and Maghribi political leaders and also between Maghribi and West African states. Agreeing to increase aid to the guerrilla movements by 50%, the conference succeeded in getting the two Angolan liberation movement leaders, Dr. Agostinho Neto of the MPLA and Roberto Holden of the FNLA to cooperate in what was called "the spirit of Rabat." The delegates also effected a reconciliation between Hassan II of Morocco and Boumedienne of Algeria. The two Presidents settled their frontier dispute, and agreed to exploit jointly the iron ore near Tindouf in Southwestern Algeria. The delegates also suggested that the African states set up a joint military organization, a plan that was broached in 1963 but was never resolved. Unresolved during the conference was the conflict between Hassan II and Libya's President al-Qadhafi. Nevertheless there was agreement that a Maghribi Hassan II, would be the next president of the OAU and Mr. Ekangaki of the Cameroons the Secretary General of the organization for the next four years.

KING HASSAN II AND OAU

It is still too soon to know what effect the election and Hassan II of Morocco would have on the relations between the Maghrib and the Black African states. The Moroccan king has already shown his increased support for the Liberation Movements by pledging them a personal contribution of \$1 million. Less than a week afterwards he broke relations with Portugal over its colonial policy, and called upon the African countries bordering colonial territories to permit the guerrillas to operate from their territories "even if they are bombed day and night by the enemy," as happened in Morocco during the Algerian war.

The results of the last meeting of the OAU in a Maghribi state and the hard line that Hassan II is taking against the remaining pockets of European rule in Africa indicate that all four factors that relate the Maghrib to Black Africa: geography, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islamism, and Pan-Africanism appear to be working in tandem. One could suggest that the reasons for this positive factor are in fact negative: frustration with the continuing impotence of Africa in world affairs, continued occupation of African territory by outsiders, the failure of the liberation movements, the continuing instability in many African countries, and declining position of African products in world trade. Yet there was the hint of something new at Rabat. There was a recognition of the need to promote trade links across monetary and phonic barriers, and to foster the development of regional economic groups both in the Maghrib and in Black Africa to help develop the continent. The African states appeared to have been trying to bring their wishful thinking in line with the political and economic realities of the continent and its people.

Mr. HAMILTON (presiding). Thank you very much, Mr. Skinner. Our next witness is Aaron Segal.

Mr. Segal.

STATEMENT OF AARON SEGAL, VISITING ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

(A biographic sketch of Mr. Segal appears on p. 117.)

Mr. SEGAL. Mr. Chairman, I want to focus on the relations between each of the North African states and the Western countries and particularly Western Europe and the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States and try to examine what are the basic issues and concerns at stake both from the standpoint of the North Africans and from the standpoint of the rest of the world.

Essentially each one of these countries has been engaged since political independence in trying to explore various ways of coming to terms with dependence. That dependence—economic, political, cultural—was a relationship which they inherited as part and parcel of an extensive colonial experience. It was a relationship that found

them, for instance, in the case of all of the countries with the exception of Libya, relying for their governmental business much more on French than on Arabic, on the exchange of traditional export crops cultivated during the colonial period quite often by French and other settlers for the import on preferential terms of French consumer goods and industrial products, and of course a political relationship in which they were subsumed to be part of France's historic/geographic sphere of interest.

INDEPENDENCE AND DEPENDENCE

Each of these countries has sought to alter the terms of dependence but has gone about it in very strikingly different ways. It is first significant to note that their search for alternative to dependence—is primarily concerned with France and secondly with Western Europe. These are still countries that have three-fourths or more of their exports with Western Europe and a majority of their foreign trade still is conducted with France.

When they began to look for alternatives to dependence one of the first considerations was the question of what they could do among themselves, to what extent North Africa as a regional political, or economic bloc represented an alternative to dependence on Western Europe and other western industrialized countries. While they have tentatively explored various arrangements, basically each state, primarily because internally they are very different, has decided to go its own way. The Moroccans and the Tunisians have consulted informally and otherwise in their very critical negotiations with the ECC. The Algerians and Libyans talk to one another about their oil negotiations with the major Western companies. But in actuality, and in my evaluation, the prospects of extensive North African unity—political, economic, or cultural—as an alternative to dependence on Western Europe are not really a live option.

Both of my distinguished colleagues have elaborated on the question of relationships with the rest of Africa and with the Middle East primarily again as options, seen in political terms to a much lesser extent than seen in cultural and economic terms. While each of the countries in its own way has manifested at various times degrees of interest, all of them have recognized that the crunch comes in terms of altering dependence vis-a-vis Western Europe and that means more and more the European Economic Community.

UNITED STATES AND NORTH AFRICA

I should say that basically the United States from the perspective of each of the North African states has also largely been regarded as an alternate, not as a substitute, not as a replacement for France, not as a replacement for trade with the EEC but as a kind of a bargaining lever for various political and economic purposes in order perhaps to extract better terms from the Europeans or to lessen that fundamental dependence on Western Europe.

With that kind of broad perspective I want to look then at each one of the countries and try to examine how they come to terms with dependence, how they have tried to restructure their relations with the Europeans and with the United States and perhaps speculate a

little bit about where they may be going and what is at stake for the Europeans and the United States.

By far the most important country politically and economically is Algeria and the Algerians are the most determined to use their rather impressive energy resources of oil and natural gas to complement political independence with economic independence. That is to say, they want to do primarily two things. They want to sell the world not only raw materials in the form of oil and natural gas but they want to be able to process and transform those raw materials into industrial goods which will be competitive on world markets so that they have major commitments in the field of petro chemicals and steel. They have the desire to acquire the most impressive and the most up-to-date technology available and to pay for it with their own hard currency and foreign exchange reserves and eventually to be able to place their goods on anyone's markets, recognizing of course that when you are 400 miles on the other side of the Mediterranean from Europe that Europe is going to be essentially the primary market.

ALGERIA'S POLICIES

This has led to a situation in which the Algerians, in spite of their political disagreements with the United States, which are fundamental with respect to Vietnam or with respect to Israel, and certainly American policies on southern Africa, have been very anxious to consummate oil and natural gas agreements with the United States in order to lessen their dependence on Western Europe and to increase their bargaining power with respect to the European Economic Community.

The nature of these agreements which are not yet ratified provides for a very fundamental transformation which has significance well beyond Africa of the basic relations between energy exporting developing countries and the industrialized West. Basically what the Algerians are saying is: We want with our own resources and our own people to take that oil out of the ground, to pump it up to the coast, to transform it, and to sell it on our own terms in joint ventures with Western companies that will not own properties in our countries, that will not by and large employ our nationals but will basically be functioning as distributors and providers of technology and capital equipment.

I think that the Algerians are going to pull off these arrangements. I think that they are going to be precedent setting for a total and very rapidly changing set of relationships between oil companies and natural gas companies around the world. That the stakes both for the United States and for the Western Europeans who have been much more reluctant to concede these new kinds of joint ventures than American companies, are very high.

The other side of dependence is what you do about the traditional relationships you inherited, and those in the case of Algeria were relationships in which Algeria, formerly considered a part of metropolitan France, had preferential access for its oranges and its wine and its traditional agricultural exports which were mostly grown by French settlers for the French market.

THE EEC AND NORTH AFRICA

When the European Economic Community was formed the Algerians sought to negotiate commercial agreements which would extend these kinds of French preferential arrangements on a European-wide basis, meanwhile taking advantage of a kind of negligence on the part of the EEC which has continued to allow certain Algerian goods to enter France at least on a duty-free basis. Basically the Europeans for their own reasons and for their own internal agricultural interests have not been willing to concede broad preferences to the Algerians without asking in turn for additional kinds of economic concessions which to the Algerians spell dependence.

The Algerians have said, "We are not willing to tolerate that any more." Wine, which was one of their leading preindependence exports, and for which there are diminishing markets within Western Europe, is a key example. Algeria decided gradually to tear up the vineyards and to replace them with wheat and other agricultural crops which will both limit their import bill and their dependence on the rest of the world.

Given the Algerians' objectives, resources, and their determination, my guess is that they will succeed. I would underline that it is to the inherent interest of the United States to encourage the Algerians in this endeavor to lessen their dependence on Western Europe because we are in a position to offer them technology and markets on comparable terms and because they are extremely interested in acquiring certain kinds of know-how that we have. We need to do a great deal more to press our economic, culture, and commercial relations with Algeria whether or not we are able to reestablish actual formal diplomatic relations.

LIBYA

The other country that has tried to directly confront dependence is Libya. It has done so by using its very impressive oil and natural gas resources to put its basic commitments into alignment with the Middle East and with Egypt in particular and to the kind of pan-Islamic and pan-Arabic and to some extent pan-African policies that my colleagues have been describing. The Libyans are confident that they don't need special arrangements with anyone, particularly with respect to Western Europe which is the major market for their oil and natural gas. They are confident that the Western Europeans really don't have any alternatives, whether in the North Sea or the development of nuclear energy. Even if the Western Europeans had alternatives, the Libyans are not interested in any kind of economic or political relationships that would smell again of that hated dependence from which they feel they so recently escaped.

The problem with respect to the Libyans is that unlike the Algerians they really don't have the manpower and the skilled resources to run their own industries and they know that and they are very, very sensitive about it. Nor do they have like the Algerians the basic manpower in the pipeline in training in order to be able to eventually take over their industries. It hurts like hell when they have to bring in the Egyptians having thrown out the Italians. Whatever they say in public about their commitments to the Egyptians, they would really pre-

fer to have Libyans running those industries and running those shops rather than being dependent on anyone.

Given this kind of nationalism, I think that while there is no necessary showdown of conflict between Libya and Western Europe or Libya and the United States, nor are there really effective prospects for basic cooperation. This regime is one which we have got to live with. We are not going to like what it does to us or to other people. It has got to deal with the West to obtain the money if not the manpower to back up at least some of its goals and ambitions.

There are issues at stake which are basic for both Western Europe and the United States where we are going to have to come to terms with Libya. The first issue is that of nationalization. The U.S. private investments in Libya are nearly \$1 billion, virtually a third of U.S. private investments in all of Africa. Western European interests are even more substantial.

POSSIBLE NATIONALIZATIONS

Whether it is tomorrow or 5 years from now or 10 years from now, and there is no timetable in my opinion, sooner or later the Libyans are going to take over those interests. Whether they are going to take them over 51 percent or 100 percent, whether or not they will pay compensation, is anybody's guess at this stage but the Libyans are going to do what the Algerians have done and what other oil producing states are getting ready to do.

We have two choices and the Western Europeans have the same choices. One is to stall and fudge and delay and try to prevent the inevitable from happening and try once our interests are nationalized to get compensation and lose the ball game. The second is to accept that this is going to happen and to encourage as far as possible the development of joint ventures along Algerian lines in which we will retain our markets, and retain our technology. Whatever foreign exchange the Libyans earn they are not going to be able to spend in Libya, they are going to have to import capital and consumer goods from the rest of the world.

If we fight nationalization, we are likely to end up with the American companies being thrown out and the Japanese will move in or the Italians or someone else. I think there is a basic issue at stake with which we must come to terms. This is one of the rather intriguing elements of the agreements with the Algerians. If we can work out an agreement with the Algerians with whom we don't have diplomatic relations, there is no reason why we cannot have similar kinds of agreements with the Libyans.

We have a headstart. In spite of their hostility toward us the Libyans respect our technology and know-how. The Libyan Government sends nearly 200 Libyan students to the United States to study petroleum engineering, and other subjects. Although we have a headstart, we are likely to find ourselves replaced by the Japanese or the Italians if we try to ride a hobbyhorse in protecting U.S. private interests that are doomed.

MOROCCO AND TUNISIA

Morocco and Tunisia in their own respective ways are trying to do something which I call making a virtue out of dependence. When you

get up in the morning you say, "I'm small and I'm poor but maybe if I am nice to my rich neighbors some of that gravy will roll down my way." The Tunisians have been pretty good at it. The EEC protects, to a limited extent, their exports of wine, olive oil, citrus fruits, and other products.

They are now, like the Moroccans, getting jumpy for two reasons. One is because the Europe of Six is becoming a Europe of Ten. Tunisian oranges once had a slight EEC preference over Spanish oranges or Israeli oranges. With the extension and the broadening of Europe there are going to be a whole series of preferential arrangements that are going to take place at the expense of those rather slight advantages that Morocco and Tunisia had obtained through jumping in a little bit earlier and negotiating with the Europeans.

Secondly, Morocco and Tunisia are getting jumpy because they see the United States leaning rather heavily with its billions of dollars of EEC trade at stake. The United States says to the EEC, "What about those Florida oranges, what about that Florida grapefruit?" Why is it that an orange produced in Morocco pays no duty when it is sold in Belgium or France and that same orange when it is grown in Florida pays a 5-cent duty or a 10-cent duty?

We have got bargaining power and have already extracted rather minor concessions from the Europeans primarily at the expense of the kinds of arrangements that had been extended to Morocco and Tunisia. This is very shortsighted because the basic problem is not what happens to a Florida orange compared to what happens to a Moroccan orange. The basic problem is how you get into the European market and to what extent they are going to favor their own traditional, often obsolete products instead of opening up their markets.

By leaning on the EEC to help particular U.S. commodities at the expense of other countries that are much poorer than we are, I don't think that we do anyone a particular advantage. Instead we delay the eventual process of the European Economic Community becoming a much less protectionist area.

AID TO MOROCCO AND TUNISIA

In addition to these kinds of commercial agreements with the European Economic Community, both Morocco and Tunisia in terms of making a virtue of dependence, have accepted economic assistance primarily from France and to a considerable extent from the United States, on a very substantial scale. They have gone out of their way to develop economies which are based on tourism, on export of labor intensive manufactured goods, and they have been concerned, as has Algeria, with the export of migrant workers to the EEC.

There are more than 1 million persons from North Africa who are working within the EEC primarily in France. These migrants are a kind of subproletariat. They are able-bodied men who leave their families behind and do the jobs that nobody else is willing to do in Europe working under substandard conditions. Each of the North African states has sought to stabilize the export of labor, to improve working conditions, and to prevent migrants from being exploited. Neither on their own nor collectively have they been able to do this.

UNITED STATES AND MOROCCO AND TUNISIA

Both Tunisia and Morocco have seen the United States as an alternate form of dependence, a way of saying, "Well, we are struck with these Europeans, we have got to take pretty much whatever they are going to give us." On the other hand, if we can get a little bit more from the Americans, so much the better. It is not going to be a substitute but it gives us that much more leverage.

The fundamental difference is that essentially the Tunisians have done a reasonably good job with dependence. The economic assistance that they have received from the United States, France, and other countries has to some extent trickled down. It is a regime which is concerned about the welfare of its people. It has a difficult problem of succession due to the illness of President Bourguiba but one where I do not see fundamental change occurring because I don't think there is any potential leadership group in Tunisia that sees any alternative to dependence.

MOROCCO AND KING HASSAN

This is not the case in Morocco. Morocco is a rather repressive regime in a country in which social injustice is rampant, and in which economic assistance from the United States and France manifestly has not trickled down but has been largely confined to self-perpetuating elites. We as well as France and the Western Europeans have committed ourselves to a regime which does have fundamental opposition at home both from the right and from the left. Some opposition elements are saying, "Why do we have to be basically schizophrenic, making a virtue out of a situation which is a very ugly and unfortunate one? Why can't we do like the Algerians and others and try to somehow minimize or reduce dependence in various ways?"

The Moroccans may not have the natural resources to do this. They may not have the potential leadership that is going to oust King Hassan and present alternate policies. But meanwhile the regime itself has not been able to effectively use dependence in order to extend its support. I think that both the Western Europeans and the United States have made a very serious mistake in propping up this kind of a regime with loans and technical assistance. We overcommitted ourselves to a regime that is incapable of delivering at home and has very little to offer us in terms of any kind of interests that we may have in that area of the world. So whether or not that regime stays in power, I think that there is a great deal to be said in terms of minimizing our involvement with it.

The search for alternatives to dependence is going to remain one of the basic themes of the foreign relations of each of the north African states. Fortunately each of these states is not dependent on the United States nor is it intimidated by nor particularly concerned with the United States. It is in our interest as well as in the interests of each of the North African states for us to play whatever role we can in encouraging this process of minimizing the degree of dependence and helping the North Africans to extract better economic terms from the Western Europeans. We should let them know that we don't want to duplicate with them the kind of relationship they are already unsatisfactorily experiencing vis-a-vis Western Europe.

Thank you.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Segal follows:)

NORTH AFRICA AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

Agriculture in North Africa is in deep trouble. Output and productivity in the agricultural monetary sector has been stagnant or falling in recent years. Meanwhile nearly 50 percent of the population remains stuck in a subsistence agriculture which yields neither adequate diets nor marketable surpluses.

The failure to establish a mutually beneficial and durable relationship with the European Economic Community, the "colossus to the north", is only one, and not necessarily the most important, of the many causes of the North African agricultural malaise. Yet it is the cause which is both the most visible and the most subject to short-term change. One reason for such change is the imminent entry into the EEC of the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway. This entry and the formation of a Europe of "10" in place of "six" will render obsolete the existing unsatisfactory trading arrangements between individual North African states and the EEC.

Another reason for change is mounting pressure from the United States protesting against limited EEC preferences for certain North African agricultural exports, especially citrus crops. While North African producers are convinced that these preferences have been of little economic value to them, the United States government seems determined to use its vastly greater political power and economic leverage with the EEC to have them abolished or mitigated.

North Africa's agricultural problems with the EEC are symptomatic of its broader inability to effectively negotiate a relationship with the EEC which will both facilitate economic development and not jeopardize hard and recently won political independence. At stake are markets for agricultural products, processed foodstuffs, consumer and industrial goods, and oil and natural gas, the only commodities which North Africa possesses for which the EEC has neither an adequate substitute nor a reliable alternate source of supply. Also involved are close to one million North African migrant workers in the EEC, the last to be hired and the first to be fired in times of economic recession, more than one million Western European visitors to North Africa, principally Morocco and Tunisia, and extensive flows of capital, investments and concessions.

Each of the four North African States, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia, has approached the problem of relations with the EEC in a distinct fashion. Each has rejected association with or eventual membership in the EEC as incompatible with their political independence, threatening to their fragile economies, and inconsistent with their pro-Arab sentiments.

Although the subject of occasional rhetoric, the notion of a North African Economic Community has made little headway, and is not considered a viable alternative to the EEC. At present aside from sharing pooled services of their national airlines on North African runs and a small coastal freighter service, there is little trade or common services. Libya, since its entry in September 1971 into a loose federation with Egypt and Syria has withdrawn from advisory North African economic cooperation meetings and studies. Faced with distinct and often hostile as well as ideologically incompatible political regimes each country has preferred to come to terms on its own with the EEC, although Morocco and Tunisia continue to consult informally and extensively.

LIBYA

Libya, both under the monarchy of former King Idris, and the present militant military regime, has decided to seek no formal relationship with the EEC. Instead it has relied on tough bargaining tactics, limits on production, and coordination with other oil-producing states, to nearly double within two years its revenue per barrel of petroleum. The EEC has no alternate source of low-sulphur and low-pollutant oil available to replace Libyan crude with its distinct transport advantage. Stalled in its pursuit of a common energy policy, delayed by several years in having nuclear energy available on a commercial basis, and faced with galloping increases in energy consumption, the EEC has had no choice but to cave in to Libyan demands.

Although petroleum and soon natural gas make Libya statistically rich with a per capita income over \$1500 for 2 million inhabitants, it has not resolved its basic problems, especially its acute shortage of skilled manpower. Petroleum is notoriously capital-intensive and pays enormously high wages for a handful of workers, while distorting many other prices. Libyan agriculture and livestock account for less than 1 per cent of total exports and the country experiences a huge and increasing food import bill combined with a massive abandonment of

agriculture as a way of life. The prestige Khufra project to use Saharan underground water for irrigation, begun by the oil companies and taken over by the military government, has been unable to attract settlers, while coastal cities swarm with underemployed ex-herdsmen ill-adapted to urban ways.

The Libyan Government is staking its economic plans on the development of petroleum and natural-gas based industries, the same strategy as that of Algeria, although on a less ambitious scale. Here the problem of the lack of a preferential trading arrangement with the EEC may be a major obstacle to the future viability of plants currently at the project stage. The Libyan tactic is to acquire increasingly large equity shares of foreign-owned oil concessions in Libya, perhaps in the hope that these can be bargained into market outlets in these companies for future Libyan petro-chemicals. The Libyans have the cash (\$2.5 billion in foreign exchange reserves) to finance their own development, prefer to recruit Egyptian or other Arab technicians rather than solicit EEC workers, and are determined to go it alone.

ALGERIA

Ironically the even more militant Algerian government continues to benefit from a colonial relationship with the EEC. When the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, a special clause provided that Algeria, as a "province of France" would receive integral treatment as an EEC member. Since its independence in 1962, the Algerian government and the EEC have conducted periodic negotiations looking towards a commercial agreement without any final settlement. Meanwhile Algerian goods have continued to enjoy duty-free entry into France and certain other EEC member states with the exception of Algerian wine, which has been displaced as a result of French wine-surpluses. Algeria has adopted both state trading and a rigorous system of import licensing which by 1972 offered few remaining concessions to French goods and none to those coming from the EEC. Suspecting that *ad hoc* treatment for their exports in each EEC member state, sometimes on the basis of their being EEC goods, was probably a better deal than could be negotiated in any commercial agreement, the Algerian government has not been in a hurry to end this anomaly, in spite of its colonial origins.

Instead the Algerian Government has diligently sought to diversify its external trade to preclude its becoming overly dependent on the EEC. It has concentrated its investments on heavy industry, especially steel and petro-chemicals, and bartered for trade in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. It has recently signed two long-term agreements to export petroleum to private United States companies purchasing directly from the 100 per cent state-owned Algerian SONATRACH, and is on the verge of a \$1 billion long-term contract to export natural gas to the United States. The 1971 showdown with France left the Algerian government in complete control of its petroleum industry, ending the last of the special concessions to France acquiesced in at the time of independence, but reducing the volume of Algerian oil exports to French companies, now minority shareholders with SONATRACH in joint enterprises.

The emphasis on heavy industry and diversified markets probably reflects an assessment by Algerian decisionmakers that its agriculture has few hopes of increasing exports to the EEC. Already measures are being taken to systematically cut-back the extent of Algerian vineyards in a country where little wine is consumed and where the Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC has destroyed traditional European outlets. Planners hope that vineyards can be replaced with hybrid wheat to reduce imports. Yet over-all less than 15 per cent of total investment under the current four year plan (1970-1973) goes for agriculture, and that is aimed at import substitution rather than the traditional export crops of wine, citrus, and olive oil.

The drama of this partly political and partly economic decision is that Algeria has the youngest population in North Africa—50 per cent under age 20, the fastest rate of population increase, 3.3 per cent, and the greatest dependence on migrant workers (nearly 600,000 Algerians resident in Europe, mostly France, but also Belgium, Switzerland, and West Germany). Lacking a dynamic export-oriented agriculture, Algeria cannot slow-down the rural exodus while its rural households depend on remittances from unskilled Algerian migrants.

Unlike Libya, Algeria is anxious to arrive at a commercial agreement with the EEC but fears that with the loss of France as its major ally that it will be unable to extract satisfactory terms from Brussels. At best it hopes for a package which would provide some protection for its agricultural exports, uniform social se-

curity, further vocational training, and improved working conditions for its migrant workers, EEC technical and other assistance with its modest tourist drive, and some financial aid. Proud and pragmatic, the Algerians have been quietly cultivating Britain, already a customer for their natural gas. In spite of their fervid desire to escape dependence, 74 per cent of current Algerian exports and 65 per cent of imports are with the EEC, and Algeria will desperately need friends within the Europe of 10 to protect its interests.

TUNISIA

While the Algerians want to keep the EEC at a comfortable distance, the Tunisians are in hot pursuit of a close accommodation. This partly reflects the generally moderate, pro-western stance of the government of President Habib Bourguiba as well as the cosmopolitanism of a small country with limited resources which has long lived by trade. What the Tunisians have wanted is virtually association in all but name with the EEC; that is an extensive and binding permanent economic union but without political ties and with ample safeguards for the country's vulnerable economy. What Tunisia obtained in May 1969 was a limited five year commercial agreement covering some but not all of its major agricultural exports, and providing no financial or technical assistance.

Since the ouster in the fall of 1969 of Ahmed Ben Salah as Minister of the Economy, Tunisia has returned to an economy based on encouragement of local private entrepreneurs in agriculture and trade, incentives to attract foreign private investment, and tourism, light industry, and export agriculture as the economic pillars. Ben Sallah's attempt to impose through decree cooperatives in retail and wholesale trade and agriculture has been largely abandoned. The re-emergence of the Tunisian private sector, the growth of tourism with over 500,000 visitors in 1971, and 3.5 million planned for 1975, and the official desire to expand the present 80,000 Tunisian migrant workers in Europe, all lend new emphasis to relations with the EEC. Replacing the present commercial agreement when it expires in 1974 with a broader and fuller arrangement is a *sine qua non* of the government's having a chance of fulfilling its development goals given its present strategy.

MOROCCO

The Moroccan government of King Hassan II has like Tunisia been concerned with protecting its traditional agricultural exports to France, finding outlets for new industrial products, securing financial and technical aid, and improving the status of Moroccan migrant workers in Europe. All that it was able to obtain was a commercial agreement in 1969 on lines similar to that offered to Tunisia providing limited preferences on citrus fruits, olive oil, and vegetables and duty-free entry for non-sensitive industrial goods. These preferences have been of little value to a stagnant Moroccan economy faced with rapid urbanization and population increase. At the same time the leading opposition political party, the UNFP, has opposed both the present agreement and association with the EEC on the grounds that it would leave Morocco economically dependent, postpone vital domestic land and social reforms, and undermine the chances of a North African Common Market.

Morocco and Tunisia have further complained about deterioration of the limited preferences made available in the 1969 agreements. For instance in 1971 the EEC adopted non-reciprocal preferential tariffs for certain manufactured goods coming from all developing countries. Commercial agreements with Israel and Spain have cut into North African agricultural preferences and in 1972 under pressure from the United States preferences for oranges and grapefruits were reduced. At best Morocco and Tunisia have been able to retain within the EEC once highly protected markets in France for limited exports. The trade agreements have not helped either to expand existing or to develop new exports.

Several alternatives have been suggested for re-structuring these unhappy, confused and complex relations. One is for the EEC to develop a "Mediterranean" policy to strengthen its political and economic ties with the entire area. Yet there is no agreement on the terms of such a Mediterranean policy or how it would distinguish between countries such as Greece and Turkey expected to gradually become full members of the EEC, and other states. A second alternative is to treat trade in terms of commodities rather than countries.

THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH AFRICA

Given the limited interest in or prospects for North African regional cooperation, the United States government should concentrate on bilateral relations

with each North African state. However our trade negotiations with the European Economic Community (EEC) should not narrowly focus on defending U.S. exports such as citrus at the expense of North African competitors. Instead we should encourage the EEC to revise its common agricultural policies to permit trade expansion across the board.

Algeria is the most important country in North Africa from the standpoint of United States interests. The major obstacles to closer political relations are our differences over Vietnam and Arab-Israeli questions. At the same time Algeria promises to become an important source of natural gas under joint venture agreements between Algerian state companies and private U.S. firms. Once approved by the Federal Power Commission, and with financing from the Export-Import Bank, these contractual joint ventures could serve as precedents for a new era in the international extraction and marketing of energy.

Algerians have a pronounced respect for American technology, especially in oil and gas, and a desire to take advantage of American know-how, particularly to reduce their dependence on France. We need to push our commercial advantages, taking part in the annual Trade Fair, re-establishing and expanding cultural and educational exchanges, and offering technical assistance in those areas where it is requested. The restoration of diplomatic relations is a desirable but not essential step towards increasing the presently modest U.S. presence. Mindful of Algeria's fierce desire for economic independence, its socially conservative and politically radical leadership, and their determination to reduce French influence, we should be able to develop relations based on mutual economic self-interest, and cultural and political respect.

No such prospects seem feasible for Libya where our goals and interests will remain in sharp conflict with the present and any likely future Libyan leadership. Two questions should dominate future Libyan-U.S. relations and their resolution permits a minimum of cooperation in spite of enmity between the two governments in other areas. The first and most important is how eventual Libyan nationalization of oil and gas concessions occurs and what takes their place. The second question is how Libya uses its nearly \$3 billion of foreign exchange reserves, mostly in U.S. dollars, to effect the outcome of the search for a new international monetary system.

Rather than futilely resisting an eventual Libyan nationalization, the U.S. government should take the lead in encouraging U.S. oil companies to explore joint ventures with the Libyan state firm. Otherwise we risk having our properties expropriated with or without compensation, and seeing the Japanese, Soviets or someone else signing post-nationalization agreements to extract and market Libyan oil and gas. Considering the respect that Libyans have for American technology, their experience in dealing with American firms, and the fact that the government continues to send its brightest students at its own expense to be educated in this country, we have the inside track on staying in Libya after the nationalization. We should keep the prize in mind and not throw it away by pressures to postpone the inevitable. Libya should remain an impressive market for technology-intensive goods and we need to improve U.S. government and U.S. exporters coordination in order to be able to compete.

When it comes to their foreign exchange reserves the Libyans act conservatively, seeking secure interest rates. Not only should they be brought into international monetary negotiations, but they should be encouraged to invest in such institutions as the African Development Bank.

Morocco is a deeply divided and troubled country with a stagnant economy and mounting and gross social injustices. Together with France, we have become identified as a major external support for an unpopular regime which has demonstrated little concern for the welfare of the majority of the population. Our economic aid to Morocco should be reduced in favor of other African countries whose governments are more concerned with raising standards of living rather than lining personal pockets. Our limited military assistance should be completely terminated and a diligent search begun for alternatives to our present U.S. naval communications facility at Kenitra, Morocco. We are over-committed and over-exposed in support of a corrupt and repressive regime. No U.S. political, economic, or military interests justify such involvement and if and when the regime falls we risk being labeled as foes by its successors. Our relations with Morocco should be modest and correct, rather than warm and embracing.

The same does not hold true for Tunisia where external economic aid is having some effect together with an inefficient but concerned government in broadly raising living standards. As Tunisia prepares itself for the difficult problem of personal and institutional succession to the regime of ailing Presi-

dent Bourguiba, our continued economic aid and political support will be desirable to ease the transition. We need to work harder to coordinate that assistance with other donors to avoid duplication and waste. Limited external aid can also assist Tunisia to extend its valuable experience in such fields as publishing and legal reform to French-speaking, Sub-Saharan Africa.

Coming years are going to be tough at home and abroad for North African states. The hardest external problems are likely to be elaboration of equitable political and economic relations with the emerging European Community. There is little that we can do to help in this respect except to encourage the Europeans to be generous, even if such generosity may at times involve marginal discrimination against U.S. exports. What we can offer is the prospect of a reliable long-term aid, trade, and cultural relationship which is less intense and less strained than that between North Africa and Europe because there is less at stake.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your excellent statements.

My colleague, Mr. Vander Jagt, will begin the questioning.

ISRAEL AND U.S. RELATIONS WITH NORTH AFRICA

Mr. VANDER JAGT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank each of you for the light that you have shed on the subject through very informative statements.

I would like to ask you, Ambassador Smythe, and then if anyone else cares to comment on the answer why feel free to do so. In your opinion to what extent does our support of Israel affect our interests in North Africa, particularly our access to energy resources?

Mr. SMYTHE. Basically, I would say this. You must remember in my statement I indicated that all Arab and Islamic people are religious but each follows an independent economic position. On the surface, they, of course, have to take a certain kind of stand. I would say it is not our relations with Israel as much as it is the Arab-Israeli thing itself. Our relations with the individual states are really what is significant.

For example, I think my colleague here, Dr. Segal, pointed out to you, as he talked about Morocco, saying we probably give too much support to Morocco, considering the kind of regime it has there now. So, one of the things that I pointed out in my statement was that although they are really Maghribi, each really looks out first for its own individual national interests.

You noticed the approach of Morocco is very cautious and very quiet. The Moroccans will make noises overtly but in their relations with the State Department it is another matter of how they talk about the Middle East question. You must remember that even though I said that all of them happen to be against having military bases and things on their own soil, I think you know that we do have a certain kind of relationship with certain military people in Morocco. This is one indication of how it affects our Israeli posture. We are not going to let anything stand in the way of our getting support, needed aid or things of this sort when it comes down to the crunch.

CASE OF ALGERIA

Algeria is another matter. I think you know it was not until this year that we began to do some serious talking with the Algerians. In March our Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, the Honorable David Newsom, had talks with President Boumedienne. I don't know where this is going to lead because I think you know in terms of foreign

relations this is something for the State Department to work out in tandem with the White House.

Maybe we are not really ready yet to resume official diplomatic relations; perhaps we want to see a little more clearly what is going to happen in the Middle East before we sit down and talk seriously about this. On the other hand, you must remember that my colleague also referred to the problem of working out with the private sector the matter of natural gas and things of this sort. So this gives you another perspective of how it really affects Israeli relations.

LIBYA

As regards Libya, you have an entirely different situation. This is pointed up, I think, by the very fact that there are less than 2 million people in that vast country, which I think is about the fourth largest on the continent, and it really does not have the kind of technical and skilled personnel that it needs in order to carry out the kind of modernization it desires. This is all complicated by the fact that the head of state is sort of a complex combination of a man who is looking forward to being modern but at the same time is deeply religious. Another thing you need to keep in mind is that Nasser was his idol and he has never forgotten this. I think there are certain things going on right at this moment which indicate that, in part, this is the strength of the Libyan-Egypt attraction.

Insofar as we are concerned where oil interests are involved in Libya, you must remember that we have been the leading technologists in the development of her petroleum industry, but at the same time, as Dr. Segal pointed out, the possibility of nationalization is always present. I would say this possibility is there but I think some people still wonder about the Libyan leaders in spite of his so-called hard facade on the surface, since he still keeps his money in our banks and in Swiss banks and that really should tell us something. So Colonel Qadhafi will make noises, he will help the fedayeen, but as yet he has not sent his troops to the Middle East to do any fighting. When it really comes to a showdown he, too, will react largely in terms of Libyan interests.

Now Tunisia is another question. I think Dr. Skinner indicated this. This nation has been rather isolated among the four North African countries. It is western oriented and certain political developments are going on there now. Dr. Skinner pointed out that Bourguiba is aging and ill and is faced with serious internal problems. Not too many weeks ago although there was a shakeup in the political structure of Tunisia, the political bureau still exists and Bourguiba is still there. However, opposing elements did force him to accept some changes in personnel that he did not wish to have in his Government.

Mr. HAMILTON. Dr. Smythe, we have a recorded teller vote on the floor now and we don't have very much time to make that vote, only about 12 minutes. We will have to declare a recess here while the three of us cast that vote. We will be back as promptly as we can. Excuse us for the interruption.

(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)

Mr. DAGGS. The joint subcommittees will resume.

I believe that when we temporarily recessed Dr. Smythe was completing a statement. Will the gentleman resume.

Mr. SMYTHE. What I was really talking to was the question of how did United States-Israel relations affect our situation in the North African states? Let me conclude by saying, fundamentally, as I pointed out previously that each of these countries, in terms of their relations with each other is concerned with how they must individually and collectively react in terms of the United States vis-a-vis Israel. I think my colleague Dr. Skinner, however, would like to add further to these remarks and respond to your question also.

ROLE OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Mr. SKINNER. Yes; I am a bit suspicious of the notion that the economic factor always dominate relations between the states. The fact that the North African states are trying to establish economic relations with us may not automatically make for good relations with us. The reason for this is that, as we look historically at the relations between states, we find that the ideological climate very often precipitates action on the part of states which, had they time to reflect, they would not have reacted in a hostile manner.

For example, during the Six Day war the Algerians and Mauretanians reacted almost automatically to the charge that we were helping the Israelis and broke relations with us. Significantly, neither Tunisia nor Morocco did so. In other words, in the heat of the argument, ideology very often plays a dominant role, and it is only after people have the time to reflect, that the economic facts of life are borne in on them and suggests to them that they should have taken a position in line with their real interests.

Looking at our present involvement in Vietnam, one suspects that a good analysis in geopolitical terms, rather than in the self-righteous ideological terms of Mr. John Foster Dulles, would have dictated to us a different course of action.

In other words the Maghrib states may be linked to us economically but there are the ideological factors of Arabism and Islam; and when the crunch comes and people have to react, they often react in terms of ideology rather than in terms of economic self-interest.

The racial situation in the United States is a good example. We often act on the basis of race whereas reflection would counsel reaction in terms of class interests, the old school tie, or what have you. I think the same thing should be said in terms of United States-Israel relations. Here we often appear to be acting with a concern for religious, sentimental, and guilt factors and the Jewish vote in the United States, even more than with concern for the geopolitical factors of the cold war, and not at all in terms of our vital interests in Arab oil.

Mr. DIGGS. Does the gentleman from Alabama have any questions?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I got acquainted with our witnesses; I was late, and I will read the statements with interest and have listened. I have no questions.

Mr. DIGGS. The gentleman from Alabama is known to be a fast learner; he absorbs 60-some-odd pages with dispatch.

Mr. Hamilton, our cochairman.

U.S. POLICY

MR. HAMILTON. Let me address a question to the panel if I may. Dr. Segal, I am interested in our assistance to Morocco, and your feeling that we are overdoing it. This leads to a more general question. I would like each of you to comment, in as specific a way as you can: What is right and what is wrong with American policy towards these four North African countries.

MR. SEGAL. Well, that is a tall order indeed. I want to focus on the lack of a clear definition of what our short- and long-term interests are.

As in other parts of the world, in North Africa we have acquired a set of relationships, some of them going back to World War II, and which have built up their own bureaucracy and have continued without anybody ever sitting down and saying, "Well, what the hell are we doing here and why?"

Now, that is really what happened in Libya, which is the place where we got off on the really wrong foot. We committed ourselves to propping up what everybody agreed was a very conservative, not particularly efficient, regime, because it was there and because it was very, very generous in terms of its negotiations with our oil companies. It didn't make problems for us and it let us have the Wheelus Air Base, when somebody in the Strategic Air Force decided "You need a desert to drop bombs in, and this is a nice place, and we have been dropping bombs here since 1942 and we have not had any static, so why not continue?"

Then we woke up one morning and we found that another group of people were running the show, and we were very fortunate that they didn't throw us out completely. The reason that they didn't is because, with this kind of critical balance that Dr. Skinner has pointed out to us, on ideology and self-interest, they recognized that they needed us but on very different kinds of terms.

RESPONDING TO CHANGE

We have not responded sufficiently rapidly to the changing power relationship that prevails, and I think this is, to some extent, the case also in terms of our relationships with Algeria. We are still concerned with conserving and extending and perpetuating these former ties and agreements because we are comfortable with them.

A new age is coming, but it is going to be a painful exercise, and we have rather waited for each of the North African states to take the initiative, which means that we very well may find ourselves behind the eight ball.

With respect to Libya, as I emphasized in my statement, I think that our basic concern is to make it clear to the Libyans that we accept their right to run their own oil industry we want to provide them with the best technology in the world; and they understand, when it comes to taking oil and natural gas out of the desert, this country can do a much better job of it than the Japanese or the Soviets because we have much more experience. Whatever our differences may be with respect to Israel or other areas of the world, our basic policy commitments, we can have satisfactory joint ventures.

ALGERIAN AGREEMENTS

That is why I think the present arrangements with the Algerians are so critical, because I think they are going to provide a precedent for Libya and a lot of other countries. I just don't think we have sorted out a basic understanding that the job of the United States Government is not to defend United States business interests as they are presently constituted abroad. It is to help those business interests be restructured so as to correspond to new kinds of political and economic relationships between the United States and other societies.

With respect to Algeria, we are moving much closer toward a new kind of an agreement without too much help, I must say, from the White House. But let us face it; the lights are going to go out in Washington and the power is going to go off in Baltimore unless we get somebody else's natural gas and oil. The Algerians are reasonable people to deal with in a number of respects, and they are anxious to deal with us because they are tired of dealing with France. They have been kicked around by the French; they think they can get a better deal from us in a number of respects than they can from the French, and we should encourage them in that belief. We have a lot of goods to sell them.

Last year, we failed to take part in the Algerian International Trade Fair. Thirty-five countries participated. This is the largest single market for American trade goods in North Africa, and we were not there. We have not, in a country which is very anxious that its technicians learn English—and that means American English—helped their efforts.

EL PASO NATURAL GAS DEAL

Mr. HAMILTON. I don't want to get diverted from the main question, but on the Algerian situation, are the Algerians getting impatient? We have been fooling around with that El Paso deal for nearly 3 years.

Mr. SEGAL. There is no question the Algerians know they can sell that natural gas to the Soviets or to the Italians or other people. They have a series of deals cooking. They like the U.S. arrangements because it was a 100-percent-owned Algerian concern. From the standpoint of nationalization, there is nothing better than having a foreign government in a 100-percent-state venture, because that means that U.S. private companies have absolutely nothing in the country that can be nationalized. They don't have offices, they don't have employees, they don't have assets. If we don't pull that deal off, the Algerians are going to strike a deal with someone else and we are going to lose a market which is not just a market for this year's goods but it is a market for 15 or 20 years worth of ships, processes, and technology.

MOROCCO AND TUNISIA

While failing to respond to new situations and initiatives, in Morocco and Tunisia, we have been much more concerned with perpetuating these inherited relationships, which are of diminishing value, certainly to us, and whose rationale has been consistently eroded.

In the case of Morocco, we do have a communications facility there that goes back to the Second World War, and I have never heard

plausible arguments why we need a particular military base in Morocco which could do something which could be just as well done from existing bases in Spain or elsewhere.

Primarily, we have put in a great deal of economic assistance, second only to the French, in helping a regime which is a rather shaky one, which has not used that economic aid to improve the welfare of the majority of the people of that country and which has been rather moderate and conciliatory on Arab-Israeli relations. I don't see that it is to our particular long-term interest to continue to provide that degree of support for that particular regime.

With respect to Tunisia, I would differ, because I think that is a much more broadly based regime that has tried hard to use the economic aid that it has received from outside in the kinds of projects which will not just be prestige projects but which will really have some visible and meaningful benefits.

So I would not pull the rug out from under the Tunisians nor from the Moroccans but I would sit down and say, "What are we doing here and why? What is it we really have at stake?"

Mr. HAMILTON. I would like both the other witnesses to comment on the question.

A STATIC POLICY

Mr. SKINNER. U.S. policies have been conditioned by our refusal to look at the situations as they change and change accordingly. We have tended to be static in our policy. For example, we inherited the situation in the Maghrib after World War II, and we supported the French in Algeria even though it was quite clear to many, including Senator John F. Kennedy, that the French could not sustain their position in Algeria.

Our cold war with the Russians conditioned our attitude toward the Wheelus Base in Libya and also the base in Morocco. Unfortunately, by the time we were winding down much of our concern with the cold war, we got involved in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. Our policy toward the Maghrib states has since been conditioned by whether or not we could expect their support for our position vis-a-vis Israel and Egypt. We refuse to look at these States in terms of the requirements of their own people and their own societies.

In many ways we have tended to support what has been known as the Ball thesis—that thesis being that the Europeans had control of African areas; therefore let the Europeans continue to deal with their former minions. As my colleagues have pointed out, we have yet to grasp the fact that these societies are changing, that they do have other interests—interests specific to themselves in terms of oil, whether it is with Texas, not too far from Mr. Buchanan's State—and that we must think in terms of the reality of the societies themselves. We have not been willing to make new departures and formulate policies specific to these countries. We have been content to wallow in the errors of the past rather than—

NEW DEPARTURES

Mr. HAMILTON. What kind of new departures are you talking about?

Mr. SKINNER. For example, let us take Libya. It is quite clear that

al-Qadhdhafi has new ideas. It is quite clear that Ambassador Palmer should have instructions as to how to deal with the nationalism of Qadhdhafi, so as to make the United States be the recipient of orders from Libya for new types of equipment, and so forth.

Let us take Algeria. When the Algerians were trying to pin French oil interests against the wall, what happened here? The French were able, for a time, to mobilize petroleum interests, including those of the United States, against the Algerians. One would have hoped that the United States would have encouraged its petroleum interests to seize the opportunity, recognizing that the Algerians wanted to break out of the French zone and create a new kind of relationship for themselves.

We did not do it. In other words, we have been content to follow the Europeans. We have tended not to develop a foreign policy toward North Africa specific to American interests. Right now, the two candidates are locked into a state policy of support for Israel. They ignore what this means in terms of continuing relations between the United States and North Africa, even though the Arabs complained to Secretary of State Rogers when he went through the Maghrib States not too long ago.

In other words, we are guilty of remaining with the past, and of being unimaginative, by not formulating a policy based on the reality of the Maghrib States.

Mr. SMYTHE. Mr. Chairman, I am going to try to respond as you asked—what is right and what is wrong? I will reply country by country.

MOROCCO AND U.S. AID

With regard to Morocco, we really should render aid for progressive development insofar as and if our aid really trickles down to the masses. But I have some real reservations whether this is the case. I was in Morocco last year; and this year from what I have seen, and heard, and read, leads me to question whether this is what is happening. I went to visit some of the great slums, those famous Bidonvilles, in Rabat. It did not seem like what we are doing there is really getting across to those people who live in these poverty-ridden ghettos.

I think you gentlemen know about what happened to the nearly successful coup attempt to overthrow King Hassan last year. Much of the discontent behind this was generated by the great poverty which exists in the midst of those luxurious surroundings one sees in Casablanca and Rabat and other well-to-do Moroccan communities. I think if we continue to shore up the elite there and don't insist that the aid we give should be used to improve conditions of the poor, we are going to remain in trouble and the Moroccan man-in-the-street is not likely to see us as friend or benefactor.

ALGERIA

In regard to Algeria, I think it is really right that we make overtures now leading to resumption of diplomatic relations. Fundamentally any country is handicapped when it is not accredited to a country officially even though we have a constituent group serving with our Swiss protecting power. This is not like being there working

directly for yourself, because everything has to be screened through the foreign power that is serving as your protector.

Also, you know that before we broke relations, one of the things we were trying to do was secure port facilities for our Navy. We don't have any intermediate stops in the Mediterranean for our Mediterranean Fleet. When I was serving in Malta, it was the only base where our naval units could stop for rest and recreation.

We had been trying to get port facilities in Algeria but, of course, they would not allow this. But this is always a possibility, and since things continue to be very tight for us in this regard and we cannot get any facilities in Egypt, I think we should try to develop our relationships and resume formal diplomatic relations with Algeria. I think we are wrong and lacking foresight if we stand aloof from this country because we don't like its form of government or don't like the individuals who are in control of that government, or because they refuse to support our basic political positions generally in foreign affairs.

On issues like Cuba, Vietnam, Korea, I think one has to keep these things somewhat separate, because all nations act out of self-interest, and unfortunately we have not yet reached that stage in world development where, although you talk a lot about brotherhood, you don't really mean it, because everybody is looking out for his own national concerns.

I think the United States must move from this position and do whatever is necessary to let Algeria know we feel her government is her own concern. I don't think we ought to stand aloof because of the attitudes they take which seem to run counter to ours. Because after all, our European friends don't actually support us either on some of these same particular issues; nevertheless we usually manage to continue to have friendly relations with them.

So I think that as far as Algeria is concerned, we should not stand apart from them any longer simply because they won't support us on certain political issues.

TUNISIA AND LIBYA

Now as regards Tunisia. It is the smallest and poorest North African country. Our relations with the Tunisians happen to be quite cordial and they continue to be so. You must remember that Tunisia actually takes a stand that coincides closely with our stance with regard to the Israeli situation. You may recall that President Bourguiba was censured, I think, by the Arab League for the fact that he said he thought Arabs ought to sit down face to face with the Israelis to negotiate. We have always been for this sort of thing and encouraged both sides to follow this course of action to end the Arab-Israeli impasse.

I would say overall, roughly, things are in good shape in regard to our association with Tunisia and there is not much you can say that is wrong with our relationship.

Turning to Libya, I think we should go along with what Qadhafi is trying to do now. I think just a week or two ago he reduced the number of staff that we may have in our embassy there. We accepted this action in good grace and went along with it. I would say, gener-

ally, knowing what I do from being a part of the Foreign Service from time to time, that there are far too many people in some of our embassies. Of course, the Department of State feels it has to have jobs for the surplus people running around the departmental halls and pushing paper, since we have retrenched somewhat our overseas posts.

Returning to the issue, on the other hand, I think we are wrong if we continue to work against what the Libyans see as really in their own best interests. I don't know what kind of position we are taking now in terms of Libya as she seeks a new rapprochement and merger with Egypt.

On the whole, the public statements are to the effect we are really standing by and watching and waiting to see what the two nations will do. I think that is about all we can do at this stage because, as you know, we don't have a good image in Libya, and we have not been able to get Colonel Qadhafi to be really cordial and friendly with us. He is not outrightly hostile, but, nevertheless, I think we need to do much more there to get him to see that our intentions are well meant, that we do have some interests in common, and that we don't intend to try to interfere with what he is trying to do for his country.

PRIORITIES OF THE UNITED STATES

Finally, I would say in terms of both the Near East and North African regions, with the exception of token gestures of assistance, military and otherwise, to Jordan in the Near East and very limited nonmilitary aid to selected African nations, our policies in both areas are still questionable insofar as their being of mutual advantage. Africa is still at the bottom of priorities in our international policy planning, while our relations with the Middle East remain strained, and in some places still officially nonexistent. Where we have resumed official ties, as with Yemen and the Sudan, we have failed to demonstrate that a new order of things, a more perceptive understanding, and a very positive change in our attitude are evident.

Here, too, we might have increased our credits with both Africa and the Near East if we had given strong support to the 10-nation African delegation that visited Egypt and Israel late last year on a mediation mission. There is nothing in the public record to show that we did so, nor reveal that we made extra effort to insure the success of U.N. Middle East conciliator Gunnar Jarring, when he went to Africa in January this year in search of ideas and help to break the Egyptian-Israeli deadlock.

So I think that overall our policy needs a great deal of change, it is in need of much rethinking, and could stand overhauling and reshaping.

EXECUTIVE BRANCH TREATMENT OF AREA

I would like to add another point here. Since in the past the State Department saw the feasibility and usefulness of joining the Near East and Africa together as a unit, I wonder why, today, when the present separate Bureaus are in existence, close liaison is not retained? This is all the more unusual considering how African nations have developed even numerically since 1957, while the Near East has been an area of

continuous conflict involving a short but serious war in that period. Is it not possible for us to see even at this late date that our policies regarding each of these two regions need to be made to coincide more closely? Were this done it is likely Africa might serve as a constructive factor in ameliorating the continuous hostility that exists between Arab and Israeli. Although I know the Near East and Africa Bureaus of the State Department have the usual formal meetings from time to time, I do not believe there is much dovetailing of policy and action between the two, in spite of the fact that the two sections in the Department are closely related.

Dr. Skinner referred to the Muslim influence, the Islamic influence, down in black Africa, and I think you know there are certain black African states in which 80 to 90 percent of the people are Muslim, even though the leader is not a Muslim. For example, you have a Catholic Christian President in Senegal which has about an 80-percent-Muslim population.

What this tells us is that if the State Department looked carefully at all these various elements and saw their implications, they would realize that basically you don't have to really worry about religion as a force in terms of our Middle Eastern policy, because as you look at the North African leaders, they may be Muslim in North Africa but all African leaders seem to want to keep their governments secular as they try to develop and move their countries forward.

Pan-Islam and Pan-Arabism are things we should be very much aware of, but we should keep our sights on the reality of constructive development that these leaders are trying to achieve in both regions. I think if we did this, we would seem more right and less wrong in terms of policy.

Mr. HAMILTON. I realize the question was a difficult one, and I respect your responses.

With that, I yield back.

Mr. DIGGS. If the gentleman has further questions, as cochairman you have special prerogatives in these joint hearings.

Mr. HAMILTON. I will yield.

Mr. DIGGS. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Whalley.

DEVELOPING NORTH AFRICA

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to be here because of the distinguished witnesses, but we in Pennsylvania have just had about a \$2 billion flood loss, so we were meeting at 2 p.m. with the U.S. Army Engineers, trying to work something out, so you do see that even the States over here have tremendous problems.

I am very much interested in reading the opening statement. I understand that one of the problems in North Africa are economic relations with Europe—the lack of skilled workers there—and another is the finding of oil.

What can you recommend to improve the situation over there? You talk about what is wrong with it. Has anyone made a study on what is the best way to start? These four North African countries don't work together too well with the other parts of Africa, is that right?

Mr. SMYTHE. Basically I would say this: They work all right with the other parts of Africa in the sense that there is really not any

animosity among the four and with black Africa as such. I would say that in the OAU—unfortunately, as you say, you were not here at the time—on the whole, they work in the Organization of African Unity, they tend to get along fairly well.

A good example of this is what happened at the recent meetings in Rabat, which was the 19th session of the OAU.

Mr. WHALLEY. I mean they are more or less inclined to deal with Europe because of their interests and location.

NEAR EAST AND AFRICA

Mr. SMYTHE. I would say that fundamentally you must remember that all African countries are in need of aid and help. Obviously these four countries are developing countries. I think you must remember between 1953 and 1963 Egypt was rendering assistance of a kind all over black Africa. She set up a special radio program, sent teachers, organized I think, some kind of congress, and even created for black African areas what Egypt called at that time an immigration citizenship certificate which it would give to Muslims down in that part of the continent.

So while Egypt was in a position to try to do something, although you realize this was mostly in the ideological and political realm at the time, the other North African countries were not and are not in position to give the kind of aid that black Africa or sub-Saharan Africa really needs.

In responding generally, let me say that I feel there are major discrepancies in our foreign affairs planning in this part of the world. Our foreign policy planners fail to utilize in our interest the growing closeness of the Near East and Africa because of oil. Nigeria is becoming increasingly important as an oil producer linking up with North African and Near Eastern members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Although the 1967 war set in motion forces that have sharply changed the international oil industry, changes that continue to occur, we fail to recognize and amend our policies to develop more fully relations with these countries in line with the fact that the once powerful Western controlled petroleum industry has lost some of its physical strength as well as emotional drive.

Since the last Arab-Israeli War the winds of change have seen a swing in the balance of negotiating power from the industrialized nations of the Western World and Japan to the oil producing states of the Near East, Asia, Latin America, and Africa. This has come about at a time when America faces the threat of energy supply difficulties and possible shortages. A solution to this overall situation likely has to come from OPEC, which contains almost 70 percent of the world's oil reserves, and the once powerful Western dominated international oil industry is virtually helpless in the face of this cartel of oil producing nations. New agreements have given these Arab-African nations considerable financial power, also, which is likely to increase as time passes.

Perhaps the other two gentleman would care to comment further.

MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGIES

MR. SEGAL. I think that in response to your question, two of the keys in terms of the U.S. relations with each of the North African states are markets and technology. These countries, and particularly Algeria and Libya, have got very valuable natural gas and oil resources which are going to command increasingly higher prices in world markets, and these countries are determined to make the best deals possible for those rather rapidly depleting resources.

They are not particular. They don't really mind whether they sell those resources to the Japanese or to the Italians or to the Americans or to the man on the moon, but they are concerned with getting the best deals possible consistent with their political and economic goals.

Now, that means, first of all, accepting that there have to be new kinds of arrangements, ones in which the host government will primarily determine and dictate at least what goes on within the country, which was not the case in the past with the way American or Western European oil companies operated in Libya or French oil companies in Algeria.

The quicker we are to respond to that, the better the chances are not only that that natural gas will be going into Baltimore but will be available on mutually acceptable terms and will create additional markets for American goods. I think this is very critical, because what we have to sell the rest of the world is technology. The day we can sell Singer sewing machines to everybody else is over. The day in which we can sell petroleum rigs made in the United States or the services of technicians who know how to operate those rigs is going to be with us for a very long time to come, provided that we are willing to make technology and markets available on competitive terms consistent with the political and economic nationalism prevailing in those countries.

NEW POLICIES TOWARD ALGERIA

The Honorable Mr. Hamilton asked about new departures, and just as an example in this area, the Algerians and the Libyans in particular are determined to train their own petroleum technicians, to have their own schools, their own geology institutes, their own business administration programs. Again, they want the best technology for their conditions available in the world.

The Algerians experimented with the Russians and found out one thing: The Russians are not very good at getting oil out of deserts. They are not as good as the Americans, who know something about North African deserts and have comparable experience in this country.

On the other hand, the Soviets, the Italians, and the French set up schools of petroleum engineering and technology in these respective countries and offered hosts of scholarships and tried to insure that the people who are going to be running these industries 5 and 10 and 15 years from now will have been trained in French or Italian or Soviet methods and will be familiar with that kind of equipment.

The Algerians, using their own money through their own state oil company, have contracted privately with U.S. firms to do geologic

and other surveys. They have done that because they think that the Americans have the best know-how in the world. On the other hand, they have gotten absolutely zero technical assistance and encouragement from the U.S. Government with regard to the training of people in petroleum technology.

I think this is the kind of new departure in which we indicate that:

Sure, we are going to be tough; we will deal with you on a commercial basis; we are not doing you favors, but we have got the best men and the best know-how in the world and we want to make it available to you. We are not going to hoard it and see to it that it is exclusively reserved for us.

If we fail to do this, we will end up in a situation in which we may have Japanese firms operating joint ventures in Libya or Algeria and selling natural gas in the United States for which not only are we going to be paying higher prices, we are going to see that oil taken out of the ground with Japanese or Italian equipment with the flow of remittances away from North America and North American goods.

That is trying to get back to your initial question that we have got to look for mutual self-interest in which markets and technology are available on the new kinds of terms and conditions that the North Africans are insisting on.

NORTH AFRICA AND ISRAELI ISSUE

Mr. SKINNER. I think, to answer your question specifically, I must refer to the experience of the Secretary of State when he visited these states. He wanted to find out what was the biggest problem between these states and the United States. It was a question of U.S. relationship with Israel. This was pointed out to the Secretary of State as the major issue disrupting and complicating relations between the United States and the Maghribi States.

I think what they would like to see is support for the Arab mission to have the United States back Jarring in trying to effect some kind of rapprochement between Israel and Egypt. As long as our position is unchangeable in terms of how we support the U.N. resolution on the Middle East, I think we will continue to have political problems with these states.

I think secondly is the question of trade. We have not been willing or able to respond adequately to the attempts on the part of UNCTAD to establish new economic relations between the United States and the Third World. While I am quite aware, Mr. Whalley, about the problems of your constituencies and our fellow citizens in Pennsylvania, the hope of these people is that the terms of trade can be so modified that both the Americans and the Maghribis derive a better deal from new relations between all the countries.

SUEZ CANAL

Mr. WHALLEY. How important is the Suez Canal? What effect did it have when it was closed or how important would it be to have it open? Is there a move by the African nations to get it open?

Mr. SMYTH. On the whole, as far as the Suez Canal is concerned, particularly if you are talking about sub-Saharan Africa, it really does not have a bearing on what they are trying to do as such, but, of

course, in another way, in foreign policy all things are connected. I think you have to look at the Suez Canal in terms of overall U.S. policy. Let me comment on that, and I will try to lead into the implications of the Suez Canal's closing.

I think, first of all, the U.S. Near East policy has given very little attention over the years to the relation of the Near East to Africa and the significant implications in this kind of association for pursuing what I consider a successful program in both regions which is what I think you are seeking with your question.

Although African nations have emerged as separate entities, the Department really continues to give them very little attention and the continent receives only secondary notice and consideration in our policy planning.

Let me give you an example of what I am talking about. In three addresses by Secretary of State William P. Rogers on the U.S. aspects of foreign policy in January, August, and October, last year, one of which dealt expressly with our principles and pragmatism, in not one of them was Africa given any major consideration.

PRIORITIES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Further, in a speech made in May 1971 on foreign economic matters and U.S. interests, by Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Nathan Samuels, Africa was not mentioned a single time, not even in the separate section of the talk on "The Developing World."

Although we are preoccupied out of necessity with the Middle East, our foreign policymakers have given no evidence that they understand or are concerned about a possible affinity now or in the future between the Near East and Africa and how and in what ways this tie-in has significance and importance for our overall foreign affairs operation. Nor do they seem inclined to seek the views of significant persons in either region as regards the regional relations with each other and how such relations may have real and notable impact on the functions of the United States in either or both places.

Now, another important omission, I think we make, is the failure of the State Department to comprehend the nexus of pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism. Nowhere in public statements or by overt action by our foreign affairs functionaries do we find their perception of how it can be useful and helpful to our image and operations as positive in both areas by pragmatically grasping the scope of such a thing as countries like Guinea, Ghana, Tunisia, and Egypt, providing for limitation of sovereignty in their constitution as a step toward states of Africa and the Near East attaining a true reality of independence, since they realize this might be impossible so long as they remain small entities, more or less opposed to each other.

More than 10 years ago, you must remember, some Arab and African leaders realized certain common viewpoints were absolutely necessary. Yet nowhere in our Near East and African policy do we seem to have taken this into consideration. There have been efforts in the past that I think can recur in the present and which hold possibilities for the future of certain African Islamic states to form unities, such as the Nile Union of Egypt and the Sudan and the Greater Somalia federation, both akin to the Maghrib unity of northwest Africa that includes

the Muslim areas of Mauritania, Niger, Upper Volta, Mali, and the former enclaves of what was once Spanish North Africa, as well as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt.

Here is vast geography with multitudes sympathetic by religion and history to the people and states of the Near East. Yet U.S. foreign policy appears not to be intelligently contrived and construed when it ignores this type of affinity. All of this carries implications for the pan-African and pan-Islam structures and ideational underpinnings of the Arab League. These may not as yet have come into fruition as viable conglomerates, but their potential and value still remain.

It behooves our foreign policy makers and shakers to change their cavalier complex in the belief that Arab and Islamic world disunity is endless and everlasting, while thinking African divisiveness will continue for years, so there is no need to worry about any African-Near East rapprochement as a power bloc of any significance in the international firmament.

It is against this sort of background that I now turn specifically to discussion of the Suez Canal. It is more important to the greater oil interests, because once it was closed, this really gave an impetus to the construction of those great supertankers that are now being widely used for oil transport.

The other implication is largely for Near Eastern countries, not the African countries, because it affects the pipelines running through some of them that come out in the Mediterranean area. Insofar as Africa is concerned, it would not affect a country like Nigeria, because it is not affected directly by what happens in the Suez.

EFFECT OF CLOSURE ON SUEZ CANAL

So, overall, I would say the Africans, where the Suez Canal is concerned, would normally give support where Egypt is involved, but as for bearing directly on African-Near Eastern relations, it is not too important from that point of view. The Suez is particularly an Egyptian problem insofar as the oil revenues are concerned.

However, the one thing I think we ought to keep in mind is the fact that Egypt did prove that it could operate the canal itself after the 1956 war when certain Western powers thought she was incapable of doing so.

Perhaps the others would like to elaborate further.

Mr. SEGAL. An African proverb is: When two elephants fight, it is the ants in the grass that suffer most.

The east African countries have been, next to Egypt, the primary economic losers—that is to say, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. They find their imports have to make that nearly 12,000-mile haul around the cape, which is about 2 weeks longer, rather than being able to transit the canal. I think this is one of a number of reasons why these states have been so concerned to take the initiative in trying to conciliate and mediate on Arab-Israeli relations.

I agree entirely with my two colleagues that in that initiative, they have not gotten the kind of support that they should have gotten from the United States. We rather dismissed them, whereas they do have some real material interests at stake as well as perhaps a third-party kind of role to play.

I should also say—and this goes back to U.S. relations with North Africa—one of the other economic effects of the closing of the Suez Canal has been to make North African energy sources that much more valuable. Libyan and Algerian oil and the pipeline that transits through Tunisia are now much less expensive, high-quality low-sulfur oil than they were compared to, say, Persian oil or otherwise in the past. This change again reiterates the point with respect to the current negotiations between Algeria and the United States for natural gas and eventually for petroleum resources as well. The Algerians have other customers.

As long as the Suez Canal remains closed, the Algerians and the Libyans are fairly confident that they can strike effective deals and play off the Europeans with respect to the Americans. At the same time, the Egyptians are building a pipeline to bypass the canal, running from Suez up toward Alexandria, using French and British money. They want to restore some of the options available to them including the opportunity of exporting their own new, rather interesting petroleum deposits. They have been willing to deal with the British and the French on those terms.

The east Africans have suffered and nobody has paid much attention. They tried to do something about it. As long as the Suez Canal remains closed, access to North African energy resources through a kind of competitive bidding is going to be very critical. As I said before, I hope that we will act to take advantage of the initial head start that we have.

POSSIBLE EGYPTIAN-LIBYAN MERGER

Mr. DIGGS. Will the gentleman yield. It is a related question. The announcement today about a prospective merger between Egypt and Libya is not defined in any precise way. I wondered if, number one, you could hazard a guess as to what kind of a merger they had in mind and, secondly, what does this suggest or portend with respect to American relations in that area?

Mr. SKINNER. This question follows almost naturally from the previous question, and that is the emergence of Libya as one of the wealthiest states in this area. This has not been only a function of discovery and development of all resources in Libya, but also of the fact that the Sudan and Egypt, cut off for a long time from the revenues which will derive from the Suez Canal passage have had to rely a great deal upon the largess that they are now getting from Libya. Libya, then, is in a position of inducing Egypt to follow a harder line towards Israel and the outside world.

We should not forget that when Libya bought Mirage jets from France, the question was whether or not France would sell these jets if the possibility existed that these jets could be removed at some point in time from the national control of Libya. What will happen now if there is some kind of confederation or fusing of the national identities of Libya and Egypt. It might mean that these French jets could then flow across the now defunct national boundaries and become part of the air force of a larger Arabic-Islamic unity.

The indication is that Sadat—and here I have to depend upon the New York Times—is now playing a very interesting game trying to

move the United States from the status quo. It also may be that Qadhdhafi, given his new resources, and given the fact that he does have resources to use, might be responsible for moving Sadat from a moderate or moderating posture to a more militant one. This might be the implication of this new rapprochement between Libya and Egypt. The Suez blockage, depriving Egypt of resources, may be one of the key factors here in this new situation.

Mr. Diggs. Mr. Buchanan, did you have a question?

U.S. POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am not sure I entirely understand the precise recommendations as to what revisions our Near East policies gentleman would recommend. I think that it is beyond the realm of possibility, indeed something I would vigorously oppose—whether the United States would abandon Israel or to disregard the fact that we have a basic situation in which the Soviet Union has thrown heavy support behind the United Arab Republic notwithstanding the recent turn of events and in which it was the United States or no one to provide balance in terms of support for Israel. There simply was not anybody else in the world in the picture who could do that.

Like other people, I regret the appearance of a situation in which the U.S. interest was confined to Israel. I think that is most emphatically not the case and has never been, and I think that it is not good for anyone for that idea to be in people's minds.

But I cannot see a radical departure from our present policy in the realm of possibility unless one takes the attitude that the abandonment of Israel would be a good thing. It is very hard for me to see that in terms of the welfare of the people of the Near East, both Israeli and Arab. I would love some further clarification and identification only on that.

Mr. SMYTHE. First of all, I don't think any of us advocate that we should abandon Israel. That is No. 1. Let us get that cleared up first of all.

You point out, yourself, that you realize that there exists a kind of image that we are overwhelmingly supportive of Israel and this sort of complicates our situation with Africa but particularly with the Near Eastern states, and think we all accept that, too. That is very true.

HOW TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION

Then you ask: What do you think we really ought to do that would be helpful in ameliorating the present stance that we have?

First of all, I think we ought to give higher priority to Africa and the Near East. I think you know at present in our Government, Africa, as I mentioned previously, has the lowest priority, it always has had lowest priority even in the National Security Council. So far as the present administration is concerned, Africa is written off—send somebody there occasionally like an Assistant Secretary or some business representative, but that is just to keep African people pacified—to tell them you exist but you are really not important.

Insofar as the Middle East is concerned, the present attitude of the current administration is just to let it simmer along, to let things remain in status quo. Because of the recent development of President

Sadat's inviting the Russians to go home, our foreign affairs officials really don't know what to do about this right now. They don't understand it, so they are going to sit back and wait. This is the present stance of our Government.

So I think what they need to do is become more active in both of these regions. Routinely they give out the statement that we are interested in peace, but basically they are not going to make any moves at all until after the November 7 national elections, so don't expect anything, any policy shifts, until after the first of the year in regard to the Near East.

In terms of political realities you can understand why this is likely to be the case, although I don't subscribe to this kind of thing. If something should actually develop, then I think the thing that Congressman Diggs just asked about in terms of the new development between Libya and Egypt. I think we really ought to take advantage of this and see what we can do with it to help ourselves in both the Near East and Africa.

RECOGNIZE IMPORTANCE OF AFRICA

Another thing, I think we ought to recognize that Africa is of real importance. I think until we do this, we are always going to stay in trouble because there are quite a number of people in Africa—nobody has been able to count all the people on the African continent; it ranges anywhere from 260 million to 300 million, and some sources try to put them at less than that. There are a lot of people in Africa and we don't seem to realize this.

I think we need to begin to look at Africa on a par with all the other world regions and stop giving our attention overwhelmingly to Europe—because some day Africa is going to be important to us, as you indicated, yourself.

As Dr. Segal pointed out, great resources in that continent are going to become more important to us as time passes. As he mentioned the Far East also, and I, having worked in the Far East, particularly in Japan, I know the Japanese are moving into both Africa and the Near East and 5 to 10 years from now we don't want them to be in the No. 1 position while we will be there but suffering. We are going to need that part of the world.

As I mentioned, Israel is not to be abandoned, let us face this. I mean we have a great responsibility where Israel is concerned. But one of the complaints which I always got when I was serving in the Near East, and which I found in my research and travel throughout the area, is that we need to do something to break down the feeling on the part of Arabs that it is a truly one-sided policy that we have in regard to the Arab-Israeli problem.

EVENHANDED POLICY

I think that there are some people who feel that we really ought to sacrifice our great oil interests out there simply for the sake of a political stance for certain kinds of benefits that hopefully will occur back here at home on the domestic front. I think we ought to make it quite clear to both the Arabs and the Israelis that we really mean to have what we call, as the State Department calls it, an evenhanded policy.

I think you probably know that the evidence, on the surface at least, indicates that our policy is not evenhanded, no matter how much we really say so, and we have not been able to convince the Arabs that it is.

So what I think we need to do is make some moves that will sort of indicate to the Arabs that we really are trying to move in the right direction to bring things into balance as far as the Israelis and the Arabs are concerned. I think there are some Arab leaders, some of whom have some real power, who have a real understanding that Israel is a State, it is there, nobody is going to push it into the sea, for it is going to be there and the thing that everybody has to learn to do is to learn to live with it.

I think the sooner we indicate our perception of these realities and show that we understand this and we know that the Arabs understand this and that we are trying to get the Israelis to understand, I think we are going to be much better off.

Lastly, I think there is the matter of a lot of Arabs feeling—and even some Americans feel this way, too—they simply cannot understand why our investments over there—and I am speaking largely of oil—seem always to be sacrificed. Actually the State Department does not take the position that it is making sacrifices in this sense and it would like to get rid of this particular belief among segments of our American public, as well as among those who think this way in the Arab world. But I don't see it taking any great active, visible steps to do this so that people realize that we are really trying to be somewhat fair in the area.

I don't want you to think I am signing off here by saying that we are really trying to be fair and that we give evidence of it, because we really aren't doing any of this. I think the State Department needs to become a bit more occupied in this regard and work strenuously to restructure our image more positively.

It is unfortunate, however, I think, as all of us know, that our emphasis has not been toward these two areas. I think if we could get certain individuals, not only in the State Department but even at the higher echelons, to pay attention to Africa and the Near East in a more active, demonstrable manner that you are asking for, things could improve for all concerned.

APPROPRIATE THRUST OF POLICY

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman.

Certainly, Doctor, I would concur in the matter of the emphasis and the importance, and certainly also clearly we need to demonstrate our friendship for all the peoples of the Near East and of Africa.

However, do our expressions which are pro-Arab necessarily have to be anti-Israeli? This is the side which troubles me some. I think if it is true that the Arab world does accept Israel's right to exist and they exercise the normal rights of sovereign nations and if this can be conveyed to the Arab world, I think most of the problems may be solved right there.

Do our actions in order to demonstrate our interest in friendship and our pro-Arab actions and particularly our actions in strengthening

our relationships with these particular North African states have to be anti-Israel in their content?

Mr. SMYTHE. Mr. Buchanan, you asked a good question. You hit the nail on the head. Fundamentally they don't have to be pro-anyone. So what we need to do is what you are calling for, simply develop an entirely new stance and make new statements by people in authority who deal with foreign policy. But they are not forthcoming. That is really the crux of the issue.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I could, of course, hope, Mr. Chairman, so that we won't put words in anyone's mouth, I would vigorously oppose any stance that could be interpreted as an anti-Israeli stance. Anything that we could do to strengthen in a positive way our interest in and friendship toward various Arab people I think would be a good thing.

I appreciate these very, very responsive answers, but I would be interested in specifics and particularly whether in your judgment, Dr. Skinner, you feel that in order to strengthen our relationships to these North African states and to show the kind of interests we ought to show and to demonstrate friendship, it has to take any kind of anti-Israel slant.

Dr. Segal, I share your interest in the gas resources in Algeria. I happen to represent the only non-Texas transmission company of any size in the country, and they have been involved in that, too, and I think this is the point well taken. These resources are important to us and I think these states are more important to us than we have indicated by our past actions.

ACCEPTING ISRAEL AND BEING EVENHANDED

Mr. SKINNER. I fear that the Honorable Mr. Buchanan has not understood me. I concur with Dr. Smythe that we must accept as one of the realities of political life the existence of Israel. None of us here would even suggest that Israel's position should be jeopardized.

I think the problem from the point of view of the African states and of the Arab world, is that we have not been viewed as taking an evenhanded approach in the Middle East. I suspect that the Arabs, more or less concede, the existence of Israel. I think there might not be too much debate on many of the items of the U.N. resolution—for example, on the future of Jerusalem.

I believe the problem of borders might pose a more difficult problem. I think the Israeli retreat from occupied areas is the thing that most of the Arab States would insist upon. I think we should support the Jarring mission, and I think what we should remind the Israelis about something that they should know very well. They have been in the diaspora for over 2,000 years and they have returned. The Arabs, too, will not forget. The Arab countries will modernize, and then they will attack. Empires don't last as long as they used to last in the past. Rome lasted for a thousand years. The Western World, 200 years? American hegemony? About a few decades?

These countries will modernize and it behooves the United States to advise Israel at this time—a time when Israel does have the military supremacy in the area—to look to the future of her 2 million or so people. It is impossible, given the factors of the demography

and modernization for such a small population in this area not to come to terms with the Egyptians.

As the United States goes about realining its own policy with respect to other issues in the world, this group of stalwart and brave Jewish pilgrims will not be abandoned. I think we are fooling them and fooling ourselves if we believe that we are entering a stage in the world's history comparable to the expansion of Europe when a few Spanish conquistadors could conquer mighty nations such as the Aztecs, Incas, India, and so forth. Those days are over, Mr. Buchanan. I think we should tell the Israelis to come to terms with the Arabs because their future lies in this area—their future perhaps as Levantines rather than the last doomed survivors of the declining European hegemony over the entire globe.

Without jeopardizing the survival or our interests in Israel I think we ought to support the Jarring mission and call for the end of the occupation of all Arab lands. What are safe borders today? There are no safe borders. A few miles of territory should not be the cause of continuing warfare. If the Israelis could not forget Jerusalem; how could the Egyptians forget Sinai?

NORTH AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST POLICIES

MR. SEGAL. I would just want to come in briefly on this one if I may. There is a basic idea that I think you have hit upon, and it is fundamental. We have been looking at four different countries this afternoon, rather divergent. We have been looking at how they deal with the Middle East, how they deal with Europe, how they deal with the United States, how they look at the rest of Africa.

Neither at the present time nor in the future are American relations with any one of these countries determined by American relations with Israel. There is absolutely no reason at present or in the future why we cannot retain our commitments to Israel and at the same time have mutually beneficial relations which are going to be quite different with any one of these four countries. They are not going to like some of the things we do; we are not going to like some of the things they do.

But the notion that our relations with them will be determined by our relations with Israel is fundamentally mistaken. It has led us in the past to providing fair amounts of economic assistance for Morocco and Tunisia because we liked the rather moderate stands that they adopted on Arab-Israel questions. That is foolish. If there are good reasons for providing economic assistance to Morocco and Tunisia, that is because of something we had at stake in those countries or the conviction that they could use that assistance, but we never should have allowed ourselves to base our relations in any respect at all with those countries in terms of what they might get from us or we might get in terms of Arab-Israeli relations.

CONCERNS OF ALGERIA AND LIBYA

Now, in terms of Algeria and Libya, at least economically, these governments are concerned with maximizing the benefit to them of their rapidly depleting resources and naturally in some respects they

would prefer to do business with people who are not involved with Israel. But you don't find very many nations in the world today that have markets for oil and gas and that have capital to extract oil and gas and have technology, that are not involved with Israel. Some, like the Soviet Union, ask even higher prices for their support, which is one of the experiences of the Soviet involvement in Egypt and elsewhere.

So that the question really for Algeria and for Libya is: Are we going to do business with the Japanese and the Italians or the West Germans or the French or the Americans, and how can we play them off one against the other to get the best terms for us? All of them in one way or another are going to be lined up on the side of the Israelis, and what will determine our relations will be what we have specifically to offer Algeria and Libya compared to what the Japanese or the West Germans or the French have to offer. We cannot offer them any kind of a basic reappraisal of our commitment to Israel.

I would agree with you entirely there, but what we can offer them are very attractive terms for their natural gas, for their oil, for the training of their technicians, for the transformation of those products. I think they will accept those terms and accept at the same time that they don't like what we are doing about Israel.

I agree entirely with my colleagues; in our interest, we need to be much more evenhanded, but I think that we can draw a distinction between our relations with each one of these countries and the Arab-Israeli question. I think that by seeing them as somehow inseparable, we may wind up on the short end of the stick with other countries who are just as committed as we are to Israel, but who go about their commitments in a different way, being able to take away from us resources that we really need.

UNITED STATES-ALGERIAN RELATIONS

MR. SKINNER. Mr. Chairman, I just would like to put on the record the fact that Algeria did break relations with the United States as a result of the Arab-Israeli war. That is a fact.

I would also suggest that had the present Libyan Government been in power during 1967, it too would have broken diplomatic relations with us. Mauritania broke relations with us; so did the Sudan. In other words, I acknowledge the relationship between economics and the ideology, but point out that in the history of nations, ideology is very often the trigger for action when reflection, in terms of economics, would have led to a different action.

I cannot sustain or subscribe to the thesis of my colleague. I think that ideological factors; factors of pan-Islamism, pan-Arabism, pan-Africanism, factors such as race; these factors very often generate pressures which force nation states to act. Economics, yes. The economic explanation, while valid, is not the only explanation, especially in the realm of foreign policy, where emotions, history, traditions, and sentiment play an important part—things which generate actions among human beings.

I think that the present relations between the United States and Israel will continue to influence the relationship between the United

States and the Maghriben countries. The sooner we change this policy; not necessarily at the expense of Israel but by a greater attempt at even-handedness, the sooner we can help resolve the problem in the Middle East. We can then start to create viable relations with the North African states based on economics as well as cultural factors, because cultural factors are the cement which bind the economic interest of nations together.

Mr. Diggs. This has been a very interesting session, and I say that with all sincerity on behalf of the joint subcommittees.

On that very high note of your concluding statements, the joint committees stand adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 4:42 p.m., the joint subcommittees adjourned.)

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A.—BIOGRAPHIES

HON. DAVID DUNLOP NEWSOM

David Dunlop Newsom, of California, was sworn in July 17, 1969 as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Mr. Newsom had served since 1965 as United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Libya. He succeeded Joseph Palmer 2nd, who, in turn replaced Mr. Newsom as U.S. Ambassador to Tripoli.

A Career Minister in the Foreign Service, Mr. Newsom was born on January 6, 1918 in Richmond, California. He was educated at the University of California at Berkeley (B.A., 1938) and Columbia University (M.S., 1940). After traveling around the world as a Pulitzer traveling scholar (1940-41), Mr. Newsom joined the U.S. Navy when the U.S. entered World War II, and he served overseas with the rank of Lieutenant. After the war, he returned to his native California, where he published a weekly newspaper.

Mr. Newsom entered the Foreign Service in 1947, and has held assignments in Karachi (1947), Oslo (1950), Baghdad (1951), and London (1960). He was Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs in the Department, 1955-58, and attended the National War College in 1959-60. In 1963, he became Director of the Office of Northern Africa Affairs.

Ambassador Newsom received a Commendable Service Award from the United States Information Agency in 1955 for his service in directing the USIA staff in Iraq for a three year period. He received a Meritorious Service Award from the Department in 1958.

Ambassador Newsom is married to the former Jean Craig, and they have three sons, John, Daniel, and David, and two daughters, Nancy and Catherine.

WILLIAM B. QUANDT

Date of Birth : November 23, 1941.

Place of Birth : Los Angeles, Calif.

Education : Stanford University, B.A., 1963, in Political Science ; M.I.T., Ph.D. 1968, in Political Science.

Employment : The Rand Corporation, Research Staff, Social Science Department, 1968 to present. U.C.L.A., Department of Political Science, Lecturer, 1969 and 1971.

Specialization : North African and Middle Eastern Politics ; U.S. Foreign Policy.

Languages : French, Spanish, Arabic.

Awards : Phi Beta Kappa ; NDEA Title IV fellowship ; Foreign Area Fellowship from the Social Science Research Council ; International Fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations, 1972-73.

Major Publications : *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria 1954-1968*, M.I.T. Press, 1969. *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, forthcoming. "Can We Do Business With Radical Nationalists: Algeria—Yes," *Foreign Policy*, June 1972. Articles on Algeria and U.S. policy in the Middle East.

AARON SEGAL

Currently Visiting Associate Professor, Department of Government, Cornell University, and Research Fellow, International Population Program, Cornell University. Formerly editor of *Africa Report* magazine and foreign correspondent for various publications in Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America. Received Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley after doing graduate work as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University. Taught in Ar-

gentina as a Fulbright-Hays Lecturer, at the University of Puerto Rico, and the University of California at Berkeley. Author of two books on the Caribbean, and numerous monographs, pamphlets and articles. Born March 8, 1938 in Los Angeles, California. Married with one child.

ELLIOTT PERCIVAL SKINNER

Born: June 20, 1924 Trinidad-Tobago.

Citizenship: United States of America.

Armed Forces: Status: U.S. Army 1943-1946 Technician 4th Grade E.T.O.

Education: U. of Neufchatel (Switzerland) Under Auspices U.S. Army, 1945-46; B.A. 1951, University College, N.Y.U.; M.A. 1952, Department of Anthropology, Columbia University; and Ph.D. 1955, Department of Anthropology, Columbia University.

Fellowships: John Hay Whitney Foundation, Opportunity Fellowship, 1953; Columbia University Traveling Fellowship, 1954; Ford Foundation Foreign Areas, 1955-57; Guggenheim Fellowship (1971-72); and Social Science Research Council Fellowship, 1971-72.

Fieldwork: (a) Ethnic Relations in British Guiana (Guyana), 1954; (b) Effects of European Contact on the Mossi People of French West Africa, 1955-57; and (c) Urbanization in Ouagadougou Upper Volta, 1964-65.

Academic History: Franz Boas, Professor of Anthropology, Columbia University, 1971, Chairman of Anthropology Department.

Public Service: Sometime lecturer on African Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State 1958-66; Operations Crossroads Africa, 1958-66. Led groups to Ivory Coast, 1960; Upper Volta, 1962; and Chairman, African-American Scholars Council.

U.S. Government: U.S. Ambassador to Upper Volta, 1966-1969.

Decorations: (a) Commandeur de l'Ordre National Voltaïque presented by the President of the Republic of Upper Volta, 1968 and (b) Grand Commandeur de l'Ordre National Voltaïque presented by the President of Upper Volta, 1969.

Professional Societies: Fellow, African Heritage Studies Association; Fellow, American Anthropological Association; Fellow, Royal Anthropological Association of Great Britain and Ireland; and Member, International African Institute.

Bibliography: (Over twenty-five articles, plus four books). Articles include:

1957: "An Analysis of the Political System of the Mossi" Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences 19, Ser. 2, 8:740-50.

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1968: "Chiefs, Politicians and Municipal Councillors: The Problem of Government in a West African Municipality" Proceeding of Conference on the Government of African Cities. Institute of African Government, Department of Political Science, Lincoln Univ. Penna. pp 96-104.

1972: Politics and Revolution in an African Town. *Amer. Anthro.* 1972.

Books include: (1) The Mossi of the Upper Volta, (2) A Glorious Age in Africa, (3) Peoples and Cultures in Africa, and (4) African Urbanism.

HUGH H. SMYTHE

Education: Ph. D., Northwestern University, 1945; M.A., Atlanta University, 1937; A.B., Virginia State College, 1936 and LL.D., Virginia State College, 1968.

Graduate study: Fisk University, 1938-1939; University of Chicago, 1940; Woodstock School in Vermont (special study in international relations), 1950; Columbia University (Asian Affairs), 1950-1951.

Experience (Government and Non-Government): Professor, Department of Sociology, Brooklyn College, and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, 1953-present (I have been on leave from time to time for special assignments as noted below); Examiner on Panels, Board of Examiners of the New York City Board of Education, 1970-1971; Director of Research Project on Benefits of School Desegregation-Integration, New York State Commission on the Quality, Cost, and Financing of Education, 1971; Special Lecturer, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia, 1969-1970; U.S. Ambassador to Malta, 1967-1969; U.S. Ambassador to Syria, 1965-1967; Chief Consultant, Youth In Action, Poverty Program, Brooklyn, New York, 1965; Lecturer, Special Forces, U.S. Army, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 1964; Senior Adviser of U.S.A. to the National Research Council of Thailand and Fulbright Professor at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand, 1963-1964.

Senior Adviser and Officer, Economic and Social Affairs, United States Mission to the United Nations and member of delegations to the 16th Session of the U.N. General Assembly: 33d and 32d Sessions of ECOSOC; U.N. Conference on Elimination of Statelessness; the 14th Session of the U.N. Sub Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities; 18th Session of the U.N. Human Rights Committee; 16th Session of U.N. Status of Women Committee; 14th Session of U.N. Social Committee; 12th Session of U.N. Statistical Committee; 8th Session U.N. Special Fund Governing Council; U.N. Committee of U.N. Development Fund; UNICEF Program Committee; UNICEF Executive Board Meeting; U.N. International Coffee Conference (All of the above in the period 1961-1962; International Congress of Africanist 1962; White House Conference on Race Relations 1966; Organizing Conference of Center on Int'l Race Relations, Barbados, 1970.

Examiner on New York Civil Service Commission Panel of Examiners, 1961-1965; Special Lecturer, Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. Department of State, 1960-1965, 1970-present; Director of Research, New York State Senate Finance Committee Evaluation Project of the State Commission Against Discrimination, 1956; Visiting Professor of Sociology and Anthropology, Yamaguchi National University, Japan, 1951-1953; Director of Research, W. B. Graham & Associates, New York, New York, 1949-1950; Deputy Director of Special Research, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, New York, New York (national headquarters), 1947-1949; Professor of Sociology, Tennessee State University (A. & I.), 1945-1946; Professor of Sociology, Morris Brown University, Atlanta, Georgia, 1944; Assistant Director of Research, Negro Land Grant College Cooperative Social Studies Project (Headquarters at Atlanta University, Atlanta, Georgia), 1944; Research Associate, Department of Sociology, Atlanta University, Atlanta, Georgia, 1942; Research Assistant and Instructor, Fisk University, Nashville, Tennessee, 1938-1939; and Research and Administrative Assistant, American Youth Commission of the American Council on Education, Washington, D.C., 1937-1938.

Consultant to: U.S. Department of State, 1969-present; U.S. Office of Education, 1971-present; National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., Special work on the Middle East, 1971-present; Phelps Stokes Fund, 1969-present; and The Ford Foundation, 1971-present.

Board memberships: Near East Foundation, United Service Organization, African Student Aid Fund, Operations Crossroads Africa, Frederick Douglass Institute of Negro Life and History, Museum of African Art (Washington, D.C.), Arab-Israeli Research and Relations Project, United Nations Association of the U.S.A., Unitarian Service Committee, Committee on World Development and World Peace, Trustee of Luther College (Iowa), African-American Scholars Council.

Honors: Knight of the Grand Cross of the Sovereign Military Order of Saint Agatha, 1969; LL.D. Virginia State College, 1968; Knight of the Grand Cross of the Royal Crown of Crete, 1968; Delta Tau Kappa International Social Science Society for Distinguished Work in the field of Social Science, 1967; Diploma of the International Institute JVEK of Germany, for contribution to Better Human Relations and World Peace, 1968; Distinguished Alumnus of Virginia State College, 1957; and Sigma Ki, Sigma Lambda Alpha Kappa Delta, Alpha Pi Zeta (all scholarly societies).

I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN

Dr. I. William Zartman was born in Allentown, Pennsylvania, on January 9, 1932. He received his undergraduate education and masters degree from the Johns Hopkins University where he studied until 1952, a diploma from the University of Copenhagen (Denmark) where he was a Fulbright Student in 1952-53, and his doctorate in international relations from Yale University in 1956. He then joined the U.S. Naval Reserve and served as a Lt. (jg.) at the Fleet Intelligence Center in Kenitra (Morocco); he was medically retired from the Naval Reserve as a Lieutenant Commander. At the end of his active duty, he joined the faculty of the Department of International Studies in the University of South Carolina as assistant and then associate professor. While on the faculty at South Carolina, he was awarded a Rockefeller Foundation research grant to study the development of relations among western African states, resulting in a number of articles and contributions to books (*The Strategy of Deception*, James Kirkpatrick ed.; *African Diplomacy*, Vernon McKay ed.; *French-Speaking Africa*, William Lewis, ed.) as well as a work of his own, *International Relations in the New Africa* (Prentice Hall, 1966). Earlier, before leaving Morocco, he was awarded a grant from the Social Science Research Council, to do research on Moroccan politics, resulting in the publication of *Problems of New Power* (Atherton, 1964), *Destiny of a Dynasty* (University of South Carolina Press, 1964), and *Government and Politics in Northern Africa* (Praeger, 1963).

In 1965, he went to New York University as a Visiting Associate Professor of United Nations Affairs, on a Rockefeller Foundation grant, and the next year joined the tenured faculty as Professor of Politics. From 1966 to 1969, he was Associate Director of the NYU Center for International Studies, and while at the Center produced his latest work, *The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the European Economic Community* (Princeton 1971) and also edited a symposium, *Czechoslovakia: Intervention and Impact* (New York University Press, 1970). He frequently reports on his research to the African Studies Association and the American Political Science Association annual meetings; he has been Executive Secretary-Treasurer of the Middle East Studies Association since its founding in 1966. In 1970, he became Head of the All-University Department of Politics at NYU. In 1969, he was the recipient of a Fulbright-Hayes grant to Algeria to study revolution and political development, a project on which he is currently working. He is a member of the Joint Committee on the Near and Middle East of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies and co-director of the Committee's project on the study of elite circulation. He is currently also working on the theory of negotiation as a decision-making process.

APPENDIX B.—“CURRENT DYNAMICS IN NORTH AFRICA”

(ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE DAVID D. NEWSOM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, MARCH 22, 1971, CONFERENCE ON NORTH AFRICA IN TRANSIT: BETWEEN FRENCH COLONIAL PAST AND THE ARAB SOVEREIGN FUTURE, MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE—COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY)

It is perhaps presumptuous of me tonight to talk about what is going on in North Africa.

First, I am among real experts.

Secondly, I am an American, an outsider, talking about another area of the world. At times, I am sure North Africa feels it has had its share of comment by outsiders.

Although an outsider, I speak as one who has a deep feeling for the lands and the people. I have enjoyed the stimulation of more than seven years of direct relationships with its leaders and its common people. I have seen at first hand the dynamics of its growth. Whether beside its Mediterranean shores or in the vastness of its desert spaces, I have found its beauty and variety a source of inspiration and pleasure.

Further, this is an exciting area. The sons of men who twenty or thirty years ago saw little hope for independence or progress are today making political and economic history. We may not agree with all they are doing. That is part of the inevitable interplay of continents. This does not diminish our respect for their desire for a greater role in their own affairs and for a greater role for their countries.

An American can speak of this area with a sense of history.

Above the old Turkish castle in Tripoli is the mast of a ship. Legend says it is the mast of the U.S.S. Philadelphia which was burned in Tripoli harbor. Whether this is the fact or not, the legend bespeaks the long—and occasionally turbulent—nature of our relations with North Africa.

A 1787 treaty of peace and friendship with Morocco is still in force. Our first resident consular representative went to Algiers in 1792 and to Tunis in 1795. The importance of North Africa to the U.S. has grown over the years—as many of the World War II generation found out through personal experience—and our interests in the area have expanded accordingly. Private Americans, out of the labor movement and educational and humanitarian organizations, established valuable ties with North Africa in the 1930s and 1940s long before official relations with the North Africans themselves became possible. We are benefiting today from their early interest.

Today our presence in the Mediterranean contributes to the overall peace of the area and to an atmosphere in which regional stability and cooperation can flourish. American assistance programs are accelerating economic development in Tunisia and Morocco, and American private enterprise is playing a similar role in Algeria and Libya.

Our ties are personal as well as official. Secretary Rogers, the first U.S. Secretary of State to visit Africa, began his February 1970 trip with visits to Morocco and Tunisia. King Hassan of Morocco will on April 22–23 make his third State Visit to the U.S. since he acceded to the throne in 1961. This is a mark of our respect both for the King personally and the nearly three centuries old Alaouite dynasty. President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia is one of our oldest and most valued friends among world leaders, and we earnestly hope that he will soon recover from his present illness.

With Algeria, despite the break of diplomatic relations in June 1967, a new set of mutually advantageous economic ties has been established, largely through the imaginative efforts of American private enterprise and the Algerian desire for advanced technology. American and Algerian leaders both have an interest in improved official relations. President Nixon's personal emissary, Colonel Frank Borman, was received by President Boumedienne last August and, more recently, President Henry Kearns of the Export-Import Bank made an official two-day visit. Algeria appointed a senior diplomat to Washington in December 1970 and

he has been received by Secretary Rogers and other ranking American officials.

Despite the change in government in Libya, many men in positions of importance were educated in the United States and close ties with individual Americans remain. We see these ties continuing and developing.

North Africa's pivotal position makes it important to Europe, the Arab World and Africa, as well as to us. What happens there has wide implications.

North Africa dominates the Western entrance to the Mediterranean, the Strait of Sicily, and borders on the southern flank of NATO. Algeria and Libya together provide 36% of Western Europe's petroleum supply, much of it found, produced and marketed through the enterprise and technological ingenuity of American private capital. All four countries of the region are active and respected members of the United Nations, the Arab League, and the Organization of African Unity. In our relations with these countries we are conscious, not only of our own ties, but of their sovereignty and of their own recognition that North African interests require effective relations in several directions.

Let us take a look at what is happening in North Africa. In our world, the positive often gets overshadowed by the troublesome and the dramatic. In North Africa one can truly accentuate the positive.

Looking at the area as a whole, one sees strong and realistic leadership, committed to the pursuit of national and Maghribian interests. There is a realization that a stable Maghrib, capable of managing external influences, is to the advantage of all. The regional rapprochement of the past few years is a great tribute to the realism and statesmanship of the North African leaders.

The key events include the January 1969 rapprochement between Morocco and Algeria, embodied in the Treaty of Ifrane that *inter alia* laid the foundation for the resolution of the Moroccan-Algerian border dispute. The detente has been further consolidated by the opening of new border crossing points and the movement of Moroccan goods through the Algerian port of Ghazaouet. Another Algerian-Moroccan summit meeting took place in May 1970 at which it was agreed that a joint border commission would be established to demarcate the frontier.

Tunisia and Algeria also resolved their major bilateral problems, including a border dispute, with the signing in January 1970 of a 20-year treaty of friendship. Bilateral cooperation has ensued in a variety of fields including the exchange of military delegations.

Libya has expressed a desire for Arab solidarity, particularly with her Eastern neighbors. While avoiding identifying itself with concepts of Maghribian unity, it has pursued some contacts in economic areas with Tunisia and Algeria. Chiefs of state visits have been exchanged with Algeria and in February 1971 Colonel Qadhafi became the first Libyan chief of state to visit Tunisia.

All four North African countries are searching for viable and durable political institutions; a process made difficult by the fact that traditionally the North Africans have placed greater importance on men than institutions. The leaders have recognized that the modern world requires institutions that can survive both men and events. While the experience varies, from the communal and regional assemblies in Algeria to the reform of the National Assembly in Tunisia, institutions are emerging in each country designed for its particular needs and personality.

The same realism is evident in economic policies. Thus, we are seeing major reforms in the agricultural sector in Tunisia, Algeria's acceptance of a mixed system of state capitalism and socialism, and, in Morocco, massive irrigation plans for the intensive cultivation of the most favorable agricultural areas. Rapid industrial development continues to be a goal, particularly in Algeria, but hard economic criteria of profitability and potential markets are being applied. Libya is seeking new relationships, doing what it perceives best for Libyan interests.

North Africa's record of accomplishment in the search for a better life for its peoples compares favorably with that of any area of the world. All four countries are moving toward universal education, on which they spend an average of 30 percent of their national budgets. Forty-five percent of primary school age children are now going to school in North Africa and 18 percent of secondary school age children. This represents an increase in total school enrollment since 1960 of well over 100 percent.

There are equally impressive figures in the fields of public health, adult education, and housing. There are major accomplishments in judicial reform, labor legislation, and women's rights. Tunisia in particular, under the guidance of President Bourguiba, has, in the area of social reform, been the most "revolutionary" of the Arab states.

What is the role of the United States in North Africa in the years ahead? The US recognizes the importance of North Africa's commercial, cultural, and geographical ties with Western Europe. We do not wish to compete with the Western European powers for influence. France, in particular, with its linguistic, cultural and economic ties will continue to have especially close relations with the Maghrib, relations important for the Western position and for all concerned. At the same time, the United States favors the free flow of trade and investment in North Africa and we recognize the right of the North African states to deal with countries of their own choosing.

North Africa's economic ties continue to be primarily with Western Europe, which accounts for about 80% of the area's total trade. Tunisia and Morocco have association agreements with the Common Market and Algeria is negotiating for a similar status. While the US opposes provisions that harm US trade interests in North Africa and Europe, we recognize the complementary nature of the respective economies.

While recognizing significant regional aspects in the Maghrib, our essential relationships are those with the individual states. These relationships are based in North Africa as they are elsewhere in the continent on a respect for their independence and their diversity.

The forthcoming visit of King Hassan will emphasize once more the long relationship between the United States and Morocco. King Hassan has played a significant role not only in leading his own country but in relationships with the rest of the Arab world and Africa as well.

Morocco continues to afford the United States facilities for the Voice of American transmitters and for naval communications. These arrangements are based on the continuing mutual interest of the two countries.

More and more, American private enterprise is finding opportunities and a friendly atmosphere in Morocco. Such efforts supplement the continuing United States official assistance to Morocco's economic development.

In neighboring Algeria, the building of a satisfactory relationship has at times been complicated by markedly different attitudes on world and area issues. These have been clearly recognized but nonetheless it has been possible to find common ground for a growing and improved cooperation despite the absence of diplomatic relations. The Algerian interest in US capital and technology and the prospects for access to the US market for gas have been basic to this relationship.

Both we and the Algerians are aware that practically and legally there are limitations to a relationship which excludes diplomatic relations. We hope that the basis can be found before too long for a full return to normal conditions.

Tunisia is in a period of transition. We have every confidence that the Tunisians will meet the challenge of this period of building institutions and of shaping the future. Our relations with Tunisia have been based primarily on a recognition of the energy and determination of the Tunisians in furthering their own progress and development. We have contributed to that and will continue to do so.

The new leadership in Libya entered into power with serious doubts regarding what our attitude would be. We were close to the previous regime. We had military facilities and still have substantial investment. Nineteen American oil companies account for 88% of Libya's oil production.

Through our Ambassador in Libya, we have, we hope, effectively persuaded the new Libyan Government that we desire a normal relationship of mutual respect.

Our principal interests today are those associated with our petroleum investment. The companies involved in that investment are currently engaged in difficult negotiations on future arrangements. The U.S. Government is not involved in these negotiations, but has a clear and continuing interest in the stability of the petroleum supply and the circumstances of investment. Our future relations with Libya will not be based on any single aspect of our interest in the country, but would obviously be enhanced by a fair and stable arrangement between Libya and the producing countries.

In our efforts to overcome early Libyan doubt about our attitude, in our withdrawal from Wheelus and in all that we have sought to do since, we have consistently attempted to meet the legitimate demands of the new regime. There are, of course, limitations to such a policy unless other states recognize that the United States too has its domestic and international imperatives.

While the role of the United States in North Africa and the western Mediterranean will continue to be supplemental to that of Western Europe, we will, in the interest of peace and stability, maintain our presence in the Mediterranean. We are a maritime trading power and we have been in the Mediterranean since

our colonial period. Our presence there encompasses access and transit, trade and defense on a scale commensurate with our international role. As a great power with partners and projects both East and West of Suez, the U.S. needs access to the lands of the eastern Mediterranean. The U.S. is the leader of a defensive alliance—NATO—whose southern flank is bound together by this area. The American presence in the Mediterranean is thus no transient aspect of a fading period. It is part of the texture of relationships which have contributed to the security and well-being of Mediterraneans and Americans for a long time, and will continue to do so.

Finally, the United States recognizes that the North African states have a strong interest in what happens in the Middle East. They have played and will continue to play a significant role in Arab councils. The Arab states are critical of U.S. support for Israel, but, as Secretary Rogers said on March 16, there has been "some awareness that we are making an honest, genuine attempt to work out a peaceful settlement." At the same time, President Nixon has made clear that "the primary responsibility for achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East rests on the nations there themselves." The President has also expressed our desire to maintain friendly relations with all Arab countries which welcome our friendship.

Tonight I have attempted to define briefly our official and unofficial relationship with the countries of North Africa.

It is a relationship based on a deep respect for the sovereignty, the culture, the progress, and the people of the region.

It is a relationship inevitably affected by the dynamics of the area. It is our hope that, where there is continuity, we can help the evolutionary progress which must inevitably take place. Where there is dramatic change, it is our hope that new relationships of confidence can be built.

I have not spoken of unity. This is an aspiration for the nations of the Maghrib to realize in their own fashion and their own timing. In the meantime we welcome such steps as have taken place to bring these nations, with so many common interests, closer together.

Some years ago, I made a speech on North Africa and likened the area to the hub of a wheel with spokes which reached out to the north, to France and Europe, to the East to the Arab world, to the south, to Africa, and to the West and to us.

The ties we symbolized then continue to grow in the interests of North Africa as well as of the United States.

APPENDIX C.—THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH AFRICA

[From Current Foreign Policy, Department of State, January 1972]

(This pamphlet is based on a speech by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs David D. Newsom at Princeton University, November 18, 1971.)

INTRODUCTION

Recently in the Congress of the United States, a crucial debate has been raging. That debate is concerned with some of the fundamentals of our foreign policy over the last three decades, including the question of foreign aid.

In this debate, three charges have been leveled against the foreign aid program and our policies in the developing world: that we have looked at the world solely in Cold War terms; that we have sought to support only certain kinds of regimes; and that we have not kept up with changing world circumstances.

U.S. POLICY IN ASIA

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate, using North Africa as an example, that these assertions are not substantiated.

North Africa is, in many ways, a microcosm of the developing world. Among the four nations of this area—Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya—we find characteristics, problems, reactions and issues common to most of the “Third World.”

The history of our relationship to this area over the past two decades demonstrates that our policies have moved and are moving with the changing tides. They are policies which accept change and accept nations as they are.

These states have many characteristics in common: a strong sense of national pride, an underlying belief that the West has obligations to make up for earlier exploitation, and a keen sensitivity to outside interference. At the same time, they are diverse in their national characteristics, their forms of government, and their resources.

Let us go back 20 years—to 1951. Only Libya was moving toward independence, but its prospects for viability were poor. Its first annual budget was only \$6 million, and few knew where that would be found.

In the other three countries, France played a dominant role, largely to the exclusion of other outside influences. Americans in both government and the private sector, nevertheless, were beginning to learn about North Africa. They were beginning to be aware of its peoples and their quest for freedom. We realized earlier than most that independence was coming and coming rapidly.

But these were, at that time, side issues. Our concern as a nation then was the relationship of this area to the emerging position of the Soviet Union and to its containment. Before missiles and long-range bombers, our Strategic Air Command bases in Morocco were considered vital for our national security. In 1951, also, we made the decision to seek to retain, in Libya, an important training base for our Air Forces in Europe. We ultimately reached agreement and committed ourselves initially to pay Libya \$4 million a year in economic assistance.

Ten years later, the situation had changed dramatically, and we had changed with it. Morocco and Tunisia were independent. General De Gaulle had stood in Algiers and had spoken one of history's great ambiguities, “Je vous ai compris.” [“I have understood you.”] Libya had begun to realize that its deserts covered vast resources of oil.

In those ten years, U.S. policies had moved, too. President Eisenhower had agreed to the evacuation of our air bases in Morocco. Our earlier interest and confidence in Tunisia was followed by a pledge of long-term development aid—without conditions or demands for facilities. In 1964, we agreed in principle with the Government of Libya to the evacuation of our military facilities whenever they were not wanted. We were preparing to help independent Algeria with substantial food and technical aid.

Each of these countries, as they became independent, looked to us in a special way. They sought alternatives to full dependence upon the former metropole. It was not yet fashionable to turn massively to the Soviets or the Chinese.

Morocco, because of early links with the United States, encouragement by individual Americans, and the presence of our bases, expected special help.

Algeria, despite harboring a resentment because of our support for the French, looked to us as an early sympathizer and benefactor.

Tunisia, under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba, remembered earlier help and encouragement and looked to us.

Libya saw in us and the British the primary sources of critical financial help. The Libyan King felt both an indebtedness to us for our support at the United Nations for Libyan independence and territorial unity despite Soviet opposition, and a dependence upon us.

Ten years ago, we were deeply involved. These nations had expectations of us. We expected to find friends and support, particularly against growing inroads of Soviet influence. We did tend to judge nations in those days by their attitudes toward the Soviets and the Chinese. We, perhaps, underestimated their ability even then to stand up against external influences—from all directions.

Today, this has changed. We and they have adjusted to radically new circumstances.

PRESENT SITUATION

Each of the four countries is now fully independent.

Each has, further, demonstrated its independence in policies toward the former metropolises and toward other countries. Each country has diversified its relationships. None is any longer dependent predominantly upon a single power, politically or economically. Each in its particular way has sought to qualify as "non-aligned."

The area has seen major political upheavals which have changed the leadership and, in the case of Libya, the basic reorientation of the country.

There has been a dramatic discovery and development of resources, primarily oil and gas, in the last ten years. The direct importance of the area economically to Europe has expanded.

All of this has brought a very basic change in the relationship between North Africa and the United States.

Except for the use of communications facilities at one Moroccan base, we no longer have any military facilities in North Africa.

The proposition of economic assistance provided by the United States has steadily declined as European countries have assumed a larger share.


U.S. grant military assistance and military involvement have declined substantially.

Our relationship with the leadership is changing. The generation has passed or is passing which recalls our initial help to the newly independent countries. This change happened early in Algeria where the original leaders of the NLF (National Liberation Front) whom we had known were replaced by those we did not know. In Libya, those who recognized and welcomed our help to that country in its early years have been replaced; both the present prosperity and the changed circumstances have obliterated recollections of that earlier relationship.

Where there has been an abrupt change in a country in which we had close relations with the previous regime, we have had the added element of suspicions regarding our intentions on the part of the new leaders. Only time can overcome such feelings.

The last decade, further, has seen climatic events in the Near East which have affected our own relationships. Algeria broke diplomatic relations with us; relations with the other three nations of the area became difficult in the months immediately following the 1967 war. The belief that we had helped Israel to win the six-day war died hard. While these nations may not have been directly involved in the fighting, they were committed as Arabs and shared the feelings of humiliation and bitterness over these events. The Near Eastern issues remain a serious, but not insurmountable, problem in our relations with North African countries.

In 1971, we have new interests and requirements. For the first time in our peacetime history, we face shortages of significant resources. One of them is natural gas. In Washington, D.C., early in November 1971, the local gas utility announced it could take no more new commercial customers; there was simply not enough gas. North Africa—and particularly Algeria—has large gas reserves.



U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH AFRICA

Our approach to North Africa in these circumstances is based on certain clear assumptions:

First, North Africa remains important to us as an area. We have a keen interest in the freedom of the Mediterranean and in the continued access for all to that sea and to the nations around it. The establishment of dominant foreign influences adversely affecting these interests on the southern shore of the Mediterranean would be a matter of grave concern to us.

Secondly, the orderly development of these nations and their resources is important to them, to Europe, and to us. While there are, and will continue to be, differing views on what constitutes a reasonable basis for access to these resources, there is agreement that such access is important to all.

Thirdly, we shall remain an important source of the capital and technology required for the development of this area. The nature of arrangements may change, but the U.S. private role is likely to continue.

Fourthly, the nations of North Africa, despite policies shaped by different histories and influences, will all stoutly resist domination by any outside power. They will defy simple categorization in any East-West lineup.

Finally, events in North Africa, as in many other parts of the world, will move today with far less concern over the role of the United States and reference to us than in years past. If we have interests there, it is our task to preserve them, whether it be in investment, in trade, or in security. We cannot assume that others will do it for us.

Against the background of these assumptions, what is our approach to these nations today?

We regard them, first, not as pawns in an international game, but as independent, sovereign nations. We seek relations with them based on mutual interest, independent of their relations with others. We recognize and respect the variety among the nations. The Cold War is over—unless others choose to continue it. As the President said in his report to the Congress on foreign policy in February 1970, "United States Foreign Policy for the 70's," one of our two major concerns in Africa is "that the continent be free of great power rivalry or conflict in any form. This is even more in Africa's interest than ours."

BILATERAL RELATIONS

Morocco

We have had particularly close ties with Morocco and Tunisia.

Despite the withdrawal of military facilities from Morocco, our economic and strategic interests there remain substantial. We retain important Voice of America facilities. We have growing trade with Morocco and our investment there is also increasing. We value the presence of this friend at the southern side of the gateway to the Mediterranean.

Morocco has, since independence, faced severe economic problems. We have helped in the development of its agriculture and in meeting problems of employment.

King Hassan, thrust suddenly into power in 1961, has led Morocco skillfully through critical years and critical problems. We have both benefited from cooperation. Our relationship with Morocco, however, has given us neither the right nor the capability to determine the course of Moroccan political or economic life, even if we had desired to do so.

In foreign policy, too, King Hassan has followed an independent course. He has, over the years, improved his relations with Europe and has established friendly relations with the Soviet Union. He has taken an active role in Arab affairs and has frequently used his relationship with us to bring to our attention Arab concerns.

Neither in Morocco—nor in any other developing country—do we seek to further or support any particular system or foreign policy. We feel that both are the responsibility of the peoples of the country.

We have established a mutually beneficial relationship with Morocco, despite the different nature of our systems of government. We find a common interest in continuing Moroccan economic growth and the continued absence in Morocco of influences hostile to our basic concerns. In the area of economic development, we have no magic formulae to guarantee growth either for ourselves or for the Moroccans. Only the Moroccans, themselves, can assure their own progress—political, economic, and social. We believe, however, that our assistance has improved their ability to make such progress.

Tunisia

Tunisia exemplifies a smaller country, ably governed by responsible leadership possessing influence beyond its borders, but endowed with modest natural resources.

The United States has enjoyed 15 years of very close relations with Tunisia and has contributed a very significant amount of economic assistance—well over \$600 million since 1956. We have no alliance with Tunisia, no bases there, and no real strategic interest in that country. U.S. investment is minimal (approximately \$12.9 million in FY 1970). Yet U.S. policy over the years has been marked by strong support for Tunisia's economic and political independence.

The United States was one of the first governments to recognize Tunisia in 1956. Our assistance followed the 1961 decision that Tunisia should be one of the countries to receive a long-term commitment since it possessed the infrastructure, sufficient economic potential, and political will to serve as a model for other developing countries.

Despite this commitment and interest in Tunisia's success, we did not attempt to determine the path Tunisia chose for development. It is difficult to conceive of a leader of President Bourguiba's character permitting such interference if it had been tried. Tunisian successes and errors are their own. There were misgivings within the U.S. Government in 1966–1969 during the period of accelerated expansion of agricultural cooperatives and increased state control over the Tunisian economy. It was agreed, however, that the Tunisian experiment was worthy of our continued support. Tunisia's ensuing decision in 1969 to reverse the course of its economic policy to give greater emphasis to private enterprise and free market forces was entirely a Tunisian determination.

As a result of the farsighted reforms of President Bourguiba, Tunisia is, in social terms, still the most advanced of the Arab states. Its human resources are its greatest wealth and we will continue to be interested in its development and well-being.

Tunisia has always had an independent foreign policy. It continues to do so. As its leadership passes into other hands, we look for a continuation of our close relationship, one based essentially on a common interest in Tunisia's development.

In both Morocco and Tunisia, however, the basic U.S. role has changed in the past ten years. Economic assistance is flowing to both countries from more sources and the overall U.S. share has declined. Tunisia has been one of the models of the multilateral approach in which a Consultative Group, under the aegis of the World Bank, has, for a number of years, coordinated the international effort.

French aid to Tunisia has held steady in real terms and aid to Morocco has increased in both real and proportionate terms. U.S. aid has declined absolutely and proportionately in both countries.

Between 1960 and 1964, the U.S. provided two-thirds of all non-Communist economic aid to Morocco and Tunisia. Between 1965 and 1969, this proportion declined to 42 percent of the aid flowing to each. In 1970, the U.S. share dropped still further as other donors have increased their share. Our decreasing share is a reflection of the progress these countries are making, and of the widening responsibility being assumed by other nations—a trend entirely consistent with overall AID policy.

Algeria

Our relations with independent Algeria have been quite different from those with Morocco and Tunisia.

If we go back to 1962, U.S. expectations about the potential benefits of bilateral relations with Algeria were probably higher than with most other newly independent countries. They were probably unrealistic at that time given our inexperience in dealing with each other. President Kennedy had felt a special interest in Algeria dating from his 1957 speech urging that country's independence. The Algerian leader, Ben Bella, had flown back to North Africa, following his release by the French, in a U.S. Air Force plane. His first foreign visit as President after Algerian independence was to the United Nations and Washington where he was received by President Kennedy. The fact that Ben Bella chose to proceed directly from Washington to Cuba was perhaps an omen of what was to come.

The Algerians for their part always held a strong ideological bias against the United States. They identified the United States with France through NATO. Conversely, they felt a deep bond of sympathy with those states which had en-

dorsed and supported the long, bitter Algerian war of independence against France: North Viet-Nam, Egypt, the People's Republic of China, and Cuba—all countries with which, in varying degrees, the United States was at odds. In this environment of suspicion and hostility, and given the instability and rivalries of the Ben Bella period, it is not difficult to understand the lack of rapport. Even the fact that the United States supplied some \$165 million of PL-480 foodstuffs between 1962 and 1967 was regarded by the Algerians as a minor recompense for the devastation suffered during their independence struggle.

The overthrow of Ben Bella on June 19, 1965, by Minister of Defense Houari Boumedienne revived briefly U.S. hopes that satisfactory relations might be possible. Boumedienne's serious approach and his announced intention to concentrate on his country's problems seemed to augur well for such a development.

With the six-day war, however, Algeria broke diplomatic relations, and all U.S. aid to Algeria ceased by law. At the same time, Algeria seized almost all U.S. firms operating there, principally oil companies.

In retrospect, the break in relations proved to have had some benefits. For one thing it cleared the air. The romantic view of the prospects for U.S.-Algerian relations vanished overnight. We recognized that mutual confidence would not be based solely on aid programs, however, well-intentioned, nor on public gestures of support, however sincere.

The subsequent upturn in U.S.-Algerian relations has been marked by several turning points. One was the emergence of President Boumedienne as the undisputed leader of Algeria. He focused his government's efforts on domestic economic development and, in the pursuit of rapid industrialization the Algerians found they wanted the expertise and technology that private American enterprise could supply. Many U.S. firms responded to the indication that they would be welcome.

Another major turning point was the October 1969 agreement between SONATRACH, the State oil company, and the El Paso Natural Gas Company for the sale of one billion cubic feet-per-day of natural gas in liquefied form for importation to the U.S. east coast. This project and others like it represent a natural arrangement between the United States, with its estimated annual shortfall in gas supply of 35 trillion cubic feet by 1980, and Algeria with the fourth largest proven, and largely uncommitted, gas reserves in the world—130 trillion cubic feet.

But given the past history of U.S.-Algerian relations, and Algeria's treatment of U.S. petroleum companies, the huge amounts of capital needed, and the respective government authorizations required, it was clear even in 1969 that to bring these projects to fruition would be no easy task. If they could be implemented, however—and there is cause for optimism that they will be—they would create the most significant long-term economic links between the United States and North Africa in history. They would make a substantial contribution to Algeria's economic development and reduce Algeria's dependence on foreign governments for development financing.

During the past two years both governments have, in a spirit of businesslike cooperation, taken actions to enhance the possibilities for an early realization of these Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) projects. Algeria has upgraded and strengthened its diplomatic representation in Washington—still under the flag of Guinea—and we have done likewise in Algiers under the Swiss flag. Algeria has resolved all but one of its expropriation disputes with U.S. companies. The Export-Import Bank has informed SONATRACH that it is prepared to consider favorably the financing of several hundred million dollars of U.S. exports for the construction of the necessary facilities in Algeria for this project. The American companies will make no investment in Algeria, but they will finance the Liquefied Natural Gas tankers. The final authorization by the U.S. Federal Power Commission—which will set important precedents for the LNG industry—is the one remaining requirement.

Libya

U.S. relations with Libya over the past 20 years have gone through the same radical transformations as the country itself. In the pre-oil, pre-military-coup period, Libya was considered one of the most disinherited of the developing countries and showed little promise of economic viability. In the early 1950's, Libya was dependent on U.S., U.K., and other foreign aid for its economic development and military assistance. Libya concluded a defense agreement with the United Kingdom, and agreed to the establishment of Wheelus Air Force Base outside Tripoli and a British air base near Tobruk. Wheelus, because of its ideal climatic

conditions, became the principal training base for U.S. fighter aircraft stationed in Western Europe.

This close relationship, which was clearly one of Libyan economic dependence on the United States and the United Kingdom, was obviously headed for change when, in December 1957, Esso became the first oil company to announce it had struck oil. By 1968, Libya had become one of the world's leading oil producers and the per capita GNP of its 1.6 million inhabitants had increased from about \$100 at independence to \$1,640. Reflecting this transformation, our assistance program was ended in 1965.

In Libya, the United States faced in a very special way the problem of identification with a regime. We had provided substantial financial support in the early days of the kingdom. We enjoyed the benefits of military facilities. There was a widespread—but unfounded—belief that the British and American Ambassadors dictated policies to Libyan Governments.

There was much less awareness of the growing concern of American representatives in Libya at the increasing detachment of the King from events in the country, the influence of some of those around the King on policies and, what was particularly serious, the disenchantment of many of the best young men in the country with the lack of progress in the building of modern institutions.

It is conceivable that the United States could have had a significant influence on the course of events in Libya, but this must remain in the realm of speculation. Our aid had helped launch the country. The King and many of its leaders felt an indebtedness to the United States. Yet, it was clear to American officials serving in Libya during those years that the course of events was in Libyan hands and would be determined by Libyans. Neither an earlier withdrawal of our facilities from Libya nor the exercise of any extraordinary influence in that country would likely have changed the basic direction of events.

It was particularly regrettable, but not at all surprising, that the leaders of the coup of September 1969, under Lieutenant (now Colonel) Qadhafi took power with deep suspicions of the United States and with serious expectations that we would try to oppose their coup. The matter was further complicated by the fact that the new regime, deeply influenced by the frustration of the young Arab military officers over the course of the six-day war, made the Arab struggle against Israel a principal tenet of its foreign policy. Their belief in our unqualified support for Israel remains today the chief obstacle to better relations. Other suspicions have, in all probability, been modified.

We adapted quickly to the change in Libya. It was never our intention to do otherwise. We agreed to the evacuation of our air base near Tripoli and our Coast Guard navigation station in the Gulf of Sirte. We modified the nature of our relationship to meet the new situation.

In Libya today, the greatest U.S. interests are, in a sense, beyond the government domain. The investment and activities of private American companies in the development and production of Libya's vast oil reserves are essentially matters between the companies and Libya. Our role—when we have a role—is to seek to explain wider aspects of international relations which may bear on oil policy. In the 1970 negotiations, for example, our official effort was confined to explaining our primary concerns as a government over the consequences for the consuming nations of any breakdown in negotiations, and to explaining actions taken by the U.S. Government in permitting the companies to concert on negotiations.

Today the 11-nation Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), consisting of Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Venezuela, Libya, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Indonesia, and Nigeria, are in a strong position as a result of the world energy outlook. Demand for oil and gas by the developed world is expanding by leaps and bounds. The OPEC countries have that oil and gas, far in excess of their own needs. A great amount of creative diplomacy by governments and business alike is going to be required if the demands of the producing countries for increasing revenues and for control of the companies are to be met without disrupting the industry, the consumers, and the economies of the producing countries themselves. Libya will be a major driving force among the OPEC countries.

It can be asked, in retrospect, what were the benefits we gained from our substantial assistance to Libya in its early days?

First, we must recall the strong efforts made by the Soviet Union in those days to have established a Soviet trusteeship over the former Italian colony of Tripolitania. Our help to Libya enabled it to emerge and survive as an independent nation. This gave us advantages in access to and the utilization of key facilities during critical years following World War II. It provided a base on which

the Libyans and private American firms could build the important petroleum industry that exists in that country today.

Events have moved. Circumstances have changed. We have changed with them. We should not regret what has gone before, for that was important to where we are today. And today's Libya has a leadership with which we still have problems, but it is an independent leadership providing no more of an opportunity to other non-Arab forces than it provides to us.

LONG-RANGE VIEW

North Africa is a significant area of the world, at the hub where Europe, Africa, and the Middle East meet. It lies on our route of access to southern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean. It is a significant source of energy for Europe and will increasingly become so for us. It is an example of the trends and problems of the developing world generally.

We have, without forgetting our friends, adapted to change in North Africa. We see its nations as individual entities, each with unique characteristics, determining its own future and its own policies. We see our relations with them as important to our own interests. We can preserve those interests so long as we are prepared to continue an active role in the area and to find foundations for our relationships built genuinely on common interests.

APPENDIX D.—NORTH AFRICA: BACKGROUND

PREPARED BY I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN FOR THE FORD FOUNDATION REVIEW CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

We have long known that the Maghrib can easily become a Mediterranean replica of Pacific California, with its industry, mechanized agriculture, modern cities, and complex communications, and all the more so since we have learned that oil-rich North Africa has a Texas for its Nevada. However, we have no idea what North African man can or will become, except that it will certainly not be the same as California man. The notion that, with development, we will all be alike some day is probably as much of an illusion of perspective as the meeting of parallel lines on the distant horizon. The important question is then not how much North African man is fulfilling a teleological notion of development but how much is he fulfilling the potentialities of his present self in developing a new one. North African man is changing, without even a clear notion of the parameters and direction of that change. The following discussion tries to look at that change and its current setting in social, economic and political terms, after an initial presentation of the foreign relations context of North Africa. Our purpose is to develop answers to the two questions, What is the Maghrib? and Is it important? understood within the context of a possibilistic notion of development.

North Africa is here considered to be Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. (Mauritania and Libya are not included; both are rich in mineral resources and poor in productive manpower, presenting less of a challenge and capability for development, and both have major attractions to other regions. Particularly since the republican coup of 1969, Libya has traded in its membership in the Maghrib cooperation council for membership in the Union of Arab Republics and looks east, except for its bitter radio campaign against the Moroccan monarchy. Mauritania trades and lives southward and, while never an Arab League member and no longer an OCAM member, remains a member of the Senegal River Union. It has, however, moved into closer cooperation with Maghrib councils since 1970.) Not only are Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia joined together by their economic cooperation committees, their friendship treaties, and their transportation and energy networks, but they have a common "Western Arab" or "Arab-Berber" identity and an overwhelming socio-cultural similarity. (The three countries share the common proverb that "A is a woman, B a man and C a lion," with the country names in the blanks dependent on which country's national is speaking.)

Yet, as members of a primary region (one which is not further subdivisible into internal groups or among external groups), the North African states also belong to other regions: African, Arab, and Euro-Mediterranean, as well as developing or Third World. Prior to the formation of OAU, *African* ties were important for North African states as supports for their foreign policy prestige in general, their particular policy aims (including irredentisms), or their independence struggle. After the breakup of the more radical Casablanca Group to which Morocco and the Algerian Provisional Government belonged, the North African states have found the OAU above all useful as a podium for their policies and a place to let the Morocco-Algerian border dispute soak until it had cooled off enough for them to handle it alone. After 1964, however, Africa slipped in its importance to the Maghrib, for the region's policies were little in need of the kind of support that African states could give. Trade continued to grow, and North Africa has particularly important trade ties with West Africa. In other than official terms (trade, diplomacy), Africa is relatively unimportant to North Africans. It is not a primary identification referent and most sources of sympathy—colonialism, racism—are so because they are also part of the Maghrib experience, not because they are associated with Africa. Except for a resurgent anticolonial issue, nothing is likely to make Africa important to the Maghrib, or vice versa, in the foreseeable future.

The Arab region is closer to the identities of North Africans, although socially as well as politically, Maghribi attitudes are still distinguishable from those of the Arab East. No North African state agrees with current Arab policy toward Palestine (whenever and whatever it may be), although none of them agrees with the other two on the subject either. Significantly, Bourguiba's unsolicited opinions on diplomacy, Boumedienne's haughty emphasis on guerrilla warfare, and Hassan's militancy only when prompted reflect each country's particular ways of achieving independence. The Arab League itself has dropped in importance in Arab politics, but when it was more useful (through the Casablanca summit of 1965). North African states were a secondary part of the balance of power pattern that accompanied the Unity of Purpose phases of Arab politics, and of the concert pattern that accompanied the Unity of Ranks phases. None of these states has ever given decisive weight to an intra-Arab coalition of policy, either on the side of the radicals (Algeria) or the moderates (Morocco or, when not boycotting, Tunisia). The Maghrib is much less important to Arab politics than Arab politics are to the Maghrib. Bourguiba nurtures his charisma by baiting Egypt and, when necessary, mediating intra-Arab squabbles; Algeria feeds its pride and builds domestic support by outradicalizing the rest; and Morocco compensates for domestic moderation by anti-Israeli radicalism lest the Palestine issue be used to rally opposition to the monarchy. The unlikely event of a settlement would do much to free North Africa from its embroilment with Arab politics, and even an unfavorable settlement would not be nearly as likely to produce a compensatory overthrow of government in North Africa as it would in the Mideast. In the absence of a settlement, Arab politics and the Palestine question remain distant but visible, a flag to be brandished by the government lest it be captured by counter-elites.

North Africa's relation to *Europe and the Mediterranean* is more complex. The three countries are deep in a post-colonial love-hate relationship with their former metropole, reinforced by high but decreasing ties of trade and assistance. As the complex of colonial ties peels away, the last to go are the cultural imprints left by language, thought, and habits, accompanied by the resentment that is imposed by the realization that these three important processes have been determined by foreigners. Yet important parts of the population still look to France as the place where things are done properly—or at least the place from which notions of proper functioning come (even if these notions are not followed there any more than elsewhere)—as well as the place to go for work or vacation, to make money or to spend it. The number of Moroccan workers in Europe is greater than the industrial labor force in Morocco; the amount of money sent home from Algerians in Europe is equal to the total oil revenues of Algeria. Thus, economic ties reinforce cultural ties, and are eroding less rapidly than the decolonizing trend might suggest. The maintenance of technical assistants in large numbers, particularly in Morocco and Algeria, and the maintenance of trade through association with the European Communities, already formalized since 1969 for Morocco and Tunisia, keep North Africa close to France and to Europe in general. Indeed, the French strategy of sharing its postcolonial burdens through EEC association has been most successful. But not only have trade ties and workers' opportunities been enlarged; North Africa has also been incorporated into a Mediterranean economic space. The terms of its association accords are now being negotiated within the context of competing demands and supplies from Italy, Spain, Turkey, Greece, Lebanon, and Israel. Like the latter two, the Maghrib's association is not directed toward full membership in the Community but it does reinforce ties and prevent isolation.

It would be wrong to suggest that North Africa's foreign relations fit only into the concentric circles of regionalism. A major consequence of *decolonization* has been not only the renewal of ties with Arab and African areas but a general diversification of ties with developed countries. Beyond simple foreign policy, the degree of this diversification tells something about the direction of politics within the countries. If one could imagine a binomial index of dependency which would express both direction and intensity, all three countries would be scattered along the spectrum on both measures, quite unlike the intuitive impressions they give.

Morocco has done least to diversify its military, commercial, aid, assistance, investment, and other ties and has retained a Western orientation by relying mainly on France and the United States (with some alternation between the two in times of troubles). Morocco remains an Atlantic nation, bereft of major Mediterranean ports (it needed a transit treaty with Algeria in 1970 to get its

products to the sea) and separated from its eastern compatriots by a wall (the Atlas), a moat (the Moulouya), and a desert. Its dabblings into radical foreign policies with Eastern countries—Casablanca Group (1961–1962), Russian MIGs (1960)—have been tactical and short-lived. Yet its actual policy proclamations and UN votes have been independent and less frequently or openly pro-Western than Tunisia's.

Morocco still has American troops aboard a Moroccan base and two American communications facilities, and its arms come from France and the U.S., as well as Russia. Trade with France has increased 10% since 1958 and remains the largest segment of all Moroccan foreign trade, although total Moroccan trade has risen from about twice its trade with France to about three times that figure in 1970. Other Common Market countries' trade has risen from a third of the French figure ($\frac{1}{3}$ of Moroccan trade) to two-thirds of the French figure ($\frac{1}{6}$ of Moroccan trade). The second and third partners at both times have been Germany and the U.S., but each takes less than a tenth of Morocco's trade. Aid too comes principally from the U.S. and secondarily from France.

Of the three North African countries, Morocco has the largest number of French cooperants, the largest amount of continuing colonial investment, the largest proportion of Frenchmen in higher business positions, and a number of Europeans continuing to own farmland. A decade and a half after independence was granted, there are still 9,000 French technical assistants and schoolteachers in Morocco, a figure that has not changed in nearly a decade and that must be placed in the context of a bureaucracy which has more than doubled since independence. Postcolonial investment amounts to over \$5 billion, and Frenchmen hold half the top business posts. Although Moroccan investment capital is scarce, its potential business directors and landowners are numerous, and continued French presence creates some friction and resentment.

Algeria has not only done most to diversify its external relations but has also slid the furthest (although certainly not all the way) toward the Eastern side of the foreign policy spectrum of any North African country. Algerian foreign policy has an independent, arrogant assurance about it that is both ram-bunctious and refreshing. Algerian diplomats start from a feeling that they have just finished beating a major world power with one bare fist and with the other tied behind their back, aided by nothing more concrete than the benevolent looks of the East and opposed by embarrassed American assistance to their enemy. Having done all this, they proceeded to chop off remaining French claims on parts of their country (land, oil, industry, special economic and financial relations), using each succeeding disruption as a self-imposed challenge and image-builder. Indeed, there is something brashly "American" about Algeria, which may be admirable but is scarcely endearing.

Algeria expelled the last colonial troops two years after independence and has not taken on any others, rumors about Russian presence inside the Mers al-Kebir naval complex notwithstanding. Its arms sources are largely Russian, and training outside Algeria has taken place in Russia, Egypt, and France. Although France remains Algeria's largest trading partner, total trade with the metropole has dropped considerably, and its proportion of all Algerian trade has fallen from 90 percent in 1958 to 60 percent in 1970 (although exports to France have increased). Increased exchanges with other countries were insignificant in 1958 but by 1970 trade with the rest of the Common Market had risen to more than a third of the French figure and trade with Communist countries had risen to a sixth of the French figure; the U.S. equaled the Communist import figure but fell far behind its exports from Algeria. Algeria also has a large number (8,000) technical assistants from France, nearly the same number as Morocco in half the time since independence was granted; reduction has been the result of French refusals, however. There are about half that number from other countries, including more than 2,000 Russians and some American business consultant missions.

All foreign ownership of Algerian land, resources and industry has been abolished. Technical assistants clearly work for Algerians, not the reverse. They are treated as reference librarians or computer terminals, to be tapped for their output but never to be granted executive authority.

Between the two countries, *Tunisia* has developed an impressive amount of diversification but has maintained a Western orientation in its foreign relations with France on a close and friendly basis and developing an obligation relationship ('ar) with the U.S. to fill its security needs. Tunisia has worked hard for this relationship and has threatened France with the U.S. and the U.S. with

Russia to get it. In the process, it has practically eliminated French influence in its domestic property and relations, to an extent almost as great as Algeria, and has become a special ward of American aid and diplomatic programs, to the point where it could break off relations with Arab and Communist states from time to time with impunity and could make outrageous policy statements on such inflammable issues as Vietnam and Palestine without losing the stance of independence in foreign policy that has made it such a frequent mediator. Tunisia took a longer time than its neighbors to rid itself of French troops because of the Algerian war, but all in all its tenacity on the issue was remarkably effective. No other troops have taken over the watch—almost literally, since Tunisia's own army is so small; arms aid for the limited armed forces is primarily American and secondarily French.

Trade with the former metropole has dropped absolutely and its proportion of the total has fallen dramatically from two-thirds (1958) to between a quarter and a third (1970) of Tunisian exports and imports, respectively. Other EEC countries, which took a twentieth of Tunisian trade in 1958, now account for a third of its exports and a fifth of its imports, and the U.S. for a sixth of Tunisian imports. Aid is above all American, and in large quantities. Tunisia was the fifth highest per capita receiver of Western aid of all independent developing countries, with a 1968-70 figure of \$23, ranking just above Israel, as well as above Algeria (31st with \$8.57) and Morocco (42nd with \$7.13); aid was over 10% of Tunisian GNP (and about 3.8% in the cases of Algerian and Moroccan). Tunisia has reduced French technical assistants to 3,600 and has kept other sources of foreign personnel diversified and small; Tunisia's richest resource is its own educated population. Foreign ownership has also been nearly eliminated, by both nationalization and Tunisianization.

II

It has been implied that foreign relations have some relation to domestic relations involving power, status, and wealth, although it is not clear whether foreign ties reflect or influence such domestic considerations. In any case, unless an understanding of the Maghrib and its importance is sought only in international geopolitics, a closer look must be taken at some comparative measures of North African countries and then at some more dynamic processes associated with different types of development, in order to understand the possibilities for self-realization and change in North Africa.

Morocco and Algeria have roughly the same population (14 and 13 million), three times that of Tunisia (4.6 million), and roughly the same number of people per unit of arable land (175 and 195), nearly twice the figure for Tunisia (102). They also have about the same high population growth rate (3.3), slightly higher than that of Tunisia. All populations are very young, with half the people less than 16 years old. Per capita GNP is between \$200 (Morocco) and \$250 (Algeria), having risen from 1956 from between \$140 (Morocco) and \$175 (Algeria and Tunisia). In the middle of the decade, nearly 3 out of 10 Tunisians and 2.5 out of 10 Moroccans belonged to the economically active population, twice the Algerian figure. Of these, 60 percent of the Tunisians and Moroccans and 70% of the Algerians were in agriculture; 20 percent of the Tunisians and Algerians were in services and 25 percent of the Moroccans. The remainder were in industry, the Tunisian proportion being more than twice the Algerian and almost twice the Moroccan. Non-agricultural unemployment at the end of the decade was 44 percent in Algeria, 22 percent in Morocco, and none in Tunisia; agricultural underemployment was 69 percent in Algeria, 59 percent in Morocco, and 66 percent in Tunisia. Among the economically inactive youth, in the mid-sixties, out of ten primary-school age children 4 were in school in Morocco, 6 in Algeria and 8 in Tunisia. Expressed differently, primary school enrollment rose between independence and the mid-sixties from 9 percent to 12 percent of the total population in Algeria, from 7 percent to 17 percent in Tunisia, and from 5 percent to 9 percent in Morocco. At the same mid-point in the sixties, out of 10 pupils in primary school, 1 went to secondary school in Algeria, 1.5 in Tunisia, and 2 in Morocco; out of 10 pupils in secondary school, 1 in Tunisia and Algeria and $\frac{1}{2}$ in Morocco went to college. By mid-decade, literacy in Morocco had risen only to 15 percent, in Tunisia to 19 percent and in Algeria to 22 percent. Towns and cities over 20 000 (urban population) contained not quite a quarter of the population in each country in 1960, and about 3 out of 10 a decade later; cities over 100,000, however, contained

1 out of 10 Tunisians, 2 out of 10 Moroccans and a number of Algerians rising from the first to the second figure over the decade.

Although these are important development indicators, many others could be cited. It is clear from them, however, that there is no sharp differentiation among the three countries and that their individual variances occur within a range that also includes Egypt, Syria, Senegal, Zaire, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ecuador, and others. Thus, if other developing countries are considered, it is the similarities rather than the differences within North Africa that are brought out. This is clearly shown in an examination of "social mobilization neighbors" on the basis of seven major social mobilization indicators—urban population, school population, literacy, industrial labor force, radios per capita, per capita physicians, per capita GNP—as used by Deutsch and Hudson. Morocco and Tunisia were the only "neighbors" on the basis of all indicators (using figures about the time of their independence); on the basis of 6 indicators, they were joined by Algeria and Guatemala. On the basis of 5 indicators, "neighbors" were Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Guatemala, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Nicaragua, and Turkey. A decade later, the three had grown further apart. Morocco was the least developed on all six indicators (data not available for industrial labor force) and Tunisia and Algeria split the lead on the others; in between them were no countries on 5 or 6 indicators but on 4 there were Ecuador, Brazil, Egypt and Congo (Brazzaville), North Africa's closest "neighbors." (Another attempt to delineate natural regions beyond propinquity, developed by Russett, also keeps the three Maghribi countries together and factors out similarities with such others as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Thailand, South Korea, and also with Turkey, Ceylon, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Paraguay, although the measures are less clear and the data late colonial.)

Such indicators, of course, give as much but no more idea about a society than vital statistics give about a person. They can be given a bit more life and depth by being brought together within the notion of an economic, social, and political system and within the processes of economic, social and political development. Definitions of the latter are legion, but the one to be used here refers to the existence of self-sustaining growth in each of the three sectors of human activity, in terms of wealth, roles, and power. In each case, both growth and distribution are necessary components of the concept of development.

Economic development, extended to concrete instances, means the growth of the money supply in an economic system and the roughly concomitant increase in available goods and services (otherwise there is merely inflation), accomplished through the investment of the increased money in increased production capacity, and accompanied by the expansion both of resources and of the people benefitting from them. Since these things are often harder to measure than the terminology might suggest, and since the author is not an economist, descriptions will be general.

The three North African economies have been based for millennia on Mediterranean agriculture—grain, olives, citrus fruit, vegetables, vineyards—augmented by more recent discoveries of minerals—oil and gas, phosphates, and lesser quantities of iron, manganese, lead, zinc. In both agriculture and minerals, each country is usually competitive with at least one other of the three, but there is some basis for exchanges in goods nevertheless. Despite great efforts, many plans, burgeoning technocratic attention, and much foreign aid, the distribution of these activities—the structure of the economy—has changed little since independence. Even the much greater changes during colonial rule were not enough to make change self-generating: at best it is only self-maintaining. In the decade 1957–66 (the first decade of independence for Tunisia and Morocco), GNP rose by 40 (Tunisia) to 80 (Morocco) percent, per capita (GNP by 20 (Tunisia) to 30 (Morocco) percent, and consumer prices by 15 (Tunisia) to 40 (Morocco) percent; in each case, Algeria fell somewhere in between. But in each country agriculture has continued to produce about 30 percent of the GDP, and industry about 20 percent, with the rest in services, administration, and commerce. Only energy resources have boomed. Although production in agriculture has risen, productivity has remained constant or fallen since colonial times and is often low compared with developed industry or agriculture or even with other developing countries. Investment figures are rare and contradictory, but investment appears to be lower than before independence and is heavier in infrastructural than in industrial or, even more so, agricultural sectors.

It is clear enough what has to be done in such situations. The theories of investment sources and the technologies of increased agricultural and industrial

productivity are replete with remedies. The question is how a particular group of people and the leaders from its midst can decide, support, and implement the necessary policies. Its answer lies in an examination of the society and policy in which the economy operates. As a transition between economics and matters of social and political development, it is important to consider the social structure of the economy.

More people are benefitting from the growing economy for two reasons: population growth consumes economic growth, and the elimination of the colonial sector has allowed for a redistribution of goods and services to and within the national community. The aggregate figure for per capita GNP indicates that economic growth plus redistribution of the colonial share has provided a national economy that has increased enough for everyone to be better off, although when corrected by the consumer price index, even this figure is severely reduced. But in addition, the aggregate is a gross and unreal figure. What matters more is the social distribution of the wealth. Sound figures are very hard to obtain. However, those estimates available suggest that, despite all the differences in self-appointed labels, there is remarkable similarity among the three countries. In the mid-sixties, Algeria and Morocco had a similar labor (300,000) and white collar (100,000) population; the Moroccan commercial and artisanal sector (220,000) was larger than the Algerian (180,000) but the Algerian executive (25,000) and government (300,000) sectors were larger than the Moroccan (10,000 and 240,000). It is hard to establish proportionality in Tunisia for comparison; its population should give it a third of the Moroccan-Algerian figures but its higher urban employment rate gives a total equal to half of the Moroccan-Algerian figure. The Tunisian breakdown reflects both proportions.

Tunisia had half the Moroccan-Algerian number of workers (150,000) and half the larger, Moroccan number of artisans and traders (110,000); it had a third the smaller, Moroccan number of government employees (80,000) but larger proportions of white collar workers (70,000) and executives (15,000). Unfortunately, the income figures are even more speculative and less complete. According to Samir Amin, Algerian incomes are higher than Tunisian for the government and workers categories, lower for the artisan-trader category, and the same for executives; that, in any case, is an effective translation of the two countries' ideologies and may not be any more reliable than that. By the same measure, we would expect Moroccan incomes to be closer to the Tunisian than to the Algerian, and perhaps show an even greater span between workers' and executives' average incomes than in Tunisia (4:1; compared with 2:1 attributed to Algeria). On the other hand, a full comparison must also take into account the larger unemployment in Algeria than in the other two countries. A few, more impressionistic conclusions must be given, even at the risk of overtaking the discussion of social development. There is unequal distribution of wealth in all three economies, probably somewhat greater in Morocco than in Algeria, with Tunisia in between, but similar in all three cases nonetheless. The notable difference is not in the concentration of wealth but in the social background of the wealthy. Although all three have rich commercial families who make money by trade and invest it in real estate (Algeria included), the majority of those who hold wealth and power in Morocco tend to come from the traditional upper class (urban or rural), those in Algeria are a "New Class" of nouveaux riches from modest, small-town, lower middle class backgrounds, and those in Tunisia tend to be a mixture, combining urban upper class and middle class backgrounds.

Social development, extended to concrete instances refers to the expansion of roles in society through increased specialization and division of labor, and increased mobility or roles access. It is also accompanied by a change in cultural values, relating to roles and mobility but also to identity. Roles means more than simply jobs, but there is enough of a relation between the two to begin by focussing on promotional opportunity through education and employment. In the Maghrib as elsewhere in the Mideast, colonization has brought social development conceived in these terms, upsetting the patterns of traditional Muslim society. Furthermore, decolonization (except to the extent it is blocked by the continued presence of post-colonial Europeans) has brought a sudden influx of North Africans into the roles occupied (and frequently created) by the colonizer. Yet the situation varies a good deal in the three countries, considering both the amount of growth and the social source of those who filled new roles.

In all three societies, the majority of the population has continued its traditional agricultural existence largely unchanged. Although the fellahin's children may now be going to school, they are less likely to do so than if they lived in an

urban setting. Even where schooling is available, its effect is felt by the sons, not the fathers (and all the less so by the mothers and daughters). Whether the current policy is to improve infrastructure, as in Morocco, or facilities and sometimes structures, as in Tunisia, or industrial trickle-down on radically changed structures, as in Algeria, the fellahin still remain the neglected dead weight of North African society. The social framework for improving the quality of life for those who stay on the farm is some sort of cooperation in a form adequate to replace the autonomous *jem'a* of the traditional society or the paternalistic private farm or state extension service of the colonial regime. The form varies, from the state farms which succeeded the self-management experiment on former colonial lands in Algeria, through the stringent cooperativization enforced throughout Tunisia in 1968 and rapidly abandoned a year later, to the various types of machine tractor stations, extension services, and village development programs which have followed one another in Morocco. It is significant that the biggest problem, common to all these programs, is the lack of trained agricultural technicians who can relate to the fellahin (the same problem, ironically, that the French faced across a racial barrier).

Yet rural mobility is possible, either in or out of the countryside. Many achieve a change in status within the countryside by becoming agricultural workers on either private or state farms. The traditional form of this status has been the *khammes*, a share-cropper working for a fifth of the produce; salaried farm labor arose on modern colonial farms, which when taken over after independence continued to require the same type of labor, even if organized collectively for a period, as in Algeria. It is not certain, however, that the minimum salary (if enforced) or the possibility of more stable employment (if realized) overcomes the disadvantages of alienation and dependency that is inherent in farm labor, in Maghrib as well as elsewhere.

The other way for farmers to achieve mobility has been to move into the towns and cities, as they have done in droves throughout the century. Such a move is initially not permanent and is a self-fulfilling expectation; no matter how bad things are in the bidonville, they seem better than the drab *duwar* (hamlet), with which ties are in any case maintained as a seasonal alternative or ultimate fallback position. The shantytown is a vulnerable, vigorous, aspirant society, but not a rebellious one; the Battle of Algiers (1957) and the Casablanca riots (1965) took place in the casba or medina (traditional quarter), not in the bidonvilles. But social change though it may be, rural migration is social promotion only if jobs are available. Continuing in-migration has the advantage of depopulating marginal agricultural areas, but in the process it creates both urban and rural imbalances that could constitute either constructive or debilitating pressures.

Within the urban society, colonial rule created a rapid expansion in the number and types of new roles, and even provided opportunities for Muslims to fill them. The opportunities were not enough, of course; conditions for the nationalist revolt were created by the ascriptive barrier to the promotion of North Africans who had been prepared for achievement, through increased education and aspiration. The French created the structures to be filled, provided both the training and the blockage necessary for a movement of self-assertion, and left under its pressure. The wave of North Africans that swept over these structures grew with its own momentum. In 1955, about a quarter of the non-teaching, non-military civil servants were Muslim (5,000 out of 19,000 in Tunisia, 10,000 out of 50,000 in Algeria, 12,000 out of 50,000 in Morocco); a decade later the Muslim civil service had taken over and doubled the French total (34,000 in Tunisia, 93,000 in Algeria, 120,000 in Morocco). In the last year before independence, a twentieth of the population in Morocco and Tunisia and a tenth in Algeria (450,000 or 4.4 percent in Morocco, 255,000 or 6.5 percent in Tunisia, 1,040,000 or 9.7 percent in Algeria) were French; their roles in society were rapidly taken over by the Muslims after sovereignty changed hands.

Numbers alone give some notion of social promotion or the "instant mobility" of independence; source gives another dimension. Those who moved into new roles did so from two different positions; either laterally from a similar social level in traditional society or vertically from a lower social level. Again, figures are unavailable, but in a schematic way and with plenty of exceptions, it is possible to say that Moroccans have tended to follow the lateral path, Algerians the vertical path, and Tunisians a mixture.

The "instant mobility" of independence is an impressive moment of social development, just as the nationalist movement represents a tremendous outburst of political development (there is no parallel phenomenon at the same moment in the economic sphere, to the contrary). A tougher test comes thereafter: can the growth of the social system and the continuing mobility of new people into new roles be sustained? Again, hard data are difficult to find, but unemployment figures suggest a negative answer. Yet if population, education, urbanization, and aspiration growth rates all outdistance economic growth rates, there is at least a suggestion that social development is not lagging, but rather that it is outdistancing economic development. Like many developing countries, the North African societies have the manpower that is free and able to take on easily conceivable roles; what is lacking is the economic base to employ the newly educated and to meet the new aspirations. As the absorption capacities of the countries become saturated, they find themselves faced with the same sort of blockages that gave rise to the nationalist movement, a dangerous situation for any incumbent. The result can be rebellion or apathy.

Before leaving social development, there should be a word about changing values. There is no doubt about massive changes in two important aspects of traditional culture: women and religion. Changes mirror the "style" of each country. Algeria, with the massive secularization and women's liberation brought about by the war, has undergone an equally massive retrenchment, producing sharply contradictory currents. Women have returned to the home and the mosque to the village, but young school girls from that home are being educated in equality and the mosque is more important than attendance in it. (What other country provides separate voting booths for its veiled women but has its high school girls in gym suits doing calisthenics publicly in the middle of the capital?) Morocco is gradually liberating its women but its traditional religion is still strong and even institutionalized. Tunisia has moved more rapidly on both fronts but not so rapidly as to cause the Algeria type of counter-reaction. The extent and impact of secularization in Muslim North Africa is difficult to grasp and varies in many dimensions within each country. Some of the religious functions—support of the mosque, redistribution of wealth to the poor (*zakat*)—have been taken over by each state. In social life, religion has been reduced to social rites—the *hajj*, observation of Ramadan (enforced in both monarchical Morocco and revolutionary Algeria)—rather than being the motor of society. In education, there are classes in religion and morality in all three countries, freeing the rest of the curriculum for secular teachings. Despite superstition and faith, there is a pervasive view in North Africa today that human will and scientific law, not external forces, guide daily events. Yet, at the same time, all Maghrib is Muslim, even its socialism! Islam is an innate, inherited identify factor, not a social belief or personal practice. As such, it is not a trait that has to be cultivated, because one is born that way.

Yet within this identity, national identity has also grown: across the Arab-Berber gap and within the Muslim community (*umma*), the nation has been built. Within the national form, the three nations seek the content of their identity. Their academic and other intellectual communities begin to face the supreme measure of social development: the ability to study and evaluate oneself. The job is easier in its beginnings, since literature and history can first be revisionist to correct the biases of colonial stories and studies. Beyond such reevaluations, it is much more difficult to face the present: Tunisia is the only one of the three countries that can claim active, honest scholarship in current social science. In literature, all three countries have thriving contesting writers: ironically but understandably, some of the best are abroad, honest critics from a distance.

Political development, extended to concrete instances, refers to the expansion of the polity's problem-solving capabilities. The generation of political power is accompanied by the creation and expansion of institutions for its exercise, for without regularized channels for solving problems sustained power generation over a long period of time is unlikely. There is more difference among the three political systems in North Africa than among their economics or societies. If hard data for looking into these differences are still not clearly conceptualized, let alone available, some general appreciations can nevertheless be supported.

In *Morocco*, legitimacy or the right of the incumbents to exercise authority is shrinking. Yet, while the monarchy's days seem to be finite, they are not yet numbered, since alternatives and their schedules are not clearly present. Since independence, the monarchy has enjoyed a broad legitimacy based on traditional,

charismatic, and legal-rational sources. After the death of Mohammed V, whose *baraka* was proven by the largest miracle of all—independence, his son, Hassan II, has lost legitimacy on all three counts. Social change and a native cynicism have eaten into traditional sources of support, his charisma has worn thin, and the performance of his regime has not been up to its self-imposed developmental challenges. The high degree of institutionalization and legitimization inherent in the traditional monarchy has misled its incumbent away from the continual cultivation of legitimacy and the careful construction of institutions; the ascriptive nature of his selection has led him away from social change, for it is natural for him to assume that by keeping people in their place he can keep himself in his. All in all, there is a growing and inescapable resemblance to Farouq.

The Moroccan political system has been the victim of an unhappy coincidence: at the end of a historic process over a century in which power has come to be concentrated in the monarchy ruling over a national polity, a new source of power—organized popular participation—arose and became a potential challenge to the newly reinforced monarchy. Instinctively, the monarchy has avoided “being put in equation” by first helping the independence (*Istiqlal*) movement break up into a number of competing political parties, and then, encouraged by his own success, by reducing these parties to pressure groups dependent for their power on access to his chambers. In the process, institutions of government have been weakened and shuffled, constitutions have succeeded each other with exponentially increasing rapidity (1962, 1970, 1972) and decreasing support, and elections—which started out as models of competition, honesty and participation in a developing country—have become a fraud and a joke.

As organized political expression declines, anomic politics increases. The first major outbreak was the explosion of expressive violence in the Casablanca riots of workers and students in the summer of 1965. A minor instance occurred in the summer of 1970 when farmers rebelled in the Gharb as former colonial land they sought was handed over to an absentee landlord. A major outbreak came again the next summer, when an ill-conceived military revolt nearly overthrew the monarchy but in the end only succeeded in annihilating most of the leading officers (on both sides of the revolt). Unless a miracle—out of his character—is produced by the king in the form of a galvanizing burst of popular and effective energy toward social change and economic development, cynicism is likely to spread from its traditional rural base to the new elites and fewer people will be willing to take an active and responsible role in politics. As a result of these trends, power is not only concentrated; it is inflated and shrinking in the Moroccan system—in a very broad sense, it takes inordinate amounts of energy to get things done in Morocco and fewer problems are being solved.

Yet the alternatives are not at all clear, largely because they have each missed their chance. Mehdi ben Barka, the most prominent bearer of revolutionary-ideological legitimacy, dissipated his energies, on the Tri-Continental movement and was then kidnapped and eliminated by the palace, to the conspicuous silence of his fellow leaders and rivals within the leftwing party (UNFP). Whether the 1971 coup at Skhirt was a general's coup or a colonel's coup (both were involved), it was above all a *coup raté*, wasting the military's capabilities for either preemptive or constructive action in the near future. Yet as the political system shrinks, a large amount of political energy is not likely to be required to overthrow it, security forces notwithstanding. A growing middle class, with more and more young people in it, stands ready to support a government that would generate productive and problem-solving capacities.

In *Algeria*, the broadest aim of the present government has been to move from revolutionary-ideological legitimacy to legal-rational sources. Boumedienne came to power in the name of The Revolution, charging Ben Belia with its betrayal. Indeed, the previous government had tried to combine revolutionary ideology and charismatic sources of legitimacy, a fatal attempt since one of the major tenets of the ideology of the Algerian Revolution was collective, not charismatic, leadership. As Islam stands behind the right to rule in Morocco, so The Revolution (1954–1962) stands behind it in Algeria, and in both cases at an ever-increasing distance. Yet the passage from revolutionary to institutional legitimacy has its dangers, since complete institutionalization implies the possibility of contesting and removing the revolutionary incumbents from office. As a result, institutions at the top remain bureaucratic, and only at lower levels more democratic. The type of politics, in turn, follows this formal division.

As in any nationalist movement, but to a far greater extent, the struggle for independence in Algeria meant an intense but relatively short-lived burst of political development. Tremendous power—to accomplish man's highest goal, control of his own destiny—was unleashed against impressive resistance, identity and participation were galvanized, and the high goal was achieved. The result was erratic. Alongside high revolutionary expectations was also widespread post-revolutionary fatigue; many people had fought to be left alone. Alongside the sharp dislocations of revolutionary change came the need for revolutionary order; control, direction, and guidance were needed to create the New Algerian Man (and even more, Woman) in the New Algerian Society. After an interim of enthusiasm, disorder, insecurity, and unclear directions, the Boumedienne regime has tried to meet these needs.

In this light, it should not be surprising that one of the Third World's most famous revolutionary movements (the FLN) has been such a dud as a single party. At the time of independence, everyone was FLN and, except for the Federation in France, there was no autonomous organization to bear the party name. Those who were active members of the FLN were in reality either members of the Provisional Government (GPRA) or the army (ALN). The first, with its important body of technicians, was incorporated into the new Algerian government (minus most of its leaders); the second split four ways after independence, the best officers going into the national bureaucracy or into the new army (along with some of the troops), the others going into the local party bureaucracies or simply (along with most of the troops) going home. The party became a club of leaders and a "ministry of mobilization", with little connection between the two. After the fall of Ben Bella, the politicians were retired or worked their way out of the system, and the party remained as a bureaucracy, relatively unrelated to power, government, or politics. Elections under Ben Bella were ritual ratifications of single-candidate slates. Under Boumedienne, an ingenious system of party elections was established in which candidates need not be party members, but are often non-party members favored by the bureaucracy and, more important, by the voters; in each district, twice the number of candidates as there were seats were presented, giving the voter a choice. Local assemblies have been elected (1967) and reelected (1971) under this system, as have provincial assemblies (1969). The date for national assembly elections has been repeatedly postponed, and the powers of the lower assemblies are at best managerial. Another attempted experiment with new institutions, the self-management committees, has been less successful.

National bureaucracy has provided an institutional framework for the generation and exercise of power. Although bureaucratic inefficiency is commonplace, the bureaucracy has mobilized and rewarded talent, created and channeled energies, and attacked problems. Its agrarian reform plan, pursued by Boumedienne with personal tenacity, will be a test of its reforming capabilities since it strikes at some of the political elite themselves. Yet power is generated through participation in and guidance by bureaucracy, not by participation in politics. Party politics is less likely in Algeria than in Morocco. Parties might eventually form out of factions in a national assembly or out of client groups of competing ministers, but such eventualities are far off and are only timid extensions of the bureaucratic regime. Opposition outside the system has been unlikely ever since the last of the revolutionary consumers—those who wanted the immediate benefits of the revolution—were eliminated by the revolutionary producers (the current regime) in 1967. In foreseeable time, there appears to be no social source of boatrockers, no growing dissatisfied group that has been blocked in the present policy.

In *Tunisia*, charismatic legitimacy has been used as an agent of transfer from a traditional system to a legal-rational system. Bourguiba's role of the Supreme Combatant, School Teacher, and Father Image has been reinforced by the institutional legitimacy of the party (PSD) itself. As time has passed, and Bourguiba's health and political savvy have sagged, his charisma has worn a bit thin. But the institutions remain, and even his dissident lieutenants have proposed only increasing the political role of the party and the national assembly, not of replacing them with some other process or source of legitimacy. Tunisia has been able to avoid the dilemmas of the Moroccan monarchy. Its monarch

was compromised by collaboration; its charismatic leader and its nationalist movement reinforced each other. Without a ready source of legitimacy, Bourguiba has had to cultivate one and hence is forced into the very meaning of a legal-rational system. In the process, he has subjected the new institutions of government to change, but it is a change of renewal and readaptation, not of replacement. At periodic intervals, the party has been reorganized, as has the state, but with an aim at their effective functioning. Policies too have been revised on occasion, but after long intervals and, usually, after serious consideration. Thus it is possible to point a reorientation of governmental energies toward planned development in 1960, to a revision of the initial education plan in 1968, and to a reversal of the agricultural cooperativization in 1969. This is a far cry from Morocco's rapid succession of development plans and educational policies and its unimplemented agrarian reforms and improvements; it is also a more deliberate process than Algeria's eight-year delay in establishing a plan, and its ratification and then annulment of a spontaneous self-management idea.

The bureaucracy is the agent of output in Tunisia, and is responsible for mobilizing energies and implementing change. The party is the agent of input, more active at times in the past than at present but nevertheless an importing channel for participation and the generation of power. There is democracy in the PSD; there is none in the government. Party elections have been occasions of real competition and promotion, and the critics of the regime have been insisting on even greater autonomy of choice at the cell level. On the other hand, public elections for local national assemblies are characterized by high participation but single candidatures. This can be considered good training in the forms of democracy, in preparation for the day when choice will be available. That day is foreseeable. Bourguiba has promised to retire at the end of his present term, in 1974, if he does not die beforehand. A number of his junior companions in the nationalist struggle are available to replace him, providing continuity and stability in leadership. But their very numbers and differing policies are likely to provoke a party split and a competitive system. The fact that such an eventuality has been evoked, even if denounced, supports its eventual likelihood and acceptability. It can of course mean the end of productive energies and the beginning of overwhelming competition and control, to the elimination of political development in Tunisia. It is more likely to mean a new step in political maturity and a continuation of power generation and problem-solving.

Hopefully, by now, North Africa will have made its own case for its importance. It has been seen that the Maghrib is a strategic area, not merely in the military sense (certainly the least important claim for priority) but in its relationship with much broader areas. In addition to its geographic ties, North Africa is typical of many aspects of other developing countries, which it resembles. In other ways it is less typical: all in all, the three countries have a record of dynamic stability, a heritage of resources, and a background of growth and change, combined into an orderly process of development. Yet it is not in their accomplishments that their importance lies. North African states are important because they are models for development, in a very different sense of the word.

North Africa contains three similar economies, very slightly different societies, and very different politics, and thus very different approaches to the similar challenges of development. Morocco, for all its stability that is growing fragile, is an example of *laissez-faire*, ad hoc, pluralistic development in each sector of life. Now that its struggles for power have been worked out, Algeria represents a post-revolutionary, bureaucratic, technocracy. Tunisia is a pre-democratic, semi-planned, bourgeois mobilization system, likely to continue as such despite the imminent passing of its founding father. None of these approaches can claim to be the final answer to the problems of development, yet all can claim to be intelligent attempts to grapple with them. Whether the grappling is "successful" or not, it is worth the effort and there will be lessons from failure as well as success. It is in this sense that North African states are models: not perfect cases or candidates for emulation, but comparative examples of differing approaches to self realization in a changing world.

APPENDIX E.—NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH AFRICA

(By J. William Zartman, from "The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the European Economic Community: the Weak Confront the Strong")

THE Maghrebi set of negotiations is African only in the geographical location of its applicants and in the broad context of weak-strong or developing-developed trade problems. When it comes to the details and specific subjects which provide the meat for discussion and the bones of contention, the Maghreb negotiations are clearly Mediterranean, and hence touch on problems and products that are part of the southern flank of the Community itself.¹ Except for edible fats, the Yaoundé and Commonwealth negotiations did not involve

¹ There have been a number of good studies of Maghreb-EEC relations during the period of negotiations. The basic study is Jacques d'Yvoire, *Le Maghreb et la Communauté Economique Européenne* (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1965. Etude Maghrébine, no. 4), summarized as "Le Maghreb et le Marché Commun," *Maghreb* 3:45-54 (May 1964), and later updated in [Rodolphe Roussel], "Les conversations Maghreb-CEE," *Maghreb* 11:3-8 (November 1965); "Les Relations entre la CEE et le Maghreb," *Maghreb* 26:45-47 (March 1968); "Les Accords d'association entre la CEE, le Maroc et la Tunisie," *Maghreb* 33:9-12 (May 1969); "Marché Commun et Maghreb," *Revue du Marché Commun* 7:485-88 (November 1964). See also the thoughtful annex to a detailed study, Amor Benyoussef, *Populations du Maghreb et Communauté économique à Quatre* (Paris: Sedes, 1967), pp. 532-40; Charles F. Gallagher, "From Carthage to Rome," XIII American University Field Staff Reports 1 (February 1967); and André Tiano, *Le Maghreb entre les mythes* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), pp. 478-85. A detailed study of the Moroccan situation is Nor el-Ghorfi, *Le Maroc à l'heure du Marché Commun* (Rabat: Imprimerie Franco-Marocaine, 1967). Highly critical treatments of the subject are given by Fathallah Oualalou, *L'assistance étrangère face au développement économique du Maroc* (Casablanca: Editions maghrébines, 1969), pp. 207-24, and Joesph Muzikar, *Les perspectives de l'integration des pays maghrébins* (Nancy: Centre européen universitaire, 1968), pp. 55-66. For a brief discussion of the Algerian background, see Jean Raux, *Les Relations Extérieures de la Communauté Economique Européenne* (Paris: Cujas, 1966), 339-41. On other Mediterranean countries, see Werner Feld, *The European Common Market and the World* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), and Rouhollah Ramazani, *The Middle East and the European Common Market* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1964).

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major products that compete with European production; the North African negotiations, on the other hand, stepped directly on European economic toes. Since they dealt directly with the same products involved in Yugoslav (1970), Spanish (1970), Israeli (1964, 1970) and Lebanese (1965) trade agreements, Greek (1961) and Turkish (1963) Association, and Italian Membership, as well as with the northern Members' concept of a balanced Community and the whole difficult problem of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), they were complex and directly related to European interests.

The three former French territories in North Africa have had different relations to the European community. Algeria was still an integral part of France when the Treaty of Rome was signed. It thus enjoyed *de facto* membership in the Community, in that it benefited from all the economic provisions of the Treaty except those applying to the CAP (Rome 227 and Application Convention 16), although without any political participation. At the end of 1962, six months after independence, Algeria requested a temporary continuation of this status, promised to it by the Evian Accords, and the Community agreed six months later.

However, Algeria's *de facto* status was slowly being eroded. Its customs regime was slightly modified by the establishment of a triple-column tariff in November 1964; the lowest column applied to France (which continued to apply a zero tariff to Algerian products), a third column to most-favored nations, and a second—the average of the first and third—to the EEC. In 1966, the Council decided to exclude Algeria from further intracommunity tariff decreases and various Members granted its products intermediate customs status—between intracommunity and Common External Tariff (CET) levels.

The Council's acceptance of Algeria's continued "status" was not achieved without a good deal of grumbling and even abstention on the part of some of the Six, and the final communiqué, underlining the provisional aspect, called for Algeria to make its intentions known. Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands all questioned the continued duty-free entry of

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Algerian goods into France; if they did not cancel all of these benefits on their own markets, Belgium and Germany at least considered Algerian workers to be outside of Community preferences. In May 1964, the Dutch government threatened to act unilaterally to end Algeria's de facto membership privileges by the end of the year, and members of the Commission began to wonder if, in the light of its vague position, Algeria was not simply seeking to maintain its comfortable status indefinitely.

Yet the Dutch threat was never realized, no Algerian talks took place for several years, no formal negotiations ever took place, and de facto membership continued. The sole explanation for this situation lies with France, which had given high priority to protecting Algeria as part of its general policy toward its former territory.

Morocco and Tunisia had been independent from France for a year when the Rome Treaty was signed. Both were covered by a protocol maintaining the customs regimes currently in force with France (presumably until the CET was in operation), and by a Declaration of Intentions inviting them to negotiate association agreements with the Community in order to "maintain and intensify traditional currents of exchanges . . . and to contribute to [their] economic and social development." Morocco continued to enjoy duty-free entry for most of its exports to France. Tunisia's 1959 commercial treaty with France was gradually worn away, beginning with modifications made in 1962 as a result of French engagements to the CAP and ending with French denunciation of the treaty in 1964 in reprisal for Tunisian nationalization of remaining colonial land. Deprived of its French preferences and guarantees, and locked out of Europe by the CET and CAP, Tunisia was gradually being excluded from its customary markets in Europe. Thus Tunisia was under great pressure to reestablish a commercial regime with France, as well as with the rest of the Six, whereas pressure on Morocco only came, specifically, from the CAP and worsening terms of trade (despite a favorable trade balance) with Europe.²

² See Marc Pellerin, "La CEE et les états du Maghreb," 1 *Le Mois*

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However, Morocco has had an additional legal obstacle to EEC Association—the multilateral 1906 Algcciras Treaty which commits Morocco to a nondiscriminatory trade regime.⁸

Like Europe and Africa, the Maghreb has its unity goals too. Although the three countries have not been one for some 900 years, and even under the conquering Romans, Arabs, and French they enjoyed separate (and sometimes different) status, North African unity—like its continental counterparts—is seen by many as a past commonality of destiny, a present condition of fraternity, and a future goal of integration. In reality, however, the North African experience has followed the African, not the European, pattern, seeking an elusive unity that in fact was not strong enough—either in its own right or as a sum of the three national interests—to outweigh the conflicting demands of those interests. Commercially, there have been few intra-Maghreb exchanges and few efforts to encourage any. As far as EEC negotiations were concerned, the most important instances of division were, as seen, the separate independence dates, the different customs regimes, the divergent pressures for somewhat differing outcomes, a recent history of shifting ideological and political conflicts, and, as a result, separate negotiations with the EEC. The most important pressures for unity in negotiation were the Commission's desire for joint talks on the model of those with the Eighteen or East Africa, and the North Africans' own sporadic realization that there is strength in unity—a realization that took on strategic perspectives in Moroccan and Tunisian eyes, but as far as the Algerians were concerned only produced an occasional joint tactical appeal. Never have the three states jointly decided or fully coordinated positions for even one round of EEC negotiations.

en Afrique 9:56-71 (September 1966), iv *Afrique-Express* 66:22 (10 February 1964). A good summary of the changing tariff position of the three states was given by the Commission in answer to written question 104 on 3 January 1967.

⁸ See Melvin M. Knight, *Morocco as a French Economic Venture* (New York: Appleton-Century, 1937).

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A year after independence, France proposed Associate status to Morocco.⁴ After 18 months of domestic political maneuvering and some study,⁵ Morocco concluded that Association offered it an unfavorable balance of advantages and disadvantages and therefore opted only for diplomatic representation to the EEC. The following year, 1959, Tunisia sounded out the EEC on some sort of modified Association, but neither party was ready.⁶ Once the Algerian war was ended, in early 1962, Tunisia tried again because rising European competition was threatening its markets. A little later in the year, liberal Moroccans in King Hassan's entourage started their own soundings in Brussels; at the beginning of 1963, their election campaign called for "an association agreement with the EEC."⁷ Morocco's and Tunisia's initial position was to propose a simple extension of the quotas and preferences on the French market to all of the Members, a position which the Commission rejected as not taking Members' interests and the CAP into account. In fact, the very competition which was making Association a pressing matter for the Maghreb was making it unattractive for some of the Six.

Negotiations

The sporadic nature of the preparations, preliminaries, and negotiations that followed made them particularly susceptible to the impact of outside events, including other sets of nego-

⁴ *Petit Marocain*, 13 August 1958.

⁵ See Maurice Ruet, "Le Maroc devant le Marché Commun," *Maroc-Documents* 2:17-47 (Rabat: Foreign Ministry, July 1958), presenting, as "an opinion among others," his reasons for a careful and limited Association.

⁶ Tunisian parliamentarians at the Eurafrikan colloquium at Bari were favorable to association but wanted to await results from the Greek and Turkish negotiations; *Le Monde*, 5 July 1961. The whole series of Mediterranean discussions with the EEC in 1961 and 1962 were an important factor in North African thinking.

⁷ *Séjour à Bruxelles de S.E. Ahmed Reda Guedira* (Brussels: Moroccan Embassy, special number, Information Bulletin, January-February 1964), p. 8; *Le Monde*, 13 March 1963.

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tiations. The North African talks did not have enough momentum of their own to ride over such events, but rather were shaped by them. In the North African set of negotiations, 1963 was the year of preparations, 1964 of preliminary talks, 1965 of the first round of partial negotiations, 1966 of stagnation, 1967 of revival, 1968 of the second round, and 1969 of limited agreement.

In North Africa, 1963 began with an abortive move toward coordination of negotiations policy.⁸ Emissaries of the three countries held talks in January and March; foreign ministers in February conducted what was to be the first (and turned out to be the only) in a series of bimonthly meetings and decided on a coordinated approach to the EEC; King Hassan visited Algiers in March; and Morocco and Algeria signed economic and other agreements in April. Rising tensions between the two neighbors, however, climaxed by their border war in October, put an end to the spirit of cooperation.

In Europe, an unhealthy mood was created by the French veto early in 1963 of the British application for membership in the EEC; this action provided a difficult atmosphere for the candidacy of formerly French North Africa, particularly because its products competed with those of every Member except Germany. Nevertheless, Algeria asked for the opening of talks on 1 July and then again on 18 December; Tunisia made its request on 8 October; and Morocco on 14 December. The first point to be clarified concerned the subject of the negotiations. "Association" in North Africa had unattractive political connotations, yet a commercial agreement alone was not considered sufficient, and North Africa attached as great an importance to aid as to commercial provisions.

Tunisia was the first to engage in exploratory talks (in mid-December 1963 and mid-January 1964), asking for a free-trade agreement with the EEC, with no tariffs, either no quotas or very large ones, investment guarantees, and a higher (i.e., Community, not world level) purchasing price for

⁸ A good review, among others, of North African economic cooperation, is found in *Maghreb* 26:32-49 (March 1968).

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agricultural goods, notably wheat. Since Tunisia's development effort required increasing imports of finished goods and equipment, most of which had habitually come from Europe, Tunisia sought better trade terms for its largely agricultural exports to Europe in order to be able to buy European goods. In regard to the changes needed to achieve this goal, Tunisia emphasized the need for more rapid trade liberalization by Europe than by North Africa in setting up the free-trade area, and for comprehensive negotiations on a global agreement that would include both technical and financial assistance and commercial provisions.

Morocco's position was similar. Opening the first round of preliminary talks at the end of January 1964, Foreign Minister Ahmed Reda Guedira asked for "the progressive establishment of a free-trade area . . . without excluding in any manner other international ties"⁹ and with interim protection possibilities, technical and financial aid through long-term loans and grants, and the protection of Moroccan labor in Europe. The free-trade area would include Moroccan industrial and agricultural goods within the Community price and customs area, with compensation for differences in price arising from the CAP. Morocco saw in the Rome Declaration of Intentions an engagement to expand North African commerce and support North African development, and it therefore looked to an Association of unlimited duration, without excluding other commercial agreements by either party as long as they did not conflict with the Association. To manage affairs within the free-trade area, Morocco asked for a joint commission to determine liberalization measures that would apply to specific products on a year-to-year basis, taking into account European progress in setting up its CAP.

The nature of the subject under negotiation—a modified free-trade area, with technical and financial aid—was accepted by both parties in the second round of preliminary talks with Morocco in mid-June 1964.¹⁰ Two types of modi-

⁹ *Séjour . . . Guedira*, p. 21.

¹⁰ See *Le Monde*, 14 June 1964; *Correspondance Européenne*, 1 July 1964.

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fication were considered necessary by the Commission. On one hand, coordination was needed between the two parties' liberalization measures as they moved toward free trade. Although Morocco desired a more rapid lowering of the European tariffs than it was willing to offer, the Six wanted some corresponding concessions by Morocco along the way, rather than a single Moroccan liberalization measure at the end of the transition period. On the other hand, the final free-trade area would still involve some European tariffs or their equivalent (a "corrective coefficient"). Otherwise Morocco, which could not take part in the European harmonization of economic policies, would end in a more favorable position than the Six, having the benefits of the Community regime without its obligations. Compensation for some of these modifications could be achieved through aid to North Africa. These considerations showed the need both for negotiations on all aspects of Association in order to work out delicate concessions and compromises, and for careful consideration of the reciprocity matter that was troubling many "Association" negotiations.

The Algerian preliminaries which opened in Brussels late in February 1964 were quite different. The Commission began by emphasizing the purely provisional nature of the recently prolonged "status" of Algeria. Since Algeria limited itself to explaining its need for expanded European markets, and above all to requesting technical assistance, free movement with improved conditions and training for Algerian workers in Europe, and financial aid through grants and loans, the Commission repeated that only Association under article 238, in the form of a customs union or a free-trade area, would be possible within the wishes of the Council and the limitations of GATT. A second round of preliminaries, scheduled for early April, was postponed until mid-May because of the FLN (National Liberation Front) Congress.¹¹ Again Algeria requested improvements in its current status, but rejected a commercial treaty (too limited and nondiscriminatory), a free-trade area (too limited), and Associa-

¹¹ *Europe* 1842 (16 May 1964).

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tion (too political). It asked for the continuation of its provisional status throughout the negotiation period. Again the Commission reminded Algeria of the impatience of some of the Six with its present status and pointed out that assistance from the FED and the free movement of Algerian workers within the Community had had to be terminated upon Algerian accession to sovereignty.

A working hypothesis which appeared conceivable to the Commission was the conversion of Algeria's current status into a free-trade Association over a fixed period of time, with a certain amount of aid to be made available separately from the FED.¹² This framework was almost identical with that discussed by Morocco and Tunisia. A final round of preliminaries took place in mid-December.¹³ A working hypothesis of a modified free-trade area was agreed to, and economic problems—notably Algerian workers and oranges—were discussed in greater detail.

The Commission report on the Moroccan and Tunisian preliminaries,¹⁴ presented to the Council in mid-October 1964, looked to a modified free-trade area with economic and technical aid, indefinite in duration and periodically renegotiable. The "modifications" involved broad tariff and quota advantages for Maghrebi products in Europe—or preferably, simple inclusion of North Africa within the EEC customs walls—teamed with progressive lowering of North African tariffs on European products.

In detail, however, serious limitations were envisaged for North African agricultural products on the European market. Although this was necessary because of the gradual and dif-

¹² *Le Monde*, 9 April 1964. Nine FED social and economic projects in Algeria were approved for completion on 30 September 1964, despite the end of the EEC legal obligation to do so and threats to follow the letter of that obligation. Italy and the Netherlands particularly opposed new aid obligations.

¹³ *Europe* 2014 (21 December 1964); *Le Monde*, 22 December 1964.

¹⁴ *Europe* 1958 (15 October 1964), 1972 (3 November 1964), 1973 (4 November 1964), 1988 (20 November 1964), 1989 (21 November 1964), 1993 (26 November 1964).

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ficult establishment of the CAP, it affected the bulk of North African exports and gravely reduced the encouragement that Association could provide to North African development. On the other hand, unless such limitations were provided, North Africa, neither willing nor eligible to join in determining the CAP, would not only benefit from it without undergoing the readjustments that it might impose, but would also be able to disrupt its effects on commonly produced products. The limitations envisaged by the Commission concerned primarily grain (which would be imported under a regime intermediary between intra-Community trade and imports from third countries) and fruits and vegetables (which would receive some preference, possibly as high as customs-free entry before the European season began). Some products (wine, olive oil, fish, preserves) would be subject to provisional measures—not spelled out—until the CAP covering them went into effect, and current preferences granted to North African products on the French market would be gradually reduced and brought into line with the free-trade regime.

Algeria was the subject of an intermediary report by the Commission two weeks before the Morocco-Tunisian report and was also considered in the latter;¹⁵ a final résumé could not be submitted, however, until February 1965 after the third round of Algerian preliminaries had been completed.¹⁶ These final talks permitted Algeria's inclusion in the general perspective of a modified free-trade area and allowed the considerations summarized above to cover all of North Africa.¹⁷

One of the stumbling blocks to an earlier submission of the Algerian report—and to more rapid progress in Maghreb negotiations in general—illustrates the complicated nature of North African Association. Algerian oranges were continuing to enter the Community in growing quantities under the same conditions as Members' oranges, a situation which

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1947 (2 October 1964); *Le Monde*, 8 October 1964.

¹⁶ *Europe* 2065 (25 March 1965), 2066 (26 March 1965).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 2100 (8 April 1965), 2101 (9 April 1965).

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troubled Italy but which Algeria wished to maintain.¹⁸ However, if any agreement concerning oranges was made by the Community, Israel, under the terms of its commercial treaty with the Six, could request a mixed commission to take up the problem. The Commission could envisage various solutions: exclude oranges from the Maghreb negotiations, restore quotas, or set up a Mediterranean producers' agreement, among others. The third solution came closer to Italian wishes, but raised hotly debated problems, not only of bringing Arabs and Israelis together, but also of the treatment of Members, Associates, and commercial partners.

In fact, a Mediterranean proposal was submitted to the Council by the Commission with the Moroccan and Tunisian report in October 1964, and another in late May 1965.¹⁹ The second proposal discussed production limitations, tariff preferences (including the possibility of suspending tariffs before the European season began), reimbursement of tariffs to Associates, and maintenance of the countervailing charges system (charges to be applied when import prices fell below the European reference price, in order to avoid flooding of the market). At the same time, a proposal for fruits and vegetables was also submitted to the Council, along essentially the same lines.

Another question that was not solved was the relation of the three Maghreb states to each other. The Commission favored joint negotiations toward a single free-trade area; although it could have adopted a tactic of playing off each of the three against the others, it opted for a contrary policy, and it was the Maghreb countries themselves that jealously sought separate negotiations. The year of the preliminaries—1964—was typical of the ups and downs of North African unity. After the Moroccan-Algerian war of October 1963 had

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 2018 (29 December 1964), 2138 (28 May 1965); [Rousset], *op.cit.*, p. 5; v *Common Market* 4:86 (May 1965).

¹⁹ See *Europe* 1958 (15 October 1964), 1973 (3 November 1964), 2018 (29 December 1964), 2082 (18 March 1965), 2093 (31 March 1965). In addition, FAO foresaw a citrus surplus by 1970, which made the pressure much more real.

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nullified the five-month-old Moroccan-Algerian agreements, Algeria turned to Tunisia to sign economic agreements, including provision for the joint study of negotiations of the kind carried on with the EEC. The joint study commission was never constituted. However, President Bourguiba of Tunisia worked during the following year to bring the other two heads of state together again, and he finally succeeded at the second assembly of the Organization of African Unity in Cairo in July 1964, thus preparing the way for a ministerial conference on North African economic cooperation in Tunis late in September.

At Tunis, the final communiqué only "recognized the necessity of defining new relations with the EEC,"²⁰ without specifying what or how. A commission of experts designated to study Maghrebi-EEC relations never had any specific follow-up in the subsequent meetings of the Economic Coordinating Committee (which Morocco had insisted should be only consultative) at Tangiers in November 1964 or at Tripoli in May 1965. King Hassan's visit to Tunis in December 1964 resulted in the scheduling of regular meetings among the three ambassadors in Brussels; at the first (but only) one, Morocco suggested that all sessions between any Maghreb state and the EEC should be attended by an observer from each of the other two states, but there was no response to this suggestion from Tunisia and Algeria. As time went on, the institutions of North African economic cooperation met less frequently with less relevance to the EEC negotiations, and the only coordination was carried out informally among the three countries' Brussels missions. From time to time, joint representations were made: against provisions covering oranges in the Israeli-EEC agreements (March 1964); or against CAP regulations on fruits and vegetables (January 1965); or against CAP regulations concerning citrus fruit (September 1965).

On the European side, unity on a mandate was arrived at only after long and difficult discussions, and then only partially. It was not until the Council meeting of mid-June 1965

²⁰ *Le Monde*, 3 October 1964.

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that a partial mandate to negotiate with Tunisia and Morocco was given, excluding fruits and vegetables, olive oil, and financial and technical aid—all the most important aspects of Association. Although the Commission also asked for a mandate to negotiate with Algeria, none was given. The separation of major commercial and all aid topics from minor commercial matters greatly reduced North Africa's ability to bargain, at least during the first round of negotiations. The Commission's proposals for an intermediary regime on grain and a provisional regime for other CAP products (wine, fish, preserves) were accepted as a basis for negotiation, and special conditions were also attached to cork exports to Italy, a cork producer.

However, Morocco had also added a new request, in a note to the EEC in April,²¹ for transitional measures for its exports until a final agreement could be reached. The gradual establishment of the CET was damaging Moroccan trade, regardless of whether the previous European tariff had been higher or lower: thus, France's lowering her tariff toward the CET reduced Moroccan preferences on the French market and hence Moroccan advantages over competitors, while Germany's raising her tariff toward the CET raised Moroccan export prices and thus also hurt her trade. Grain and eggs were particularly hard hit. Acceptance of a transitional regime would have strengthened Morocco's hand in negotiations, since it would have established a Communitywide precedent against which final arrangements could be compared. The Council did not grant the request.

The limitations on the mandate, and the difficult process of agreeing to it, reflected a number of concerns among the Six. Politically, there was simply no great eagerness to favor countries that were considered candidates of France, particularly as long as the Nigerian negotiations were not yet completed (the final Nigerian mandate was given in the same Council session as the partial North African mandate). Furthermore, the tense atmosphere of the summer of 1965 over

²¹ Note verbale du gouvernement marocain, 5 April 1965. The mandate was dated 14 June 1965.

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establishment of the CAP did not favor negotiations with countries whose major exports were competing agricultural products (the eight months' French boycott over the failure to observe established agricultural timetables began two weeks after the Maghreb mandate was given). Economically, Italy was most wary of North African Association, for—following on the heels of agreements with Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and a renewed Spanish candidacy—the North African countries were adding to the pressure of competing Mediterranean products. Thus, it was Italy that insisted on excluding fruit, vegetables, and olive oil from the negotiations until the CAP on these items had been decided, and it was Italy that required special treatment for cork.

The problem of Mediterranean products, however, raised problems in a larger, twofold context. On the one hand, beginning in February 1964, Italy had begun a sustained campaign to delay—or at least question and scrutinize—additional commercial agreements on Mediterranean products until a Mediterranean doctrine had been established.²² This attitude found sympathetic echoes among the Dutch, who were becoming concerned over “the shift in the center of gravity” of the Community toward the south, as overtures to “northern economies” (England, Scandinavia) broke down. Thus, for complementary reasons, both northern and southern European Members of the Community feared loss of the community's original balance.

On the other hand, there were also pressures from Italy and Belgium to delay new Associations until an Association doctrine had been established. Association, they felt, should lead to membership (as in the case of Greece and Turkey), and other nontropical relations should be covered by commercial agreements. Since each Association was turning out to be “*sui generis*,” there was some thought that the relationships of the Associates to the Community and its developing policies should be established before individual agreements were signed, rather than resulting from them.

²² For the Italian memorandum of May 1964, see d'Yvoire, *op.cit.*, pp. 63-70.

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Partial though it was, the June 1965 mandate was acted upon with alacrity. Less than three weeks after the Council meeting, negotiations began with Tunisia, followed immediately by negotiations with Morocco in mid-July.²³ In these discussions, the Commission negotiated for the Six, with five observers present, although France was kept informed by the other Members. These sessions were devoted largely to restating previous positions—now within a negotiating context. Although there was no formal coordination on the part of the North Africans, their presentations were quite similar, and the first round ended at about the same point for the two countries.

Both the Tunisians and Moroccans protested the partial mandate (that excluded the subjects most important to them). They emphasized that the negotiations were taking place on the basis of the 1957 Declaration of Intentions which assured them of special consideration. Both the intermediary tariff on grain and the provisional nature of proposed arrangements on wine, fish, and preserves brought forth questions. It was only on the minor matter of industrial goods that any negotiations could be carried out. In an effort to be sympathetic beyond its instructions, however, the Commission indicated that it was willing to hear and transmit to the Council any proposals, even beyond the mandate, in order to prepare a broader base for negotiations later on.

The parties accepted the establishment of modified free trade—immediate duty-free access for North African industrial exports to Europe, and gradually decreasing tariffs for European industrial exports to the Maghreb, with infant-industry protection clauses. But how much of any particular item had to be made in North Africa for it to be considered a North African product (the “origins” question)? Europe was concerned about goods from transformation industries or assembly plants installed by third states in North Africa,

²³ The following accounts are based largely on interviews with the participants in Brussels, Rabat, and Algiers during the negotiations; see also [Roussel], *op.cit.* In fact all Mediterranean Associations began with a partial mandate.

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and Morocco felt that the Yaoundé definition of origins (then still in the process of being worked out)²⁴ gave inadequate consideration to developing industry in the Maghreb countries. Reservations were also expressed on the European side concerning steel and petroleum exports which Tunisia expected to increase considerably. In regard to the rhythm of liberalization during the transition period, the Moroccan ambassador sought "a balance of mutual advantages in the development of commercial exchanges rather than in a strict notion of reciprocity";²⁵ three categories of transition periods up to 22 years in length were discussed, with a maximum of flexibility. Because it was outside the Council's wishes as expressed in the mandate and would thus require the same procedures as were being negotiated for a long-term agreement, an interim regime was unable to receive the Commission's agreement, as Morocco again requested. However, the Commission also cited economic arguments—that Morocco appeared to be moving toward consumption of its own agricultural production (especially in grain) and that all egg exporters (including those among the Six) were being affected in equal measure by CAP regulations.

The first round of negotiations with Tunisia and Morocco lasted less than a week, with a second round scheduled in September-October. Although details on quotas and origins could be discussed further, the main body of any Association agreement remained excluded by the partial mandate, and modification of that would require new Council discussions. Such a change was not possible, however, as long as CAP details were not established and—of more immediate import—as long as the French boycott continued. September and October passed, therefore, without any renewed negotiations, as did all of 1966.

From time to time there were murmurs of renewed attention to the Maghreb. French delegates returned to full activity in the Community in February 1966; the Committee of Permanent Representatives immediately began study of the

²⁴ See Chap. 5, pp. 171-72.

²⁵ Internal report, 25 September 1966.

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Maghreb dossier in hopes of renewing negotiations in March. The chairman of the Committee reported periodically to the Council and was instructed to continue his work. Late in July, agreement was finally reached on the CAP, thus clearing the way in principle for a full mandate for North Africa and new negotiations.²⁶ But there was no immediate move. With the Community focusing its attention on the Kennedy Round negotiations, and Italy continuing to oppose Mediterranean Associations without prior protection for its own production, the Maghreb continued to be pushed aside, although not rejected out of hand.

During the negotiations, the Moroccan ambassador perspicaciously noted, "Despite any other considerations, the political will of the Six remains the single motivating factor in the final decision. And that political will has to be stimulated by a vast and persevering diplomatic action."²⁷ It was, however, Tunisia that implemented this observation most effectively. Seizing on the opportunity to revive the matter afforded by an international colloquium on "The EEC and the Third World," organized in Tunis by a private German foundation, Tunisia demanded a complete mandate for full negotiations on all subjects; Morocco supported the demand, as did the European representatives.²⁸ In July, Bourguiba traveled through the European capitals (except Rome and Paris), drumming up support for revived negotiations; later, a Tunisian newspaper declared that the Members (except Italy) were favorable to renewed negotiations with Morocco and Tunisia.²⁹ Tunisia appeared to be cultivating Germany as an informal sponsor, a wise move because of the weight of Germany in the Community and the absence of conflicting interests with Tunisia. Even Italy in July 1966 felt obliged to announce that it too wished to have the "prob-

²⁶ At the same time (late July 1966), Italy also protested the Franco-Tunisian customs agreement and French preferences to the Maghreb.

²⁷ Internal report, 25 September 1966.

²⁸ *Le Monde*, 22 April 1966. Algeria was absent.

²⁹ *L'Action*, 5 April 1967. On Bourguiba's trip, see *Maghreb* 17:24 (September 1966).

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lems" of the Tunisian negotiations "solved as soon as possible."³⁰

At the turn of the year, the Commission told the Community that it had "finally come to the conclusion that the negotiations . . . could not be effectively renewed except within the framework of global proposals concerning all the aspects of the projected agreement."³¹ It therefore sent a detailed report to the Council, requesting a full mandate.³² At the same time, Tunisia and Morocco pressed the Council for speed in preparing a new mandate.

For Moroccan and Tunisian exports to the Community, the Commission asked for admission of industrial products on the same duty-free basis as those of the Members (with some exceptions for petroleum and canned fruits and vegetables) and for preferences for agricultural products. These preferences would vary according to the status of the product under the new CAP. Products for which the market organization system involved levies (grains, dairy products, rice, fats, sugar, pork) could benefit from either reduction or partial reimbursement of the levy, but there could be no harmonization of production or guarantee of prices. Products for which the market organization system involved tariffs and reference prices (fruits and vegetables) would benefit from a partial reduction in the CET during the European growing season and duty-free entry out of season; quotas and minimum prices would be abolished; the countervailing charges system would be maintained to prevent dumping; and a three-year transition period would be set up for French tariffs on North African products to rise to the preferential level proposed. Products for which there was no market organization system

³⁰ Pellerin, *op.cit.*, p. 64.

³¹ Commission answer to written question 104 in the European Parliament, 3 January 1967.

³² Commission Compte-rendu, 15 December 1966; *Europe* 2590 (30 December 1966); *New York Times*, 7 January 1967; *L'Opinion*, 15 January 1967; *MTM* 14 January 1967, pp. 273-74; *vi Afrique-Express* 130:28-30 (10 January 1967). See *Le Monde*, 26 January 1967, for speech of Ahmed ben Salah, Tunisian Secretary of State for Planning and Economy.

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were generally to receive gradual elimination of tariffs, although provisional measures were spelled out for some products: wine and fish would be given different treatment by each of the Six until an organized European market was established; canned fruits and vegetables were to be given a 50 percent preference with a three-year conversion period for France; cork was still up in the air.

For European exports to North Africa, the Commission proposed long-term progressive elimination of Maghrebi tariffs over 10 to 12 years, with safeguard clauses (a state trading system such as Algeria's would be required to give firm purchasing commitments in the absence of tariff preferences).

The other aspects of the Association would include, for Morocco and Tunisia, a five-year agreement on soft loans, grants for technical assistance, and coordination of Community and bilateral aid programs. Social security systems applicable to Maghrebi workers in the Community would be harmonized and improved, although free movement and hiring preferences could not be guaranteed. For the Six, the Commission proposed Moroccan and Tunisian guarantees on investments, payments, and rights of establishment.

The Commission's proposal took into account the need—often emphasized by the North African states—for a global agreement and a full mandate; although it recognized the North Africans' refusal to negotiate as a bloc, it insisted on a single agreement with no special preferences for one Maghreb state or another. Some details differed from Maghrebi positions—such as the duration of the transition period—and others still bypassed problems that North Africa considered important—such as the definition of origins. But its most remarkable aspect was that, except for some new details on products whose transitional regime was previously not spelled out, the proposal was practically identical to that made more than two years before when the Commission asked for the first mandate. The Commission's two proposals, and the history of negotiations in between, indicated that the power to decide (and hence to delay) belonged to the Six.

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Community action on the proposal required another 10 months, for Europe's attention was elsewhere, watching the establishment of the CAP. Although the chairman of the Committee of Permanent Representatives reported to the Council twice before the 1967 summer recess, he could only cite three points of agreement and two Members' objections.³³ In mid-July he was told to report back in two weeks in order for negotiations to begin in the fall. The points of agreement provided for negotiations first on trade and later on aid, leading to 10-year treaties (not necessarily a single one for all three North African states), all to end at the same time and to be renewable, with provision for the Maghreb states to return to the French preference system if they chose not to renew. The stumbling blocks—since France's special position had been preserved for the future—were still Italy, which insisted on marketing guarantees for its own Mediterranean products within the Community before agreeing to any new Mediterranean Associations, and the Netherlands, which opposed both Italy's proposal of using the new CAP Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) for this purpose and also had reservations on the three "agreed" points, saying they should be kept for bargaining. The permanent representatives were told to concentrate on products that could rally agreement among the Six, and to leave out controversial items, matters of financial and technical aid, and labor for the moment.

When the Council resumed its meetings in September 1967, the Committee had prepared an exhaustive report³⁴ on the formulas and machinery to be proposed to Morocco and Tunisia. Only statistical elements such as the level of custom preferences, the volume of quotas, and the duration of the agreement were left for the Ministers to specify.

³³ *Europe* 2721 (11 July 1967), 2725 (17 July 1967), 2730 (25 July 1967), 2733 (28 July 1967); *Le Monde*, 27 July 1967; *vii Afrique-Express* 143:27-28 (25 July 1967), 146:35 (10 October 1967).

³⁴ *Europe* 2755 (12 September 1967), 2757 (14 September 1967), 2764 (25 September 1967), 2767 (28 September 1967).

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On their side, Tunisia and Morocco were actively mobilizing support for their positions. Foreign Minister Habib Bourguiba, Jr., made an official visit to Italy to sign an agreement to compensate Italian landowners whose Tunisian lands had been nationalized in 1964 and to extend economic and financial cooperation between the two countries, all as a background for Italian support in the forthcoming negotiations.³⁵ On the Moroccan side, Minister of Commerce Ahmed Alaoui visited Brussels for talks with the Commission in anticipation of reopening negotiations.

The mandate of 24 October 1967 complemented the June 1965 mandate on industrial products, preparing for negotiations to begin in mid-November with Tunisia and a week later with Morocco. For industrial products (13 percent of the two countries' exports to the EEC), the Six were prepared to offer the intra-Community system, with reservations on origins, processed agricultural products, and safeguards; while for petroleum products, the intra-Community system was extended for a limited quantity (100,000 tons for each country) (Rabat and Tunis Annex I 2). For olive oil (of major importance only to Tunisia), there were to be no quotas and a \$5 reduction per 100 kilograms in the third-country levies—if Tunisia would accept a minimum price (Rabat and Tunis Annex I 5). For citrus fruits (of major importance only to Morocco), an 80 percent reduction in the CET was offered provided that a minimum price was observed—to prevent dumping (Rabat and Tunis Annex I 4). Fishing products (of some importance to Morocco and less for Tunisia) would be given the intra-Community system without limit by five states and within a quota by Italy. However, 40 percent of the two countries' trade, including wines,³⁶ tomatoes, canned and other fruit and vegetables, and cork, was excluded from the mandate.

³⁵ See *Le Monde*, 2 September 1967.

³⁶ *Europe* 2770 (3 October 1967), 2779 (16 October 1967); *Jeune Afrique* 360:28-29 (3 December 1967). A Commission proposal in mid-1967 on a common wine market among the Six considered the Maghreb among the third countries with their wines excluded from any Association agreement; *Le Monde*, 27 June 1967.

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Despite the insistence of Morocco, Tunisia, and the Commission that negotiations should be more comprehensive, covering not only all of their exports to the Community, but also technical and financial assistance and their migrant workers, the Ministers made it clear that they preferred a partial agreement initially, which would be followed later by other negotiations.³⁷ A global agreement would require much more time and involve the parties concerned in difficult negotiations because of the so-called sensitive products (wine, tomatoes, etc.) and because of the pressure put upon the EEC by other Mediterranean countries offering similar products and also asking for preferential treatment (Yugoslavia, Israel, Spain). But time was very important for Morocco and Tunisia, who were interested in getting at least some immediate results to try to boost their economies which were in trouble. In a situation when negotiations could not be both global and rapid, the North Africans were expected to make the most of the EEC's limited offers, but they did insist on a renewed Declaration of Intentions providing for further negotiations on full Association. Morocco also began to think that the price for partial agreement should be tougher terms. The mandate covered those products of importance to Morocco and Tunisia about which the Six felt strongly—but not too strongly, thus eliminating both the “sensitive” products (about which there could be no rapid concessions) and what might be called the “insensitive areas,” such as social provisions and assistance for North Africa (about which the countries other than France knew and cared little). Such a division of subjects could lead the North Africans to get “the most” rapidly and the Europeans to protect “the most” at the same time.

After a two and a half year interruption, the delegations of the EEC and Tunisia resumed negotiations in November 1967 under the new mandate. Tunisia accepted the favorable offers (industrial goods), protested the exclusions, and found the olive oil and citrus provisions “attractive,” although the conditions for olive oil (Tunisia's major interest) could be

³⁷ *Europe* 2793 (6 November 1967); *Le Monde*, 27 October 1967.

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improved by another 10 percent (i.e., another 50¢ reduction in the levy [Rabat and Tunis Annex I 5]). Moreover, it "suggested the possibility of concluding a partial agreement to be completed by a possible subsequent overall agreement";³⁸ until full and unlimited Association was reached, however, the privileges with France must remain unchanged for those products not included in the agreement. The Community asked for details on Tunisia's reciprocal offers.

When the Moroccan delegation took its turn at the conference table, its reaction to the Community offers was similar to that of Tunisia. While the proposals concerning petroleum and industrial products were considered satisfactory, the rest of the mandate was found wanting. Morocco asked for full customs exemption on citrus fruit (instead of 80 percent), pointing out that it already benefited from (and would be losing) duty-free entry into France, which took nearly all its exports, and that competitors such as Spain and Israel had gotten an edge by devaluating their currencies. The Moroccan delegation also emphasized the importance of financial and technical assistance and cooperation on migrant labor. Like Tunisia, Morocco was in favor of a speedy conclusion of a partial agreement in anticipation of an Association agreement to be concluded later on. However Moroccan Ambassador Bensalem Guessous emphasized that Morocco could not offer tariff concessions until the global agreement was concluded.³⁹ The sudden hardening of Morocco's attitude was ordered from Rabat in anticipation of a tougher European position; Morocco wanted something to bargain with but also something to fall back on.

In early February 1968,⁴⁰ the Commission declared its support for the proposals put forward by Morocco and

³⁸ Joint statement, 16 November 1967. See also *Europe* 2798 (13 November 1967), 2799 (14 November 1967), 2801 (16 November 1967), 2807 (24 November 1967).

³⁹ Interview with Moroccan Press Agency, Feuille documentaire 135/1967. See also *Europe* 2803 (20 November 1967), 2807 (24 November 1967); *Le Monde*, 26 November 1967.

⁴⁰ Commission Compte-rendu, 9 February 1968; *Europe* (NS) 12 (14 February 1968), 33 (15 February 1968).

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Tunisia on the speedy conclusion of partial agreements. The lengthy process of ratification by national parliaments would not be necessary for such agreements because trade problems came within the province of the Community (Rome 111, 238). But the Council should, according to the Commission, look into the requests for improvement of the offers on citrus fruit and olive oil. The Commission also justified the concern expressed by Morocco and Tunisia—but opposed by all but France—over their special relations with their former protector; a partial agreement should not end the privileged system of trade concerning products not covered by the agreement, which could be included in the agreement by adding a special protocol.

The permanent representatives spent much of the spring and the summer of 1968 studying the Community offers and the corresponding proposals of Morocco and Tunisia.⁴¹ Among the questions before the Committee were: Should the partial agreement include a declaration of intentions regarding future developments? Is it to be of an evolutive nature? What would be its legal basis? What improvements could be made in the Community offers on citrus fruit and olive oil? What counterparts must be requested from Morocco and Tunisia? There was also a problem of origins of certain products and the question of the special trading system between France and the two North African countries.

During these debates, Italy was a frequent dissenter whenever the other Members allowed some flexibility in their offers (for example, concerning the minimum price system which Morocco and Tunisia were to respect). Another major problem which made any progress difficult was the Netherlands' insistence, with some support from the others, that France give up all bilateral trade agreements with Morocco and Tunisia.⁴² Nevertheless, in the Council of Ministers at

⁴¹ *Europe* (NS) 88 (6 May 1968), 98 (20 May 1968), 105 (30 May 1968), 106 (31 May 1968), 110 (7 June 1968), 135 (11 July 1968).

⁴² The Netherlands has been more interested in the Association of Arab, among the Mediterranean applicants; see *Jeune Afrique* 354:21 (22 October 1967).

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the end of July, the Six gave a third mandate for negotiations to begin in October;⁴³ their reciprocal demands were not spelled out until the end of September.

As they approached the finish line, the North African negotiations, which had hobbled along in tandem for half a decade, began to take on the appearance of a three-legged sack race in which one runner had cramps. The Tunisians were ready to seize the mandate which was put into final shape in July 1968 and turn it into a commercial agreement now, leaving other aspects of Association to be worked out subsequently. The Tunisian round took place in early October; the atmosphere, as characterized by a statement at the end, was that it was "inconceivable, politically, that the negotiations might fail."⁴⁴ The Six were able to improve their spring offers, including new products (durum wheat, refined olive oil, fish) in their duty-free imports and bettering their offers on olive oil and citrus fruits; they requested consolidation of all Tunisia's quotas and a margin of preference to the Five equal to 70 percent of that currently granted to France. Tunisia claimed that the European offers were too low, then shifted its efforts to the counterpreference side and negotiated a gradual approach to the 70 percent figure: 50 percent when the agreement entered into force, 60 percent after 18 months, and then 70 percent at the end of three years (Tunis Annex 3 List 1). The agreement (by a European decision in July that calmed fears and accelerated progress) was to run five years, but there was also a commitment to open negotiations within three years on a complementary agreement on the excluded items, including technical and financial assistance, rights of establishment, and personnel (Tunis 14). Tunisia also won the right to limit or abolish counterpreferences for infant-industry protection on a specified number of products, after consultation with the Association Council

⁴³ *Europe* (NS) 177 (23 September 1968), 186 (4 October 1968); *Le Monde*, 31 July and 1 August 1968. The mandate was dated 30 July 1968.

⁴⁴ *Europe* (NS) 191 (11 October 1968), also 188 (8 October 1968), 190 (10 October 1968); *Le Monde*, 22 October 1968.

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and as long as other counterpreferences were granted "to keep the balance" (Tunis 7). Privileged entry to the French market and bilateral accords would continue for goods not covered by the agreement and would be restored at its expiration (Tunis exchange of letters).

The pattern of Tunisia's negotiations led it to trade a full-fledged Association agreement for time, thus achieving something that resembled a commercial agreement but one which nevertheless bore the name "Association" (Tunis 1). Once this decision had been made by both sides—i.e., after five years were spent, if not lost—problems about "sensitive" products and "insensitive areas" that could have caused intransigence on one side or the other were put aside. Since there remained enough products of interest to both sides to provide for the liberation of substantial trade (GATT 24), the crest was passed and slight ways of improving the offers soon shaped an acceptable free-trade agreement.

At the very moment when Tunisia was arriving at convergence with the Six, however, Morocco posed new problems. The Act of Algeciras which had been lurking in the background from the beginning suddenly took on importance when Morocco used it to justify refusal of "the limited classicism of tariff and quantitative concessions"⁴⁵ and asked instead for greater liberalization of trade through symbolic *erga omnes* tariff reductions only, denying the European request for significant tariff cuts and enlarged and combined quotas. Although Morocco promised to grant "a deliberately preferential tariff" and "envisage the abrogation of the [Algeciras] Treaty" when Europe was ready to offer full-fledged Association, in the context of the 1968 negotiations it was retreating to the same position that had long prevented East African agreement.⁴⁶ In an effort to meet the Algeciras obstacles, the Six had worked on the final touches of its offer to Morocco until late in September, when an ingenious proposal was put

⁴⁵ Ambassador Guessous. The following discussion (to the "Analysis" section) is based on the minutes of the negotiations and supporting documents.

⁴⁶ See Chap. 3, pp. 93-106.

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forward.⁴⁷ For the concessions requested of Morocco, there would be three groups of products: one for which Morocco would grant a single consolidated quota equal to the past quotas of the Six increased by 25 percent, another for which Morocco would grant consolidated quotas and would reduce tariffs 30 percent *erga omnes* (but from which Europe would benefit since it was the principal supplier of the ten items involved), and the third for which only tariff reductions were asked (18 products of which Europe also supplied over 60 percent). But Morocco stuck tightly to its 60-year-old imperially imposed Algeciras obligations, feeling that they provided protection against possibly harmful reciprocity, guaranteed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, and offered a bargaining item for later full Association (although they had already been contravened in Moroccan trade agreements with smaller countries).⁴⁸ Despite a meeting of the minds on many lesser points, the mid-October negotiations therefore deadlocked over reciprocal measures, and discussion was deferred to the level of experts in November, thus delaying the Tunisian agreement.

The Moroccan and European delegations met, as scheduled, in late November to return to their discussion of the single outstanding problem—reciprocal measures. Contacted by France in the meantime and realizing the difficulty of holding out, Morocco gave in on the principle of reciprocity through quotas. To implement its concession, it rearranged the products on the European lists of late September into three lists of its own and varied the figures slightly; the negotiations had passed their crest and were in the final stage of seeking slight ways of improving the offers. The Community's first two (quota) lists were divided into a first Moroccan list of products for which Europe would receive a given consolidated quota increased by 25 percent (Rabat Annex 3 List 4), a

⁴⁷ *Europe* (NS) 182 (30 September 1968), 191 (11 October 1968).

⁴⁸ *Le Monde*, 15 and 22 October 1968. Morocco has granted reciprocal tariff reductions to Algeria, Tunisia, and Senegal. However, GATT admitted the principle of preferential tariffs among developing countries on 14 November 1968.

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second list of products for which Europe would receive a fixed percentage of the annual import figure as a quota (Rabat Annex 3 List 5), and a third list of products included in the current Five-Year Plan for which Europe would receive the same kind of quota as the second list (Rabat Annex 3 List 6) but only until local industry could handle Moroccan needs (Rabat 7). To the last item, the Commission proposed adding a small sliding percentage increase that would vary inversely with the size of the original quota (called the principle of least digression); the principle was drawn from the Tunisian negotiations, although the use of the Plan as a criterion for products receiving flexible quotas was a Moroccan invention. With some juggling of figures, Morocco accepted the arrangement.

Morocco also became more flexible on the matter of tariff reductions, although the *erga omnes* obligation of the Act of Algeciras remained. The products on the second and third European lists of late September (tariff reductions) were accepted by Morocco in November; on some of these items a tariff reduction averaging 24 percent was proposed, but on others, the reduction was to be only about 6 percent to protect Morocco's industrialization (providing a total tariff cut of only about 13 percent compared with the Community request of 30 percent). Although the difference now concerned numbers rather than principles, the negotiations recessed for further instructions. The Council in early December asked for slight improvements, and the delegations met again in the middle of the month to examine the lists, alter some of the figures, and shift some of the items from one list to another, but Morocco was able to hold on to the 13 percent tariff cut. By this time the Moroccans were finally at about the same stage in their negotiations as the Tunisians had been in October.

The final round of the Moroccan and Tunisian negotiations took place throughout February 1969—Morocco in the beginning and the middle of the month and Tunisia in between when the delegations went over the final drafts of their agreements. The Lagos Convention and the commercial agreement

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with Lebanon served as precedents on some points, and the two North African delegations looked over each other's shoulder to make sure that their advantages were the same; exceptions for North African economic integration were carefully maintained (Rabat and Tunis 4). The two agreements were identical in their final form. The only differences appeared in the annexes and lists appended to them (conforming to the export needs and possibilities of the two countries): Morocco received a slight reduction on hard-wheat levies (Rabat Annex I 8) and different fish quotas (Rabat Annex II 2, 3, 5; Tunis Annex II 1, 2, 4, 5). Both countries granted the Six the same three quota arrangements, but in tariff reductions, Morocco granted *erga omnes* liberalization whereas Tunisia granted progressive preferences on some items as well as tariff removal on others as negotiated. With some exceptions (cork products excluded, petroleum limited), Moroccan and Tunisian industrial products (40 and 55 percent of their exports to the Six) are to enter Europe without duties or quotas. With some more important limitations (processed and preserved foods, wine, grains, tomatoes), Moroccan and Tunisian agricultural products (50 and 70 percent of their agricultural production) are to enter Europe under various conditions of advantage. Appended to the agreements was also a detailed protocol defining "origins," in which up to 50 to 60 percent "foreign matter" was permitted. Each Association was provided with its own Association council (the sole institution stipulated). The respective agreements were signed in Tunis on 28 March 1969 and in Rabat three days later, and they were both to run for five years.

Since the conclusion of preliminary negotiations in early 1965, Algeria had been inactive. But between 1966 and 1968, the advantages of *de facto* status had been eroded to the point where some action became necessary. The Commission continually stressed that Algeria's status was legally indefensible. Italy repeatedly protested against the competition of Algerian wine in Germany and the Benelux countries, and applied the third-country system to Algerian exports begin-

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ning in 1968. Algeria's participation in the Middle Eastern war and her pledge to remain in a state of war with Israel helped to create an atmosphere of tension, particularly in relations with Germany and the Netherlands. In a more economic domain, the CET was scheduled to go into effect in mid-1968, with unpredictable effects on Algeria. All these factors impelled Algeria to seek an Association agreement.

Thus, in mid-January 1968, an Algerian mission approached the Commission to express willingness to open negotiations.⁴⁹ European experts first made a study of Algeria's tariff situation and found that Algerian exports entered the EEC duty free or with widely varying preferences.⁵⁰ France granted Algeria full exemption on industrial products, privileges for petroleum, and special conditions for agricultural products. Of Algeria's exports to the Six in 1966, France took 80 percent, over three-fourths of which was crude oil (a figure that was increasing). Germany applied an 80 percent reduction in duty on industrial products, and 60 to 65 percent on agricultural products not under the CAP, while the Benelux regimes' reduction amounted to 10 percent less in both categories. Italy applied third-country tariffs. Thus the systems applied varied not only from country to country but also from product to product, presenting formidable obstacles to the conclusion of a single harmonious agreement with Algeria.

Despite these difficulties, five Members expressed willingness to negotiate with Algeria as early as February. The Netherlands still reserved its position. At the same time, Algeria made a friendly gesture intended to show its goodwill when it informed the Commission in advance of establishing new triple-column tariffs. It also tried to influence the more difficult Members through diplomatic action. In February,

⁴⁹ *Europe* (NS) 9 (12 January 1968), 20 (29 January 1968), 30 (12 February 1968). On the Algerian position, see Aflakh Mamcri, "L'adhésion de l'Algérie à la Communauté économique européenne," *Revue algérienne des sciences juridique, économique et politique* 2.429-35 (July 1968).

⁵⁰ *Europe* 35 (19 February 1968).

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Italian Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani was invited to make an official visit to Algeria, and during this visit he assured the government that Italy would do its utmost to further Algerian cooperation with Italy and the EEC.⁵¹

But the atmosphere in Europe was not yet favorable. In early March, the Council was unable to resolve the difficulties raised by various Members.⁵² Italy remained opposed to negotiations with Mediterranean countries so long as the problem of enlarging the EEC to the North had not yet been resolved. The Netherlands would be ready to negotiate with Algeria only if the same decision were taken for Israel. But France was not ready to negotiate with Israel.

Still, a solution to the Algerian question had to be found by 1 July 1968, the date set for the establishment of the CET. The only acceptable alternative to terminating Algeria's "status" was to prolong it, through a provisional system for Algerian imports until an Association agreement could be concluded.⁵³ But a totally harmonized interim system was impossible, not only because of technical difficulties, but also because such a system would grant far greater preferences to Algeria than to Morocco and Tunisia, thus contravening the Community's determination not to discriminate among the three North African countries. In early May, the Commission proposed a unilateral transitional solution, as different as possible from the system currently being negotiated for Morocco and Tunisia, yet falling within the perspective of future negotiations with Algeria. Within the legal provisions of the Treaty, the solution was to authorize France to defer the increase in her duties on Algerian products to the CET level (supplemented by a ban on reexportation) (Rome 26) and allow the other Members temporary and partial suspension of the CET on Algerian products (with individual quotas permitted) (Rome 28). Specifically, for the Five, about ten agricultural products subject to the CET would benefit from

⁵¹ *Le Monde*, 10 February 1968.

⁵² *Europe* (NS) 41 (27 February 1968), 44 (1 March 1968), 45 (4 March 1968).

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 89 (7 May 1968).

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a 50 percent tariff cut (wine, fruits, vegetables, oranges, tomatoes, canned products, olives, etc.), with wine quotas based on averaged imports since 1962.⁵⁴ For nonagricultural products (except coal and steel), there would be a 70 percent cut in the CET. For France, most of these products would continue to receive duty-free entry. France would apply a minimum duty (one-eighth of the CET) to wine, and would maintain levies on olive oil and certain agricultural products.

The Council referred the Commission proposals to the permanent representatives for further study, and by July, the Members had reached agreements on all but two main questions. The first concerned the legal basis of the transitional system. Third-country articles (Rome 111, 238) would be easiest to apply, but they entailed negotiations with Algeria. The Six expressed serious doubts about applying articles that enabled CET duties to be temporarily suspended (Rome 26, 28) as the Commission had proposed. The only alternative acceptable to all was to use the Council's power to take action where the Treaty provides nothing else (Rome 235).

The second problem was Italy's opposition to large wine quotas. During the time of these debates, Algerian wine continued to flow into the market, and its volume even increased in Belgium and the Netherlands. Italy threatened to refer the matter to the European Court of Justice and in fact set the procedure in motion (Rome 170). At the end of July⁵⁵ the Council finally decided on a transitional system for Algerian wine imports applicable by August 15. Negotiating among themselves, they lowered the CET in some cases and raised quotas. Other products were given final, transitional solutions in the fall. By 1970, Algeria had fallen back on Tu-

⁵⁴ Germany has absorbed a huge and rising quantity of Algerian wine since independence (600 hl. in 1962-63 to 700,000 hl. in 1966-67), and even Belgium and the Netherlands increased their imports (to Italy's chagrin). Thus, an average would be considerably lower than the latest year's imports and demands. See *Le Monde*, 9 May 1968. There were no provisions for products subject to levies, since Algeria had enjoyed no preferences on them.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 31 July and 1 August 1968; *Europe* (NS) 135 (11 July 1968), 149 (31 July 1968), 151 (2 August 1968).

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nesia's and Morocco's tactics of earlier years, sending ministers to Brussels to press for negotiations. It is ironic that, of all countries, Algeria went through the "most colonialist" decision-making process by allowing the substance of its inherited advantages to be prolonged unilaterally, something the procedural-minded Commonwealth and Yaoundé Africans had indignantly refused some years before.

Analysis

Even though their products were different, the North African negotiations were comparable to the other sets. The Moroccan and Tunisian negotiations began with a few basic commitments. The Six pledged special concern for the two countries' development and established trade currents in their 1957 Declaration of Intentions, thus rather explicitly committing themselves to the ultimate success of the negotiations, even if not to their rapid conclusion. Since eventual, rather than immediate, success was the extent of the commitment, Europe was acting within its limits when it let the pressures of deteriorating terms of trade and European economic integration act on the North African economies. Morocco and Tunisia made their initial commitment through reference to their nonaligned foreign policies, which precluded "Association," at least in word. A free-trade area was therefore the only applicable framework. The Europeans' concern lest North Africa share in the benefits of the CAP without bearing its obligations, as well as the Maghrebis' concern over their own underdevelopment, led rapidly to adding the word "modified."

Thereafter, an attempt to pin down the notion of a "modified free-trade area" led to two long rocky paths of debate: one concerned the rhythm of liberalization within the limits of inequality and reciprocity, the other concerned transition measures and final regimes for specific categories of production, notably agricultural. Competition with Italy, crises with France, and frequent disinterest on the part of the rest made these paths first interminable, and then extremely narrow, as many products and measures were excluded.

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At this point, beginning in early 1966 when a new mandate became both evidently necessary and theoretically possible, the North Africans needed to shift their efforts and impart the urgency of negotiations, so that the process of limiting alternatives could continue. Tunisia made the most publicly determined effort. The speeches of both Bourguibas, Hedi Nouira, Mohammed Masmoudi, Salaheddine al-Goulli, Ahmed ben Salah, Ali Zouaoui, and other Tunisian officials carried a multiple thrust.⁵⁶ They promised Europe the advantages of a united Maghreb which it would help create. They appealed to Europe's sense of obligation to develop North Africa. They warned of the dangers of leaving the three countries underdeveloped and divided, whatever might be the short-term temptations and advantages of a "politique de balance." President Bourguiba said, "It is in the interest of Italy, as well as France, to obtain a more favorable situation in Tunisia, to show a little comprehension."⁵⁷ Morocco played a slightly harder line. "We have a hard time understanding why the countries of Maghreb must pay the costs of the internal differences of the EEC. . . . I launch an appeal to the Conscience of Europe."⁵⁸ Guedira earlier also warned against "compromising the current of exports directed by the Community toward Morocco," and noted that "it is thus in the mutual interest of our economies . . . to consolidate our exchanges but, even more, to enlarge them constantly."⁵⁹ There were more explicit appeals to various "interests" launched during the North African negotiations than in any other set.

⁵⁶ For some examples, see Pellerin, *op.cit.*, pp. 57, 61, 67-69; President Bourguiba in *La Presse*, 26 January 1967, and Information Ministry brochure; Masmoudi in *Maghreb* 19:39-42 (January 1967); al-Goulli in d'Yvoire, *op.cit.*, pp. 101-02; Zouaoui in APF 3963 (21 April 1966) and *Tunisie-CEE Colloque international, Tunis 14-20 avril 1966* (Tunis: Editions du PSD, 1966).

See also a strong Algerian voice, *Révolution Africaine*, 30 July 1965, 30 April 1966, 30 April 1970; *Le Monde*, 22 April 1966.

⁵⁷ *La Presse*, 26 January 1967.

⁵⁸ Cited in Pellerin, *op.cit.*, p. 65.

⁵⁹ *Sejour . . . Guedira*, p. 20.

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The effectiveness of the commitments, obligations, predictions, promises, threats, and warnings was seen in the Commission's second request for a mandate, which found negotiations necessary for political and economic reasons: the impossibility of reorienting Maghrebi trade, political stability, obligation to develop, need to eliminate current anomalies, and commitment to the Declaration of Intentions. The limits in effectiveness were seen in the slowness of the Six in coming to the table. Yet when they finally did, in 1967, there was little preaching about the advantages of Association. Both sides agreed but, unable to overcome their own obstacles, put the global problem aside and turned to an augmented commercial agreement. The feeling was that it was better to save something now than hold out for the whole package. The threshold for Morocco and Tunisia was located at the point where the minimal offers or possibilities for them crossed the level of their needs. Tunisia's needs were more pressing, so it was more active in pressing for some agreement. In addition, Tunisia seemed to "believe in" Association,⁶⁰ a belief that did not contradict the country's realism, whereas Morocco simply found it necessary.

Algeria's threshold was different: it was composed of the point where Algeria's "present" privileges began to descend below the level of Tunisia's and Morocco's. There is no precise way to calculate this point, since it had many components (Six Members, innumerable products, a level of trade for each, growth rates and future priorities to weigh the past figures), but there were enough signs between 1966 (when the application of intra-Community reductions to Algeria was ended) and 1968 (when third-country treatment was given it by Italy) to make Algeria move. Once it received its special unilaterally decreed status, it was under other pressures. Although its position vis-à-vis France was more favorable than that of its two neighbors, its preferences on the Five's markets were less. This was a situation that Al-

⁶⁰ The point is discussed in Gallagher, *op.cit.* The role of the opposition is important in keeping Morocco from "believing in" Association, although many Moroccan officials did "believe."

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geria could live with as long as Europe permitted it and as long as its French advantages outweighed its other European disadvantages compared to Tunisia and Morocco—two conditions which had governed its earlier de facto status. Algeria was also different from Morocco and Tunisia in that one Member of the Community needed it badly, whereas no one really needed Morocco and Tunisia. Algeria's power was roughly as great as its needs (in this context).

In considering the North Africans' position, two other elements must be treated: opposition arguments, and problems of unity. Opposition to Association came primarily from within Morocco; in Tunisia, any opposition was either impotent outside the party-government or neutralized within. In Algeria, however, government tactics of "nonnegotiation"—relying on the very complicated nature of its situation and on conflicts among the Members to permit its ad hoc membership to continue—effectively disarmed any critics. In Morocco, the most coherent criticism came from the reformist wing of the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP)—principally 'Abderrahim Bouabid and Mohammed Lahbabi⁶¹—while the Istiqlal, the Communist party, and the revolutionary wing of the UNFP all added their critical interpretations.⁶²

The UNFP's opposition can be divided into two parts: positive alternatives and negative fears. The first included a domestic program of agricultural reconversion and agrarian reform, industrialization, trade diversification (particularly toward the Communist bloc), creation of a Maghreb com-

⁶¹ See Bouabid, speech before the seminar organized by the General Union of Tunisian Students, Tunis, 17 April 1962; speech before the seminar organized by the National Union of Moroccan Students, Algiers, January 1963, reprinted in *Industrialisation au Maghreb* (Paris: Maspero, 1963), pp. 241-60, followed by discussions by Lahbabi and Bellal; *Le Monde Diplomatique*, July 1969; [Mohammed Lahbabi], *Libération* (Rabat), 45:8 (15-21 July 1965). Also interviews by the author with Bouabid and Lahbabi.

⁶² Abdulaziz Bellal, *Le Marché Commun Européen est un Protectorat Deguisé* (Bureau de Documentation et d'Etudes, Rabat, 21 March 1962); *La Nation Africaine* (Rabat), 23 December 1963.

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mon market, and conclusion of a commercial agreement with the EEC. The latter would avoid long-term commitments to and controls by Europe, and would allow flexibility suited to annual needs. In this, the opposition position was compatible with that of the Italian and Dutch governments. But the UNFP was far from governmental power in Morocco.

In many points, UNFP fears of "association or a free-trade zone" approximated the negotiating concerns of the Moroccan government. Bouabid noted the growing self-sufficiency of the EEC, and feared that a short-term Moroccan commitment to a continued colonial exchange would end abruptly with the Moroccan economy still unconverted for external competition and internal development. He foresaw early EEC membership for Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey, who, along with Italy, would close out Moroccan agricultural products and migrant workers. He believed that protection for European settlers in the agricultural sector and European investments in the industrial sector was the only reason for Europe's interest in North Africa. He also believed that on the day when land and industry were nationalized, this interest would drop, and the expanding economy of the Community would be a greater attraction for new investments than underdeveloped North Africa. On the other hand, as long as European investments and commercial circuits dominated the Moroccan economy, pressures against invoking any safeguard clauses would be irresistible. Aid, too, would mean control and indebtedness. Meanwhile, finished goods would flood the North African market as protective customs were removed. As Lahbabi said, "An association between a dominant economy . . . and an underdeveloped economy is made at the expense of the latter. In this curious system of international division of labor, we are in danger of continuing to specialize in underdevelopment."⁶³

The force of the UNFP's criticisms was seriously weakened by radical Algeria's de facto membership, more than radical Black African criticisms against Association were

⁶³ [Lahbabi], *Libération*, *op.cit.*

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weakened by radical Mali's Associate status. But there was no undercutting the critics' reasoning. Paradoxically, the relevance of Bouabid's criticisms worked in two ways to strengthen the hand of the North African negotiators. It reminded the Moroccans of potential dangers to be avoided in their negotiations, and it put pressure on the Europeans to create an Association that would prove the critics wrong. In general, Bouabid's criticisms were not outlandish; some of them could only be answered in the light of experience, with opinions on the future differing sharply in the meantime, while others brought into relief the problems of any relations—in or out of Association—between a developed, protectionist economy and an underdeveloped, protectionist one.

A point on which critics and the governments agreed—in principle—was the necessity of integrating the Maghreb. The North African governments, however, were not ready to go to the point of joint negotiations, and hence appeared to be heading toward three parallel free-trade areas arising out of three nearly identical treaties. At the same time, the North African governments protested that they were working toward and believed in Maghreb unity, but that it was the other fellow who was refusing to cooperate. The European experience—to cite an example at hand—shows that any integrating group is made up of "other fellows," each with his own interests to preserve. But the process of dealing with these interests provides the substance of creative—even if sometimes painful—compromise and the partners committed to integration have made a basic option resting on belief in both the dominance of common interests and the applicability of compromise for handling conflicting ones.⁶¹

What was the balance sheet on common and conflicting interests for the Maghreb states in their EEC negotiations? Did they stand to gain individually from joint negotiations (as the Commission appeared to think) or from separate discussions (the method they followed)?

There were many things that kept the Maghreb states

⁶¹ For another treatment of the process, see Robert Penn Warren, *Night Rider* (New York: Random House, 1939).

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separate—suspicions, different regimes, territorial claims, subversions—but none of them except the vested interest of separate state structures could be called *interests*, particularly as regards EEC negotiations. Each of the three states does have a special interest in certain exports—Tunisian olive oil, Moroccan fish—but even these are exported in small quantities by the others.⁶⁵ More important are those products high on the lists of two of the three states—petroleum for Algeria and Tunisia, fruits and vegetables for Morocco and Algeria. The third category of leading exports from the Maghreb to Europe includes products, such as wine, that are important to all three states.

In this highly competitive situation, one of two strategies would seem rationally preferable: Association by one state with the Community to the exclusion of the others, or a common front. The first is impossible for the future, although it is the strategy inherited by Algeria with its *de facto* membership and permitted to continue because the Community was unable to agree on a change. A modified first choice—negotiating separate advantages within parallel Associations—was specifically excluded in the Commission's first negotiations and second report. Indeed, in the context of the negotiations this act of a European body was the most (only ?) favorable pan-Maghreb action taken by either side, and the Three have nothing comparable to offer. In fact, defensively, they let it

⁶⁵ Products under analysis are those which represented more than \$6 million or 3 percent of each state's exports to the EEC for that year. Figures taken from d'Yvoire, *op.cit.*, pp. 80-85. Percentages are given in the following table:

<i>Morocco</i>		<i>Algeria</i>		<i>Tunisia</i>	
Fruit	22	Petroleum &		Petroleum	34
Vegetables	17	products	57	Wine	15
Phosphates*	16	Wine	16	Olive oil	14
Wine	8	Fruit	10	Phosphates*	7
Minerals	7	Vegetables	3	Fruit	5
Fish	6			Grain	4
Olive oil	3				
Vegetable products	3				

* There is no EEC tariff on phosphates.

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be known that unity was their own affair and any European attempt to impose it would be regarded as interference.⁶⁶ Yet even if the EEC had decided to favor one country's exports of the same product over another's, joint negotiations and a common stand by the North Africans would have strengthened their negotiating position—*provided they were able to agree among themselves beforehand.*

This conclusion may be broken down into component situations. Conceivably, a state with a small export of one item (for example, Algerian olive oil) negotiating alone might be able to win preferential treatment for that item which far exceeded anything the Six would be willing to grant a large exporter (in this case, Tunisia). Such treatment, however, seems both unlikely and unimportant. More important would be a similar case in which the small exporter's production was far less than that of the larger but still relatively important to its trade; in the only such case among leading Maghrebi exports—Tunisia vs. Algeria, respectively, on petroleum—a special arrangement favoring Tunisia was predictably excluded, since neither country could come near to meeting European demand. Also theoretically possible is the reverse situation, where a major exporter negotiating alone is able to obtain a preferential arrangement assuring it the European market for its product to the exclusion of his Maghrebi competitors. Such cases are obviously important, particularly for Algerian petroleum and wine, Moroccan fish and vegetables, and Tunisian olive oil; since several products are involved, a state could lose more than it would gain if each state cornered all its important markets. Therefore this kind of situation also favors the protection afforded by joint negotiations. A slight preference "edge" for one country over the others is also conceivable, although such an arrangement would involve a major departure from the guidelines the Six have set themselves in Maghrebi and other African negotiations. Moreover, even in this case, joint negotiations would

⁶⁶ *Maghreb* 26:46. There was also the feeling that a collective Maghrebi Association would constitute a more political engagement with the West than bilateral agreements would.

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give North Africa greater bargaining strength (again *provided they had agreed among themselves beforehand*) on the allocation of these "edges."

As long as Europe decides to accord no special treatment to any one North African state over the others, joint negotiations on commercial matters would appear to strengthen their individual positions. Some of this two of the Maghrebi states (Morocco and Tunisia) realized. Their negotiations, if separate, were parallel and they kept each other informed. They met together with the Commission informally. Tunisia negotiated the olive oil provisions and Morocco the citrus provisions of both treaties. It may be objected that, beyond that point, any closer Moroccan-Tunisian cooperation would have worked against Maghreb unity, in that it would have excluded Algeria; this was the reasoning that delayed Association until after 1962, but it was never mentioned by the North Africans in regard to the negotiations once they were under way. The real occasion for testing awareness of the benefits of joint negotiations has been postponed until the 1970's when the Treaty promises (Rabat and Tunis 14), Algerian needs, and the recent wave of North African cooperation (announced in the Algerian-Moroccan friendship treaty of January 1969) seem to coincide.

In noncommercial matters, excluded in the 1960's but pertinent to full Association negotiations, similar considerations appear to indicate the value of joint diplomacy. In the matter of social provisions for North African labor in Europe, the interests of the Three are identical since only the harmonization and improvement of social security systems are under discussion (preferences in hiring, where competing interests exist, are excluded). The final matter is that of aid; conceivably, a single state negotiating alone could obtain a larger amount of aid than it would if all three states negotiated together, but only if negotiations took place at widely separate times and the Europeans did not, among themselves, assign a total figure to be subdivided. The practice of dividing a total aid figure among the applicants was followed in the Yaoundé

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negotiations, and it is unlikely that it will change. In the Maghreb negotiations, there is no natural reference figure to serve the purpose that the FEDOM total did in the establishment of the Yaoundé FED. Reference to development in the 1957 Declaration of Intentions and in North African appeals suggest that the three states' development budgets will serve as one such reference point for their negotiations, with Europe assuming a certain percentage in development plans. But the other reference point will certainly be a sum that each of the Six feels ready to give, probably related to its present bilateral aid programs to North African countries. It is hard to see how separate negotiations can increase this figure.

It might be asked then why separate negotiations were the practice in this case. Two reasons can be adduced, both more understandable than rational. One North African country's internal report states, "The need . . . to conclude an agreement rapidly with the European Common Market has led to undertaking separate contacts. . . . In fact, the search for a complete Maghrebi agreement prior to these contacts has appeared susceptible of pushing new economic and commercial relations with the Common Market to an indefinite date." Although it may have been difficult to predict the pace of negotiations in 1963 when the three states made their requests for talks at several months' intervals, by late 1966, when the report was written, it was hard to imagine that the progress of negotiations could have been delayed any more than it was, and by causes essentially outside of North African control.

The other reason for avoiding joint talks goes back to the general level of suspicion existing among the three states. Fear of unilateral leaks and deals behind their backs, lack of trust, and reluctance to engage in harmonizing development plans based on different political and economic philosophies have obscured the advantages of joint negotiations. Thus the condition of prior agreement necessary to make joint negotiations advantageous in all cases has not been obtainable in reality. Yet joint negotiations would probably provide their own pressure for prior agreement.

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In the circumstances, however, although completely separate negotiations might favor some states as far as their most important products were concerned, the practice of concomitant negotiations and the policy of not favoring any one of the three states points to joint negotiations as the most favorable procedure for North Africa. Other considerations pointing in the same direction include the practice of using an informal "sponsor" in Association negotiations, for the European "spokesman's" efforts for one Maghreb state would pull the others along. Since the states' sponsors vary, the effect is strengthened; France strongly defends its interest in Algeria, and Germany is thought to have been helping Tunisia. Morocco has no known "spokesman," a fact that should increase its interest in joint negotiations. By the same token, however, Algeria's advantage of a vigorous spokesman and its special status within the Community makes it the least favorable of the three states to joint negotiations.

Another factor favoring joint negotiation is the veto power it would give any one state. Bloc negotiations are often rather cumbersome, but they strengthen the hand both of bloc partners vis-à-vis each other and of the bloc vis-à-vis the other party. The Six have made striking use of the imperatives of binding unity in their negotiations with the Yaoundé Associates, and the tactic can work to strengthen the North Africans' hand as well. Such a commitment is particularly useful in influencing convergence, once the general principles have been established and an agreement to agree is granted by both sides.

Finally, this analysis would be incomplete if the effect that joint negotiations would have on North African unity—the goal proclaimed by each Maghreb state—were not mentioned. It would certainly be idealistic to pretend that the simple act of negotiating together would automatically bring about integration: the joint partners might well feel more annoyed, distrustful, or abusive toward each other than before. But the probability is that greater mutual acquaintance, shared experiences, common planning, and exchanged con-

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cessions would reinforce the effects of the more closely integrated economic activity likely to come out of joint negotiations, and would thus enhance the progress of Maghreb cooperation. The need for the coordination of plans that prior agreement would require in preparing for joint negotiations would strengthen this effect. Optimally (in terms of the stated goal), it could easily give the impetus to a basic commitment to active integration.

In relations with the EEC, North African unity has been at the mercy of the Six. If Europe continues to exclude individual advantages to any one of the three states and to treat them more or less as a group, a *de facto* imposed measure of North African unity is present. But if not, the "politique de balance" can easily keep North Africa cut up in its component pieces—in the absence of a firm change in Maghrebi tactics. This pattern of power is evident in most other aspects of the negotiations to come. Until 1968, there was little negotiation, in the strict sense of the term as bargaining counterconcessions. The Maghreb states made known what they wanted, would accept, and considered important. With this information in hand, the Six then retired to discuss among themselves, taking North African wants, demands, and needs into account where possible in accordance with their own interests.

In its second report, the Commission emphasized the need for a long-term agreement to stage out current tariffs and preferences, since North Africa *might not agree* if asked to act too rapidly without long-term guarantees. But such concepts of a Maghreb "resistance point" concerned only broad principles, and even these were open to wide interpretations. In fact, rather than not agreeing, the North Africans saw wisdom in agreeing as fast as possible on less than the total goal, a tactic that was highly "Bourguibist," but not predictably so.

One expert has this to say on the problem:

Objective minimum positions . . . normally do not exist for three reasons. First, governments do not face two choices

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only, agreement and no-agreement, that a minimum position could separate like a watershed. . . . Second . . . governments must be concerned with more than probable gains from further bargaining and the comparison of agreement with no-agreement. . . . Third . . . all evaluations and expectations—and even goals—keep shifting. Instead of fixed minimum positions, each party can have only an *anticipated minimum*. . . . There is a further complication: the anticipated minimum is usually blurred.⁶⁷

Instead, whether negotiating jointly or separately, the North Africans can only put their efforts into changing details on what they consider most important once the Six have reached their own convergence point. This position has been recognized by the negotiators themselves. A Tunisian negotiator pointed out just before the first round of negotiations that Tunisia had made no proposals—it awaited an offer from the Commission.⁶⁸ The Algerian ambassador made this statement during the preliminary talks, “The EEC has not asked us to take a position. Besides, taking a position means already having negotiated or, if you will, implies that negotiation is going on, which is not the case.”⁶⁹

To say that this is the procedure whether negotiations are joint or separate does not imply that greater influence over the details cannot be achieved by a common front. It does mean that negotiating positions could be partially inverted if the North Africans’ convergence point were in their own hands, rather than being at the mercy of agreement among the Six. It also means that the North Africans are obliged to deploy efforts not only to influence the convergence points—by strongly indicating which alternatives are unacceptable—but also to keep Europe aware of its commitment to an agreement and at the same time to make the Six aware that the value to both sides of such a commitment is increased if the

⁶⁷ Fred Charles Ikle, *How Nations Negotiate* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 191-92.

⁶⁸ Interview with member of Tunisian mission, Brussels, June 1965.

⁶⁹ *Le Monde*, 17 October 1964.

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agreement is reached early.⁷⁰ Unlike the Yaoundé Associates the Maghreb has not had a formal deadline pressing it, but it has had an informal and continuing one that weakens its position and limits its alternatives as Europe integrates without—indeed, against—it.

⁷⁰ Another paradox is that the longer Europe makes North Africa wait, the more North Africa needs Association, but by the same token the weaker it is in bargaining for it.

APPENDIX F.—“CAN WE DO BUSINESS WITH RADICAL NATIONALISTS?
(1): ALGERIA; YES” BY WILLIAM B. QUANDT

[From Foreign Policy, Summer 1972]

At the time of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Algeria, along with the other “radical” Arab states, broke diplomatic relations with the United States. This seemed to bring to an end the five year old process of trying to find a basis for friendly ties between two very dissimilar countries. Substantial amounts of U.S. economic aid had done little to promote U.S. interests or to win Algerian goodwill. One might well have expected at the time that Algeria would follow the path of Syria and Iraq, both of whom virtually eliminated all forms of American presence from their countries after 1967.

Instead, nearly five years after the break in relations, the United States and Algeria have developed a complex network of interactions that defy the conventional stereotypes of American behavior toward radical nationalist regimes. Despite persistent policy differences on major world issues, the two governments maintain businesslike contacts and are intent upon developing spheres of common interest. Private U.S. companies have taken an active part in improving the atmosphere between the two countries, and by mid-1972 it seems likely that the U.S. Export-Import Bank will have nearly \$500 million in credits and guarantees extended to Algeria to finance the purchase of American products.

At a time when the United States is lowering its official profile in much of the Third World, and may be cutting back on such traditional components of foreign policy as economic and military aid, the case of U.S.-Algerian relations suggests that new types of U.S. involvement in developing countries are possible that can capitalize upon American economic and technological potentials without the exploitative and politically manipulative overtones of earlier policies. The learning process that has made this new relationship possible has been long for both Americans and Algerians, but by now both sides can point to tangible benefits and other countries are beginning to take notice of the unexpected dealings between Washington and Algiers.

If the world of the 1970's is one in which multipolarity further weakens the ideological conflicts of the cold war era, we may expect the United States to begin to treat other radical countries as it has Algeria. The key elements in promoting reasonably good relations between the United States and Algeria since 1968-1969 have been modest expectations on both sides concerning governmental actions; stability and a related serious development effort within Algeria; and the establishment of substantive mutual interests involving oil and gas exports to the United States and the use of American technology and expertise by the Algerians.

In its relations with radical nationalist regimes in the Third World, the United States is both aided and constrained by its immense wealth and power. Because of its vast capabilities for exerting influence, the United States looms very large in the concerns of Third World leaders, as potential benefactor as well as dangerous opponent. An asymmetry exists, however, in that the United States rarely views its relations with the countries of the Third World as matters of much importance. The disparity in power virtually assures that perceptions and expectations of U.S. officials and Third World leaders will be distorted and that egalitarian relationships will be hard to achieve.

The general problems for U.S. diplomacy caused by this power differential are accentuated when dealing with radical nationalists. Almost by definition, radical nationalist leaders are particularly sensitive to issues involving sovereignty, are generally committed to rapid social and economic change and see the role of the state as critical to such transformations, and are likely to be suspicious of the United States. As a result, many of the traditional instruments of U.S. diplomacy are of little utility. U.S. economic aid, if available at all, is un-

likely to be provided on terms compatible with the recipient country's desire for full independence and equality. Aid will be seen as having political strings attached, and the generally patronizing context in which it is offered will often irritate nationalist sensibilities. Nor can congressional approval for aid to friendly countries be counted upon from one year to the next. At best, small quantities of humanitarian assistance may be provided.

If economic aid is not effective as an element of U.S. diplomacy toward radical nationalist regimes, military assistance is even less so. The prospect of becoming an arms client of the United States is remote for most radical regimes for reasons of their own self-image and U.S. reluctance to provide such assistance. At best, a limited military relationship based on sales and training may be possible for a few radical regimes of the Third World.

As for U.S. private investments as an element of the U.S. presence in radical nationalist countries, once again host-country sensitivities over sovereignty are likely to reduce or eliminate such economic ties. Private U.S. economic interests serve as an easy target for nationalist hostilities toward the American government, and consequently risk being expropriated or nationalized. As a result, private U.S. investment, rather than being welcomed for the economic benefits it may bring, may be forbidden by radicals, or if present, may be a source of considerable tension.

Unable to rely on these traditional instruments of foreign policy in dealing with radical nationalist countries, the United States is left with its diplomatic presence, trade, a variety of economic transactions such as the granting of credits and the promotion of joint ventures, and educational-cultural exchanges. While perhaps lacking the potential leverage of economic and military assistance, these relationships have several desirable qualities. First, they tend to promote realistic expectations about what each side can expect from the other. Second, they help to overcome the power gap by concentrating on non-manipulative aspects of diplomacy. Third, they permit the host country to take initiatives and set limits to the bilateral relationship.

In the U.S.-Algerian case, several stages can be distinguished in terms of expectations and the instruments of U.S. diplomacy that were utilized. During the earliest period of Ben Bella's rule, a special relationship developed for a variety of reasons. President Kennedy had a long-standing interest in Algeria. The postwar reconstruction and economic needs of Algeria led to a large U.S. aid program. As a result, expectations on both the U.S. and Algerian sides about what was possible in the relationship were unusually high. A series of events began to transform these expectations, to provoke tensions and to undermine the aid relationship. Most notable of these were foreign policy disagreements and the expropriation of U.S.-owned property in Algeria.

After Ben Bella's fall from power, new efforts were made to improve relations, but once again foreign policy disputes and quarrels over aid and compensation to U.S. nationals caused tension and eventually resulted in the breaking of diplomatic relations at the time of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

More recently, particularly after 1968, the United States and Algeria began to discover substantive mutual interests, primarily in the field of oil and gas developments and exports. A key element in improving relations in this period was the signing of a contract between the Algerian national oil company, Sonatrach, and El Paso Natural Gas Company for the delivery of Algerian liquid natural gas by tanker to the east coast of the United States. The scale of the proposed project is impressive, especially in view of the modest level of past Algerian exports to the United States. Over a 25-year period, Algeria will deliver each year 15 billion cubic meters of liquid natural gas to the United States. For the United States, the imported gas will help to fill the large deficit between U.S. production and consumption that will exist by the end of this decade. For the Algerians, direct profits will initially be modest because of the financial outlays required for the project, but at least \$200 million in hard currency will enter the Algerian economy each year once the El Paso project is underway. The approval of the Federal Power Commission is still required for the full implementation of the Sonatrach-El Paso contract, but this is expected in the very near future. But even before both sides begin to realize monetary gains from their expanding economic relations, the United States and Algeria have already learned to do business with each other, in the broadest sense. As a result, their experiences provide an important example of how the United States may deal in the future with other radical nationalist regimes.

Contacts between the U.S. government and the Algerian FLN were made prior to Algerian independence in 1962. From these early ties, Algerians came to expect friendly treatment from Washington after independence, a condition not commonly true for radical regimes. The basis for U.S.-Algerian good relations after independence stemmed from two prior sets of events. First, John F. Kennedy, as Senator and member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, had delivered a speech in July 1957 calling for Algerian independence. Most American officials at the time were outraged by the speech, fearing its impact on U.S.-French relations. Although Kennedy was in later years to back away somewhat from his strong stand of 1957, the Algerians nonetheless remembered him with unusual warmth. Second, when Kennedy became President in 1961, U.S. concern with Algerian issues increased noticeably. Knowing that Kennedy had a personal interest in Algerian affairs, members of the U.S. foreign affairs bureaucracy who favored expanding contacts with the FLN, especially the Bureau of African Affairs in the Department of State, took several initiatives in 1961 and 1962. The French desk in the European Bureau at State, reflecting opinion in Paris, became the strongest bureaucratic opponent of these moves. Despite considerable criticism, the U.S. government sent the former director of North African Affairs at the State Department, and the man who had helped Kennedy to prepare his 1957 speech, William Porter, to Algiers in May 1961 as Consul General. That same year, the then current head of North African Affairs, William Witman, was quietly directed to meet with Algerian representatives at the United Nations.

When Algeria became independent in July 1962, the United States had already developed some momentum in its relations with the Algerians. Once Ben Bella had officially come to power in September 1962, the United States recognized his government and Porter was named Ambassador. Assistance programs, which had been worked out over serious AID opposition, were ready for implementation. Ben Bella's first trip outside of Algeria as President was to the United States, first to the United Nations and then to Washington for a cordial meeting with Kennedy.

During and immediately following Ben Bella's trip to the United States, signs appeared that Algeria's "radicalism" might lead to friction between the two governments. On leaving Washington, Ben Bella flew directly to Havana, where he joined Castro in calling for the elimination of the U.S. base at Guantanamo. This occurred on the eve of what was to become the Cuban missile crisis, and had the effect in some U.S. circles of identifying Algeria with Cuba. From that time on, the image of Algeria's becoming a second Cuba was frequently evoked in U.S. policy circles, despite efforts by North African specialists to combat the misleading analogy.

During 1963, further incidents occurred that cooled U.S.-Algerian relations. In March, Ben Bella dramatically announced the nationalization of "vacant properties," most of which had been left behind by former French owners. A few U.S. citizens were affected by the measures, which eventually led to the filing of a number of private U.S. claims for compensation, totaling perhaps several million dollars in all. Although the amount of money involved was minor, this issue came to be an important point of contention in U.S.-Algerian relations in later years.

A more troublesome problem than nationalization of property owned by U.S. citizens was the border dispute between Algeria and Morocco, the latter a country with close ties to the United States. Even prior to Algerian independence, the Moroccan nationalist party, the Istiqlal, had made clear its claims to parts of Algeria's territory. During the war for independence, the Algerian Provisional Government had even agreed to discuss these historically disputed areas with Morocco once French rule had ended. But in the chaotic first year of Ben Bella's regime, the Algerians were in no mood to relinquish any territory under their control.

The issue of borders remained in dispute, and finally in the fall of 1963, in the midst of an Algerian domestic crisis involving an insurrection in Kabylia, war broke out along the Moroccan frontier. The Algerians were still in the process of converting their army into an integrated, modern force, and in the fighting the Moroccans acquitted themselves well, although no lasting territorial changes were registered by either side. Despite the rapid end to the war and the inconclusive results, the Algerians suspected that the creditable Moroccan performance could be at least partly explained by American assistance, including the transport of Moroccan troops to the front. Earlier Algeria had tried to acquire arms from

the United States and had been turned down, and this too could be seen as part of a plan to keep Algeria weak in order to permit the Moroccans to realize their irredentist ambitions. While the United States position during the war was officially that of neutrality and an expressed desire to see the war end rapidly, the net impact of the conflict on U.S.-Algerian relations seems to have been to increase suspicions on both sides.

In the United States, some observers felt that the Algerian-Moroccan war showed that Algeria, like Cuba, was seeking to export revolution to its more moderate neighbors. In Algiers, the idea that "U.S. imperialism" was backing the Moroccan "reactionary" forces in order to undermine the Algerian revolution was heard in the press and was doubtless believed by some officials as well. One concrete result of the border war was to accelerate Algeria's search for modern military equipment, particularly from the Soviet Union. This also added a sour note to U.S.-Algerian relations as the Soviet presence in Algeria began to grow along with heavy doses of Marxist jargon in the Algerian press. In the State Department, Algeria was now referred to as a cold war "danger point" in Africa and concern with "pro-Communist influences in important opinion-making positions" was officially expressed.

Despite irritations with Ben Bella's revolutionary zeal, especially among high-level U.S. policy-makers, State Department specialists were generally willing to give Algeria the benefit of the doubt during the period of instability and uncertainty following independence. The keystone to U.S.-Algerian relations during these years was the PL 480 wheat program. With immense needs for imported wheat, particularly following the drought of 1963, Algeria became a major recipient of PL 480 grant aid during Ben Bella's rule. Algerians were glad to receive the wheat, but seemed to expect it as something due them as a matter of course to help compensate for the ravages of the war for independence. During the program's six years of existence in Algeria, wheat valued at over \$175 million was provided.

Problems periodically arose in Washington over the continuation of the PL 480 aid to Algeria, and shipments were at times delayed, as in late 1963. By early 1965, the feeling was widespread in Washington that the aid program had outlived its usefulness. Among other problems, AID officials were confronted with a legal obligation under the Hickenlooper Amendment of January 1962 to suspend aid to any country that had failed to take "appropriate steps" within a "reasonable amount of time" to compensate U.S. citizens for nationalized or expropriated property. Claims stemming from the nationalizations of March 1963 had been formally received by the U.S. government toward the end of 1964. The United States did not insist that the amounts in question or even the facts of ownership be fully accepted by the Algerian government, but it did demand that the claims be dealt with according to acceptable legal procedures. The handling of these cases, which were later to become a sore point of controversy between the two governments, contributed to the general atmosphere of disenchantment with the Ben Bella regime in Washington, and by late spring 1965, the U.S. government had apparently decided not to renew PL 480 aid for the coming fiscal year.

BOUMEDIENNE AND THE BREAK IN RELATIONS

In June 1965, Ben Bella was overthrown in a surprise coup d'état led by his Minister of Defense and Vice President Houari Boumedienne. While U.S. officials were generally pleased with Ben Bella's ouster, few knew anything about the austere and remote figure who now spoke on behalf of the Council of the Revolution. Boumedienne was thought to be more deeply influenced by his Arab-Islamic culture than Ben Bella, but his trips to Moscow and the dependency of Algeria on Soviet arms led some observers to assume that Algeria under President Boumedienne would continue its drift toward becoming another Cuba. This image, however, was soon weakened as Boumedienne moved against his domestic Marxist critics and engaged in a public quarrel with the Soviet Union. Combined with the serious, non-demagogic tone of Boumedienne's early speeches, these acts gave rise to modest hopes that U.S.-Algerian relations might improve now that Ben Bella was out of the picture. Nonetheless, foreign policy differences and disagreements over the continuation of the aid program remained.

Shortly after the coup against Ben Bella, Ambassador Porter was transferred from Algiers and several months passed before he was replaced by a professional diplomat with former experience in the Arab world, John Jerneagan. During the interlude between ambassadors, few initiatives were taken toward the new re-

gime. By the end of the year, however, the Algerians had been presented with the still unsettled claims from 1963, and after agreeing to take up these cases, the Algerians received the welcome news early in 1966 that the PL 480 program was being resumed on a modest scale. Out of a desire to keep this aid flowing, the Algerians continued to report throughout 1966 that progress was being made in the processing of these claims and that they were "not gathering dust."

Despite these few positive signs, U.S.-Algerian relations were beginning to deteriorate as early as mid-1966. In June, the Algerians accused the United States of building secret military bases in Morocco and Tunisia. Later in the year, the Algerian press, always quick to criticize "U.S. imperialism" in Vietnam and the Middle East, extended its attack on the United States, blaming Washington for most of the world's ills. U.S. officials in Algiers had long resented the behavior of the press, and finally in early 1967 Ambassador Jernegan wrote a letter to the Algerians protesting the distortions and errors in the mass media concerning the United States. The Party newspaper defiantly published this supposedly confidential letter, accusing the United States of trying to pressure Algeria into abandoning its support for various progressive and revolutionary causes. It was even suggested that Jernegan had implied that future aid would depend upon a more restrained attitude in the press. The specter of blackmail seemed to be rearing its head, and the Algerians were very much on their guard as negotiations began for a new PL 480 program for fiscal year 1968.

The Algerians depended upon the continued supply of U.S. wheat and were anxious to conclude a new agreement, even on the stiffer terms of Title IV cash sales instead of grants, as in former years. With the legal requirements of the Hickenlooper Amendment always in the background, the United States urged Algeria to settle the outstanding claims as a precondition for continuation of the aid program. Meanwhile, at the expert level the details of a new agreement were being negotiated, with scant attention paid to awkward political considerations. By May, the text of an agreement was ready for signatures, and neither the Algerians nor U.S. Embassy personnel in Algiers anticipated any last minute difficulties, despite long-standing contentions over the tone of the press and the unsettled private U.S. claims. The Algerians had suggested that once the aid agreement was concluded, then the matter of the claims could be dealt with. The U.S. government, however, held out for the opposite order of priority. Privately, the Algerians explained their reluctance to act on the claims for compensation by the fact that any agreement with the United States might be seen as a precedent for the much more extensive French claims stemming from the 1963 nationalizations.

On the eve of the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967, the U.S. Embassy in Algiers received firm instructions from Washington that there could be no aid agreement without continuing progress on the settlement of the claims. Embassy officials, who had been minimizing the chances of such a decision in talks with their Algerian counterparts, were faced with the unpleasant task of informing the Algerians that no agreement was possible because of the terms of the Hickenlooper Amendment. The Algerians saw in this unexpected announcement the confirmation of their fears that the United States was trying to pressure them into abandoning their militant stand on such matters as Vietnam and the Middle East. Surely the issue of the claims was mere disguise for the more sinister purposes of U.S. policy. And to bargain over food supplies at a time of great need in Algeria was seen as particularly unsubtle. The handling of the entire question left bad feelings on both sides, and in this atmosphere the Algerians needed little encouragement to break diplomatic relations with the United States, although the ostensible reason given was the Egyptian allegation of U.S. participation in the war on Israel's behalf. With the suspension of diplomatic ties, U.S. aid to Algeria was automatically prohibited under the terms of the Gruening Amendment which forbids all but minor humanitarian assistance for countries that break relations with the United States. The special relationship, stemming from the Kennedy years, had come to an end. New bases of common interest would have to be found now that economic assistance had been eliminated. Henceforth, U.S.-Algerian relations would develop in a context that bore some similarity to the problems encountered by the United States in dealing with other radical nationalist regimes. As the unique features of the Algerian case have faded, U.S.-Algerian ties have assumed greater interest as a model of what can be accomplished by pursuing practical self-interest despite ideological differences.

Even when diplomatic relations reached their low point in 1967, the Algerians stopped short of total estrangement from the United States. For example, although breaking diplomatic relations, they nonetheless allowed a small staff to maintain a U.S. interests section under Swiss protection in the U.S. Embassy. In addition, consular relations were not broken, which left two American consulates operating in Oran and Constantine. Finally, the Algerians made it clear that they hoped to maintain some ties to the United States despite the current political-diplomatic crisis. These gestures of continuing interests in relations of some sort were only partially offset by measures taken against several U.S. companies, most of which were involved in oil production. These companies, including Esso, Mobil, Sinclair, El Paso, Philips, Getty Petroleum, and Newmont Mines, were eventually all nationalized, with each company negotiating for compensation on its own.

An important development in Algerian domestic politics indirectly contributed to the improvement of U.S.-Algerian relations after 1968. An internal power struggle had been brewing during 1966-67 between the group around Boumedienne, consisting of professional military men, technocrats, and intellectuals, and a rather mismatched coalition of former guerrilla leaders and Marxist ideologues. By the end of 1967, the conflict took the form of an attempted coup d'état, led by the Chief of Staff of the armed forces, Tahar Zbiri. The coup was rapidly thwarted by the use of air power against the advancing tank columns. Boumedienne then moved swiftly to eliminate his opponents from positions of influence. The result was a relatively homogeneous government with good prospects of long-term political stability.¹

During 1968, the Algerian government, for the first time relatively free of internal security threats, began to concentrate on improving its relations with Morocco and Tunisia and on domestic economic development. This turning inward was in no sense a result of U.S. policies, but was very much in line with American preferences. In addition, the serious developmental effort launched by the Algerians, especially as part of their Four Year Plan begun in 1970, led them to desire American technology and products, both of which they were able to pay for in hard currency as a result of their profits from oil production. Algeria took the initiative of seeking out the U.S. private sector and U.S. business responded with considerable enthusiasm. Between 1967 and 1968, U.S. trade with Algeria nearly doubled, from \$33 million in U.S. exports to almost \$64 million, placing the United States in the position of being Algeria's second or third most important trading partner, surpassed only by France and West Germany.

With the private sector having taken the lead, the U.S. government sought to capitalize in this area of obvious common interest between the two countries. During 1968, U.S. policy became that of maintaining correct political relations and encouraging the growth of economic ties by adopting a liberal position on granting export licenses. As part of the political strategy, it was decided to try to reach the center of the Algerian policy-making structure, which increasingly seemed to consist of Boumedienne himself. After the assassination attempt against Boumedienne in the spring of 1968, the United States sent a note expressing the relief of the U.S. government on learning of his well-being. In time, a dialogue on political-diplomatic issues was reopened. The United States did not initially push for the resumption of diplomatic relations, but at the same time decided not to try to extract any price from the Algerians for the restoration of relations. The initiative, however, would have to come from them. In the absence of diplomatic relations, the American presence was bolstered somewhat through a variety of educational and cultural programs and a small amount of humanitarian aid. Meanwhile, progress was being made on the economic front.

In October 1968, Getty Petroleum Company signed a precedent-setting agreement with the Algerian petroleum monopoly, Sonatrach, whereby Sonatrach acquired 51 percent ownership of Getty's operations, while Getty agreed to provide capital for further exploration and production in return for a specified percentage of realized profits. The Algerians were pleased with the terms of this joint venture and subsequently, in February 1971, imposed similar conditions on French oil companies operating in Algeria.

¹ More information on internal Algerian developments can be found in my *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria 1954-1968* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969) and "Algeria: The Revolution Turns Inward," *Mid East*, August 1970.

ENTER EL PASO

In mid-1969, an important turning point was reached in U.S.-Algerian economic relations with the signature of the preliminary agreement between El Paso Natural Gas and Sonatrach for the annual delivery of 10 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas to the United States over a period of 25 years. (In early 1971, the amount was increased by 50 percent.) The United States was entering a period of scarcity with respect to natural gas and Algeria possessed enormous reserves as well as proven capacity for economically liquefying and transporting the gas. The scale of the project was immense, requiring the construction in Algeria of a new liquefaction plant and of a tanker fleet. El Paso agreed to handle the marketing of the gas in the United States as well as the construction of the tankers, while Algeria undertook to cover all operations within its own borders. Two major obstacles, however, remained in the path of full implementation of the agreement. First, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) in the United States had to approve the importation of the gas. Second, the Algerians needed to find financial assistance to cover part of the envisaged \$500-\$600 million in expenditures required of them. Prominent among possible creditors was the Export-Import Bank in Washington.

With the prospect of a long-term economic relationship of huge magnitude before them, both the United States and Algerian governments took steps to improve their dialogue. Algerians had expressed their regret to U.S. officials that they had broken relations with the United States on the basis of false information provided by Cairo and mentioned the hope that future developments in Vietnam and the Middle East would allow Algeria to renew its ties to Washington. During the United Nations General Assembly session in the fall of 1969, Foreign Minister Bouteflika met with Secretary of State Rogers to discuss U.S.-Algerian relations. The following month the El Paso contract was formally signed, thus providing the United States and Algeria with a potentially important point of common interest, something that had been noticeably lacking in earlier years.

In order to clear the way for approval and financing of the El Paso deal, the Algerians made some efforts to settle the issues arising from the post-1967 nationalizations of several U.S. companies. During 1970, most of the U.S. companies agreed to settle their claims with the Algerians, leaving only Esso and Newmont Mines as outstanding cases from the post-1967 nationalizations. The minor claims from 1963 were still on the books as well. Neither party wanted to make a major issue of these formerly troublesome cases, but it was clear that if Algeria and the United States were going to enter into serious long-term economic transactions, it would be helpful to dispose of all such claims in order to avoid a possible repetition of the 1966-1967 experience.

To improve the dialogue between Algiers and Washington, in December 1970 Boumedienne sent to the United States the former head of Algerian protocol, Abdelkader Bousselham, as Minister in charge of Algerian interests. A close aide to Boumedienne, Smail Hamdani, had already been given special responsibility in Algiers for U.S.-Algerian relations. Through these and other channels, the issues of financing and implementing the El Paso deal were discussed at length.

In mid-February 1971, the head of the Export-Import Bank, Henry Kearns, visited Algeria to discuss the financing of the Algerian part of the El Paso contract. He met with virtually all top Algerian officials, including President Boumedienne, and was apparently favorably impressed with the prospects for financing the construction of the liquefaction plant. Within several weeks of Kearns' visit, Algeria, then in the midst of a serious crisis with France concerning the nationalization of French oil companies, took the important step of settling its dispute with both Esso and Newmont Mines. This may have been a tacitly understood *quid pro quo* for the Ex-Im Bank credits. Shortly after these settlements, the Bank did tentatively offer to finance virtually all of the Algerian costs of the El Paso project, with the stipulation that the credits be used for the purchase of U.S. equipment. The surprising ease and generosity of the offer was greatly welcomed by the Algerians. Full agreement on the El Paso contract now depended only on a favorable Federal Power Commission ruling and prior approval of the various concerned branches of the U.S. government.

In June 1971, both the State Department and the Defense Department were prepared to inform the Federal Power Commission that they had no objection to the El Paso project on foreign policy or national security grounds. At the last minute, however, the White House, perhaps under pressure from domestic gas producers, the French oil companies, and conservative Republican interests, asked

for a delay in the announcement pending a high-level review. A month later the White House let it be known that it had no objection to the contract. Despite some concern over these delays, U.S. and Algerian officials both expect implementation of the El Paso agreement in the near future.² A favorable FPC ruling is expected during summer 1972, provided that differences over the price of the imported gas can be resolved. In U.S. circles, it is hoped that diplomatic relations might follow positive FPC action.

UNITED STATES AND ALGERIAN INTERESTS

American policy-makers have generally argued that the United States has several major interests in Algeria and in North Africa more generally. First, a number of military security issues involving Algeria have caused some concern in the U.S. government. As former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara saw the problem:

The Soviet thrust into the Mediterranean and Middle East . . . represents a potentially serious threat to the equilibrium of both that area and Western Europe. The Maghrib and the Horn are the areas of Africa of most immediate strategic concern to the United States—North Africa covering the southern flank of NATO and the Horn standing at the approaches to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. The Arab-Israeli crisis and the continued Soviet-sponsored Algerian military build-up have added to the basic instability of the area. The delivery of over \$200 million worth of Soviet equipment to Algeria since 1965 continues to alarm her moderate neighbors. . . .³

To prevent Algeria from providing the Soviet Union with a strong military presence in North Africa, and to prevent polarization between a U.S.-supported Morocco and a Soviet-supported Algeria, the United States has sought to provide something of an alternative to exclusive economic reliance on the Soviet Union as Algeria moves to reduce her exceedingly heavy dependence on France. One area in which the United States has been able to play a particularly effective role is the provision of advanced technology, especially for Algeria's petroleum industry. In addition to the objective of maintaining a strong Western presence in Algeria to counter possible Soviet influence, the United States has developed modest economic interests of value in Algeria. The favorable trade balance in the U.S. favor of over \$50 million is not of great importance, but the growing need for natural gas imports to the United States is contributing to American economic interests in Algeria.

While the strategic and economic interests of the United States in Algeria have been generally acknowledged without much controversy, an earlier desire to gain intangible political benefits from ties to Algeria has disappeared. During the Kennedy years, there seems to have been a desire to identify the United States with non-Communist but progressive Third World countries. Because of Kennedy's early interest, Algeria for a brief period was seen as a country to be courted in the hope of convincing neutral governments throughout the world that the cold war mentality of the Dulles era was over. This "New Frontier" philosophy did not survive long after Kennedy's death, with Vietnam growing as an issue.

Algeria's interests in dealing constructively with the United States have varied somewhat over time, but generally have complemented U.S. interests reasonably well. Initially, Algeria had need of wheat to feed a substantial part of its population, and the United States was willing to provide large amounts at virtually no cost. Second, Algeria, particularly in recent years, has sought to diversify its foreign relations in order to maximize its own independence. This had led to the development of close relations with the Soviet Union in some areas, and more recently with the United States and a host of middle-range powers such as Canada. Third, the Algerians hope to gain access to U.S. technology to further their development efforts, as well as to tap U.S. financial resources and markets. The El Paso agreement is a case in point. Finally, Algerian leaders probably hope to forestall overt U.S. hostility that might take the forms of internal interference in Algerian affairs, strong backing of Morocco and Tunisia against

² Two other sizable U.S.-Algerian economic transactions were announced in late 1971. Standard Oil of New Jersey intends to buy 150 million barrels of oil from Sonatrach over the next 4 years for sale in Europe. A much larger deal involves the purchase by Commonwealth Oil of an estimated \$8 billion worth of petroleum products from Sonatrach over a 25 year period.

³ Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of Security* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 28. McNamara earlier states that he does not believe Algeria will give "full base rights" to the Soviets.

Algeria, or United States support of French claims against Algeria arising out of nationalizations such as those of February 1971. This latter objective in particular has required the maintenance of a constant political dialogue with the United States, which from time to time is complemented by high-level contacts such as the visit to Algiers in March 1972 of the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, David Newsom. As the El Paso contract nears implementation, it is fair to say that both Algeria and the United States are relatively pleased with the manner in which their respective interests in each other have been progressing in recent years.

CONCLUSIONS

The policies adopted by the United States in dealing with a radical nationalist regime may have considerable impact on whether the government in question becomes a threat to U.S. interests or whether limited areas of cooperation can be established. The worst fears of U.S. officials concerned with Algeria have not come true. Algeria has not become a second Cuba, has not vigorously exported revolution to the rest of Africa, and has not provided bases to the Soviet Union from which Europe or the Sixth Fleet might be threatened. It is not implausible, however, to believe that if the United States had adopted an uncompromisingly hard line toward Algeria, some of these fears might have become reality. Strong U.S. pressure against them could easily have encouraged Algerians to respond by threatening U.S.-backed regimes on their borders and calling for attacks on U.S. interests throughout the Arab world. By adopting a relatively relaxed posture toward Algeria, the United States has insured in recent years that the door to good relations would be open whenever common interests brought the two countries together. By 1969, this policy began to pay dividends, as the Algerians, feeling secure for the first time since independence, were able to approach the United States on a basis of equality, rather than as seeker of aid without strings. U.S. officials by this time had also abandoned some of their simplistic views of "revolutionary" Algeria and were prepared for businesslike relations.

The key to successful U.S.-Algerian relations has been the adoption of modest, and therefore possibly realistic, expectations about each other in Washington and Algiers. Neither side believes it can manipulate the internal or foreign policies of the other. Algeria will continue to oppose the United States on Vietnam and the Middle East, and the United States will continue to live quite easily with such criticism. As the war in Vietnam comes to an end, however, and as a new American policy in Asia is developed, and as the Middle East crisis stagnates in its unresolved state, these points of contention may take on less importance in any case. President Nixon's trip to China in February 1972 was viewed in Algiers as a significant step toward changing relations between the United States and the Third World.

The Algerians would like to keep economics and politics separate, and up to a point this may be feasible. Trade, the transfer of technology, and joint ventures like the El Paso deal seem to provide a fairly sound basis for good relations. These economic ties are less susceptible to political strains than direct U.S. investment, which the Algerians do not want in any case. They are also less vulnerable to U.S. domestic politics than aid programs, which require periodic congressional approval. Neither side is likely to be tempted to use economic levers stemming from trade and joint ventures for political purposes. By way of contrast, aid programs invariably have strong political overtones, and private U.S. companies can be held hostage by the host country in the hope of political gain. Unlike the cases in other parts of the world where U.S. business activities cause political problems for the United States, in Algeria improved political relations have been a consequence of vigorous U.S. private sector activity involving trade and the transfer of technology. To the surprise of ideologues in both countries, Algerian "socialists" seem to find it easier to deal on an equal basis with private U.S. business than with the U.S. government.

The absence of diplomatic relations has not thus far been a major impediment to the improvement of U.S.-Algerian relations. A good dialogue has been possible even without formal ties. The United States cannot, however, offer aid to Algeria or investment guarantees to U.S. companies operating in Algeria in the absence of diplomatic relations. While Algerians have disclaimed interest in aid programs, they would nonetheless like to purchase wheat on concessional terms which is only possible now through the PL 480 program. Thus, diplomatic rela-

tions might lead to a restoration of some U.S. economic assistance to Algeria, although not on the terms or scale of earlier years.

In dealing with Algeria, U.S. business firms have played a surprisingly positive role that the Algerians have come to value. As a result, extensive economic relations with Algeria in the future seem likely to produce some favorable political side-benefits. Algeria will continue to see itself as a "nationalist, socialist and anti-imperialist" state, but if provided an alternative to heavy dependence on France or the U.S.S.R., she will remain independent in foreign policy and probably interested above all in regional stability and rapid economic development. As the scale of U.S.-Algerian relations increases, and as the stakes involved grow on both sides, it is possible that points of friction and temptations to try to manipulate each other will also grow, although current expectations all run in the opposite direction. In any case, both countries are starting from a fairly realistic base-line in 1972, and it seems unlikely that major changes in the quality of relations will take place in the near future.

The U.S.-Algerian case suggests that countries with quite different political systems and foreign policy objectives may take some time to adapt to each other. This process of accommodation and maturation may be greatly facilitated by a relaxed attitude on the part of the stronger, and potentially more threatening of the partners. It is also aided by the absence of crises and the acceptance of limited objectives by both governments. In contrast to its dealings with Egypt, where the U.S. government has sought major goals in the midst of periodic crises, the United States should be able to sustain relatively good relations with Algeria at low cost and with modest benefits. Such a result would have the welcome advantage for the United States of preventing North Africa from becoming an area of U.S.-Soviet tension on the pattern of the Middle East.

While characterized by several unique features, U.S.-Algerian relations nonetheless are suggestive of principles that might guide U.S. foreign policy in other radical nationalist countries. In particular, where common economic interests exist, the manner in which these are developed is of considerable importance. Direct U.S. investment on a large scale in countries such as Chile, Peru, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria is unlikely. By contrast, joint ventures with national companies, technical assistance and advice, and trade are generally welcomed and may serve to augment the U.S. presence even in countries where diplomatic ties do not exist. Economic and military assistance will not play much of a role in U.S. relations with radical countries, but private and public U.S. financial institutions can contribute in substantial ways to economic development through credits and guarantees. The World Bank and the Export-Import Bank are of particular importance in this respect.

If the United States succeeds in building a basis for doing business with radical nationalists, dramatic results should not be expected. These countries will not become U.S. clients, following our lead on foreign policy. They will not immediately abandon their anti-imperialist rhetoric. They will not significantly contribute to the economic well-being of the United States by supplying their natural resources. Nor will they become major markets for U.S. goods. In the world of the 1970's, however, none of these objectives is of great concern to the United States. It will be enough, in terms of U.S. interests, if radical nationalist countries remain independent and pursue their vital interest in economic and social development. If the United States can contribute in a modest way to such development by providing access to its financial and scientific resources, it will have helped promote the self-reliance of Third World countries, which, when all the verbiage is stripped away, is the essence of the "Nixon Doctrine."

APPENDIX G.—ARTICLES SUBMITTED BY AARON SEGAL

UNITED STATES-AFRICAN RELATIONS

[From Issue, Spring, 1972]

African-American relations at present are characterized by a situation in which the United States government and United States investors take more resources out of Africa than they put in. There is a negative balance of payments in the flow of aid, trade, and other resources. Consequently, Africans are disappointed in America and have little faith in the ability of this Western power to make even a modest contribution to the resolution of African problems by African means.

Exceptions to this negative balance of payments exist where there is United States government and private support of the white minorities in South Africa and Rhodesia and of the Portuguese in their African colonies. Only in white-dominated southern Africa does the rate of United State private investment and United States government support exceed the rate at which resources are taken out of Africa by the United States.

The reasons why the United States has this kind of relationship with Africa stem from the way in which foreign policy is made in this country. Just as the Vietnam war is the product of a foreign-policy process from which the majority of American citizens have been excluded, so are African-American relations considered to be the prerogative of a handful of diplomats, executive branch officials, and Pentagon representatives for whom cold war considerations continue to dictate foreign policy. For these people, African interests and problems are not taken seriously; nor are they seen from an African perspective. Our interest in a country or a continent often depends on whether or not someone in the Pentagon thinks that we may need a piece of its real estate as a site for a military base. The search for strategic interests in Africa leads to support of regimes such as those of South Africa and Portugal which are only too eager to profess their anti-communism at every possible opportunity, while creating the very conditions under which some form of communism may appear attractive to those who are systematically denied all rights and opportunities.

The Nixon Administration is more interested in lunar exploits than African welfare. Typical was Vice President Agnew's mission last summer—an expensive junket to several African countries which served only to keep the Vice President from interfering with plans for a visit to Peking. Because the President and his foreign policy advisor can find no strategic or U.S. security interest in independent Africa, total U.S. aid to Africa at \$250 million per year is less than what we provided in 1971 to Cambodia alone. To African leaders the meaning is clear. Unless you are willing to side with the West, the Americans could not care less about you. Moreover, the trickle of aid is so bound up with restrictions, obligations and bureaucratic snarls that its effective value to Africa and Africans is nominal.

Who gets this aid? Again, African needs and abilities are not taken into consideration. Rather, U.S. security interests prevail. Two-thirds of U.S. aid to Africa goes to Ethiopia, Morocco, Zaire (formerly Congo-Kinshasa) and a few other countries—all of them dominated by regimes which encourage U.S. private investment and are willing to ally themselves politically with this country. Little or no consideration is given to the ability of these countries to effectively use the aid or to ensure that it really reaches the masses. Other countries which are much more committed both to rapid economic development and equitable income distribution are neglected by U.S. policymakers who can detect no strategic interest in helping them.

Whatever aid we provide is more than offset by our trade and investment relations with Africa. Book value at the end of 1970 of total U.S. private investment amounts to roughly \$3.5 billion in Africa, with one-third absorbed in the direct exploitation of oil fields and one-third invested in southern Africa where it pro-

notes exploitation of African labor. The less than \$100 million which is privately invested by Americans in manufacturing in black Africa is used principally in conjunction with import-substitution for small national markets. In no way does it advance the export of manufactured goods from Africa which is essential for African development. Similarly, while the U.S. is an important consumer of African raw materials, it continues to export capital goods and to oppose or remain indifferent to measures to guarantee and stabilize the prices of commodities such as cocoa and palm oil. When a country such as Ghana is dependent on the export of cocoa for more than 50 percent of its foreign exchange and government revenue, failure to achieve an international agreement and continued price fluctuation make economic planning virtually impossible.

As our own ecological problems mount, and as the costs of producing and extracting raw materials, particularly minerals, rise in response to the legitimate demands of conservationists, we turn increasingly to Africa as a primary source. This attempt to export our ecological problems is at present reflected in short-term investments which extract African minerals at the lowest possible cost and without concern for environmental damage. Such investments risk leaving African states with holes in the ground after fifteen or twenty years. They do not provide the basis for self-sustained economic growth extending to the initiation and extension of local processing and export manufacturing. The odds are already stacked against successful negotiation on the part of African states with multinational corporations. There is no hope for such negotiations when the U.S. government lines up on the side of these corporations.

A similar relationship is rapidly emerging in the field of tourism as U.S. interest in Africa flourishes. Under colonialism Africans were hewers of wood and drawers of water—considered by colonial governments unfit or unable to perform more complicated tasks. Unless Africans are assisted in their desire to buy-in from the beginning on the tourist industry at all levels and phases, they risk again becoming bearers—only this time, bearers of suitcases belonging to wealthy Americans and Europeans.

The Nixon Administration would like the world to believe that all is well in African-American relations. The Vice President, confining his African safari to four countries noted for their pro-western leaders, urged black Americans to "learn from the Africans" which whom he has talked. Characteristically, he had not talked to other African leaders, to African students in a continent where education is an obsession, or to persons more representative of African interests and aspirations. Had he done so he would have learned of their deep concern with race relations in the U.S., of the direct analogies they draw between what the U.S. does in Africa and what it does at home, and in particular of their dismay at U.S. support for the racist regimes of southern Africa.

While U.S. aid to Africa dwindles and trade restrictions and disinterest in international agreements severely hamper Africa's ability to earn its own way in the world, the U.S. government agrees to the yearly sale of arms to Portugal worth \$1 million contracts to train Portuguese officers in techniques of guerilla warfare, and recently provided \$435 million of export credits to its war strained economy. It agrees to buy South Africa sugar (produced by non-whites denied by law the right to organize, strike, or hold skilled jobs) in the value of nearly \$6 million per year—twice the world market price. The government also maintains a NASA tracking site in South Africa to which black American employees are denied access, and allows the state-owned South African Airways to fly into the United States even though it discriminates by law against non-white passengers. While elsewhere in Africa the rate of remittance of profits on U.S. investments far exceeds the rate of new investments, only in South Africa and the Portuguese colonies does fresh American private money continue to pour in to take advantage of the most lucrative profit margins in the world—a direct result of the police-state that uses totalitarian methods to ensure a continuous pool of cheap black labor. Small wonder that Africans and many black Americans question America's desire to clean up its mess at home when it is engaged in propping up racism in southern Africa.

Circumstances which permit the United States to take more out of Africa than it contributes can only be reverted when there are fundamental changes in the way in which foreign policy is made. This is one of the clearest lessons of our involvement in Vietnam. America cannot continue to have two images: one for export and another for domestic consumption. As the late Martin Luther King so eloquently stated, "you cannot support integration at home and apartheid in Africa." Young Americans, civic-minded Americans, especially black Americans, must be incorporated directly into the foreign policymaking process. Only in this

way can foreign policy cease to be an arcane matter handled by irresponsible officials.

America must begin to work towards the establishment of a new relationship based on reciprocity between the U.S. and Africa. This relationship must grow out of the idea that Africa has as much, if not more, to offer the U.S. as the U.S. has to offer Africa. Historically this is no more than recognition of the fact that 11 percent of our population is of African origin and that Afro-Americans have made significant contributions to American culture. Only through searching for reciprocity in our relations with Africa can we hope to organize them along lines of mutual respect and equality.

We need to begin by asking ourselves what Africa has to offer us in addition to coffee, petroleum, chrome, copper and other raw materials. What can we learn about our problems from Africa? Clearly when it comes to family relations and the creation of a dynamic and constant relationship between work and play and work and art, Africa has an enormous contribution to make to the United States. No area of the world is as vibrant and as creative when it comes to devising systems for the development of close, kinship relations. We need to help bring Africa to America by promoting cultural festivals, art and film exhibits, the study of Africa in our schools, and the establishment of permanent scholarly exchange. We need to ask Africans what they think we should be doing to improve our race relations and related problems.

At the same time we need to alter our aid and trade patterns to establish a more equitable and reciprocal flow. We need absolutely to increase the share of aid that Africa receives and eliminate the restrictions that diminish its true value. We need to see that our aid is concentrated in countries which are genuinely committed to improving the lives of all of their citizens and not just to enriching the elite. We need to combine that aid with support for effective international commodity agreements to enable Africans to receive stable and better prices for their agricultural exports. We need to import Africa's processed goods and help Africans earn the foreign exchange to buy our products. We need to assist them to develop the kind of technology, particularly agricultural, which will free Africa to respond in its own way to its own problems. We need to ensure that our private investment, including tourism, is structured so that it leaves permanent and broadly distributed benefits behind instead of holes in the ground and a new class of servants.

We need to take Africa seriously because of its cultural and human richness and the contribution it has to make to our welfare. We need to stop relating to it in terms of global cold war strategy. We need to eliminate our remaining military bases in Africa and direct our assistance towards building Africa's own capacities. While the President has told Secretary of State Rogers that the United States wants to "keep the cold war out of Africa," this message has been accompanied by a reduction in the real value of American aid. The intimation has been that as long as there is no cold war in Africa the U.S. government has no interests there and can afford to be indifferent. We must communicate a new message of interest and concern, not based on naive do-gooding or philanthropy but on recognition of the human and cultural bonds between Africa and the U.S. and the development of mutually beneficial enterprises.

While we establish new and genuine commitments with respect to independent Africa we need to disengage ourselves from support of southern African regimes. No other action can establish our credibility in the minds of Africans and Americans who care about human equality. We need to stop buying South African sugar, to move our NASA base to a neighboring African-ruled state, to withdraw landing rights from South African Airways unless it agrees to carry all passengers on a non-discriminatory basis, to compel U.S. private investors to pay equal wages for equal work or else withdraw from South Africa, to cut off U.S. military aid to Portugal, and to withdraw from the obsolete American military base in the Azores Islands which Portugal is now using as leverage for support of her continued colonial rule in Africa.

Southern Africa is in the throes of a racial, political crisis which could threaten world peace. As four million whites enjoy the highest standard of living on the face of the earth through the total and systematic exploitation of more than thirty million Africans, the stakes for Africa and the U.S. are enormous. While the Portuguese, the white South Africans and the Rhodesians may use different euphemisms to explain racism, the nature of the game remains the same. Professor Leonard Thompson referred to such societies as *pigmentocracies* where the color of one's skin is the criteria used for the allocation

of resources and the judgment of human beings. Given the extent of our problems we need to act quickly and sanely to keep our involvement with these regimes from further poisoning our own society and its race relations. Disengagement from white southern Africa and commitment to a new era of reciprocal and equitable relations between Africa and the United States is the challenge which now faces us.

THE SEPARATED PEOPLE: SOUTHERN AFRICA TODAY

(From Vista, March/April 1972)

On July 24, 1964, a bomb placed in a paper bag beneath a bench in the main concourse of the Johannesburg railroad station, reserved for whites only, exploded, killing an elderly white woman and seriously injuring fourteen persons. Only a few minutes before I had sat on that same bench waiting to take a suburban train. The bomber, who was later hanged, was a white high-school chemistry teacher, John Harris, driven by his own conscience to terrorism after trying all the limited forms of passive nonviolent resistance available in the most efficient racist police state ever devised by man.

This was neither the first nor the last time that I was exposed to violence as an American journalist traveling in Southern Africa. Violence is a way of life in an area of the world one-third the size of the United States, in which more than four million whites enjoy the highest standard of living on the face of the earth, by totally monopolizing political power over more than 35 million Africans and two million persons of Asian and racially mixed origins. The rules of the game are the same although the players are different in South Africa, the UN-mandated territory of Namibia (South-West Africa), the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), and Rhodesia. Each of these countries is a pigmentocracy in which the allocation of all resources is determined by only one factor, skin color. Where a man eats, where he sleeps and whom he sleeps with, the job he holds and the pay he receives, the language his children learn at school and whether there is any school at all are all determined by race. The rules are laid down and ruthlessly enforced by white-minority governments using massive force.

Violence means that every year more black South Africans are hanged than the combined number of capital punishments carried out in the rest of the non-communist world. Violence means that 500,000 black South Africans are arrested every year for the "offense" of walking in a white-only area without permission. Families are torn apart and women and children sent hundreds of miles to barren "homelands" they have never seen because it is illegal for blacks to be permanently resident in South African cities. Violence means 150,000 Portuguese troops maiming guerrilla fighters and innocent villagers alike and driving nearly 700,000 persons into exile. Violence means the Rhodesian government taking half the land of the country for 240,000 whites and leaving the least fertile remainder for five million blacks, while forcibly removing peoples from land they have settled for centuries. Violence in Southern Africa means day-to-day human subjection, physical famine and malnutrition, degradation and police brutality.

In my travels and visits to more than than sixty countries I have never seen injustice on a scale comparable to that of Southern Africa. Nowhere that I know does the stench of man's inhumanity to his fellow man foul so much of the air as in these countries. These are societies in which, in the words of the Angolan poet, physician and nationalist leader, Dr. Agostinho Neto, "Fear is in the air, on each street corner, and in each conscience seethes the fear of listening to itself."

The problem is to convince or coerce racial minorities who monopolize political and economic power to relinquish their privileged position. Whites in Southern Africa (3.5 million in South Africa, 240,000 in Rhodesia, 95,000 in Namibia, and 500,000 in Angola and Mozambique) systematically use violence to maintain their privileges. One wonders what forms of nonviolent coercion or persuasion could convince them to surrender or share power. Where are the economic or political carrots or sticks tasty or harsh enough to induce them to renounce a way of life? Yet those who believe that change can only come through armed violence by Africans to overthrow these regimes admit that the toll of lives would be astronomical, and that there is scant evidence that in the next five to

ten years Africans would win if they took up arms. Is there any alternative to a racial bloodbath in which the oppressed may be both victims and losers?

The facts of injustice in Southern Africa are well known. Defenders of these governments are prone to admit to their existence while pointing to similar injustices elsewhere. The problem is what, if anything, should the world do about it? Tons of paper and millions of words have been spilled at the UN for more than twenty years in a largely futile exercise. Southern African questions take up more than one third of the agenda regularly at every UN General Assembly and inevitably produce a number of resolutions calling for UN action which are vetoed or ignored by the major Western powers. No other issue so illustrates the impotence of the UN and the inability of a majority of its members to impose their will on the major powers. The world and the UN have largely relied on exorcist rituals, devoid of purifying powers, in the hope that international sorcery will be stronger than racist evil. It isn't.

The white-minority regimes continue to enlarge their arsenals, strengthen their economies, and deepen their oppression as the gap between black and white standards of living in these countries grows measurably (what economic development that does take place is largely confined to whites). Over the years a new expansionist element has been added as South Africa takes the lead with Portugal following in an effort to exercise economic and political domination over their independent black African neighbors of Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Swaziland, whose combined populations of 10 million are economic pawns of the white-minority regimes. In addition the three white-minority governments, although differing over details, have come increasingly to share military and security information, joint investments, and a shared commitment to the defense of fortress white Southern Africa. Only landlocked Zambia, with its ample copper reserves and a \$400-million interest-free Chinese loan to build a 1,200-mile railway north to Tanzania's port, has a fighting chance of escaping white Southern African clutches.

Why should the world be concerned about man's inhumanity in Southern Africa? After all, there is no shortage of injustice on planet earth. One reason alleged for involvement is that racism is worse than other forms of injustice in its combination of political and racial oppression. It also is more explosive in that its Southern African form threatens all human societies where blacks and whites are trying to live together. Yet the white-minority regimes and their external friends are the first to argue that their race-relations record is not all that worse than that of other countries, that it in no way constitutes a threat to world peace or security, and that attempts by the world to do anything about it constitute a gross violation of national sovereignty and interference in domestic affairs.

What distinguishes racism and oppression in Southern Africa from its counterparts elsewhere is its scale, dimensions, degree of violence, and total commitment by its perpetrators to its continuance. Moreover the United States Government and U.S. businesses are accomplices in Southern African racism as are Britain, France, West Germany and other Western countries. The United States sells \$1 million a years of arms to Portugal, its NATO ally; spends \$12 million a year on rent for an obsolete military base on the Azores islands; announced in December 1971 an offer of up to \$435 million in credits and loans to Portugal, which currently spends 45 percent of its national budget on its colonial wars in Africa; purchases under a quota \$50 million a year of Angolan coffee grown by white settlers with African forced labor, and \$5 million a year of South African sugar cultivated under similar conditions; retains a racially segregated NASA tracking station in South Africa, and encourages U.S. private investment which now totals \$1 billion in this part of the world. We are involved as are others because these governments depend on arms, trade, and private investment from the West to survive.

Another reason for global involvement is that the escalation of violence in Southern Africa is a threat to world peace. Guerrilla warfare in Southern Africa depends on bases in neighboring independent black African states. Increasingly these states and the guerrilla movements are looking to the Chinese, already their principal source of arms, as their only external defense against South African, Rhodesian, and Portuguese "hot pursuit" attacks.

Acknowledging that the world has some responsibility and concern for what happens in Southern Africa raises the question of external objectives and motives. One goal would be black power, replacement of white-minority racist regimes with representative governments based on African majority rule in countries where

blacks outnumber whites by from 8-to-1 to 20-to-1. This goal can in all likelihood only be achieved by massive violence with the corresponding risk of global escalation. A more limited goal would call for a sharing of power on a racial basis with elaborate checks and balances to keep either race from dominating. Such is the formula which Britain sought in its negotiations with the rebel white government of Rhodesia, although racial parity on the voters' roll and elsewhere is subject to white approval. A related formula is that of "equal rights for civilized men" in which a handful of Africans who have assimilated to white standards of living and life-styles are accepted into the dominant white society. This formula is espoused by Portugal, which claims that its African colonies are really "overseas provinces" and that it is willing to admit fully into Portuguese society all Africans who qualify. Yet substantial numbers of the handful of educated Africans, who make up less than 5 percent of the total population of 14 million, would rather be Angolans or Mozambicans than black Portuguese.

An even more modest goal is to use whatever external influence is possible to induce the white minorities to be less brutal. Emphasizing the lack of U.S. power and leverage in Southern Africa, President Nixon told Congress in February 1971 that all we can do is "to encourage the white regimes to adopt more generous and more realistic policies toward the needs and aspirations of their black citizens." The British government also confessed its impotence, especially its inability and unwillingness to use force to dislodge the Rhodesian white settlers. It negotiated a settlement which provides the right to vote to 64,000 whites and 6,000 Africans on a franchise based on property, income, education and race which ensures for another century that white voters will outnumber blacks.

Another often avowed objective is to do nothing since the white minority governments in their staunch and fervent anti-communism are the most reliable allies the West could hope to have in Africa. The late Dean Acheson was the keenest advocate of this view, contending that the closing of the Suez Canal meant that Western reliance on oil-tanker routes around the Cape of Good Hope required friendly governments in Southern Africa. The presence of a limited number of Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean and Chinese workmen on the Tanzam railway has strengthened the hand of those who argue that no matter how we feel about their domestic policies, South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia are determinedly anti-communist and willing to commit their own arms and troops. To many like Acheson, communism was much worse than racism, both as a system of government and an aggressive threat to world peace.

Twenty years of discussion of what the UN and the world should do about Southern Africa has served merely to articulate the different objectives. The advocates of black power tend to be the more militant African and Asian states. During the early 1960's they focused on demands for economic sanctions and trade boycotts to weaken or bring down the white-minority regimes. Even where these were applied by the UN, as in the case of Rhodesia, they were freely and widely violated, and while hurting the government, did not destroy or fundamentally weaken its economic power base. The flaw of economic sanctions, in addition to the problem of enforceability, is that at best they can pressure a weak government into negotiating. They cannot bring down a firm government determined to use arms to resist.

The black-power advocates themselves lack the weapons or the technology to defeat the whites. They are hard put to make even meager contributions to the various African nationalists movements which are forced to turn to the Chinese and Russians for most of their arms. Reflecting their own weakness and divisions the black-power advocates have increasingly focused on demands that the West should stop or slow down its supplies of arms to the white-minority regimes. Even these tactics have been frustrated by the ability of South Africa and Portugal to produce their own arms, especially with Western patents and licenses, or to buy what they need on world open arms markets.

Those who reject black power as a goal and violence as a desirable or necessary means of change in Southern Africa do so on two grounds. First is the pragmatic recognition expressed by President Nixon that "neither the military nor the economic strength is available to force change on the white-minority regime." Second, there is genuine concern to build societies in which blacks and whites could live harmoniously together, and a feeling that violence would fatally compromise such chances.

Those who believe that the African nationalist forces are too weak to overthrow or wear down these regimes, and that the West and/or the Chinese or the Soviets should not or will not intervene militarily, are now advocating

"dialogue" or communication. The foremost proponents of this view are Dr. Hastings Banda, president of landlocked Malawi, the only independent black African state with formal diplomatic relations with Portugal and South Africa, and the only black African leader to make state visits to both countries, and President Felix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. Dr. Banda has made a virtue out of necessity for his impoverished and landlocked country whose monetary economy depends on migrant labor, and road and rail links controlled by his white neighbors. President Houphouët-Boigny, not subject to such economic stringencies in a rapidly developing West African country closely tied to France, has argued that violence in Southern Africa will be futile and destructive, without improving the lot of Africans.

The advocates of dialogue, whether in the Ivory Coast, Malawi, Washington, Paris or London, contend that the whites' possession of superior force, technology and organization means that they are destined to win any violent struggle and perhaps consume much of independent Africa in the ensuing holocaust. They also assume that the West and the UN will be unwilling and unable to intervene. Therefore, only by opening lines of communication to those in power, who are almost certain to remain in power, can anything be done to avoid an eventual bloodbath in which the Africans would be the losers, and to ease the day-to-day misery of the oppressed. A concomitant of the endorsement of a policy of dialogue is a commitment to restrain from providing moral or physical support to the exile African nationalist movements and to discourage guerrilla warfare in Southern Africa. Some of the advocates of dialogue contend that the exile movements, ridden by factionalism and ethnic divisions, do not represent the African masses, and have become divorced from the changing realities of their own countries.

Other proponents of dialogue are currently focusing on the policies and practices of the 300 U.S. companies operating in Southern Africa whose total investment is nearly \$1 billion, as well as the lesser investments of French, Japanese and West German concerns and the more than \$3-billion private British holdings. A focal point of the dialogue is the South African distributor of Polaroid products who has agreed to raise the salaries of his non-white employees, improve their fringe benefits, and contribute with Polaroid to a fund for African education. Campaigns from the outside to pressure companies operating in Southern Africa to improve working conditions for their legally helpless non-white employees have been mounted in the United States, Canada and Britain.

Those who favor dialogue see it taking place at three levels. At the first are discussions on a diplomatic plane of equality between independent black African states and the white-minority governments. These talks would be free and far-ranging and would involve no prior commitments or conditions by either side. A corollary to such talks would be acceleration of current efforts by the United States and other Western governments to open up lines of communication in Southern Africa, to help overcome the extraordinary isolation of its white minorities.

A second level of dialogue would involve private and governmental pressures on foreign companies operating in Southern Africa. Robert S. Smith, Deputy U.S. Assistant of State for Africa, argues that "much can be done . . . to improve salaries, increase worker education and training, provide health and welfare benefits, including educational assistance to children of workers, and generally improve conditions and opportunities for non-white labor." Since white wages and earnings in these countries average ten to twenty times those of blacks, with the gap increasing in the last twenty years, the scope for such dialogue is obvious. The legal and other limits on wage and other benefits to black employees are far from being reached in societies where foreign investments earn 15 to 20 percent annually, twice normal U.S. profits.

The third level of dialogue is still on the dim horizon. It would result from the first two levels and convince white elites not only to be more generous toward blacks and browns but to accept them as equals rather than inferior human beings. The South African government has adamantly refused to accept any dialogue with any governments or groups outside South Africa which would also be open to South African non-whites. Similarly the Portuguese and white Rhodesians insist that there are no nationalist movements in their countries, only foreign agitators and terrorists with whom no dialogue is possible.

If dialogue were successful in raising the standard of living of some blacks, especially the urbanized, industrial wage-earning minority, what else might

happened? Some advocates of dialogue see rapid economic development eroding and softening white attitudes in Southern Africa. They argue that as whites realize the economic advantages of allowing blacks to do skilled labor, earn higher wages, and purchase locally produced consumer goods, an eventual willingness to share political power will take place. Certainly South Africa, although not Rhodesia or Portugal, does suffer from a critical shortage of skilled labor due to its economically irrational reservations of jobs for whites. Certainly its rate of economic growth could be a lot faster if it would drop these and other racial barriers. Indeed some South African industrialists believe that improved working conditions and wages for blacks and a more rational allocation of labor would make it easier for whites to have sufficient means for both internal repression and personal luxury. The relationship between economic development and racial and political attitudes is complex and not easily predictable. In South Africa, nearly 50 percent of blacks work in urban areas within the monetary economy. The figure is less than 25 percent elsewhere in Southern Africa. The deepest physical poverty and open repression lies in the rural areas, where the nationalist movements hope to recruit guerrilla fighters and the industrialists cheap and docile labor.

A few businessmen familiar with Southern Africa argue privately that economic advances by blacks will not lead to nonviolent change but will speed up an eventual bloody showdown. They contend that as blacks attain semi-skilled and skilled posts and additional earning power their frustrations, aspirations and organizational skills will rise accordingly. Unlike the 1960's, when their illegal strikes and passive resistance were easily crushed by massive firepower and intimidation, they might in the future be in a position to cripple economies dependent on more than cheap unskilled black labor. Again the problem remains the time-scale, with any economic gains in the next few years serving to further consolidate the position of the present governments.

Neither dialogue nor economic isolation as tried in the 1960's will bring about black power in Southern Africa. Economic sanctions will not work because there is too much money to be made in violating them, and because in the end the white-minority governments will not crumble before economic coercion. Dialogue may succeed in raising wages and improving working conditions for the skilled and semi-skilled who are in a position to benefit from demands for equal pay for equal work. It will leave the rural peasantry and the urban unskilled as disadvantaged as ever. As long as expenditures on education of white children are 50 to 100 times greater than on blacks, blacks will be relegated to economically subordinate jobs.

The discussion about what the world should do about Southern Africa is distorted because there is no reliable way of knowing what Africans want the world to do. All opposition political movements are banned and their leaders imprisoned, in exile or underground, and all but underground political activity is crippled from the outset. Some Africans, especially in the Portuguese colonies, are fighting for independence under black-majority governments. Others are making tacit accommodations to the awesome power with which they are daily threatened. No one in Southern Africa believes that some external *deus ex machina*, whether the UN or "world opinion," can bring change, with or without violence. Those who advocate violence see no other alternative if Africans are to achieve their own self-determination. The African nationalist leaders are well aware of the heavily stacked odds against them. They ask for limited military and political aid from friendly external governments and organizations and denials or restraints of such aid to their well-armed and financed opponents.

The confrontations at the Organization of African Unity and elsewhere between the "gradualists" who favor dialogue and the militants who advocate guerrilla warfare has prompted the militants to modify their strategies. What they now tend to seek from external governments and interested parties are three measures. The first is disassociation, militarily and politically, from the racist regimes. It means minimizing contacts with them, discouraging foreign private investment, and pressuring companies there to withdraw if they cannot within a specified period of time produce labor-relations practices consistent with those that prevail in their home countries. It means refusing to sell arms of any kind to these governments although recognizing that at a higher cost they will be able to locally produce and buy weapons on the open market.

Disassociation in the case of Rhodesia would mean for some dropping the UN sanctions which have patently failed, while keeping to a minimum diplomatic and other contacts with the white-settler government. Many African states insist,

however, that the UN retain sanctions and refuse to deal with Rhodesia, even if Britain grants it independence.

Since the 1971 World Court decision finally affirming UN jurisdiction over Namibia, the pre-World War I German colony given in 1919 by the League of Nations as a trusteeship to South Africa, disassociation takes on a new dimension in that troubled land where South Africa has insisted on extending its apartheid policies. The militants oppose any form of a plebiscite which would, given South African control of the administration, be a sellout. Instead they want South African authority to be systematically refuted at every point, including non-recognition of its passports and legal documents for Namibia, and a concerted effort to have U.S., and other companies operating there pay their taxes to the legal authority, the UN, rather than the illegal South African government.

The second set of measures proposed are specified multilateral commitments, preferably through the UN and its specialized agencies, to assist the neighboring landlocked black African states to enable them to resist South African and Portuguese pressures. An aid consortium for Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and Zambia has been proposed with a funding of \$100 million a year.

An additional financial commitment is also asked for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to provide manpower and vocational training for the 700,000 refugees from Southern Africa. Since blacks are *de facto* and *de jure* systematically denied opportunities for higher education and skills it is only among the refugees that the middle-level manpower so vital to the future of these countries can be provided.

The third and most controversial measure consists of limited non-military assistance to the African nationalist movements presently engaged in combat, such as the PAIGC in the West African Portuguese colony of Guinea (Bissau), FRELIMO in Mozambique, and the MPLA in Angola. This is the strategy adopted by the Swedish government and the World Council of Churches as well as several volunteer organizations in North America and Western Europe which offer help to these and other movements.

An element of confusion in the clash between advocates of dialogue and guerrilla warfare stems from their picking different targets. Dialogue usually means South Africa, seen by most as militarily impregnable, while guerrilla warfare means the Portuguese, the weakest and logistically most important link in fortress white Southern Africa. The Portuguese colonies provide essential rail-heads and ports as well as docile migrant labor for Rhodesia and South Africa. Portugal's own military expenditures absorb 45 percent of the national budget of the poorest and most conservative and stratified society in Western Europe. The commitment of 150,000 troops to fight in Africa, out of a total population of 9 million, represents the equivalent of 2.5 million U.S. troops in South Vietnam. If and when the Portuguese will to continue to pay the human and economic costs of staying in Africa falters, then the prospect arises of South African military intervention, possibly to prop up a white-settler government in Angola or Mozambique.

Tanzania and Zambia, which provide sanctuaries for guerrillas operating against the Portuguese colonies, have vainly sought Western and UN help to mitigate the risks of escalation. Rebuffed, they have had little choice but to turn to the Chinese, who appear to be involved in Southern Africa for the long run. Scheduled for completion in 1974, the railroad north from Zambia to Tanzania will have to be defended against the white Southern African sabotage as it becomes the principal means for an increased flow of arms to the nationalist movements. This will conceivably mean Chinese air cover since Western powers have refused requests from Tanzania and Zambia to develop their air forces and missile defenses.

The nationalist movements operating against the Portuguese are hampered by poor terrain, lack of equipment, ethnic dissension and rivalries, and restraints placed on them by their host countries fearful of Portuguese escalation and counter-insurgency. They have been most successful in Guinea (Bissau), where there are no white settlers in a West African colony the size of Massachusetts with a population of 800,000, now more than half occupied and administered by the PAIGC nationalist movement. In Angola and Mozambique the Portuguese have used napalm to drive villagers out of the country and to deny to guerrillas local cover. Yet the movements are making slow but steady gains, acquiring daily new military and administrative experience and, in Mozambique, operating in the vicinity of the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project, the \$400-million joint Portuguese-South African investment. This project will provide South Africa

with 8 percent of its total electricity needs and a pretext to intervene militarily if Portugal falters.

Elsewhere in Southern Africa nationalists have yet to show an ability to successfully undertake guerrilla warfare, either in urban or rural areas. The evidence indicates that the initial showdown will come in the Portuguese colonies, possibly within the next ten years, if and when Angola, Mozambique and Bissau are in black nationalist hands, then Rhodesian lines of communication, rails, roads and ports will be indefensible and even South Africa will be externally vulnerable for the first time. However, there is no guarantee that the nationalists will militarily defeat the Portuguese, that public opinion in dictatorial Portugal will turn against the war or that South Africa will not intervene to save Lisbon.

While the militants focus on the Portuguese and what can be done through disassociation from them, multilateral aid commitments to their neighbors, and limited non-military aid to the nationalists fighting them, the advocates of dialogue rest their case on relations with South Africa. The incompatibility between the two policies is real though, since South Africa is the first line of support if Portugal weakens. Portuguese settlers and the current government in Lisbon would probably prefer to swallow their pride and be bailed out by the white South Africans, rather than transfer power to the nationalists. Some advocates of dialogue agree with U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers that because Portugal does not have racist laws on its books and formally endorses equal rights it should be singled out and encouraged.

I am personally skeptical about the kinds of changes that dialogue as presently proposed can bring about. Rather than seeking to change from the outside the attitudes of whites, we should be seeking to bring psychological and material comfort to their victims. Visits and visitors, entertainers and sporting events, are fine provided that they take place between outsiders and local Africans, and not merely whites. For instance, Senator Bayh of Indiana has suggested that preference should be given to sending black American diplomats to posts in Southern Africa, a way of saying loudly and clearly that the United States believes that blacks are not inherently inferior to whites.

Yet I am not sanguine about violence eventually righting injustice. The strongest argument for disassociation, support for neighbors, and commitment to the nationalists may be that race relations in the West will improve. Any contribution to the massive change needed in Southern Africa might just be marginal. Whatever the outcome, some change is needed from present policies which denounce these governments, call for nonviolence in societies where massive violence goes on daily, and then tacitly acquiesce in providing loans, arms and investments to the oppressors. Rhetoric and UN resolutions have not worked. Their hypocritical continued pursuit can only weaken the UN and widen the awesome credibility gap between its goals and its means. The world should do what it can do about Southern Africa: help shorten the bloody struggle of the nationalists by lowering the odds against them.

APPENDIX H.—NEW YORK TIMES EDITORIALS ON NORTH AFRICA
BY C. L. SULZBERGER

[July 23, 1972]

LINKING AFRICA TO EUROPE

SKHIRAT, MOROCCO.—Africa is short of many things as a result of a history as dark as the skins of many of its peoples but there is no dearth of new ideas, original if not always practical. There has been a ferment of experimentation since colonialism waned.

In the northeast, Nasser attempted a form of Arab socialism and dreamed of concentric power rings linking oil, Africa and the Arabs. Haile Selassie developed his Ethiopian capital as the focal point of evolving continental politics.

President Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic, which lies abeam southeast Africa, sought to interest foreign finance in a huge deep-water port at Marinda Bay, to service the gigantic supertankers that ply between Europe and Arabia around the Cape.

And now King Hassan II of Morocco wants to turn northwest Africa, generally called the Maghreb, into a transit point through which the continent's raw materials can be sent across the Mediterranean to Common Market Europe.

Hassan doesn't think this region is ready to develop its own Common Market because this would require far more industrialization than is yet conceivable and also agreements among participating countries that they would each specialize in certain regional production while abandoning other fields. He adds:

"The best way we can adapt ourselves to the ten-nation European Community, which we welcome, is by turning the Maghreb into a kind of commercial channel from which African products are sent to Europe and European products are brought back. We could develop ports and refrigeration centers to preserve agricultural produce for shipment.

"This is especially important with the Suez Canal closed and the long route around the continent in use. A more suitable and convenient transit route could reach from North Africa across the Mediterranean.

"It would require extensive work and capitalization but there are already some communications lines, for example the railway from Casablanca to Tunisian ports and the road northward from Colomb-Béchar to the Mediterranean. Nor is there any reason why a new rail line cannot link Senegal and Mauritania with Morocco and Algeria."

Many arguments can be adduced against such a plan, including the huge cost and the time required to develop it, but it shows a basic trend among the Maghreb nations of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, seeking to look both southward to the sub-Saharan continent and northward over the sea to Europe.

Nevertheless, while feeling this attraction to a Mediterranean outlook, Hassan typifies a reluctance to formalize relationships among nations bordering that famous sea as suggested in recent years by France's President de Gaulle. The Moroccan ruler says:

"In contemplating a Mediterranean pact or even a conference to discuss one, it is necessary to consider evident contradictions. The Mediterranean has become both too big and too little. It is too little because the smallest tempest there involves us all and it is too big because political and economic distances between different Mediterranean lands are too wide.

"In any thought of such a grouping, one could not exclude NATO allies like Italy or Turkey, or non-NATO lands like Spain, or a country like Egypt that has been closely linked to the Soviet Union. All of them border the same sea.

"De Gaulle's idea was certainly related to his intention to withdraw from the NATO organization and to his policy of decolonization in former French Africa. De Gaulle knew France could not play a Great Power role as against the United States or the Soviet Union. But he hoped to demonstrate that France could be a great power with respect to Africa. And of course, any eventual project

that would neutralize the Mediterranean by excluding non-Mediterranean fleets would leave the French Navy supreme.

"In a sense the concept is still alive in Algeria and above all in Tunisia and despite de Gaulle's death, it is kept in mind in France. And Yugoslavia is especially interested, for obvious reasons, in creating a non-aligned Mediterranean.

"But that is very, very hard to do. Just suppose the Mediterranean nations wanted this and asked the Russians and Americans to pull out their ships. Do you suppose they would agree? And how would anyone be able to push them?"

Hassan answers his own question by concentrating on ways of linking Africa and Europe more closely economically and commercially across the Mediterranean as a north-south conduit for trade. For him commerce seems the answer, not strategy or ideology.

YOUTH, SPACE, AND TIME: KING HASSAN SEES ISLAM UNIFYING MOROCCO

[July 26, 1972]

RABAT, MOROCCO.—Unusual interest abroad focuses on the American electoral campaign not merely because there is a striking difference between certain defense and diplomatic policies as enunciated by Mr. Nixon and Mr. McGovern but also because the recent Democratic convention was seen as a dramatic manifestation of a problem concerning most contemporary nations, regardless of ideology. This is the famous generation gap.

In various ways the discontent of youth with its elders has been demonstrated during recent years in the United States, Yugoslavia, Egypt, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, to name but a few. There is an explosion of young people with explosive ideas. It is sometimes hard to recollect that, as a South American saying goes, "In the eyes of our grandparents we are all revolutionists."

For Morocco, this a key question because, like many developing lands, it has a disproportionate number of youngsters and, not being heavily industrialized, has difficulty providing the kinds of jobs they want—in sufficient quantity. It is estimated that half this country's seventeen million people are 21 years old or less.

King Hassan II is clearly concerned with fitting this energetic and enormous mass of youngsters into his country's uneasy social structure. He says: "There will always be a generation gap. The young want space and the old want time." But then he adds:

"Here we have ample opportunities for young people. We lack sufficient cadres in our technical and administrative branches and there is so much to do that any bright youngster can find his chance. You often see a 25-year-old engineer working beside someone twice his age. Many employers are younger than their employees."

The principal problem, he contends, is psychological. If a nation's youth feels out of tune with that nation's society, difficulties begin. Yet he thinks this is ultimately easier to face here than in a highly advanced land like the U.S.A. where youth is so evidently feeling restless.

Morocco, like other undeveloped countries, has immediate room for bright young men when they finish their education. They need not wait for years, feeling frustrated, because an older managerial class is already installed and slow to give way. The only thing is to insure that youngsters are not rendered needlessly impatient by "stupidities."

With this in mind, the King emphasizes Islam as a stabilizing force to knit the community together. He thinks this provides the necessary cement. But, in talking of Islam, Hassan makes clear he is speaking of it "as a way of life" and not just as "a religious faith."

It is not his intention, he says, to try and get between a man and his creator, to intrude into his prayers. This is his private affair. The King himself has a holy personal position as a direct descendant of the prophet Mohammed.

Indeed, he stresses religious tolerance by acknowledging that, despite fanatical passions that infect some corners of the Moslem world, the two men he most admired (apart from his late father, King Mohammed V) are Pierre Mendès-France and Léon Blum, both French Jews.

Of Blum, he says: "He was a great upholder of the law, a fine jurist. He spoke for public responsibility to the law and of the relationship of the law to the public. No one with any legal understanding can fail to appreciate his qualities." The King has a law degree himself.

What he means when referring to Islam as "a way of life" is that it can be a steadying force because it specifies the rights of an individual but also specifies that an individual has no right to abuse these when that interferes with other members of the community.

"Islam," he said, "is practical—and not only a contemplative religion. It teaches certain social rules of communal behavior and lays down a relationship between the government and those it governs." Hassan's idea is that understanding between differing age groups can be increased if guided by some philosophical conception such as this.

It is an interesting conception but not entirely different from similar approaches both in Catholic or Protestant-dominated states on the one hand and Communist states on the other. In each instance, there seems to be disinterest among the youth with inherited doctrinal ideas.

And, as everywhere, there is impatience here—especially among educated youngsters. Whether Hassan can, in effect, encourage here a kind of Moslem Democracy is moot.

THE WAY AND THE WHEREFORE

(July 28, 1972)

"A war would come only if the United States or the Soviet Union felt itself directly menaced."

ALGIERS.—It is still too early to assess the importance of the withdrawal—at President Anwar el-Sadat's request—of the bulk of Moscow's enormous military mission in Egypt. Such is the view of Houari Boumediene, President of Algeria and one of the Arab world's most important leaders.

For Boumediene: "This could be just a tempest in a glass, not a big development. It has had a great deal of publicity but the event itself, as such, was not of major interest. What was actually done is less significant than the way in which it was done and why.

"One might be able to deduce—although I do not know—that Cairo is indicating it would welcome some sign from the United States that the Israelis will now be pressed to evacuate the Egyptian territory they hold. During the next 2 or 3 months we should see."

President Boumediene points out that had Cairo simply wished to send home several thousand Russians because their training and instructional job had been accomplished, this could have been discreetly done. On a smaller scale, something similar occurred here.

Algeria's forces are largely equipped with Soviet weapons and there has been a Russian military mission that was greatly reduced—in precisely the unadvertised way Boumediene mentions. But Sadat obviously had a reason for emphasizing his move, this, for the Algerian President, is the key.

He reckons it is a safe assumption that the Middle East was discussed in Moscow when Mr. Nixon visited Mr. Brezhnev. Was some kind of new approach, some accord on defusing the area agreed on then? Is the Cairo move a signal to Washington?

"The departure itself isn't what counts," Boumediene believes. "But if it is a signal that means an eventual reorientation in U.S. policy, then it could be a historic event. If it only means the Russians are no longer needed to the same degree in Egypt, then it is unimportant.

"But we cannot assume the United States will profit from the occasion. Were President Nixon to insist Israel should return to its June 1967 frontiers, that would be a real change." Boumediene, however, indicates skepticism.

He tends to dismiss as insignificant the purely strategic aspect of the Soviet departure, even if it eventually affected the accord under which Moscow's fleet is privileged to use facilities in Egyptian ports.

"The future status of Soviet naval facilities there is not," he says, "strategically important. The Russians and the Americans are side by side in the Mediterranean just as in many other seas. And it is far too soon to estimate if the recent move will, in the long run, prove to be of any influence in naturalizing the Mediterranean as we would like."

"The global military balance isn't," he argues, "dependent on whether 10 or 15,000 Russians leave Egypt or even whether there are fewer naval facilities in the long run. What really matters is this: If in the near future the United States decides, perhaps on the basis of the Soviet departure, to play a determining

role in the Middle East, then that event, the Soviet departure, would prove of historical importance.

"But if the United States continues a passive or even aggressive attitude toward the Arabs, nothing fundamental will have changed, nothing important will have occurred.

"Personally, I hope, of course, that this is, in fact, the beginning of a major shift and that, apart from the change in the Middle East, we can also look back on this some day as part of the process of neutralizing the Mediterranean. We don't need foreign fleets here. I don't see any advantage to us in having either the American or the Soviet fleets in the Mediterranean.

"There is certainly no economic reason for it. It has no political interest for us. It presents us with no advantage in either our internal or regional security. The only strategic aspect it has is global. And there will be no war started over this question. A war would come only if the United States or the Soviet Union felt itself directly menaced on its own territory."

"If" is the key word in all of Boumediene's speculative assessments of this move that has so stirred the Arab world. But then, he points out, the smaller nations are always forced to conjecture on the real meaning of events involving the superpowers—whose secrets are rarely disclosed in advance but whose actions can have profound effect on all nations.

THIRD WORLD AND NEW WORLD

[From the New York Times, July 30, 1972]

ALGIERS.—Algerian President Houari Boumediene foresees in the 1980's a global energy crisis that will vastly enhance the importance of the Arab lands with their reservoirs of petroleum and natural gas. This fact in itself will help provide the answer to what kind of new international balance is developing and whether the superpowers are truly opening a new era of peace or simply preparing to redraw the map.

Boumediene, who obviously prays for the former development, points out that the Third World of weaker and for the most part recently liberated countries "represents a majority of the people of this planet. Our atom bomb is the size of our populations."

He devoutly hopes the five major groupings shaping up will establish a positive equilibrium among themselves and also vis-à-vis this Third World, thus helping the latter to advance. The five groupings he refers to are the United States, the Soviet alliance bloc, the new and expanded Common Market, industrial Japan and eventually, a dynamic China.

Come what may, Boumediene says Third World nations must learn to depend upon themselves, not others. He adds: "Neither America nor Russia will fight their battles" and then recalls: "Algeria never accepted foreign volunteers during our liberation war. To die for Algeria was an Algerian affair."

The President concedes that recent developments in international relationships could improve the position of nonaligned nations but it is still too early to judge. Thus, he says, "Certainly the Nixon visits to Peking and Moscow were a positive factor and helped détente by reducing tension.

"And if there is really a new basis in international relationships and reduction in strains, a new era could be starting. But we mistrust the great powers simply because we are small. We don't yet know what is really behind recent contacts among them. Nor do we know if the departure of 400,000 U.S. troops from Vietnam is for humanitarian or strategic aims, if it is simply an indication of another American strategy.

"After all, other occurrences in the past year are plainly worrisome. We saw Pakistan taken apart by force—and, I might say, without any help from its U.S. ally. Even if our political relations with India are in some ways closer than with Pakistan, we were frightened to see a country militarily torn apart. This was a serious precedent for us to watch."

Boumediene makes no bones about his hope that rearranged groupings among powers or blocs will establish a stable framework reducing the fear of war and the need for bases. He says: "What we need in the Mediterranean is fleets—not of naval vessels but of oil tankers and cargo boats."

He adds the wish that peaceful commercial and technical competition among the Big Five will benefit Third World lands which need industrial and scientific help and that, on a larger scale, this competition will succeed in a positive way to the kind of competition between separate European countries which developed bilateral contacts here.

No nation or group is commercially disadvantaged by ideology, to Boumediene's pragmatic way of thinking. Algeria, which considers itself a socialist state, hasn't the least objection to doing business for mutual advantage with capitalist states.

"This is a different kind of world nowadays," Boumediene reasons. "It is not a question of great ideas elaborated in other lands. Events are moving too fast for old-fashioned ideologies."

Moreover, existence of formal political relations is not an essential precondition to flourishing exchanges. Boumediene stresses that although there are still no diplomatic relations with the United States (broken in 1967 during the last Arab-Israeli war), trade ties continue to develop, including massive contracts for liquefaction and export to America of Algerian natural gas.

The real problem, as he sees it, is the maturing relationship among the five new power groupings and their relationship with the underdeveloped Third World. He expects it will take time before the outlines of these patterns are discernible and he hopes that what he identifies as vestigial colonialist mentality in some nations will vanish.

This is of crucial importance, according to his logic, because by the next decade all five power groupings must depend increasingly on Third World oil and gas. Unless the pentagonal structure he now envisions assumes a stable balance first, the possibility could remain of neocolonialist aspirations developing as the thirty powers seek energy to fuel their industrial machines.

APPENDIX I.—THE INTEGRATION OF THE MAGHREB: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS BY ROBERTO ALIBONI¹

[From the Atlantic Institute, May 1972]

During the decolonization period the ruling classes of the Maghreb (the area comprising Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) were already deeply imbued with a sense of the historical and cultural unity of their countries and were determined that this unity should be given institutional form at the earliest possible date. Maghreb unity was one of the specific objectives of those who fought to throw off French rule, just as unity was one of the dynamic ideas which inspired the process of decolonization throughout Africa. To those who were fighting for African liberation, the ideal of unity meant different things at different times: a key element in the forging of national identity, a political program, a means of fuller development, and increased economic output, and sometimes all these things at once.

According to the ideology of the African independence movement, unity was considered to have been an essential feature of African society in pre-colonial times. The colonizing powers having Balkanized Africa, it was the mission of the new generation to restore that unity and reestablish the historical and cultural identity of the African peoples. These ideas, of course, were not firmly grounded in history. The native kingdoms and empires which had brought Africa some measure of unity had already disappeared or were crumbling away when the European colonists came on the scene. The Maghreb, in particular, was never governed by unitary political institutions except for quite short periods, notably that of the Almohades in the 12th and 13th centuries. The area undoubtedly possesses a unity of culture, but this has expressed itself throughout history in a tripartite political division similar to that of the present day. At the same time, this idea of historical and cultural unity has had its political effects. It had a concrete influence during the struggle for independence and continues to have one in the present postcolonial phase.

The idea of unity was in itself a program. Thus the Pan-Africans insisted that the continent must unite politically in order to speak with one voice and carry proper weight in the great world of interdependent states—a doctrine clearly and forcibly expounded in Nkrumah's early writings. Moreover, the cause of unity was dear to those Africans who set most store by hastening the economic development of their backward continent, an essential condition of which, in their view, was to create a geoeconomic unit of adequate size. In the early stages, the functionalist view of African integration was only one of the aspects of the Pan-African program. This program, however, faded rapidly into the background as the first national structures began to take shape. As a result, African functionalism became detached from the more complex integrationist ambitions of the Pan-Africans. Losing its former political leaders, it reembodyed itself in the team of "Afrocrats" associated with the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).

In the Maghreb, apart from these African roots, the idea of unity has its own political and cultural antecedents in the Arab world. The political theme of a reborn Arab nation is a stimulus to the aspirations toward unity that certainly exist in the Arab countries. Another factor working in the same direction is the idea of the restoration of Islam and the importance of a religious culture transcending individual states.

¹ Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome.

FUNCTIONALIST EXPERIMENTS

However, in the Maghreb as elsewhere in Africa, the effects of independence has been to take the steam out of unitary aspirations. The cultural impetus toward unity remains, but it has not borne fruit in the form of political and institutional planning. The idea of unity has generally survived in its functional form. It is, however, a functionalism stripped of political content which rests only on theories of economic integration and does not attempt to bring political implications into prominence. If we except the Madagascar-Mauritius organization (Organisations Commune Africaine Malgache et Mauricienne—OCAMM), which is more concerned with forging closer links with France than with African unity, we find that even such a modest initiative as the East African Community (EAC) is virtually a dead letter in the political sphere, while functionalist experiments pursue their course throughout Africa, uneventfully on the whole, under the aegis of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which stands guard over the national sovereignty of the participating states and their freedom from mutual interference.

In the Maghreb, an experiment in economic cooperation of this nature was set on foot by the Tunis and Tangier Protocols of 1964 and the Comité Permanent Consultatif du Maghreb (CPCM). Significantly, it was UNECA, the African functionalist organ, which brought about the initial meetings for this purpose early in 1964. By these protocols, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco agreed to grant one another trade preferences, to work out a common customs policy and a joint program for their principal exports and to "coordinate and harmonize industrialization policy in their four countries." To further these purposes, they set up a council consisting of the four Ministers of the Economy, with the CPCM as its permanent secretariat.

The pattern being a functional one with little political content, relations between the Council and the CPCM are based on the principle that initiatives must come from the former. Decisions have so far taken the form of protocols; that is, international instruments which have no binding effect inside the member states. The first four ministerial conferences (at Tunis and Tangier in 1964, Tripoli in 1965, and Algiers in 1966) resulted in the establishment of the CPCM and a number of special committees, which have so far had little or no chance to prove themselves. The fifth conference, at Tunis in 1967, seems to have instituted the exploration of ways and means to bring about Maghreb economic integration. The sixth, held at Rabat in 1970 after several postponements, was marked, on the one hand, by the defection of Libya, and, on the other, by the suspension of the initiative which appeared to have been taken at Tunis in 1967. We shall discuss below the present phase following on the Rabat conference.²

Meanwhile, it is clear that Maghreb integration, even in the economic sphere, is a very shaky example of functionalism. As for politics, relations between states in the area seem to follow a historical pattern that has been analysed by George Liska as follows. "1. North Africa's tendency, at work since Roman times, to divide into a system of three separate units * * *. 2. A related tendency for the wing powers (Tunisia and Morocco) to overcome both differences between themselves and affinities with the Algerian center and to ally themselves against the center when it engaged in expansionist and subversive policies."³ As will be seen, the prospects for Maghreb integration depend on the interaction of this historical pattern with current moves for economic cooperation.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION : THE FIRST STEPS

The most delicate and important phase of economic integration in the Maghreb up to the present is that of 1967, including the Tunis conference in November of that year. The joint institutions which had existed since 1964 had 2 years in which to define their own scope and method of activity, but they lacked a detailed program such as that laid down, for instance, in the Rome Treaty or the Treaty on East African Cooperation, nor had there been any closer definition of the general objectives set out in the 1964 protocols.

² Information in this paper concerning the evolution of Maghreb integration is derived from a set of cyclostyled documents kindly sent to me by Mr. El Kasri, the secretary of the CPCM. These include the UNCTAD report on possible ways of advancing toward Maghreb integration, on which the second section of this paper is based.

³ George Liska, "The Greater Maghreb: From Independence to Unity," Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1963, p. 6.

Accordingly, the CPCM, aided by the secretariat of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in 1967, drew up an overall plan embodying different alternatives and laying down a scale of priorities, as well as stringent procedures for concrete moves toward integration. This, at least in the original intentions of the Maghreb leaders, was to lead to economic union.

The proposals fell into three categories: A maximum, a minimum, and an intermediate program. The first of these provided for the signature of a treaty laying down a timetable for economic union after a transitional period, with the complete elimination by fixed stages of quotas and customs duties and the creation of a common external tariff. The free circulation of goods within the customs area was to be subject to temporary exceptions in favor of new industries in the member countries, after prior agreement as to their siting. Steps were to be taken to achieve a common agricultural policy and coordinate action in the economic, social, fiscal, and monetary spheres, and a bank was to be set up to finance those projects which would carry forward the process of integration. To assist the fulfillment of this ambitious program, joint institutions were to be set up and given powers of decision "at least"—as the report cautiously put it—"in certain technical fields where the necessary flexibility could not be achieved if each member state were free to exercise a veto."

Both the minimum and the intermediate program left aside the question of institutions, the progress of integration being regulated by intergovernmental negotiation and agreements. The minimum program envisaged consultation on the siting of new industries and a semipermanent process of negotiation, without time limit, as regards the internal liberalization of trade. As to foreign trade, it recommended the elimination of preferential regimes such as that in force with regard to France.

The intermediate program involved: the partial liberalization of internal trade—with a "community preference" not exceeding 30–50 percent—together with appropriate norms in regard to the origin of goods; product-by-product negotiations in the agricultural sector, consultation on siting of new industries, with a provision for limited protection within the Maghreb in the event of disagreement; a payments union; consultation procedures in regard to foreign trade policy; and in particular, joint negotiation of the terms of association between the Maghreb and the EEC.

The Ministers selected the intermediate program, and instructed the CPCM to carry out the necessary further studies and to draft an agreement for a 5-year transitional period of cooperation based on the following principles: (a) The preparation of an agreed list of industries whose products would enjoy free entry and uniform protection in the Maghreb countries; (b) across-the-board liberation as a stimulus to trade within the area; (c) the coordination of tariffs vis-a-vis third countries; (d) the encouragement of trade in agricultural products; (e) the creation of a special bank (*Banque Maghrébine d'Intégration*) to finance projects of common interest; (f) the creation of a multilateral payments system; (g) the situation and special problems of each country would be taken into account so that all might benefit equitably from the process of integration (this was especially for Libya's benefit).

For all the weakness and ambiguity of its institutional framework, this was a program of integration based on firm commitments and a realistic approach to the typical obstacles that beset an agreement of this kind among developing countries: the need to protect infant industries on the home market; the increased "polarization" effect in areas already relatively developed; loss, through lowered tariffs, of customs revenue which accounts for a substantial proportion of the budget of less developed countries; and so forth.⁴ The objectives laid down were concrete and not unreasonably ambitious.

It seemed as though Maghreb integration had really got underway. But the meeting fixed for June 1969, at which ministers were to have approved the plan prepared by the CPCM, failed to take place. It was postponed first till August 1969, then till March 1970, then—Libya having dropped out following the Republican coup—till July 1970, when it was held at Rabat and met with failure. The ministers, unable to reach agreement on the plan they had commissioned as long ago as 1967, deferred the matter to a seventh conference for which no date was set; the CPCM was meanwhile instructed to carry out further studies, to no apparent purpose.

Clearly something had happened to block the integration mechanism that had just got underway. We shall try to identify the causes of this stoppage.

⁴ UNCTAD, "Trade Expansion and Economic Integration Among Developing Countries," New York, 1967, ch. IV and V.

The course of Maghreb integration was arrested, at all events for the time being, by two interconnected developments. The first was the conclusion, in March 1969, of the 5-year association agreements which marked the completion of the first stage of the long-drawn-out negotiations between the EEC, on the one hand, and Morocco and Tunisia, on the other. The second factor was that, after coming to power in Algeria in June 1965, Boumedienne consolidated the position of his technocrats with an ambitious program of national development set out in the 4-year plan for 1970-73. We will consider this factor first.

Reporting the failure of the ministerial meeting at Rabat which brought a long-nurtured program to nothing, *Le Monde* of July 28, 1970, observed that "the chief stumbling block seems to have been industrial cooperation," while the final communiqué made it clear that progress toward Maghreb unity must be "subordinated to the right of each country to exercise its own fundamental choices in the political and economic field".⁵ This was in fact a reference to the Algerian 4-year plan and the firm determination of its authors not to permit any interference until such time as it had taken shape in the form of industrial plant and tangible output.

The attitude of the Algerian leaders is based, first and foremost, on their decision to endow the country with a substantial heavy industry resting on three main foundations: Iron and steel, engineering, petrochemicals, and other oil processing industries. Algeria's iron and steel industry was created at Annaba (Bone) and, like that of Italy, is based on water. The Annaba plant has a capacity which could rapidly rise to 2 million tons a year and is equipped to produce rolled steel, sections, and tubes. As regards oil processing, in addition to refinery, the Arzew complex is designed to produce ammonia and methanol, while both Arzew and Skikda are being equipped for the liquefaction and processing of natural gas and the production of fertilizers, plastics, et cetera. Automobile manufacture will be concentrated at Algiers for lorries, Oran for passenger vehicles, and Constantine for engines and tractors. The Algerians intend to finance three-quarters of this huge effort from their own resources; oil products are of key importance in providing the necessary foreign exchange, for which reason they say they are "sowing oil to produce a harvest of industry."

It was open to Algeria to exercise its basic economic "option" in one of two ways: either within the framework of a wider industrial complex embracing the whole Maghreb, or on a national basis confined to Algeria herself. The Algerians opted firmly for the national alternative, and in consequence had no choice at Rabat but to hold up the program of integration, which specified limitations on the siting of new industries, as well as the obligation to consult. Algeria thus became the first member to assert "the right of each country to exercise its own fundamental choices." From a regional viewpoint, Algeria is today an inward-looking country, preoccupied with its own development and its home market and determined to give these priority in its economic relations with the outside world.

The question, however, is whether Algeria's home market is adequate to the course of development on which she has embarked. If the country's 4-year industrial effort achieves the hoped-for success by the end of 1973, its technocratic leaders will be faced with the problem of securing foreign markets for the output of plants which, to be economic, must operate on a certain minimum scale which is, at any rate for the time being, too high for the domestic level of consumption. It should be recalled that an ammonia plant such as the Algerians are in the process of setting up has an output of some 1,000 tons per day.⁶ Similarly in the automobile industry: if the lorries, tractors, and passenger vehicles of Algiers, Constantine, and Oran are to be produced cheaply and efficiently and not as mere assembly jobs, there will at once be a problem of finding markets for them, since home purchasing power will certainly not increase fast enough to absorb the bulk of the national output.

When the Algerians come up against this difficulty they may once again see virtue in integration and may even seek to enlarge the boundaries of the Maghreb

⁵ The Algerians have invoked another argument against the launching of Maghreb integration, and this is the question of foreign investment, which is accepted by Tunisia and Morocco with reservations. If integration got under way, such investments could constitute a real problem for Algerian economic policy. This is a major issue, and a complex one, which strikes at the integration process in all less developed countries. It has arisen in East Africa, where Kenya has tended to accept foreign capital while Tanzania took the contrary view. The question arises to a very wide degree in Latin America. I have thought well to leave this point to one side in the present paper. But however well founded the Algerian position, the fact cannot be overlooked that little has been done to set afoot discussion of a common policy for foreign investment in the Maghreb.

⁶ Pierre Desprairies, "L'industrialisation du bassin méditerranéen," *Revue de défense rationnelle*, Paris, March 1971, pp. 391-411.

to include Libya, their natural partner in petrochemicals, and Mauritania. But if and when that happens, an essential condition will be lacking: as a result of the Algerian plan, the associated countries will no longer start on the same footing. Up to now, the countries to be integrated were all more or less equally backward; but if the Algerian plan is a success they will be on different levels, and the effect on Tunisia and Morocco of "polarization" toward Algeria will be aggravated by political tension between what Liska calls the "centre" and the "wings." This problem is one of which Tunisia and Morocco are well aware, and we may now examine their attitude.

RELATIONS WITH THE EEC: THE ROLE OF TUNISIA AND MOROCCO

Tunisia and Morocco are in no position to emulate the ambitious course chosen by Algeria. Although the three countries are differently constituted from the political and ideological point of view, in all of them the social scene is dominated by the petty-bourgeois urban class which has turned itself into an administrative and bureaucratic elite—except that in Morocco which, while it controls the economy, is excluded from politics by sections of society close to the monarchy.⁷ This similarity of social structure does not prevent, in the short term at any rate, the existence of a dynamic political system in Algeria and a weak one in the other two countries. Tunisia, after the expulsion of Ahmed Ben Salah and the suppression of an attempt to socialize the development process, is still in the throes of a crisis prolonged by the uncertain outcome of the quarrel between "liberal" and "conservative" elements. Morocco, suffers from the paradox of an *élite* confined to an economic role and shut out from politics by the classes linked to the monarchy. Apart from any question of outside interference, the attempt on the life of King Hassan bears eloquent witness to the deep-seated social and economic crisis in Morocco.

Even if Tunisia and Morocco were today more stable politically, Algeria surpasses them in economic resources and the quality of its cadres. Tunisia and Morocco are well aware of Algeria's potential supremacy, and a detailed analysis would easily demonstrate that, from the moment when Algeria became independent, both countries have pursued policies designed to stem such a development.⁸

According to the foregoing hypotheses, the "wings" join together to block the supremacy of the center. This tendency has taken concrete shape in their association with the European Economic Community, which was also encouraged by various other elements. The effect of this association has been to create a three-sided situation which, in accordance with certain rules that we shall now examine, sets up regional balance insuring against the risk of Algerian supremacy.

The rules of this game derive from the negotiating position taken up by the Community in 1965, when it was laid down that an identical settlement would be concluded with the three Maghreb countries, even though they might independently present different demands. The Community in fact indicated that it would prefer to negotiate with a single government representing the whole Maghreb. In the event, it negotiated separately with Morocco and Tunisia at these countries' wish, while nevertheless upholding the principle recorded by Zartman that "both the Commission's report and the Council's instructions ruled out the negotiation of separate provisions within the framework of parallel association agreements".⁹ Thus, paradoxically, the Commission rather than the Maghreb insisted on the latter being treated as a single entity.

This is of particular importance in the context of our present discussion. In the first place, if Algeria's interest in regional integration should revive, she would have to take account of the association ties established with the Community by the other two Maghreb countries. Second, the latter's rule of equal treatment means that Algeria could not attempt to enter into a special bilateral relationship with it.¹⁰

⁷ This account of the social structure of the Maghreb follows Samir Amin, "Le Maghreb Moderne," Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1970, pp. 169–170.

⁸ See Liska's analysis, *op. cit.*, pp. 23 et seq.

⁹ I. William Zartman, "Potere negoziale e integrazione regionale: Il caso Maghreb-Cee" (Negotiating power and regional integration: the Maghreb and the EEC), in *Conflitti e Sviluppo nel Mediterraneo* (Conflicts and development in the Mediterranean area), Istituto Affari Internazionali, Il Mulino, Bologna 1970, p. 166.

¹⁰ While in theory the consequence of the Community's intervention is such as has been described, in practice the rules of the agreements of association are incompatible with Maghreb integration. To appreciate this fact one need only examine article 4, line 3, of the agreements in question, which sets up regulations governing the origin of products along lines completely opposed to those which would be required by integration or by a Community policy genuinely favorable to it. See Mr. Tnani's study.

Hence the two "wings" have allied themselves against the center, bringing into play the countries bordering the Mediterranean to the north. This situation shows clearly the link, mentioned earlier, between the functionalist principle and the historical behavior of the Maghreb.

PROSPECTS OF MAGHREB INTEGRATION

Our conclusions so far may be summed up as follows:

(a) The Maghreb is at present in a state of balance resulting from Algeria's thrust toward hegemony and the corresponding alliance between Morocco and Tunisia. This balance is the only sound political basis on which to renew the theme of Maghreb integration, the prospects of which will otherwise be jeopardized in the not-too-distant future by intensified Algerian pressure for trade outlets.

(b) The internal equilibrium of the region depends, in some degree, on the links forged with the European Community by Tunisia and Morocco acting in concert. Consequently the prospects for Maghreb integration are to some extent dependent on the Community's policy toward the Maghreb and the Mediterranean in general.

The association agreements between the Community and Tunisia and Morocco have at present little practical scope. The Algerians have now stripped down their special relationship with France, which was the root cause of their country's peculiar situation vis-à-vis the Community. The latter may thus be enabled, perhaps when the existing association agreements fall due for renewal, to replace them through regional negotiation with the Maghreb as a whole, on the lines it has always sought. At that time, toward 1973, it will be possible to form an idea of how the Algerian 4-year plan is turning out. If the plan is successful, the EEC will be confronted by a complex situation, involving the interaction of its own relations with the Maghreb as a whole and relationships within that area.

If, by then, the Algerians are already seeking outlets for their iron and steel and oil industry products, they are not likely to encounter much success in Western Europe. It is true that the system of general preferential tariffs will by then be in force, enabling Algeria to export on favorable terms and without reciprocity, but it will not have been in effect long enough to influence the situation substantially. Similarly, while ideas for a different international division of labor may have made some headway, they will still be in an elementary stage. In the medium term, Western Europe can only offer a partial and limited outlet to Algeria's budding industries.

Consequently Algeria will have to fall back on the Maghreb market and invoke the principle of integration which she now rejects. The involvement of the European Community and its share of responsibility for events in the Maghreb will then be clear, and the situation will be a test of its policy. It should press, when the moment comes, for association of the Maghreb as a single regional unit in which financial and technical aspects, as well as commercial ones, are welded together.

By using their financial and technical resources, the "wings," with judicious aid from the Community, will be able to maintain the balance with the center and avoid resisting the Algerian quest for markets. Such a balance, granted the existence of other necessary conditions, could form the basis of a regional integration acceptable to all concerned.

APPENDIX J.—REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BY CHAIRMAN
CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR. AND REPLIES FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUGUST 18, 1972.

HON. DAVID D. NEWSOM,
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Pursuant to the hearing of July 19, and my statement at the close thereof that there would be some additional information which we would appreciate being supplied by the Department, I am now writing to state that we look forward to receiving additional supporting information on the following:

What is the basis for our military presence in Morocco, and for utilizing the naval communications facility at Kenitra?

What are the precise terms, financial and otherwise, of the understanding on Kenitra?

What is the duration of the understanding?

What is the quid pro quo?

What is the function of the facility? What do we do there?

How important is it to our defense effort?

What are the specifics of our commitments to Morocco?

What is the official American presence in Morocco?

What is the size of the VOA facility in Tangiers? What is the VOA presence?

Who operates the VOA station?

Is there training of Moroccans there?

How does this compare with the VOA operation in Monrovia?

Do the Moroccans have full access to the facilities?

What services does the Kenitra communications facility perform for the Sixth Fleet?

Is the existence of our facility at Kenitra one of the factors used by the opposition in Morocco against the King? To what extent has this happened in the last year since the coup? And previous to the coup?

Does the Sixth Fleet make visits to Morocco? For what purpose? And does this cause a stir in the Moroccan press or in Morocco at all?

What is the text of Qadhafi's speech in June on the occasion when the American Ambassador felt constrained to walk out?

Finally, we would appreciate receiving a comprehensive picture of U.S. aid, grants, credits, guarantees, and loans and other assistance, of all kinds, military and economic, to the countries of North Africa and the bridge countries (Spanish Sahara, Mauritania, Chad, and The Sudan) for the past five years.

Your cooperation is greatly appreciated. It would be of particular assistance to the Joint Subcommittees if the information requested could be received by the 5th of September.

Sincerely,

CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., September 11, 1972.

HON. CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am replying to your letter of August 18, to Mr. Newsom concerning U.S. policy toward North Africa. The following information is in amplification of Mr. Newsom's testimony on July 19.

Question. What is the basis for our military presenec in Morocco, and for utilizing the naval communications facility at Kenitra?

Answer. The United States acquired military facilities in Morocco in 1950, during the period of the French protectorate. Through agreement with France, these facilities included three SAC installation at Ben Guerir, Ben Sliman, and Sidi Sliman; an Air Force material depot with SAC; fighter units at Nouasseur and a naval air station at Kenitra. The naval air station included a naval communications facility.

After acquiring full independence in 1956, Morocco questioned the status of these bases. In 1959, as a result of discussions between President Eisenhower and King Mohamed V in Casablanca, it was agreed that U.S. military forces would withdraw from Morocco by the end of 1963. The United States adhered to this timetable, and the last base was closed or turned over before the end of 1963. U.S. personnel remained at Kenitra under a separate understanding.

Question. What are the precise terms, financial and otherwise, of the understanding on Kenitra?

Answer. In 1963, it was agreed that, in exchange for our continued use of the communications facilities, Kenitra would pass under Moroccan control and that we would assist the Moroccans with training in telecommunications and base operations. Command of the station was relinquished to Moroccan military authorities on December 16, 1963.

Question. What was the duration of the understanding?

Answer. There is no specified time limit.

Question. What is the quid pro quo?

Answer. No specific quid pro quo has been involved. We have provided various types of training to the Moroccans and continued to contribute to the general maintenance costs of the facility.

Question. What is the function of the facility? What do we do there?

Answer. It is a communications facility and a part of our worldwide system. As already noted we also train Moroccans in telecommunications and base operations. The facility helps provide communications to U.S. forces in the western Mediterranean and eastern Atlantic areas.

Question. How important is it to our defense effort?

Answer. Owing to its location, the Moroccan facility is at present an important part of our communications network. Without it, our communications capability in the area would be impaired. As communications satellites come into wider use, the importance of the facility to us is likely to diminish somewhat.

Question. What are the specifics of our commitments to Morocco?

Answer. Other than the agreement on Kenitra we have no specific commitments to the Government of Morocco. We have no commitment to assist the Government of Morocco in the event of an attack or to help it meet any internal or external threats. We do, from time to time, sell military equipment under credit arrangements and cash sales.

Question. What is the official American presence in Morocco?

Answer. Military presence—there are about 1,350 U.S. personnel (primarily Navy) associated with the Kenitra complex including the communications facilities. We also have a small military liaison section (35 authorized) associated with our credit sales and training program and an attaché section (14) assigned to the Embassy.

Civilian presence—300, plus about 2,000 civilian and military dependents.

Question. What is the size of the VOA facility in Tangier? What is the VOA presence?

Answer. The VOA relay station at Tangier consists of four 100-kilowatt short-wave transmitters, four 35-kilowatt shortwave transmitters, and two 50-kilowatt shortwave transmitters. It employs nine American and 86 local personnel.

The station manager, deputy manager, and key supervisory personnel are American.

Question. Is there training of Moroccans there?

Answer. Fifteen local employees are currently enrolled in correspondence courses. Sixteen local employees are receiving on-the-job training.

Question. How does this compare with the VOA operation in Monrovia?

Answer. The Tangier facility is smaller. Monrovia employs 13 American and 102 local personnel.

Question. Do the Moroccans have full access to the facilities?

Answer. Official Moroccans have full access to the facilities. Tours for others are arranged upon request.

Question. What services does the Kenitra communications facility perform for the 6th Fleet?

Answer. The facility helps provide communications services to 6th Fleet units as well as other forces in the western Mediterranean and eastern Atlantic area.

Question. Is the existence of our facility at Kenitra one of the factors used by the opposition in Morocco against the King? To what extent has this happened in the last year since the coup? And previous to the coup?

Answer. From time to time the existence of the facility has been mentioned by the opposition, but has not been a significant factor in the year since the 1971 coup attempt.

Question. Does the 6th Fleet make visits to Morocco? For what purpose? And does this cause a stir in the Moroccan press or in Morocco at all?

A. The ships of 6th Fleet make periodic visits to Morocco, primarily to provide port liberty for the crew. These visits seldom are the subject of adverse press attention.

Question. What is the text of Qadhafi's speech in June on the occasion when the American Ambassador felt constrained to walk out?

Answer. The text is enclosed.

I also enclose the most recent comprehensive summaries of U.S. assistance to the countries of North Africa and to Spain. The Spanish Sahara is currently a province of Spain.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID M. ABSHIRE,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

Enclosures.

AL-QADHDHAFI SPEECH

TRIPOLI DOMESTIC SERVICE IN ARABIC, 0931 GMT, JUNE 11, 1972

(Speech by Libyan Revolution Command Council Chairman Colonel Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi at evacuation anniversary celebration—live)

(Text) In the name of God, the merciful and compassionate. Prayers and peace on Muhammad, the last of the prophets and the arch apostle. Thank God, the lord of the two worlds.

Brothers, it is a pleasure to greet, with all my heart and in your name, the brothers who insisted on participating with the people of the Libyan Arab Republic in celebrating this anniversary, which is not only a domestic anniversary but also one of the anniversaries of the nation, because it is the anniversary of the liberation of a spot dear to the Arab nation. In your name, I greet brother President Ja'far Numayri, the leader of the May 25 revolution. [Applause.] No matter how much imperialism ganged up against it, no matter how much the anti-Arab nationalist forces tried to undermine it or to drag it to the left or right, this revolution, which expresses the noble origin of the fraternal Sudanese Arab people which they derive from the great Arab nation—this May 25 revolution, as its leader last night confirmed to us at the RCC, is still proceeding along the course of freedom, socialism, and Arab unity. [Applause.]

Whenever imperialism and the imperialist henchmen rejoice because the revolutionary Arab ranks have been paralyzed or one of the national revolutions has lost its revolutionary character, Arab purity rises above events and confirms, as President Ja'far Numayri confirms here today, the May 25 revolution, is still proceeding along the path with the September 1 revolution.

In your name I also greet dear brother Chairman Houari Boumedienne, [applause] who insisted on attending this immortal day with you despite the long and exhausting trip he was making to mend the split in the African Continent and to confirm the Arab role in the African Continent. Despite this exhausting trip, Chairman Houari Boumedienne, the representative of the revolution of a million martyrs, insisted on attending, to prove that the Algerian revolution is also one of the tributaries of Arab nationalism and has the right and duty to attend this great anniversary.

In your name, I also greet President Idi Amin, [applause] who spoke to you with an open heart. In his speech, he expressed the real nature of the people of Uganda and Africa in general. This leader smashed one of the Zionist links in the African Continent. The former Uganda governments were incapable of doing anything for the Ugandan people. Instead, they fettered the people with a Zionist octopus.

Sad to say, all the Arabs were deceived by the fake progressiveness represented by Obote, who was the bitterest enemy of Islam and the bitterest enemy of the Arabs and of the freedom of Africa because he established Zionist bases in Uganda. That erroneous stand was a mistake recorded against Arab diplomacy. The facts today are revealing and establishing what was going in Uganda, such as premeditated criminal aggressive action directed against the Arab nation and consequently against the freedom of the African continent.

We greet this leader who is today raising the banner of African unity and of freedom in Africa. He also raises high the banner of Islam in the heart of the black continent. [Applause.] He insisted on being with you today although according to the schedule of his trip he should have left last night.

I greet dear brother Dr. 'Aziz Sidqi, the Prime Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt. I also greet brother Sayyid Mar'i, the ASU representative in the Arab Republic of Egypt. Although I now mention them in the greetings, I do not consider them as guests here. Libya and Egypt are now witnessing a change in the map of the Arab area and a genuine cohesion between the pioneering July 23 revolution and the September 1 revolution. [Applause.]

I greet also the Secretary of the Presidential Council of the Confederation of Arab Republics. I regard him as having come to his country, not as a guest.

Brothers, it is our right to celebrate and to be proud today as we see a people few in number who, in a short while since their will has been freed, have managed to smash the biggest base of aggression belonging to the biggest state on earth—that is—the United States. This happened only because the Libyan people had resolved to liberate their land and to live free from spheres of influence and bases and, if there were a vacuum, to fill such a vacuum themselves with their deeds, efforts, and intrinsic strength.

Eisenhower's doctrine about filling the vacuum was imposed on this people. The agent rulers who controlled this people accepted it. This aggressive base as well as other imperialist bases were imposed on the people, who were brought into the spheres of influence. The rulers used to say, and the entire world was taken in by this big international lie, that Libya was part of the free world. The free world under the leadership of the aggressive United States was a world full of bases. It was a world full of domination and subjugation of weak peoples. It was a world full of U.S. domination and of destructive, aggressive U.S. bases scattered on the land of what it called the free world.

What does this mean? It means today we must be more enlightened and understanding, because of what the big powers on the horizon, whether from the East or the West, are promoting. Those who promote democracy and the democratic world are like those who promoted the free world. They are imperialists if they want, on this basis, to push the land of small peoples into spheres of political, economic, or military influence. This logic is rejected by the September 1 revolution, because when this revolution speaks about the issues of destiny, it does not act courteously or equivocally, for it speaks about an issue concerning a nation and a sacred question—the question of freedom.

Brothers, we are entitled to celebrate today. This day does not deserve only celebration and applause. It is worthy of blood with which to write the document of liberation whose anniversary we are celebrating today. The destruction of the U.S. bases could have been achieved after offering groups of martyrs. We were prepared to make such an offer. On the night of September 1, 1969, the artillery regiments led by free unionist officers surrounded the base with the field artillery which was then in the hands of the free unionist officers. The officers were determined to destroy this base if it were to act against the September 1 revolution, or attempt to oppose the revolutionary upsurge of the Libyan people on the dawn of September 1. [Applause.]

A clash was then possible. An actual battle was possible and we would probably have had to make great sacrifices on the dawn of that day. We were not hesitant at all about clashing with this aggressive base to achieve the freedom of the Libyan people on the dawn of that great day. Therefore, the day we are celebrating today does not merit celebration alone but also deserves the blood which we were prepared to spill to write the document of liberating this land from the biggest aggressive imperialist base.

This base was imposed upon us. We were told that we belonged to the free world and that the United States would defend us. What was happening in this base? There were 34 Libyan civilians unjustly and wrongly killed by American soldiers at this base. This was the price this country had to pay for belonging to the free world. In other words, this was the price the people paid for living in an

area protected by the flag of a major power, the United States. This is the fate of those who live protected by the flag of a major power under the name "free world," "democracy" or any other name. This is their fate. Our people have had their experience living under the free world—the great lie which they call the free world but which is an enslaved world. Some 34 Libyan nationals were killed at this base. They were innocent people whose only guilt was that they lived on their land near this base looking forward to and dreaming of the day when they would return to this base.

Some 1,898 other incidents took place, including theft—the Americans used to steal from the Libyans—attacks on our honor, our sacred things, and Libyan houses; destruction of farms and the burning of crops; the beating of people—the Americans used to beat the people without anybody being able to raise his voice because they were under pressure from both sides, an agent government on one side and an imperialist base on the other. There were 1,898 such criminal incidents including beatings, attacks on honor, burning of crops and blowing up of houses. These were only some of the incidents, mentioned as an example of the activities of this base and the price this people paid while living in the sphere of influence of a major world power.

When we speak today of the evils of discrimination and exploitation under the occupation of any major power, we actually do so out of experience and speak of a fact which we lived, suffered, and paid the high price of. This was not described as imperialism, but it was said that the United States was a friend and we belonged to the free world. We were part of the free world which paid the price. The Libyan people paid the price at the time.

When the United States occupied this base, it was not only occupying the base but always striving to turn Libyan territory into an American base, heedless of the Libyan people, their independence, freedom, and dignity. These things are not thought to be part of the strategy of a big power like the United States. But what the United States planned was to turn all Libyan territory into bases. After the establishment of this base, another base was established at Bir as-Samilat, which you know. The base still exists up to this time. [As heard.] This was an occupied Libyan land which was used for stockpiling ammunition for U.S. strategic planes and for storing the available nuclear bombs.

They were not satisfied with all this. They occupied large tracts of land in (Mutya) which they turned into a runway for their aircraft. Many kilometers of Libyan land in (Mutya) was denied to their owners. These owners were not permitted to set foot on this land, graze on it, or pass through it when crossing a road. The sky of (Mutya) and large tracts of land, in addition to this base which everyone knows, were denied to the Libyans. The base itself was continuously expanded. They reached as far as the Gulf [al-Khalij], where they established Mutrabin) [words indistinct]. It was another base for regulating sea navigation for the U.S. naval forces and the 6th Fleet. This base, a fenced piece of land, existed in the gulf area to serve the United States and its strategy in the Mediterranean. The Libyans were not permitted to enter this base.

The Americans had another airport in Misratah. They laid their hands on an airport there and called it Ra's Hadid Airport. This airport belonged to the U.S. base. They extended along Tajura coast. They established a radar base and covered all the agricultural land in the area with aerials and wires. More and more such land was denied to its owners. Had it not been for the revolution, all Libya would have been turned into an American base because the struggle between the United States and the forces opposed to it was continuing. The United States therefore was continuously striving to dominate more land and more spheres of influence. This continued to take place until the September 1 revolution came into being. It used to take place in the name of the free world and was carried out by the United States, leader of the free world.

We state all these facts so that all those concerned will learn the lesson that seeking the assistance of a major power is like jumping out of the frying pan into the fire.

This was not described as imperialism, spheres of influence, or expansion, but as defense of the free world. This was the state of affairs on this land. But when truth came and falsehood vanished, and when this people resolved to live free, they faced the United States. This smallest nation in the world faced the biggest state in the world with a free, unhumiliated, unparalyzed, and restricted will.

When the negotiations on evacuation were being held with the United States, the people surrounded the hall in which the negotiations were being conducted and were determined that the meeting should not end before the evacuation was

announced. In fact, the people imposed their will that day and the evacuation was announced despite the United States and despite the U.S. strategy and the struggle which compelled the United States to turn this area into a sphere of influence. This is because on that day a free will was demonstrated and the people were determined to achieve victory or die. We told the Americans on that day that there were only two alternatives. We told them that they either evacuate or Libya will be turned into unbearable soil under your feet. We actually began training hundreds of youths in the schools, universities, and institutes. We did not announce or advertise this fact or cause a clamor. We began preparing for a popular resistance war. We were not after propaganda, as we actually sought to wage a sacred war to achieve our freedom or die on our land.

When the United States was convinced that the words were translated into deeds the next morning, it submitted to the will of this free people and left this base, defeated. The great United States was utterly expelled by a few people who resolved to attain their freedom. This is the example which the Libyan people give to the peoples who struggle for their freedom and who seek a way to victory and for confronting the dangerous forces.

But brothers, this victory which we are celebrating today with pride and honor will remain incomplete if the people stop halfway in order to sing the hymn of victory without looking ahead at the long road before them, the road on which they must proceed. Evacuation was a national achievement, but was only a step toward the major national battle. This people will not be dazzled by the victories achieved on the dawn of September 1 or of June 11, when they removed and crushed the U.S. bases. This people will not be dazzled by the victories and will not stop to sing the praise of these victories. For the people found in this a means, not an end. They found in this a means to achieve a great aim and a great objective—the freedom of all Arabs and the unity of the entire Arab nation.

For this reason, after these national victories the people of the Libyan Arab Republic went to fight other battles, not only on the domestic level but also on the national level; from the first day, this people raised the slogan of the pan-Arabism of the battle and declared that their freedom was incomplete and would remain incomplete as long as there is a single Arab people still enslaved.

This was the truth, which we should not ignore, a fact that imposes itself on us. Our freedom to this day is incomplete and will remain so as long as there is an Arab people suffering from imperialism. The freedom of the Libyan land, despite the Libyan people's victories against the forces of imperialism, will remain incomplete as long as there is one bit of Arab land occupied by imperialist soldiers. The freedom of the Arab territory and of the Arab nation will remain incomplete and the Arabs, most bitterly, will remain humiliated as long as a bit of Arab land remains occupied, an Arab people is displaced, and as long as Arab capitals are under the threat of imperialist aggression.

Brothers, we thank God who did not allow us to be dazzled by victory [few words indistinct]. We thank God who guided our steps along the right path and did not make us slip in labyrinths and on secondary roads which actually lead to dead ends. God has guided the steps of this believing people because they remember God and he gave them victory. God grants victory to the believers.

God has guided this believing people on the right path. It is the path of Arab unity, the path of resurrecting Islamic strength. It is the path that the law of God prevails on earth and that the name of God alone and not the name of the great powers (tyrants), or kings is raised on earth. Brothers, we must praise and thank God almighty because these victories which our few people achieved in a short time could have made them deviate or become haughty and desist from following this path.

Praised be Allah who guided our steps along the right path. The people of the Libyan Arab Republic announced that their freedom was still incomplete and that what they had achieved was only the means not the end. The great battle is the battle of the Arab nation—the battle of Arab destiny, freedom, and unity.

Despite the social construction—the modern economic and material construction—whose foundations were laid down by the people of the Libyan Arab Republic in 2 years—despite this period which is very short in the life of a people—the people of the Libyan Arab Republic were able to lay down the foundations of the socialist society, the humanitarian society, and the Moslem society, which worships only Allah, resorts only to Allah, and seeks the assistance of only Allah.

In this short period, this people few in number were able to lay down the foundations of a genuine modern renaissance which is an established fact, not mere words, on Libyan territory. Yet our people were not preoccupied by this

work. They were not weighed down by these production projects. They also did not become regionalists. The Libyan people believed that socialism must be achieved throughout the vast Arab land. Consequently, following the September 1 revolution, the Libyan people became a party to the social struggle in the Arab land from the ocean to the gulf. The entire Arab land became the base of the socialist experiment.

But had we wanted to turn into small states, paper scraps and float in the orbits of bigger and stronger powers, we would not have entered these battles and taken this distant view. It would have been enough to have an economic experiment here, and a (similar) economic experiment elsewhere.

The unionist view, however, which seeks to build an economic Arab strategy independent of capitalism and communism is Arab socialism. The Koran speaks very frankly about its principles, the rights of man under it, and about the society of prosperity and progress under it. If we want to build this society, we cannot live within narrow regional borders which are fabricated and fake, fabricated by imperialism and perpetuated by the reactionaries.

We must look outside these borders and look at the entire Arab area in which prosperity must prevail and on which Arab socialism must be built. That is why the Libyan people have been a party in the social struggle which is now taking place on Arab land. Why are we a party to the struggle taking place in the far Maghreb? It is because we want to enter into problems? This is not entering into problems. This is also not [word indistinct] and not a search for [word indistinct]. This is an inevitable [word indistinct] for us.

We as a revolution consider our freedom incomplete so long as the freedom of the fraternal people in the far Maghreb is incomplete, whether due to domestic or foreign forces. U.S. bases still exist in the far Maghreb just as this base used to exist here. How could the Arab people here remain indifferent to their brothers, the Arab people there, when they are living under the U.S. influence which we smashed here? We are in a battle against the United States. Therefore, we have to fight the United States even in the Arab Maghreb. Our freedom remains incomplete so long as the freedom of the Arabs is incomplete. [Chants: One Arab people!]

If we want to build socialism, we should not provide feeble formulas. We are party to the socialist battle taking place between [few words indistinct]. If we want to build socialism, then this means that we are party to the socialist struggle in the Arab homeland. If we want to build Arab unity, then we must not be emotional but believe in Arab unity as the destiny of the Arab nation. Therefore, we must be a party to the unionist struggle in the Arab homeland. Otherwise, we will fail in our [few words indistinct].

We believe in Arab unity. Arab unity is not an emotional demand. Arab unity is the destiny of the Arab nation. It is necessary to the life and freedom of the Arab. So long as this is our belief, then we do not mind being a party to the unionist struggle in the Arab land, whether this is the Arab Maghreb or the Arab East. We are party to this struggle for the sake of the future of the Arab nation. Our principles compel us to become a party to this struggle. These are social facts which must be understood by everyone.

We have no personal conflict between us and any Arab ruler or with any Arab government. We have no Arab border disputes. We do not covet any other Arab border. There are no direct relations which lead to a conflict between us and any other Arab regime. The conflict stems from these principles, axioms, and incontrovertible facts of the Arab nation. [Cheers for Arab unity.]

Therefore, everyone in the Arab homeland must understand the real reasons for the conflict in the area and why there are parties to this conflict and why there are forces on this side and other forces on that side. This is a historical inevitability. The Arab map must change. The Arab state of affairs must change for the better. Arab civilization must be revived. The banner of Islam must be raised anew. The world of Allah must be uppermost, and the word of the nonbelievers must be at the bottom. The religion of Allah must prevail throughout the land.

These are facts which motivate life, create history, and change the map of the world. These are the facts which man has experienced, is experiencing, and will experience in the future. These are facts which we cannot ignore. If there is a true genuine revolution, it will not disregard the battle for Arab unity, the building of Arab socialism, or the changing of the Arab map. It will revive civilization and Islam and will define its position and identity regarding the East and the West. This is not fanaticism, alinement, isolationism, or hostility to anyone.

We befriend those who befriend us and antagonize those who antagonize us. Let East and West understand this slogan well. [Applause.]

Therefore, the September 1 revolution, as it celebrates one of its liberation days as a day of upsurge of the revolutionary will, wages the national battle and raises the banner of pan-Arabism of the battle and the banner of pan-Arabism of fedayeen action. This slogan was not raised for local consumption, but is an established fact. The whole world bears witness that Libyans were martyred in the Al-'Urqub battle. Libyans were martyred on Palestinian territory itself. There are hundreds of fighters from the few Libyan Arab people fighting battles at this hour alongside the Palestinian fighters on the usurped land and on the occupied border. Hundreds of Libyans. Let the world hear how the slogan turned into fire burning the enemies on Arab territory.

We raised the slogan in this place on a day like this last year on June 11 when we opened the door of the sons of the Libyan people to volunteer to fight with the Palestinian resistance. What has happened so far? Hundreds of Libyans are in the ranks of the Palestinian resistance at this hour. Hundreds of Libyans have come forward. There are martyrs who have fallen in battles. The Libyan people have ceremoniously received the martyrs. The entire world saw that martyrs fell and that Libyan blood mingled with Palestinian blood for the sake of Palestine. This is fact, not a slogan or mere words. [Applause and cheers.]

On this day, while feeling confident that we are right, we declare another important thing which will have an effect by our next [anniversary] celebration, God willing. Today we declare that the Libyan Arab Republic—even if it is alone—will be responsible for all the supplies, training, and expenses of every Arab from the ocean to the gulf who wishes to volunteer for the sake of liberating Palestine. [Applause.] The Libyan Arab Republic declares to the sons of the Arab nation from the ocean to the gulf that it will open its Embassies to register the volunteers, and it also authorizes the Fatah offices anywhere in the Arab homeland to receive the Arab volunteers. The Libyan Arab Republic also opens its territory to train those Arab volunteers, whatever their number, to furnish field, arming them, training them and bearing their expenses. [Applause.]

This is the real translation of the slogan of pan-Arabism of fedayeen action which the Libyan Arab Republic raised. Libya translates this slogan today into action to place the entire Arab nation before its responsibilities and destiny. The sons of the Arab nation from the ocean and gulf must not hesitate to give their names to the Libyan embassies and Fatah offices in any Arab territory, so that the Libyan Arab Republic may be responsible for sending them to the battlefield, arming them, training them and bearing their expenses. [Applause.]

This decision was made by the first congress of the ASU, which represents the people's working forces having a right to and interest in the revolution. This decision was submitted to the first ASU National Congress at its secret session. It approved it unanimously. The decision expressed the Libyan people's desire to contribute toward liberating their Arab nation. The holiday we are celebrating today is a real holiday. It is a step on the path to the great liberation—the freedom of the Arab homeland from the ocean to the gulf. [Shouts of "unity, Numayri."]

Concerning the slogan "Pan-Arabism of the battle," which is raised by the Libyan Arab Republic's people, I wish to stress now with all pride that some Arab states, headed by Algeria, have responded to the call for the pan-Arabism of the battle. Brothers, we are proud and strong, and time favors the Arab nation's cause. Brothers, when Algeria joins the pan-Arab battle, the enemy will revise his calculations in this area. Algeria is an effective Arab force and the course of fighting will change when it enters the battle.

Brothers, when I returned from a tour of the Arab homeland in 1970 in connection with the pan-Arabism of the battle, I said then that the Arab nation was doing well. Now it has been ascertained by us that this great nation is still doing well and is still blessed. We are also certain that this nation still gives for the sake of redemption and liberation, we are certain that Algeria, which offered 1 million martyrs, has not been preoccupied with its national victory. It is not content only with Algerian victories. Rather it steps forward today to participate in the pan-Arab battle for the sake of the Arab nation's freedom. [Cheers and applause.]

On this great day, we hail the fraternal, heroic, revolutionary Algerian people and hail their leader, dear brother Houari Boumedienne who represents true Arabism and who represents in this area the Arabism of this area, Arab chivalry in this area, Arab people of unbounded generosity. [Cheers and Applause.]

Nay, you have the right, brothers, to salute Algeria and its hero, who pools all his resources for the national battle. [Cheers for unity.]

In harmony with the correct stands toward history which a revolution such as the September 1 revolution must adopt, the Libyan Arab Republican declares to the world that unless a final decision is reached regarding the occupied Arab land called Saguia el Hamra—northern Spanish Sahara—by the end of 1972, the people of the Libyan Arab Republic will shoulder their responsibility by kindling a popular war for liberation in this area. This is because the freedom of Saguia el Hamra is like the freedom of Algeria and the freedom of Palestine. [Cheers for Numayri and unity.]

Brothers, reaction in Morocco is trying to conspire to sell the freedom of an Arab land which is dear to you and from which your honorable fathers and forefathers came. It is Saguia el Hamra which was a bridge between Andalusia and the motherland. Saguia el Hamra, brothers, instills several historic factors in our heart and injects factors of sacred wrath and dormant revenge in our blood. Saguia el Hamra is not an empty desert which has no value. It is not only a land rich in phosphate and minerals for reaction in Morocco to conspire with the imperialist forces to burglarize and exploit like a milk cow, but represents something dearer than any substance, dearer than manganese, dearer than phosphate, and dearer than the oil which is found there. Saguia el Hamra represents a sacred bridge over which our fathers and forefathers passed while opening Andalusia and while returning from there in the face of the barbaric expedition against the forces of Islam in that area.

Therefore, we have told all parties concerned that the issue of Saguia el Hamra is our issue too. The freedom of the Arab man in Saguia el Hamra is freedom of the Libyan people and any other Arab people. The freedom of the Arab territory of Saguia el Hamra is part of the freedom of Libyan territory. Therefore, we have told all parties concerned that unless a final solution is reached regarding this issue by the end of 1972, we will shoulder our historic and national responsibility by kindling a popular war for liberation in that sacred land. And let those who collude see what they will reap in return.

Believing in these historic facts which govern life and which, as I said, we cannot ignore, and in harmony with the national stand for which there is no substitute—that any course other than the course of unity and any stand other than the national stand are a desperate attempt to plough the sea and to follow a blind alley—in harmony with this, from the start we announced that we stand with the fraternal Iraqi people, who are being subjected to the plotting of world capitalism, which it is trying to humiliate the Iraqi people.

Despite political differences with the Iraqi Government, we announced our full support for the fraternal Iraqi people [words indistinct] against the monopolist forces and against the forces of aggression and against the forces of terrorism which want to dominate the freedom of the Arab peoples, even if this is done by threats to their livelihood and national income. Therefore, we tell the Iraqi people: We are with you and we will not leave you alone. The battle is one, the enemy is common, the destiny is one, and, God willing, victory is inevitable in the end.

At this moment, we hail the bold step taken in Syria and Iraq. We stand in awe of this blow to the forces of Western imperialism. Likewise, we hail the revolution of Algeria and the revolution of September 1, which were among the first to take the initiative in liberating the Arab will, smashing the bases of evil and crushing the oil empire which claimed that through oil it could arbitrarily rule the Arab people's freedom. However, the champion Algerian people have smashed this legend. The heroic Libyan people have crushed this image, which has now also been smashed by the people of Iraq and the people of Syria.

Brothers, I told you during the anniversary on this day last year that there were only two issues between us and Britain—a domestic and a national issue. The domestic problem was one of air defense and the relations which existed between us and Britain. The other problem was that of Britain's presence in [word indistinct]. [Cheers for unity and Numayri.]

Concerning the domestic issue, [words indistinct] now in this respect between us and Britain. This problem in particular [words indistinct].

As for the Arab gulf problem, we announced last year that we can never ignore developments in any Arab country, whether in the gulf or the ocean. We cannot ignore developments in the Arab gulf. We declared at the time that if Britain did not want to withdraw from the Arab gulf, we would become a party to the fighting against the British presence in the gulf. From that day, Britain began to inform us stage by stage of the withdrawal operation. The British ambassador would come to the command and present us with the with-

drawal timetable because he knew the Libyan people would actually be in the gulf and would actually fight Britain, because they are a believing people who, if they raised a slogan, would write it in fire and blood. [words indistinct] Finally Britain withdrew from the gulf. However—and true to its treacherous habit, just as it had handed Palestine over to the Jews, thus undermining its promise without heeding any laws, and just as it looks at the world and acts in a particular manner—Britain handed Arab territory over to the shah of Iran, who wants to lord it over the gulf just as he lords it over the people of the fraternal Iranian nation. These peoples are waiting for the day they can smash the shah's dictatorship. The fraternal Iranian people will triumph and will then join the peoples of the Arab nation under the banner of Islam, brotherhood and good neighborliness.

Britain and Iranian reaction conspired on the unjust handing over of Arab land. Therefore, we still insist that Britain must be pursued and we can never leave it alone. This has been a savage action, even from the standpoint of international law. While the treaty on protection of the gulf was still valid, Britain handed over the islands. What law and what usage condones such an action? But such action is condoned by the law of the jungle and by imperialist usage in a desperate attempt to impede the rise of the Arab peoples and to prevent them unifying and freeing themselves, because the Arab nation's freedom and unity undermines the interests of imperialism, on which imperialism lives.

Therefore, the Libyan Arab Republic deals double blows to imperialism and accords it equal treatment. At present, we support the revolutionaries of Ireland, who oppose Britain and who are motivated by nationalism and religion. [Applause and cheers.] The Libyan Arab Republic has stood by the revolutionaries of Ireland. It maintains strong ties with the Irish revolutionaries. There are arms and their is support for the revolutionaries of Ireland. We say this because Britain has done something more evil than this against the Arab nation.

We do this and we announce it because we want to affirm to the world that the Arab nation is capable of moving from the defensive to the offensive. We have decided to move to the offensive. We have decided to fight Britain in its own home. We have decided to create a problem for Britain and to drive a thorn in its side so as to make life difficult for Britain so that Britain will wake up and realize [words indistinct] on its own territory. It will pay a double price. It will pay dearly. We will give it double blows. We still proclaim on this day that we are with the revolutionaries of Ireland. If they want to achieve freedom for Ireland, then we are with them. If they want to fight Britain, then we are with them, because Britain handed Palestine over to the Jews and handed the gulf islands to Iran. [Cheers and applause.]

Britain has fragmented the Arab nation and sown discord among the peoples of the Arab nation. Britain caused all the problems and all the tragedies of the Arab nation. Now we want this shattered Arab nation to regain confidence in itself. We want it to know that a few of its people have moved the battle against Britain to Northern Ireland, only a few miles from the very home of the old empire. [Cheers and applause.]

Brothers, they want the years 1971 and 1972 to be the years 1951 and 1952. They want the leadership of the Arab revolution to be like the Government of Iran in 1951. They want to transform the nationalization of oil into mere ink on paper. However, we affirm to the world today that nationalization has become a fait accompli, despite the will of Britain and despite the oil empires. The year 1951 is not the year 1971. The then Government of Iran is not like the revolutionary commands which govern the popular will in the Arab homeland which nationalizes oil.

Brothers, we want the Arab nation to regain confidence in itself. We want it to realize that it has been able to carry the battle overseas and to other continents. The people of the Libyan Arab Republic are now fighting for the sake of 4 million Moslems in the southern Philippines and [words indistinct] in defending the Moslems, and particularly far off in the Pacific Ocean.

All this, brothers, goes to indicate that the Arab nation today has changed from a position of passive defense to one of attack and that the colonialist empires in the East and the West today face the Arab nation's attack on them. This nation today is seeking vengeance and bringing the aggressors to account. It has become capable of dealing hard blows [word indistinct] the East or the West. This people, few in number, has dealt severe blows to the impudent face of imperialism, the impudent face of the U.S. empire and of the British empire. We have crushed the British bases and the U.S. bases; we have nationalized British oil. Our people are

still ready to do everything necessary to preserve their dignity, independence and freedom. [Applause and cheers.]

Brothers, since we liberated this base from the hated U.S. imperialism, the battle has shifted to the heart of America. The Libyan Arab Republic today declares its support for the movement of the blacks in the United States. The Libyan Arab Republic now stands with 25 million American blacks who ask the Libyan Arab Republic to stand with them. The Libyan Arab Republic today stands with them sincerely, faithfully and honestly. [Cheers.] This is the correct logic: After we oust imperialism from here, we must follow it right to its home in order to show it that we are after imperialism, that we are after it for vengeance, and that we are capable of taking offensive positions.

Brothers, 25 million American blacks who are suffering all kinds of racial discrimination and who are asking this free people to stand with them—the Libyan Arab Republic stands with 25 million black Americans for the sake of freedom, freedom of man [words indistinct] because it is indivisible at any place or time. We also stand with 5 million American Black Moslems who lead the Black Moslem movement inside America. America is now subjected to a counterattack. America is being prosecuted so that it pays the price of what it did to us. It has killed innocent Libyans. Some 34 innocent Libyan citizens were killed for no reason except that they were living in the land of their forefathers. The aggressive United States occupied their land, wreaked havoc in this land, and [words indistinct] and death in it. When we do this, we return to imperialism what it did to us.

We are not aggressors; we are asking for punishment. Imperialism attacked us, therefore we attack it. Britain attacked the Arab nation and the Arab nation today is capable of attacking Britain. America attacked us, therefore we attack it. It moved the battle to our land, therefore we move the battle to its land. [Cheers and applause.]

What did Britain do? We are now replying to its attacks. What did it do? With what arms were the Arabs slain? Was it not British arms which [words indistinct]? Who handed [words indistinct] and displaced an entire Arab people, who hitherto lived as refugees in tents? Who has done this? Britain is the country primarily responsible. It was Britain which handed Palestine over. The weapons used in the Dayr Yasin massacre of children, women and innocent people were British weapons.

When we give arms to the Irish revolutionaries we do not present them so that innocent children can be killed with them, but so that the freedom of the enslaved man in Ireland can triumph with these arms. Britain has no right to enslave another people. We fight with the oppressed peoples because we are supporters of right and because we believe in right, [words indistinct]. We will continue to stand by justice until the day of reckoning. Therefore, if we support Ireland, we support an enslaved people, a people who have been enslaved and persecuted by Britain. It was Britain which initiated the killing of women and children in Ireland.

We present arms to the honorable strugglers and to the fighters for freedom, the freedom of men who God created free. Since when do you enslave people who were born free? That is what 'Umar bin al-Khattab said. These are the rights of man. This is the outcry of the rights of man, an outcry which was widespread even hundreds of years ago before it was made by the United States.

What is written in the Bill of Rights in the United States? The Bill of Rights was written in the United States. There is also the torch of freedom, beneath which are written the words: "No blacks or dogs admitted." What freedom and scorn is this?

When we ousted the United States from this base and concluded the Mirage deal with France, the United States and British press pictured a Mirage dragged by a camel—a modern Mirage dragged by a camel—and said it was an Arab Mirage. After a few minutes you will, God willing, see the Mirage flown by Arab eagles and not dragged by a camel. [Cheers and applause.] The Arab can fly the Mirage and even more modern planes.

The facts (crowd chanting "unity") are known in history. The Arabs laid down the bases for modern civilization. The Arabs laid down the bases of all modern theories in the Middle Ages when Europe lived in the dark. There is an Egyptian scientist at Cape Kennedy, the world of satellites. The matter of an Arab flying a Mirage is a foregone conclusion. We do not want to discuss this because it is a fact known by all. But we want to comment on the picture of a Mirage dragged by a camel. What does this reflect? This reflects a base mentality and a mentality

hostile to the freedom of this land and this nation. What does this mean? It means scorn of the Arab nation and its abilities and discouragement of a small people who resolved to become free. What the Libyan people did then was to expel imperialism in order to live free on their land.

Western information media are scoffing. They picture the Mirage being dragged by a camel. The Mirages are now flown by Arabs who will bring destruction to the aggressors with them. But this reflects the sick mentality in the West, the mentality that claims the Westerner is a superman. I am using the English word so the Europeans will understand. They consider themselves supermen. We tell them: You are not supermen. You suffer from complexes. This shows the complexes of the white man, the Westerner.

They are unjust nonbelievers. They are really provoking. Are they not provoking when they show the Mirage being dragged by a camel? This is a silly provocation reflecting a sick and backward mentality. It is the mentality of people who think that they are masters of the world, that all other people must be backward and depend on camels. But they must use planes, electronics, and modern equipment.

They should look back. They should return to the Middle Ages. He who showed the Mirage being dragged by a camel must go back to history, to the Middle Ages to find out who wrote books on medicine, chemistry, modern science, and astronomy for them. Who taught Europe? The Arabs were the masters who taught Europe. It was the Arabs who saved Europe from the Dark Ages, the ages of decadence, the Middle Ages. Avicenna's book on medicine and law has been Europe's reference on these topics for 600 years. Bin Khaldun's writings have been the reference of all professors of social science in the modern age.

When the Caliph Harun ar-Rashid presented a clock as a gift to Charlemagne, the King of the Franks, the Franks were astonished and said this was magic. How could the hands move without being moved by man. At that time the Arabs were advanced. The Europeans considered the clock as magic. The first clock was invented by the Arabs. Harun ar-Rashid gave it as a gift to Charlemagne, the King of the Franks at that time.

'Abbas Bin Farnas, whom they ridiculed and who it was said was crushed, was the victim of a great invention. He was the first man to expound the theory of aviation and to think of aviation. Let them go back to history. The present Europeans are challenging us. Europe is challenging us. Europe does not go back in history. It has left Christianity and the Old Testament (?developed) the New Testament, and disavowed Christ and his teachings. Europe cannot go back. It disavowed history. It has forgotten the Middle Ages, when it was in the darkness and the Arabs were civilizing Europe.

Europe disavows the struggle of peoples in the free world. It is neither democratic nor free. Europe saps the resources of peoples and scoffs at any people who try to liberate and develop themselves. It dominates peaceful peoples and covets peoples' resources. These are things the imperialist powers think about. They do not think about history. They worship rituals, not God.

There is a revolution in the United States and Europe. There is a revolution against false civilization. Millions of people oppose the Vietnam war. Millions of people oppose the war of annihilation in the Philippines. Millions of people call for the return to Christ. They call themselves the sons of Christ.

I want to tell you another fact. Millions of people in Europe and the United States have started a new movement (words indistinct). In other words, those who return to religion ask that people not be enslaved and bombed, who do not support the Marcos government in the Philippines in annihilating the Moslems—they are considered agents. Why? The virtuous principles raised by the September 1 revolution are raised now by a whole generation in the United States and Europe, where they are considered agents.

What we are doing now (words indistinct). We are doing it to do justice to history.

The aggressor must pay the price. We are committed to our stand with the Black Moslem movement in America and with the Moslems in the Philippines, as well as with the rebels in Ireland. We are in solidarity with the peoples of Latin America, Africa, and Asia which are struggling for their freedom. We consider the Third World front the only front hostile to imperialism. The major powers must be outside this front. The Third World camp is the camp hostile to imperialism because imperialism could come from the East or the West or from any direction. These peoples must form a single front hostile to imperialism.

We praised God that we are achieving these victories while we are celebrating this great day. We see that the pan-Arabism of the battle has covered much ground toward realization. We also see the pan-Arabism of fedayeen action being achieved with the fall of martyrs. We now see that, with the help of this small people, the Arab nation has been able to catch its breath and succeeded in regain-

ing its self-confidence and moving onto the offensive overseas and across continents. We see that Moslems everywhere on earth are looking at this people with great hope that the Moslem forces everywhere will triumph.

While reviewing these great victories, we strongly affirm that this people is determined to continue achieving victories, and to follow the path of socialism, freedom, and comprehensive unity. Praise be to God, this people has got rid of all its complexes and all the pitfalls in which it could have fallen. Unfortunately, some new Arab experiments have fallen into these pitfalls. This is the only people that believes that Arab unity—Arab merger unity—is the only solution.

This people is not regionalist, because it believes that it will lose its freedom unless there is a big Arab power protecting this freedom. It also believes that it cannot exploit its resources in the interest of the Arab. This people has not left gaps while proceeding with the building of Arab unity. It has not left any social gaps behind it. It laid the foundation of socialism which it wants to build on its land. It gave everyone his rights.

The Libyan Arab Republic today has socialist legislation which achieves social justice and gives everyone his rights without injustice, class conflict, fear, or terror. The ASLI, the alliance of the people's forces, has been founded on a sound basis so the people can proceed without being dominated by any class, without falling into the pitfalls suffered by other experiments, and without being tyrannized by any individual, whoever he may be.

The alliance of the people's working forces will lead the revolution and unify and organize the ranks for the sake of freedom, socialism, and unity. This great step, the establishment of the ASU, has made it easy for us to unite with the Arab Republic of Egypt and also easy to establish a single ASU and to form a single Arab movement, which was once the dream of those who wrote about and advocated the establishment of a single Arab movement.

In this correct way, this pioneer experiment which was created by this people, the single Arab movement has been formed, and the objectives of the single Arab movement have crystallized. With the establishment of the ASU in the Arab Republic of Egypt and here, unity between the two organizations became natural. Sound bases for Arab unity have now been laid down, not through governments and decisions and orders, but through the popular base—the alliance of the people's working forces. The people's working forces created a single ASU and the strong edifice of Arab unity.

In order not to leave loopholes which could be exploited by the aggressors and the enemies of Arab unity, the Libyans doubled their efforts in a short period to build thousands of homes and establish dozens of farms, and allocated 2 billion dinars for the development and general budgets to be spent in only 3 years. The people must spend 2 billion dinars on national construction in just 3 years. These represent mighty efforts and a determination to build progress so the enemies of the unity cannot exploit the loopholes which might result from the building of the path of unity.

Recently, the Revolution Command Council, with the approval of the cabinet, agreed that the minimum wages for Libyan Arab Republic workers in the private and public sectors should be 40 dinars a month. You know that the revolution has raised the workers' wages by 50 percent since it came into being. The minimum wage then was 30 dinars, and now we have decided that the minimum monthly wage for the workers should be 40 dinars, both in the public and private sectors. This is out of our belief that that productive forces which are engaged in building progress in this republic are the workers, who have long been deprived of the wealth and resources of their country. We consider this to be implementation of the recommendation of the ASU National Congress. The revolution is faithful in implementing all the recommendations of the Congress, the revolution devotes great efforts to national construction so this construction will be complete and firmly rooted.

Before I leave you in some minutes to see the Mirages—which are not dragged by camels, but are piloted by Arab pilots—I salute the officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers of the Libyan air force [cheers and applause] who, in a short time and with little experience, have been able to run the biggest base left behind by imperialism. They believed that Russia would come to occupy the base when the United States left. Russia did not come, and those who have occupied the base are the free sons of this country [cheers and applause.]

I greet the soldiers who have been able to rise the level of the current phase of the revolution and who, in a short time, have been able to master the most modern complicated equipment and to create an air force. At this moment, I must greet the members of the Egyptian armed forces who worked side by side with their Libyan brothers. I greet the people of fraternal Pakistan, sons participated in building the air force.

The Libyan Arab Republic wants to say now that it has always failed to thank Egypt for what the latter considers a duty. However, we must now express immense thanks to the Arab Republic of Egypt, which has doubled its sincere efforts, which are priceless and which it has continued to exert over since the outbreak of the revolution.

Egypt has always stood at the side of the Libyan Arab Republic and has responded unflinchingly to every call. Orders placed by telephone from Tripoli are implemented with generosity and a fraternal spirit in Cairo, out of Cairo's belief that what takes place in Libya is part of what is taking place in Cairo and that the Arab action is one, the Arab fate one, and the Arab effort one. Therefore, we send immense gratitude to the members of the armed forces in the Arab Republic or Egypt who up to this very hour are working with us despite the difficult conditions through which Egypt is passing and the enemy threats to Egypt. I tell you honestly that Egypt has never hesitated to respond to the call of the 1 September revolution and to meet the demands of the Libyan Arab Republic with faith, truthfulness, and sincerely in all the military and civilian fields. Greetings from us to this great people, the Arab Republic of Egypt's people who have given to the Arab nation all through history from the days of the Mongols and Tartars until today. [Applause.]

Greetings from us to this generous people who have given the Arab people from the ocean to the gulf and who have given their dearest sons as martyrs for the sake of the Arab nation's freedom. Greetings from us to this great people who have throughout the ages confronted all the onslaughts aimed at destroying the Arab entity since the Tartars and the Mongols, down to the Crusades and the Zionist invasion of Palestine.

Egypt remains the steadfast bastion which continues to proclaim the Arab right and on which the legions of aggression continue to founder in every age and time. The Egyptian armed forces continue to express with the force of arms and with insistence and steadfastness the Arab rights in Palestine. They have been the true force of confrontation in every battle—whether the 1948, 1956, or 1967 battles—and will continue to be in all the coming battles. Egypt will always be the true force of confrontation.

Greetings from us to the leader of this procession. Greetings from us to President Anwar as-Sadat [applause] who despite all the problems, challenges, and heavy duties has never forgotten that great Egypt has a duty toward the Arab nation. He continues to work everywhere to bridge the gap and to unite the Arab ranks, and lead the procession along the course of the great 'Abd an-Nasir. Greetings from us to this great man. [Applause and cheers.]

Brothers, despite the rumors and despite what imperialism does against it and despite what the imperialist machinery and reaction which is hostile to the Arab unity do, Egypt continues to be the true power in the Arab area. Egypt continues to raise the flag of freedom—the flag of Arab socialism and the flag of Arab unity from the ocean to the gulf.

Despite tribulations and catastrophes, Egypt has never renounced its Arab nation and never renounced its revolutionary line. Egypt can never at any time be in the spheres of influence. There are many who wonder about the international struggle and about Egypt's place in this struggle. We fear that any other Arab country may get involved with the spheres of influence but we do not fear for Egypt. We never fear that this great and deeprooted people who have built the pyramids and who have created a civilization, who have opened the canal and destroyed the Tartar will ever fall within the spheres of influence. Egypt is still free and still raises the banner of freedom, of socialism, and of unity. Industry was built in Egypt before 'Abd an-Nasir, during 'Abd an-Nasir's time and after 'Abd an-Nasir. Everywhere and in every street in Egypt you still hear slogans emanating from the heart of the Egyptian people saying: With souls and blood we will continue the march. With the army and the people we will continue the march. The Egyptian people who raised these slogans after 'Abd an-Nasir continue to raise them.

Brothers, we still stand fast behind Cairo, the steadfast Arab bastion. We say that the pan-Arabism of the battle is now being achieved from the ocean to the gulf and say that the pan-Arabism of the fedayeen action has now begun from the ocean to the gulf. [Cheers.]

Brothers, greetings from us to everyone who stands with us from East or West. Greetings to the friends. Death to the enemies, God is great and long live the Arab nation.

MILITARY FLY-BY

(Editorial Report M): Tripoli Domestic Service on June 11 followed the broadcast of the speeches by Amin and Al-Qadhdhafi with the announcer's descrip-

tion of a military fly-by. The announcer points out Mirages and Mig-21's and says: "After a short time, another formation will begin their demonstration. It will consist of Mirage planes and other planes—Mig-21's—to reveal in clear (word indistinct) that the Arab Forces are one force and that the Arab Force is one force."

UNITED STATES, BRITISH AMBASSADORS LEAVE DURING SPEECH

(Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic 1715 GMT June 11, 1972)

(Text): The U.S. ambassador withdrew from the platform of the celebration which was held today on the second anniversary of the withdrawal of U.S. Forces as brother Col. Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi was noting in his speech the harm done to the Arab people from the U.S. bases and the evils and crimes committed by the U.S. soldiers against the Libyan Arab people who worked at these bases.

The British ambassador also withdrew when the brother colonel spoke about Britain's policy and its handing over of Palestine to the Zionists in 1948 and the Arab islands to Iran in 1971.

[From Liberation radio magazine]

TRIPOLI RADIO: HASSAN IGNORES DESERT LIBERATION STRUGGLE

(Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic 2149 GMT June 11, 1972)

[Excerpts]: We have expressed our doubts on this program about the results which a conference sponsored by imperialist agents could yield in regard to the African liberation movements. Events have substantiated our expectations. World radios and press have recorded the disappointment and displeasure of the leaders of African liberation movements who are now in Rabat with the behavior of the administrators of the conference.

It is known that the most important point on the agenda is the support of African liberation movements. But these movements have been prevented from participating in the work of the committee stemming from the African foreign ministers council now convening at the Hilton in Rabat. This was confirmed in a dispatch by the BBC correspondent broadcast Friday afternoon in which the correspondent said the actions of the African liberation movements were the main subject at the discussions of the OAU foreign ministers this week.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON EVENTS IN MOROCCO IN SEPTEMBER 1972

SEPTEMBER 25, 1972.

HON. CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr.,

Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In reply to your telephone request of September 13, I am pleased to provide you with a brief description of the recent assassination attempt against King Hassan of Morocco and its relationship to the Kenitra facilities and the U.S. military presence in the country. These remarks supplement the information contained in my letter of September 11, which provided information on several aspects of United States-Moroccan relations.

On August 16, the civilian aircraft bringing the King back to Morocco from a brief visit to France was attacked by one or more Royal Moroccan Air Force F-5s of the escort flight. Although damaged, the King's plane was able to land and discharge its passengers. A short time later, Air Force F-5s strafed the field and then the Royal Palaces of King Hassan II and Prince Moulay Abdallah. The King and Prince escaped unharmed. The following day, the Moroccan Government announced that the assassination attempt had been organized and led by Minister of Defense General Mohamed Oufkir, who had taken his own life when the plot failed.

The F-5 squadron of the Royal Moroccan Air Force, to which the rebel pilots belonged, was based at the Third Moroccan Air Force Base at Kenitra. This is also the location of the US Naval Training Command Group responsible for instructing Moroccans at the Kenitra base on base operations, maintenance and communications. The Command is continuing its normal training operations.

Please do not hesitate to call on me if I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID M. ABSHIRE,
*Assistant Secretary of State
for Congressional Relations.*

AFRICA

Algeria

(U.S. Fiscal Years - Millions of Dollars)

PROGRAM	U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS - OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS												REPAY- MENTS AND INTEREST 1946- 1971	TOTAL LESS REPAY- MENTS AND INTEREST 1946- 1971			
	POST-WAR RELIEF PERIOD	MARSHALL PLAN PERIOD	MUTUAL SECURITY ACT PERIOD	FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT PERIOD											TOTAL 1946- 1971		
				1948-1948	1949-1952	1953-1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967				1968	1969
A. OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE																	
A.I.D. AND PREDECESSOR AGENCIES - TOTAL.....																	
Loans.....																	
Grants.....																	
(Supporting Assistance).....																	
FOOD FOR PEACE - TOTAL.....																	
Title I - Total.....																	
REPAYABLE IN U.S. DOLLARS - LOANS.....																	
PAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY - Planned for Country Use.....																	
(Total Sales Agreements, including U.S. Uses).....																	
Planned for Country Use:																	
Economic Development Loans and Grants.....																	
Common Defense Grants.....																	
Title II - Total.....																	
EMERGENCY RELIEF, ECON. DEVELOPMENT & WORLD FOOD.....																	
VOLUNTARY RELIEF AGENCIES.....																	
OTHER OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.....																	
PEACE CORPS.....																	
OTHER.....																	
TOTAL OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.....																	
Loans.....																	
Grants.....																	
B. OTHER OFFICIAL																	
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LONG-TERM ECONOMIC LOANS.....																	
TOTAL ECONOMIC.....																	
Loans.....																	
Grants.....																	

*Less than \$50,000.

AFRICA

Chad

(U.S. Fiscal Years - Millions of Dollars)

PROGRAM	U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS - OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS													REPAY- MENTS AND INTEREST 1946- 1971	TOTAL LESS REPAY- MENTS AND INTEREST	
	POST-WAR RELIEF PERIOD	MARSHALL PLAN PERIOD	MUTUAL SECURITY ACT PERIOD	FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT PERIOD												TOTAL 1946- 1971
				1946-1948	1949-1952	1953-1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968			
A. OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE																
A.I.O. AND PREDECESSOR AGENCIES - TOTAL.....																
Loans.....																
Grants.....																
(Supporting Assistance).....																
FOOD FOR PEACE - TOTAL.....																
Title I - Total.....																
REPAYABLE IN U.S. DOLLARS - LOANS.....																
PAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY - Planned for Country Use.....																
(Total Sales Agreements, including U.S. Uses).....																
Planned for Country Use:																
Economic Development Loans and Grants.....																
Common Defense Grants.....																
Title II - Total.....																
EMERGENCY RELIEF, ECON. DEVELOPMENT & WORLD FOOD.....																
VOLUNTARY RELIEF AGENCIES.....																
OTHER OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.....																
PEACE CORPS.....																
OTHER.....																
TOTAL OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.....																
Loans.....																
Grants.....																
B. OTHER OFFICIAL																
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LONG-TERM ECONOMIC LOANS.....																
TOTAL ECONOMIC.....																
Loans.....																
Grants.....																

* Less than \$50,000.

(U.S. Fiscal Years - Millions of Dollars)

PROGRAM	U. S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS - OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS												REPAY- MENTS AND INTEREST 1946- 1971	TOTAL LESS REPAY- MENTS AND INTEREST	
	POST-WAR RELIEF PERIOD 1946-1948	MARSHALL PLAN PERIOD 1949-1952	MUTUAL SECURITY ACT PERIOD 1953-1961	FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT PERIOD								TOTAL 1948- 1971			
				1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969				1970
A. OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE															
A.I.D. AND PREDECESSOR AGENCIES - TOTAL.....	-	1.6	109.9	16.5	11.3	5.7	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	137.3	128.9	
Loans.....	-	-	8.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.0	-1.4	
Grants.....	-	1.6	101.4	16.5	11.3	5.7	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	130.3	130.3	
(Supporting Assistance).....	(-)	(-)	(-)	(14.0)	(9.0)	(4.8)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(21.8)	(-)	
FOOD FOR PEACE - TOTAL.....	-	*	24.0	0.7	-	0.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	35.3	35.3	
Title I - Total.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
REPAYABLE IN U.S. DOLLARS - LOANS.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
PAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY - Planned for Country Use, (Total Sales Agreements, including U.S. Uses).....	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	
Planned for Country Use: Economic Development Loans and Grants.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Common Defense Grants.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Title II - Total.....	-	*	24.0	0.7	-	0.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	35.3	35.3	
EMERGENCY RELIEF, ECON. DEVELOPMENT & WORLD FOOD.....	-	-	27.5	0.7	-	0.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	27.5	27.5	
VOLUNTARY RELIEF AGENCIES.....	-	*	6.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.8	7.8	
OTHER OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.....	-	0.2	29.2	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.2	2.2	0.4	39.2	39.2	
PEACE CORPS.....	-	-	29.2	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.4	2.5	2.5	
OTHER.....	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37.4	37.4	
TOTAL OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.....	-	1.8	173.1	18.2	12.3	7.3	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.2	2.2	0.4	212.5	204.1	
Loans.....	-	-	8.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.0	-1.4	
Grants.....	-	1.8	164.6	18.2	12.3	7.3	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.2	2.2	0.4	205.5	205.5	
B. OTHER OFFICIAL															
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LONG-TERM ECONOMIC LOANS.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TOTAL ECONOMIC.....	-	1.8	173.1	18.2	12.3	7.3	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.2	2.2	0.4	212.5	204.1	
Loans.....	-	-	8.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.0	-1.4	
Grants.....	-	1.8	164.6	18.2	12.3	7.3	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.2	2.2	0.4	205.5	205.5	
MILITARY ASSISTANCE - (Cng. to FAI Approx.).....	-	-	2.6	2.2	1.3	1.9	2.0	2.2	1.8	1.0	0.4	0.1	15.2	15.2	
Credit Sales (MNS).....	-	-	2.6	2.2	1.3	1.9	2.0	2.2	1.8	1.0	0.4	0.1	15.5	15.5	
Grants.....	-	(-)	(0.1)	(*)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(*)	(0.1)	(-)	(-)	(0.7)	(0.7)	
(Additional Grants from Excess Stocks).....	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	
OTHER MILITARY ASSISTANCE GRANTS.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK MILITARY LOANS.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
TOTAL MILITARY.....	-	-	2.6	2.2	1.3	1.9	2.0	2.2	1.8	1.0	0.4	0.1	15.2	15.2	
TOTAL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY.....	-	1.8	175.7	20.4	13.6	9.2	3.3	3.4	2.9	2.2	2.6	0.5	228.0	219.6	
Loans.....	-	-	8.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.0	-1.4	
Grants.....	-	1.8	167.2	20.4	13.6	9.2	3.3	3.4	2.9	2.2	2.6	0.5	221.0	221.0	

* Less than \$50,000.

* Principal fully repaid.

MAURITANIA

(U.S. Fiscal Years - Millions of Dollars)

PROGRAM	U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS - OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS											REPAY- MENTS AND INTEREST 1946- 1971	TOTAL LESS REPAY- MENTS AND INTEREST	
	POST-WAR RELIEF PERIOD 1946-1948	MARSHALL PLAN PERIOD 1949-1952	MUTUAL SECURITY ACT PERIOD 1953-1961	FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT PERIOD										TOTAL 1946- 1971
				1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969			
A. OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE														
	A.I.D. AND PREDECESSOR AGENCIES - TOTAL.....													
	Loans.....													
	Grants.....													
	(Supporting Assistance).....													
	FOOD FOR PEACE - TOTAL.....													
	Title I - Total.....													
	REPAYABLE IN U.S. DOLLARS - LOANS.....													
	PAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY - Planned for Country Use.....													
	(Total Sales Agreements, including U.S. Use).....													
B. OTHER OFFICIAL														
	Planned for Country Use:													
	Economic Development Loans and Grants.....													
	Common Defense Grants.....													
	Title II - Total.....													
	EMERGENCY RELIEF, ECON. DEVELOPMENT A WORLD FOOD.....													
	VOLUNTARY RELIEF AGENCIES.....													
	OTHER OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.....													
	PEACE CORPS.....													
	OTHER.....													
C. OTHER OFFICIAL														
	TOTAL OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.....													
	Loans.....													
	Grants.....													
	EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LONG-TERM ECONOMIC LOANS.....													
	TOTAL ECONOMIC.....													
	Loans.....													
	Grants.....													
	EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LONG-TERM ECONOMIC LOANS.....													
	TOTAL ECONOMIC.....													

*Less than \$50,000.

Morocco

(U.S. Fiscal Years - Millions of Dollars)

PROGRAM	U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS - OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS													REPAY- MENTS AND INTEREST 1946- 1971	TOTAL LESS REPAY- MENTS AND INTEREST
	POST-WAR RELIEF PERIOD	MARSHALL PLAN PERIOD	MUTUAL SECURITY ACT PERIOD	FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT PERIOD											
				1949-1952	1953-1961	1962	1963	1964	1969	1966	1967	1968	1969		
A. OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE															
A.I.D. AND PREDECESSOR AGENCIES - TOTAL.....	-	-	211.5	32.8	21.6	18.2	11.1	3.2	14.2	2.5	10.3	12.3	339.2	241.1	
Loans.....	-	-	192.9	30.0	20.0	17.3	10.0	2.6	13.0	8.0	8.0	10.8	312.6	214.0	
Grants.....	-	-	18.6	2.8	1.6	0.9	1.1	0.7	1.9	1.5	2.3	1.5	27.3	27.3	
(Supporting Assistance).....	(-)	(-)	(-)	(31.7)	(20.0)	(15.0)	(10.0)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(71.1)	(-)	
FOOD FOR PEACE - TOTAL.....	-	0.3	78.2	15.2	44.2	19.2	21.6	33.8	56.2	28.8	16.8	40.0	393.2	380.8	
Title I - Total.....	-	-	-	7.9	5.3	-	8.7	7.3	34.2	5.9	-	18.0	107.8	95.4	
REPAYABLE IN U.S. DOLLARS - LOANS.....	-	-	-	7.9	5.3	-	8.7	7.3	11.1	5.9	-	18.0	56.6	50.6	
PAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY - Planned for Country Use.....	-	-	-	7.9	5.3	-	8.7	4.2	8.6	16.4	-	-	51.2	6.4	
(Total Sales Agreements, including U.S. Uses).....	(-)	(-)	(-)	(13.2)	(7.1)	(-)	(13.3)	(5.9)	(11.8)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(72.9)	(-)	
Planned for Country Use:	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Economic Development Loans and Grants.....	-	-	-	7.9	5.3	-	8.7	4.2	8.6	16.4	-	-	51.2	6.4	
Common Defense Grants.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
B. OTHER OFFICIAL															
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LONG-TERM ECONOMIC LOANS.....															
TOTAL ECONOMIC.....	-	0.3	290.4	48.7	67.1	39.0	33.6	57.8	72.0	45.7	30.7	55.3	772.1	652.8	
Loans.....	-	-	192.9	37.9	25.3	17.3	18.7	29.5	47.9	20.7	10.7	30.9	451.6	332.3	
Grants.....	-	0.3	97.5	10.8	41.8	21.7	14.9	28.4	24.1	25.0	20.0	24.4	320.5	320.5	
MILITARY ASSISTANCE - (Chg. to FAR Approp.).....															
Grants Sales (MIS).....	-	-	2.4	5.7	10.3	2.2	10.2	4.3	17.2	11.4	0.8	15.8	82.6	73.0	
Grants.....	-	-	2.4	5.7	10.3	2.2	6.0	0.2	14.0	9.5	0.8	15.0	44.7	35.1	
(Additional Grants from Excess Stocks).....	(-)	(-)	(*)	(0.3)	(0.5)	(*)	4.9	4.1	3.2	1.9	0.8	(-)	37.9	37.9	
OTHER MILITARY ASSISTANCE GRANTS.....															
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK MILITARY LOANS.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(-)	
TOTAL MILITARY.....	-	-	2.4	5.7	10.3	2.2	10.2	4.3	17.2	11.4	0.8	15.8	82.6	-	
TOTAL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY.....															
Loans.....	-	-	292.8	54.4	77.4	41.2	44.5	62.1	73.7	57.1	31.5	71.1	854.7	725.8	
Grants.....	-	-	192.9	37.9	25.3	17.3	24.7	29.7	47.9	30.2	10.7	45.9	496.3	367.4	
(Total Sales Agreements, including U.S. Uses).....	-	-	99.9	16.5	52.1	23.9	19.8	32.5	21.3	26.9	20.8	25.2	358.4	358.4	

*Less than \$50,000.

(U.S. Fiscal Years - Millions of Dollars)

PROGRAM	U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS - OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS											REPAY- MENTS AND INTEREST 1946- 1971	TOTAL LESS REPAY- MENTS AND INTEREST	
	POST-WAR RELIEF PERIOD 1946-1948	MARSHALL PLAN PERIOD 1949-1952	MUTUAL SECURITY ACT PERIOD 1953-1961	FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT PERIOD										TOTAL 1946- 1971
				1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969			
A. OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE														
A.1.0. AND PREDECESSOR AGENCIES - TOTAL.....			53.6	10.4	7.7	2.5	3.1	15.2	10.7	0.3	0.2	-	-	26.7
Loans.....			10.0	2.0	5.0	-	-	12.1	3.9	-	0.2	-	-	13.5
Grants.....			43.6	8.4	2.7	2.5	3.1	3.2	6.8	0.3	-	-	-	61.2
(Supporting Assistance).....			(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
FOOD FOR PEACE - TOTAL.....			*	2.8	3.6	4.1	3.1	0.1	2.2	*	0.1	*	0.1	22.2
TITLE I - Total.....														
REPAYABLE IN U.S. DOLLARS - LOANS.....			-	2.8	3.6	2.8	2.8	-	2.2	-	-	-	-	21.1
PAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY - Planned for Country Use.....			-	2.8	3.6	2.8	2.8	-	9.2	-	-	-	-	21.1
(Total Sales Agreements, including U.S. Uses).....			(-)	(4.2)	(5.5)	(6.3)	(6.3)	(4.2)	(11.4)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(37.9)
Planned for Country Use:														
Economic Development Loans and Grants.....			-	2.8	3.6	2.8	2.8	-	9.2	-	-	-	-	21.1
Common Defense Grants.....			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TITLE II - Total.....														
EMERGENCY RELIEF, LOAN, DEVELOPMENT & WORLD FOOD.....			*	*	-	1.3	0.3	0.1	0.1	*	0.1	*	0.1	2.1
VOLUNTARY RELIEF AGENCIES.....			-	-	-	*	*	*	0.1	*	0.1	*	0.1	1.7
OTHER OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.....			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.4
PEACE CORPS.....			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
OTHER.....			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.....			53.6	13.2	11.3	6.6	6.2	15.4	20.0	0.3	0.3	*	0.1	97.9
Loans.....			10.0	3.7	7.1	1.9	1.9	12.1	13.1	-	-	-	-	30.3
Grants.....			43.6	9.5	4.1	4.7	4.3	3.3	6.9	0.3	0.3	*	0.1	67.6
B. OTHER OFFICIAL														
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LONG-TERM ECONOMIC LOANS.....			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL ECONOMIC.....			53.6	13.2	11.3	6.6	6.2	15.4	20.0	0.3	0.3	*	0.1	97.9
Loans.....			10.0	3.7	7.1	1.9	1.9	12.1	13.1	-	-	-	-	30.3
Grants.....			43.6	9.5	4.1	4.7	4.3	3.3	6.9	0.3	0.3	*	0.1	67.6
MILITARY ASSISTANCE - (Chg. to FAA Approval).....			*	*	*	*	0.3	0.1	1.6	-	-	-	-	2.2
Credit Sales (FNS).....			*	*	*	*	0.3	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	-	1.5
Grants.....			(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	0.7
(Additional Grants from Excess Stocks).....			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(-)
OTHER MILITARY ASSISTANCE GRANTS.....			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK MILITARY LOANS.....			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL MILITARY.....			*	*	*	*	0.3	0.1	1.6	-	-	-	-	2.2
TOTAL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY.....			53.6	13.2	11.3	6.6	6.5	15.5	21.6	0.3	0.3	*	0.1	100.1
Loans.....			10.0	3.7	7.1	1.9	1.9	12.1	14.6	-	-	-	-	31.8
Grants.....			43.6	9.5	4.1	4.7	4.6	3.4	7.0	0.3	0.3	*	0.1	68.3

* Less than \$50,000.
a/Of this total, \$6.1 million of principal has been written off.

Tunisia

(U.S. Fiscal Years - Millions of Dollars)

PROGRAM	U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS - OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS													REPAY- MENTS AND INTEREST 1946- 1971	TOTAL LESS REPAY- MENTS AND INTEREST	
	POST-WAR RELIEF PERIOD	MARSHALL PLAN PERIOD	MUTUAL SECURITY PLAN ACT PERIOD	FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT PERIOD												TOTAL 1946- 1971
				1946-1948	1949-1952	1953-1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968			
A. OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE																
A-1.0. AND PREDECESSOR AGENCIES - TOTAL.....																
Loans.....	-	-	138.2	29.7	32.3	21.7	19.1	17.5	26.3	13.5	9.1	14.6	13.0	313.6	24.4	289.2
Grants.....	-	-	45.6	12.8	23.3	20.2	17.5	15.2	23.9	10.8	6.7	10.1	10.0	187.7	24.4	163.3
(Supporting Assistance).....	(-)	(-)	92.6	16.9	9.0	1.5	1.7	2.3	2.4	2.7	2.3	4.6	3.0	126.0	-	126.0
FOOD FOR PEACE - TOTAL.....																
Loans.....	-	0.2	102.7	16.7	22.1	19.1	20.9	1.7	27.2	24.3	35.6	31.8	31.4	365.0	12.8	352.2
Grants.....	-	-	10.5	4.5	8.8	3.1	11.7	-	20.1	20.4	13.4	18.4	12.8	123.8	12.8	111.0
(Total Sales Agreements, including U.S. Uses).....	(-)	(-)	10.5	4.5	8.8	3.1	11.7	-	16.8	9.9	5.3	1.2	-	71.9	10.8	49.9
Planned for Country Use:																
Economic Development Loans and Grants.....	-	-	10.5	4.5	8.8	3.1	11.7	-	16.8	9.9	5.3	1.2	-	71.9	10.8	61.1
Common Defense Grants.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Title II - Total.....																
EMERGENCY RELIEF, ECON. DEVELOPMENT & WORLD FOOD.....	-	0.2	92.2	12.2	23.5	16.2	18.2	1.7	7.8	14.1	23.2	13.4	18.6	241.2	-	241.2
VOLUNTARY RELIEF AGENCIES.....	-	-	90.3	11.5	21.5	14.7	16.3	0.7	5.8	11.0	20.8	11.4	16.6	220.5	-	220.5
OTHER OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.....	-	-	1.9	0.7	2.0	1.5	1.9	1.0	2.0	3.1	2.4	2.0	2.0	20.7	-	20.7
PEACE CORPS.....	-	-	-	0.3	0.6	0.2	1.2	1.6	1.2	1.1	0.2	0.6	0.7	9.1	-	9.1
OTHER.....	-	-	-	0.3	0.6	0.9	1.2	1.6	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.6	0.7	9.1	-	9.1
TOTAL OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.....																
Loans.....	-	0.2	240.2	46.7	65.2	41.9	50.2	20.8	55.4	49.1	46.5	47.0	45.1	687.7	37.2	650.5
Grants.....	-	-	49.0	17.3	32.1	23.3	29.2	15.2	44.0	31.0	20.1	28.5	22.8	304.1	-	266.9
(Additional Grants from Excess Stocks).....	(-)	-	192.0	29.4	33.1	18.6	21.0	5.6	11.4	18.1	26.4	18.5	22.3	383.7	-	383.7
B. OTHER OFFICIAL																
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LONG-TERM ECONOMIC LOANS.....																
TOTAL ECONOMIC.....	-	-	1.7	0.5	-	2.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.5	7.6	4.0	3.6
Loans.....	-	0.2	242.6	47.2	65.2	43.9	50.2	20.8	55.4	49.1	46.5	47.0	48.6	695.3	41.2	654.1
Grants.....	-	-	50.7	17.8	32.1	25.3	29.2	15.2	44.0	31.0	20.1	28.5	26.3	311.7	41.2	270.5
(Additional Grants from Excess Stocks).....	(-)	0.2	192.0	29.4	33.1	18.6	21.0	5.6	11.4	18.1	26.4	18.5	22.3	383.7	-	383.7
MILITARY ASSISTANCE - (Chg. to FM Appropr.).....																
Grants.....	-	-	5.5	4.6	7.8	0.4	0.3	0.6	5.1	2.5	2.3	2.8	4.5	27.2	3.0	24.2
(Additional Grants from Excess Stocks).....	(-)	-	2.8	0.2	7.8	0.4	0.3	0.6	5.1	2.5	2.3	2.8	4.5	34.5	3.0	31.5
OTHER MILITARY ASSISTANCE GRANTS.....	-	-	2.7	(0.1)	(0.1)	(-)	(-)	(0.1)	(1.1)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(1.1)	(3.1)	(-)	(3.1)
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK MILITARY LOANS.....																
TOTAL MILITARY.....	-	-	5.5	4.6	7.8	0.4	0.3	0.6	5.1	2.5	2.3	2.8	4.5	27.2	3.0	24.2
TOTAL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY.....																
Loans.....	-	0.2	248.1	51.8	73.0	44.2	50.5	21.4	60.5	51.6	49.2	49.8	53.1	722.8	44.2	688.6
Grants.....	-	-	53.5	18.0	32.1	25.3	29.2	15.2	44.0	31.0	20.1	28.5	26.3	314.7	44.2	270.5
(Additional Grants from Excess Stocks).....	(-)	0.2	194.7	33.8	40.9	19.0	21.4	6.2	16.5	20.6	29.7	21.4	26.8	418.2	-	418.2

*Less than \$10,000.

APPENDIX K.—CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES WITH NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES

ALGERIA	
	<i>Number of exchanges</i>
Fiscal year 1970 program :	
U.S. professors-----	2
U.S. teachers-----	5
Foreign student renewals-----	2
International visitors-----	11
	<hr/>
Total exchanges-----	20
	<hr/> <hr/>
Fiscal year 1971 program :	
Foreign professors-----	1
U.S. professors-----	3
Foreign teachers-----	5
Foreign student renewals-----	1
International visitors-----	12
	<hr/>
Total exchanges-----	22
	<hr/> <hr/>
Fiscal year 1972 program :	
Foreign professors-----	1
U.S. professors-----	1
Foreign teachers-----	5
Foreign student renewals-----	1
International visitors-----	2
	<hr/>
Total exchanges-----	10
	<hr/> <hr/>
LIBYA	
	<i>Number of exchanges</i>
Fiscal year 1970 program :	
No program-----	
Fiscal year 1971 program :	
No program-----	
Fiscal year 1972 program :	
Short-term American grantees-----	1
International visitors-----	1
	<hr/>
Total exchanges-----	2
	<hr/> <hr/>
MAURITANIA	
	<i>Number of exchanges</i>
Fiscal year 1970 program :	
International visitors-----	2
	<hr/>
Total exchanges-----	1
	<hr/> <hr/>
Fiscal year 1971 program :	
International visitors-----	2
	<hr/>
Total exchanges-----	2
	<hr/> <hr/>
Fiscal year 1972 program :	
International visitors-----	5
	<hr/>
Total exchanges-----	5

¹ Data supplied by Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

MOROCCO

	<i>Number of exchanges</i>
Fiscal year 1970 program :	
U.S. professors	1
Foreign teachers.....	3
Foreign student renewals.....	1
Foreign students.....	1
International visitors.....	18
Total exchanges	24
Fiscal year 1971 program :	
U.S. professors	1
Foreign teachers.....	3
Foreign student renewals.....	1
Foreign students.....	3
International visitors	17
Total exchanges	25
Fiscal year 1972 program :	
U.S. professors	2
Foreign teachers.....	5
Foreign student renewals.....	2
Foreign students.....	3
International visitors	11
Total exchanges	23

SUDAN

	<i>Number of exchanges</i>
Fiscal year 1970 program :	
Foreign student renewals.....	5
International visitors.....	2
Total exchanges.....	7
Fiscal year 1971 program :	
International visitors.....	4
Total exchanges.....	4
Fiscal year 1972 program :	
Short-term American grantees.....	1
Foreign teachers.....	3
Foreign students.....	1
International visitors.....	7
Total exchanges.....	12

TUNISIA

	<i>Number of exchanges</i>
Fiscal year 1970 program :	
Foreign professors.....	1
Foreign students.....	1
International visitors.....	37
Total exchanges.....	39
Fiscal year 1971 program :	
Foreign student renewals.....	1
Foreign students.....	1
International visitors.....	28
Total exchanges.....	30
Fiscal year 1972 program :	
Foreign student renewals.....	1
International visitors.....	37
Total exchanges.....	38

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